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here are three main senses in which the phrase “discourse analy-
sis” is used in literary study today. The first and fundamental sense 
is that of linguistics—the study of units of speech or writing above the 
level of the sentence. alternatively, some writers characterize linguistic 
discourse analysis as the study of language in use (as Schiffrin, Tannen, 
and hamilton point out in the introduction to their Handbook of Discourse 
Analysis [1]). Though different in emphasis, the two definitions largely 
converge. This fundamental usage encompasses the other two, that is, 
the analysis of narrative discourse and Critical discourse analysis.
Linguistic Discourse Analysis
discourse analysis in the fundamental, linguistic sense has two main 
goals. one is to isolate rules or structures that guide the production and 
reception of speech or writing “beyond the sentence” (Schiffrin, Tan-
nen, and hamilton 1). The second is to interpret particular utterances 
or speech interactions, in part by reference to those rules or structures. 
The two common definitions of linguistic discourse analysis simply stress 
one or the other of these two goals.
 paul Grice’s rules of conversational implicature provide an example. 
Grice influentially argued that, when engaged in conversation, people 
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draw many nonlogical inferences from what the other speakers say. 
These are not illogical inferences. Indeed, they are quite rational. how-
ever, they are not governed by formal principles of inference. rather, 
they are guided by looser principles of cooperation. moreover, as speak-
ers, people rely on these cooperative principles and they expect their 
listeners to draw nonlogical conclusions from what they say. one exam-
ple of this sort of principle is the “maxim of relevance.” people tailor 
their speech, and interpret other people’s speech, as relevant to what 
is currently being discussed. Suppose Jones says, “I haven’t seen doe in 
a while.” Smith replies, “he travels frequently.” Jones is likely to infer 
that, in Smith’s view, doe is away on some sort of travel. however, that 
is not a strict logical implication of the statement, or of the conjunction 
of statements. It may be true that Jones has not seen doe in a while, that 
doe travels frequently, and that Smith knows doe is in the local hospi-
tal. Smith may in principle have merely said something true that hap-
pened to occur to him—as he might have said, “The almanac predicts a 
wet summer.” Jones tacitly assumes Smith did not do this, but observed 
the maxim of relevance and made a comment with bearing on the topic 
introduced by Jones.
 discourse analysts commonly distinguish types of discourse. They 
may then look for the same general kinds of pattern in these various 
types, while at the same time examining how those general kinds are 
manifest differently. one general kind of pattern is coherence—what 
makes a particular unit of discourse unified. Grice’s principles of con-
versational implicature are in part a case of this. Grice focuses on a 
particular type of discourse, conversation. he then asks what makes a 
conversation cohere. The maxim of relevance is one part of the structure 
of coherence of conversational discourse.
 other recurring concerns in this “nomological” aspect of discourse 
are nicely illustrated by studies of politeness. Work on politeness 
addresses such issues as who can speak, when they can speak, what sort 
of vocabulary they can use, how they address others, and so forth. for 
example, it is generally impolite in contemporary american society for a 
high school student to address his or her teacher by first name, though 
the reverse is not impolite. This reference to “contemporary american 
society” indicates that nomological aspects of discourse analysis may be 
bound to particular cultures. They may also be cross-cultural. presum-
ably some principles along the lines of Grice’s maxims are cross-cultural 
(see Stephen levinson). moreover, in the etiquette of address, a wide 
range of societies restrict forms of address based on social hierarchies. 
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however, that restriction need not take precisely the same form as it 
does in the United States today.
 one type of discourse that is of interest to linguistic and related dis-
course analysts is narrative or storytelling.1 as the first chapter will dis-
cuss, discourse analysts have taken considerable interest in narratives. 
These range from the daily anecdotes people share with friends, to peo-
ple’s description of symptoms for doctors, to the official summary of a 
department meeting, to literary works such as Abhijñānaśākuntalam, The 
Odyssey, or War and Peace. In order to make their subject matter more 
tractable, narrative discourse analysts often focus on subsets of narra-
tive—such as patient narratives to their physicians or personal anecdotes 
in a particular group (see, for example, mildorf). literary critics and 
theorists who take up linguistic discourse analysis are unlikely to focus 
on anecdotes and related personal stories that are immediately func-
tional in a pragmatic context and are recounted only a limited number 
of times within a small circle of acquaintances. Instead, they tend to be 
concerned with narratives that have had widespread emotional impact 
for a broad range of people. In other words, literary critics engaged in 
discourse analysis tend to be interested in verbal arts.
 but there are two important qualifications here. first, some narra-
tive discourse analysts may teach in literature departments, but may be 
more concerned with, say, patient stories about their symptoms than 
with Shakespeare. one might say that they are doing discourse analysis 
of cultural narratives, rather than literary narratives proper. of course, 
to say that patient histories are not works of verbal art is not to say that 
there are no features of verbal art in those histories. There are. Indeed, 
that leads to the second important qualification. many of the fundamen-
tal issues that concern discourse analysts of literary narrative are also 
issues in nonliterary narrative. Though it is important to distinguish the 
principles governing different types of narrative, it is also valuable to 
consider what all narratives have in common and what rules summarize 
those commonalities.
 as already noted, discourse analysts often take up topics that recur 
across discourse types. These topics include the following: What makes 
a discourse cohere? Who is allowed to speak, when, to whom, and how? 
What sorts of vocabulary, what levels of diction, what forms of address 
are allowed? What information has to be filled in explicitly and what can 
be left for inference? and so on. In the case of narrative discourse, coher-
ence is in part a matter of story structure. Thus it is in part resolved 
into subquestions, such as the following: What constitutes a story? When 
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does a story begin? When does a story end? What are the genres of 
stories? 
 one of the most obvious recurring questions for narrative discourse 
analysis would include Who speaks? Why does he or she do so? Who listens? 
Why do they listen? These questions appear particularly pressing in ver-
bal art, thus when the story is told not for pragmatic reasons, but for 
its intrinsic interest. This is perhaps clearest in conversational storytell-
ing. as, for example, liang Tao notes, the “organization of conversation 
is a turn-taking system” (see also Kitzinger). but telling a story violates 
the usual pattern of turn-taking. Thus it violates basic principles of who 
can speak for how long. That is fine, as long as the violation is justified. 
as William labov put it, this is permissible so long as one “justifies the 
delivery of the narrative and the claim on social attention” by recount-
ing something that is “tellable” (547). Tellability derives primarily from 
the emotional force (excitement, humor, suspense, etc.) of the narrative. 
In part this is a function of the story itself. but it is also a function of 
just how the story is told. Thus it concerns not only what information is 
given, but how much is given, when it is given, and how it is phrased.
Narrative Discourse Analysis
This leads to the second use of the phrase “discourse analysis”—the study 
of narrative discourse. In the theoretical study of narrative—that is, nar-
ratology—“discourse” is commonly used to refer to a subset of the con-
cerns found in the linguistic discourse analysis of narrative. Specifically, 
within narratology, discourse is separated from story. as Shen explains, 
“Story, in simplest terms, is what is told whereas discourse refers to ‘how’ 
the story is transmitted” (“Story-discourse” 566). That “how” crucially 
involves questions of who is speaking to whom, what information is con-
veyed, and so forth. To make the relevant distinction clear, one may 
refer to the large linguistic category of all suprasentential speech and 
writing as “linguistic discourse.” In contrast, one may refer to the narra-
tological counterpart of “story” as “narrative discourse.”2
 as the preceding points indicate, narrative discourse involves many 
of the same basic concerns as other forms of discourse. moreover, lit-
erary and nonliterary forms of narrative—forms such as patient his-
tories—have common features of both story formation and narrative 
discourse organization. This is what one would expect from a cognitive 
perspective. people generate stories using the same cognitive architec-
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ture whether they are in a doctor’s office or a creative writing class. on 
the other hand, one would also expect that the cognitive processes at 
issue could be elaborated, embedded, integrated, varied, and otherwise 
rendered more complex in a heavily revised 500-page novel than in a 
spontaneous 500-word outline of one’s shoulder problem.
 Students of literature who have been reading to this point may won-
der about something that has been left out of this discussion. most lit-
erary critics spend most of their time talking about individual works. 
Sometimes they are concerned about, for example, genre patterns. but, 
on the whole, their interests tend much more toward the particularity 
of individual novels, plays, or poems, than toward what novels, plays, 
or poems have in common (not to mind what they share with medical 
complaints).
 It was noted at the outset that linguistic discourse analysis has two 
main goals. one is, again, the isolation of broad patterns or, roughly, 
rules. The second is just what one would expect from the preoccupations 
of literary critics—the understanding of discursive particularity. If the 
former is, roughly, nomological, the latter is, roughly, hermeneutic. lit-
erary study is, then, fully in keeping with linguistic discourse analysis in 
this respect. They both have two primary descriptive concerns.
 It is perhaps less widely recognized by literary critics, however, that 
these two concerns are interrelated. first, interpretation contributes to 
rule-based explanation. here it is useful to return to the example of con-
versational implicature. Jones says, “I haven’t seen doe in weeks,” and 
Smith says, “he travels a lot.” In and of itself, the conversation cannot 
contribute to the isolation of rules. rather, rules explain the conversa-
tion under an interpretation. a discourse analyst interprets Smith as sug-
gesting that doe is away on a trip and that this is the reason Jones has 
not seen him. It is by way of this interpretation that a discourse analyst 
will take the conversation to instantiate the maxim of relevance.
 The nomological part of discourse analysis also contributes to the 
interpretive part. This may not be obvious in cases such as conversation. 
That is because people have interiorized the rules of conversation and 
follow them automatically. In other cases, however, interpretive infer-
ences may be guided and enhanced by the explicit formulation of pat-
terns. Indeed, narrative—including literary narrative—provides striking 
cases of this.
 To illustrate the point, it is useful to return to labov. In an influ-
ential study treating inner-city oral narratives of personal experience, 
labov isolated the following structure: abstract, orientation, compli-
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cating action, evaluation, resolution, and coda. an abstract is a brief 
summary of what is to follow. The orientation introduces the main char-
acters, locating them in time and place. The complicating action pres-
ents the main events. It creates interest and tension. The evaluation 
involves commentary on the significance of the complicating action. 
The resolution is, of course, the conclusion of the complicating action. 
The coda “puts off any further questions about what happened or why it 
mattered” (as norrick puts it [129]). Specifically, it is “a statement that 
returns the temporal setting to the present” (labov 547). for example, it 
may indicate what happened to the main characters following the cen-
tral action.
 labov isolated the structure using a very narrowly defined corpus 
of stories. nonetheless, it seems clear that the structure is widespread, 
not only in personal anecdotes but in literary works. Consider, for exam-
ple, the operation of abstract and orientation in works of narrative art. 
films and novels often do not require an abstract in the text itself, since 
that is frequently given by reviews, advertisements, or a blurb on the 
back cover. With the leisure of hundreds of pages, the orientation may 
be delayed or spread out, dispersed over thousands or tens of thousands 
of words. on the other hand, the abstract and orientation may be much 
more straightforward also. a film may begin by showing pictures of the 
main characters (e.g., soldiers in a company), giving their names, and 
then presenting a scrolling text that outlines relevant history (e.g., about 
a particular battle in the Second World War).
 This isolation of recurring structural components obviously illus-
trates nomological literary discourse analysis. The crucial point for 
purposes here is that this general pattern has consequences for inter-
pretation. for instance, readers respond differently and make inferences 
differently when a story has an abstract and orientation and when it 
does not. readers may tacitly recognize this. for example, they may have 
a vague sense of disorientation, or they may have a feeling of camarade-
rie with the speaker, who seems to be presupposing shared knowledge. 
In either case, the explicit (nomological) isolation of a recurring pattern 
helps critics to explore the implications of what otherwise would, in all 
likelihood, be an inarticulate feeling.
 Consider, for example, ernest hemingway’s “a very Short Story.”3 It 
entirely lacks an abstract. It begins by, in effect, teasing the reader with 
the hints of an orientation. “one hot evening” has the effect of “once 
upon a time.” It sets out an arbitrary starting point. The geographical 
location “in padua” could very easily lead one to expect a straightfor-
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ward orientation—for example, “one hot evening in padua, rock Good-
fellow, a lieutenant in the U.S. marines, was seated on the roof of the 
military hospital with three other wounded, but recovering soldiers, and 
a nurse, luzia dellamore.” but, in fact, the orientation breaks off after 
“padua.” rather than being given any of this information, the reader is 
told simply that “they carried him up onto the roof.” The reader does 
not know what the building is, who he is, why he is being carried. Subse-
quently, luz is mentioned as if the reader already knows who she is.
 had there been an abstract, readers probably would have been led to 
expect something like a love story. Though war is obviously important in 
the narrative, the focus is on the couple and their desire to be married. 
The complicating action here would be anything preventing their mar-
riage. There are, in effect, three complicating events—first, they are sep-
arated by his return to the front (their lack of documents and time for 
marriage are part of this complex separation); second, they are separated 
by his return to america; finally, they are separated by luz’s affair with 
the Italian major. This tripling of complications is obviously a recurring 
technique, though it is not part of labov’s model. The first and second 
complications are in principle temporary. The third leads to the resolu-
tion, since it determines that they will never be married. There is a brief 
evaluation just before this resolution. In recounting a story of a narrow 
escape from a vicious beast, an oral storyteller might stress the danger 
by saying something like “It was the biggest, meanest-looking dog I ever 
saw.” along the same lines, hemingway has the curious evaluative state-
ment “she had never known Italians before,” which, in context, may sug-
gest virility and skill in sexual performance or charm in courtship. The 
final paragraph of the story gives a coda, telling what happened to the 
two characters after the events of the main story.
 recognizing this structure does not lead directly to any interpre-
tive conclusions. however, it does organize the story in such a way as to 
make certain aspects of the work salient, and thus important for inter-
pretation. first, the lack of orientation makes both characters somewhat 
anonymous. The reader never has a sense of just how well they know one 
another and, indeed, may suspect that they do not know one another 
much better than the reader knows them. They are brought together by 
circumstances in a context where they would feel lonely and vulnerable. 
This is likely to provoke feelings of emotional dependency. The reader 
sees the same scenario two other times in the story. first, there is the 
relationship of luz and the major. Clearly, luz does not know the major 
well enough to realize that he will not marry her. She was drawn to him 
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in part because the place was “lonely and rainy” during winter. Simi-
larly, the soldier does not know the salesgirl well enough to have any 
sense that she might have a venereal disease. It is as if the characters too 
suffer from a lack of orienting introduction to each other.
 The lack of an abstract has similar resonances. luz herself indicates 
that she expects to be married “absolutely unexpectedly.” my students 
at least find the sudden introduction of gonorrhea at the end of the 
story to be so unexpected as to constitute a shock. The reader’s lack of 
a sense of what will happen is paralleled by that of the characters. The 
point is clearer if one imagines a similar story by a religious moralist, 
entitled, say, “The Wages of Sin,” or an abstract that made reference to 
how men and women learn the wickedness of fornication only through 
pain.
 We might extend these interpretive points further. perhaps the story 
suggests that these particular people did not know one another well. but 
it may also suggest that this lack of knowledge, with its false certainty 
and dubious expectations, is an inevitable condition of human relations. 
It may suggest that, to put it somewhat crudely, abstracts and orienta-
tions are part of stories, but not part of life. perhaps when the soldier 
and luz were together on the roof, alone, they were really as much of 
a mystery to one another as they were to readers—even though they 
believed that they understood one another and were beginning to have a 
clear sense of the future.
 finally, there is the evaluation. again, the story would have quite 
a different impact if it began by suggesting that the abomination of 
unchastity leads to Godly retribution. This could be part of an abstract. 
but it would also clearly have an evaluative function. It is important that 
there is no culminating, moral evaluation in the story, nothing to make 
this pathetic series of events sensible. That is in keeping with its location 
in the miserable, pointless first World War. The story does not have any 
place for a divine plan or other context that gives the pain of these indi-
viduals any redeeming value.
 at the same time, it does have one hint of evaluation—the peculiar 
ethnic comment about Italians. depending on how one interprets it, one 
may find this comment objectionable. my guess is that readers will be 
more inclined to find it objectionable to the degree that they interpret it 
as referring specifically to sexual skill (and, perhaps even more, to physi-
cal endowments). In other words, I imagine that most readers would 
find it less objectionable to the degree that they interpret it as a mat-
ter of cultural practices relating to courtship. There is also the issue of 
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the degree to which they attribute the belief to hemingway, as opposed 
to one or both of the characters. In any case, these interpretive points 
become more salient by reference to the nomological structure isolated 
by labov.
The Politics of Narration: Critical Discourse Analysis
The comment about Italians in hemingway’s story points to a further 
aspect of literary study. for literary critics, one set of recurring and 
important concerns is normative. Critics care not only about what a 
work means but also about what it does. Indeed, a great deal of the pre-
ceding discussion concerns what effects hemingway’s lack of an orienta-
tion, abstract, and overall evaluation, is likely to have on readers. That 
examination of effects is sometimes explored purely descriptively (as 
in certain sorts of empirical reader-response study). but it is probably 
more often considered evaluatively, in systematic judgments that go 
well beyond the sorts of internal comments isolated by labov. In other 
words, literary critics are frequently concerned with specific sorts of lit-
erary effects. These effects tend to fall into two large categories—ethico-
political, on the one hand, and aesthetic, on the other. ethico-political 
effects would include, for example, the tendency of a story to foster eth-
nic stereotyping. The comment about Italians might prompt concerns 
of this sort. aesthetic effects address the emotional consequences of a 
work—for example, the effect of eliminating the orientation on a read-
er’s engagement with the story. If well done, the absence of orientation 
could enhance curiosity (as Sternberg would put it). however, if done 
badly, it could simply confuse the reader.
 The reference to ethico-political evaluation leads to the final use 
of the phrase “discourse analysis.” again, narrative discourse analysis 
focuses on a particular type of discourse within the larger field of lin-
guistic discourse analysis. What is called “Critical discourse analysis,” in 
contrast, focuses on a particular function of discourse—its consequences 
for political and social structures, specifically those that have an ethical 
component and are therefore open to ethical evaluation.
 Since most Critical discourse analysts would probably not character-
ize their approach in terms of ethics, it is worth elaborating on the point. 
a wide range of political and social practices—for example, driving on 
the right or left side of the road—are ethically neutral. Critical discourse 
analysts are not usually interested in the effects of discourse on these 
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practices. They are, rather, interested in the ways in which discourse has 
an impact on, say, ethnic or sexual minorities or the prosecution of wars. 
here, too, they are not concerned primarily with technical matters (e.g., 
which terrain is more advantageous for the government’s campaign). 
rather, they tend to be concerned with the ethical valence of the vari-
ous policies. of course, not everyone would identify ethical concerns in 
the same way. as a rough approximation, one might say that Critical dis-
course analysts are concerned with the ways in which discourses operate 
to produce or sustain unmerited hierarchies in the distribution of goods 
and services in society.
 Critical discourse analysis is, of course, attentive to individual works. 
Indeed, it prominently features the interpretation of individual works. 
however, it locates that interpretation within a larger, roughly nomolog-
ical context. Thus, in keeping with discourse analysis generally, Critical 
discourse analysts are concerned with, for example, the rules govern-
ing who can speak about what, when they can do so, and how. however, 
they are concerned about this in a particular manner. They pay close 
attention to the ways in which constraints on who can speak are simul-
taneously ways in which power is established or exercised; the degree to 
which what one can say serves to constrain how one thinks—or does not 
think—about alternative social structures, particularly structures that 
would alter relations of power; the manner in which forms of address 
and the practical consequences of address (e.g., in commands or appeals) 
orient action in politically consequential ways. In connection with this, 
drawing particularly on the work of michel foucault, Critical discourse 
analysts tend to be concerned with the ways in which discourse is insti-
tutionally situated. Thus they may attend to the power relations of a 
particular institutional structure (e.g., a hospital), exploring how such 
power relations are intertwined with discursive relations (e.g., those 
defined by the discourse of medicine).
 here, too, the general theory has interpretive consequences. for 
example, when one approaches hemingway’s story from this perspective, 
one immediately sees that the relations of lovers, including their discur-
sive interrelation, is mediated by institutions. first the hospital, then 
the church, then the army constrain what they can say to one another, 
when they can speak, how they can communicate, and what effects that 
communication can have. The late delivery of all luz’s letters, after the 
armistice, is a striking case, as are the restrictions preventing their pro-
fession of wedding vows. Clearly, all these cases are inseparable from 
relations of authority and power.
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Discourse Analysis and Narrative Art
It should be clear that these three senses of discourse are different, but 
also related. linguistic discourse analysis provides the general context 
for the other two. The analysis of narrative discourse and Critical dis-
course analysis are interrelated as well. hierarchies of power bear on 
storytelling, both in terms of what stories are told and in terms of how 
those stories are shaped in narrative discourse. Conversely, narratives 
themselves regularly concern relations of power, most obviously in their 
represented events or story line, but also in the relations of authority, 
irony, reliability, and knowledge developed in narrative discourse.
 The focus of the present book is on narrative discourse analysis, 
specifically on the analysis of literary and cinematic discourse, and to 
a lesser extent painting. Thus the following chapters will examine such 
topics as the nature of the narrator and the function of the implied 
author. however, this exploration of literary narrative discourse will 
take place largely within the broader field of linguistic discourse analy-
sis.4 Indeed, the discussion will assume the continuity between literary 
narrative and other forms of narrative production and reception. more 
generally, it will follow the presumption of linguistic discourse analy-
sis—as well as cognitive science—that the cognitive processes at work in 
the production and reception of literary narrative are not and, indeed, 
cannot be fundamentally different from the cognitive processes at work 
in the production and reception of other, more ordinary and ephemeral 
forms of narrative discourse. literary narrative may involve unusually 
complex interrelations of such processes, or distinctive forms of inter-
action and elaboration. but the cognitive structures at issue and the 
operations in which they engage are necessarily of the same sort. for 
this reason, the effort of the following pages will always be to explain 
the principles of narrative discourse in terms of a well-established 
cognitive architecture. Ideally, this will involve refining knowledge of 
narrative principles by reference to cognitive architecture and expand-
ing comprehension of cognitive architecture by reference to narrative 
principles.
 more exactly, the first goal of the following chapters is to isolate 
some of the unrecognized principles governing narrative discourse—
for example, with respect to the embedding of narrators or concerning 
the isolation of points at which narration is unreliable. In the last fifty 
years, narratology has advanced enormously, isolating important pat-
terns in stories and in narrative discourse. but that hardly means that 
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the research is complete. my hope is that the following pages advance 
nomological understanding of literary narrative discourse.
 a second goal is to explore the ways in which this nomological part 
has interpretive consequences. Thus each chapter includes not only gen-
eral theoretical discussion but also practical interpretations. Indeed, my 
hope is to show in each case that the hermeneutic and nomological anal-
yses contribute valuably to one another.
 The book has a third goal as well, though considerations of length 
have prevented its full development in the following chapters. This 
goal is to suggest how a nomological understanding of discourse and 
discourse-based interpretations of particular works may connect with 
ethico-political concerns of the sort treated by Critical discourse ana-
lysts. In part for this reason, most of the works examined in the follow-
ing pages are directly political.
 probably the main way in which literary narrative bears on politi-
cal thought and action is not abstractly conceptual, but concretely moti-
vational. It is a matter of emotion. This leads to one of the main ways 
in which the approach to narrative discourse in the present book dif-
fers from that of most linguistic discourse analysts and Critical discourse 
analysis. In the following chapters, recent research on emotion is of par-
ticular importance. Indeed, the accounts of the narrator, implied author, 
and other aspects of narrative discourse make repeated reference to 
emotion. This is not to say that no one has treated emotion and narra-
tive. narrative theorists have been interested in emotion since aristo-
tle. moreover, topics such as empathy have been central in some recent 
discussions of literature (see, for example, Keen’s very valuable book on 
the subject). however, there has been relatively little work drawing on 
recent emotion research to examine topics that are not in themselves 
straightforwardly emotional (such as empathy). despite this, one may 
argue that emotional processes are ubiquitous both in story construction 
(governing the organization of cross-culturally recurring genres5) and in 
the operation of discourse. This is not to say that narrative discourse is 
entirely a matter of emotion. as will be discussed in the first chapter, the 
composition and reception of literary narratives involve complex pro-
cesses that are only in part affective. but that affective part is crucial, 
for it governs the motivations of authors and readers, as well as narra-
tors, narratees, and characters, and the relations among these (e.g., the 
reader’s relation to the narrator). Indeed, it even guides perception and 
more seemingly abstract inferences. It would be going too far to label 
the methodology of this book “affective discourse analysis.” however, 
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the following chapters do aim to show the great importance of emotion 
research for all forms of discourse analysis.
Overview of the Following Chapters
The first chapter begins by outlining the main components of narrative 
discourse as these are commonly understood today—the real author, the 
implied author, the narrator, and so on. The chapter then takes these 
components in turn, focusing primarily on who speaks and who is spo-
ken to. It reformulates the relation between the author and the implied 
author, seeking to resolve some problems that have arisen with respect 
to this division. Specifically, the chapter distinguishes different varieties 
of authorial intent, stressing the importance of receptive and implicit 
intent. In connection with this, drawing on work in cognitive science, 
it develops an account of cognitive processing that bears directly on 
implied authorship and literary interpretation. The chapter goes on to 
distinguish varieties of narrator, to argue for the centrality of emotion in 
understanding focalization (roughly, the restriction of third-person nar-
ration to a character), to consider the ways in which the implied reader 
is as much a motivational (thus emotional) structure as a cognitive one, 
and to examine the role of the critic in relation to real readers. In order 
to illustrate these points, the chapter turns repeatedly to “a very Short 
Story.”
 The second chapter takes up the idea of the implied author more 
systematically. following the general account from the first chapter, 
it considers the degree to which the notion of an implied author may 
be applied to painting. It takes as a starting point some enigmas in two 
paintings by rabindranath Tagore. It goes on to argue that these enigmas 
are open to partial resolution by drawing on principles and ideas from a 
range of Tagore’s works. This suggests that, beyond the implied author 
or implied painter of a particular work, one is well advised to consider 
the implied author or painter across a series or canon of works—indeed, 
the implied creator, when the canon spans different types of work (such 
as literature and painting). This “cross-textual implied creator” does not 
substitute for the implied author of an individual work. however, it pro-
vides one important context for interpreting that implied author and 
that individual work. moreover, it does not render the work unequivo-
cal. rather, like any other context, this one alters the profile of ambiguity 
of the work—the range of interpretations the work sustains and the dif-
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ferent degrees to which it sustains them. In some cases this context may 
even enhance rather than reduce ambiguity.
 Indeed, the importance of ambiguity is one of the main reasons that I 
chose to treat painting in the book, particularly in the context of a study 
grounded in cognitive and affective science. In his book Inner Vision: An 
Exploration of Art and the Brain, the prominent neuroscientist of art Semir 
Zeki has a brilliant discussion of vermeer. his focus in that discussion 
is on the way in which the impact of vermeer’s paintings results from 
their ambiguity. Though Zeki does not put it this way, the ambiguity he 
is discussing concerns precisely the narrative implied by the necessar-
ily isolated moment depicted in the painting. The ambiguity of visual 
art is significant in itself. It is also significant in its implications for the 
cross-textual interpretation of a creator’s work. as discussed in the sec-
ond chapter, Tagore in effect enhances the ambiguity of his paintings by 
not giving them titles, largely avoiding standard iconography and other 
factors. at the same time, however, these paintings are embedded in an 
extensive authorial canon, including more readily interpretable verbal 
narratives. These factors make Tagore’s paintings particularly suitable 
for an examination of cross-textual implied authorship and ambiguity. 
In addition, those paintings, while highly regarded, have received very 
little interpretive attention.
 The idea of cross-textual implied authorship is related to a concept 
that has been important in film studies—that of the auteur or autho-
rial force behind a set of films. The second part of this chapter concerns 
the difficulties of extending the idea of implied authorship to cinema. 
despite auteurist theory, film poses a challenge for any account of 
implied authorship, due to the diversity of creative input that results in 
a film. after treating this issue theoretically, the chapter turns to a con-
crete case—the great Indian filmmaker bimal roy. The chapter explores 
some recurring techniques in roy’s work and their development in his 
1958 film, Madhumati.
 The third chapter goes in the opposite direction from the second. 
rather than addressing larger units of understanding and interpreta-
tion, it considers smaller units. Specifically, drawing on cognitive and 
emotional research, it argues that one may distinguish the overarching 
implied author as an explanatory principle that gives the work a degree 
of coherence. however, the same cognitive and emotional research sug-
gests that this broad coherence will not be maintained with perfect con-
sistency. rather, one would expect there to be local variations, not only 
in narration but in implied authorship as well. These local variants or 
“implicated authors” may derive from different, context-sensitive mod-
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els or associations and may have very different, even directly contradic-
tory emotional and thematic consequences. The chapter explores this 
idea in harriet beecher Stowe’s controversial Uncle Tom’s Cabin, arguing 
that the different political interpretations of the novel reflect some of 
the diversity in implicated authorship.
 The chapter ends by returning to implied authorship in cinema. It 
considers different sorts of implied authorial inconsistency in film, 
focusing in particular on the creation of multiple implied audiences 
and the way implied authors may implicitly misdirect members of one 
implied audience. The chapter goes on to distinguish different types of 
cinematic narrator and their relation to implied and implicated authors. 
It concludes by discussing an extreme example of potential authorial 
incoherence—Kabir Khan’s film New York, in which the status of the 
entire conclusion of the film is questionable.
 The discussion of Khan’s film leads to the issue of narrator unreli-
ability, which is taken up in chapter 4. This chapter distinguishes three 
levels at which readers respond to the problem of narrator reliability. 
The most basic level is largely emotional and a matter of trusting or not 
trusting the narrator. The intermediate level is triggered by distrust at 
the basic level. This intermediate level involves the application of heu-
ristic cognitive structures that serve to guide the adjudication of infor-
mation supplied by the narrator. at the most abstract level, the reader 
engages in a highly effortful elaboration of the evidence for or against 
particular conclusions regarding the story as it may be inferred from the 
unreliable narration. To explore and illustrate these considerations, the 
chapter takes up margaret atwood’s novel Surfacing. This novel is told in 
the voice of a character who repeatedly misunderstands her own mem-
ories, confusing and misattributing them, and who, in connection with 
an (apparently) incipient emotional collapse, comes to remember having 
had an abortion.
 The fifth and sixth chapters consider cases of multiple narration. 
atwood’s novel has a single, individual narrator. however, many works 
have parallel narrators (the topic of chapter 5) or embedded or group 
narrators (the topics of chapter 6). parallel narrators are individual or 
group narrators who do not embed one another. an embedded narra-
tor is simply a narrator whose telling of a story is included in the story 
told by another narrator. a group narrator is a collective rather than an 
individual. 
 Works with parallel personified narrators are fairly common.6 These 
narrators usually offer different, and sometimes incompatible, accounts 
of the storyworld. even when they agree on the storyworld, the emo-
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tional or thematic implications of their versions may differ. one task of 
interpretation involves evaluating these variations. In order to consider 
some aspects of that process, this chapter takes up William faulkner’s 
The Sound and the Fury. Unlike parallel personified narration, parallel 
nonpersonified narration is rare. Though the interpretation of parallel 
personified narration is complex, it is a process directly comparable to 
the interpretation of single narration, treating for example some of the 
same issues regarding reliability in much the same way. however, paral-
lel nonpersonified narration is far more difficult. as a result, it tends to 
be far more equivocal than other types of work, in terms of theme, emo-
tion, and even story. Indeed, it is difficult to interpret such narration 
without reconstruing one or both of the parallel narrators as personi-
fied. The point is illustrated by david lynch’s Mulholland Drive.
 The final chapter turns, first, to the embedding of narrators. It 
also takes up associated topics in focalization. Thus the chapter con-
siders what sorts of narrator may appear at what level of embedding, 
how an embedded narrator’s or focalizer’s knowledge or perspective 
may be altered by the embedding narrator, and related issues. In order 
to explore these topics, the chapter turns to Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o’s Petals 
of Blood, a national allegory of independent Kenya told in the form of a 
detective story and framed, in part, as a written testimony.
 Some of the narrational complexity in Ngũgĩ’s novel derives from the 
way it treats group experience and expression. The discussion of Petals of 
Blood leads to an outline of several types of group narration. This intro-
duces a final issue of narrative multiplicity—the relation among nar-
rating and narrated consciousnesses. In order to explore this topic, the 
chapter examines Born of the Son by Joseph diescho (with Celeste Wallin), 
a novel about the developing political consciousness of a rural namibian 
man who goes to work in the South african mines during the apartheid 
period.7 diescho (with Wallin) is careful in limiting the narrator’s access 
to the consciousnesses of characters other than the protagonist. how-
ever, there are moments when the focalization of the novel, with its lim-
ited access to other minds, is violated. This often produces a focalization 
equivalent of group narration—group focalization. The moments have 
an isolable pattern that is related to both the thematic point and the 
emotional force of the novel. as a result, the novel suggests a more fine-
grained “access hierarchy” for a narrator’s knowledge about character 
minds, leading beyond the traditional limited/omniscient division.
 The final chapter is followed by a very brief afterword. Chapter 1 
outlines both the “productive” and “receptive” elements of discourse—
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thus implied authors and narrators (the productive elements), on the 
one hand, and implied readers and narratees (the receptive elements), 
on the other. as should be clear from the preceding outline, the remain-
ing chapters cover a range of issues bearing on the productive elements, 
separately and in relation to one another. broadly speaking, chapters 2 
and 3 focus on implied authors; chapters 5 and 6 focus on narrators; and 
chapter 4, on reliability, examines a key aspect of the relation between 
the two. Thus the receptive part of narration is largely bypassed in the 
book. The purpose of the afterword is to suggest that the receptive part 
is highly complex and does not simply mirror the productive part, as 
one might initially imagine. Through an examination of a poem by the 
important Indian poet Mīrābāī (early sixteenth century), the afterword 
seeks to point out some of what differentiates the analysis of narratees 
and implied readers from the analysis of narrators and implied authors. 
It thereby points toward future work in discourse analysis.
Discourse, Interpretation, and the Purposes of 
Fictional Narrative
before turning to the overview of discourse, it is important to set out 
two sets of presuppositions that underlie much of the following analysis. 
The first set concerns the purposes readers have in approaching works of 
art—principally, fictional narratives. These purposes guide what critics 
do with narratological principles, including how they use them for inter-
pretation. They also guide how real authors understand and respond to 
their creations. The second set of presuppositions concerns the nature of 
interpretation and meaning in literary works, specifically the ambiguity 
of such works.
 as to the purposes of reading, one may say that, first, and most fun-
damentally, for any representation, readers (as well as audience mem-
bers for films, viewers of representational paintings, and so on) are 
concerned with what is represented. In standard narratological terms, 
readers wish to reconstruct the story. one may borrow a term from her-
meneutic theory and refer to this as “understanding.” The most obvious 
function of discourse is to enable—but also to selectively constrain—
understanding of the story.
 both the enabling and selective inhibition relate to the second con-
cern that drives representative art. That is emotion. here, one may dis-
tinguish the emotions of the story from the emotions of the discourse. 
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emotions of the story involve such things as readers’ empathy with char-
acters’ suffering. There are different types of discourse emotions. The 
most obvious discourse emotions, such as suspense, relate to plot. (plot 
is the manifestation of story in discourse. This includes what the reader 
is told when—for example, if the identity of a murderer is revealed early 
or withheld until the end.) but there are discourse emotions, such as 
trust in a narrator’s reliability, that relate to narration as well. (narra-
tion, in this context, is the part of discourse bearing on who speaks to 
whom.) The experience of emotions in relation to story or discourse is 
“response.” The examination of such emotions is “response analysis.” 
Such analysis may focus on real readers or on the normative implied 
reader (a concept examined in chapter 1). The following pages are con-
cerned almost entirely with the latter.
 The final concern driving readers’ engagement with a representa-
tional work may be called “theme.” Theme is, roughly, any norm—partic-
ularly an ethical or political norm—that carries over from the narrative 
to the real world. people tend to think of themes as sentence-length 
statements. however, the establishment of a character as an ideal or the 
development of a complex criticism of patriarchal society counts as a 
theme in this sense, even though it would be impossible to encompass in 
a single sentence. Taking up another term from hermeneutic theory, but 
somewhat changing its definition, one may use “explication” to refer to 
inferences concerning the themes of a work.
 Given this account of understanding, response analysis, and explica-
tion, one may give a technical definition of “interpretation.” Interpreta-
tion is any inference regarding a feature of a narrative that contributes 
to understanding, response, or explication. Conversely, one may con-
sider any isolable feature of a narrative to be interpretable insofar as it 
falls into one of the following categories: 1) elements with consequences 
for the reconstruction of the story, 2) elements with emotional conse-
quences (for story, plot, or narration), or 3) elements with thematic con-
sequences. Insofar as a feature does not fall into one of these categories, 
one may say that it has not been selected by the implied author, but 
occurs incidentally. (for example, verbal stress patterns may be selected 
for aesthetic reasons by poets, but such features are unlikely to be rel-
evant in a work of prose fiction.)
 a main focus of the following pages is the relation between narra-
tive discourse analysis and interpretation—specifically, how one relies 
on aspects of discourse to infer the storyworld, the implied authorial 
themes, and the normative emotions of the work.8 This leads to two 
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important issues. first, there is the nature of interpretive standards. 
That will be addressed in connection with the implied author in chapter 
1. Second, there is the related issue of interpretive multiplicity or the 
ambiguity of literary works. It is important to say a few words about this 
before going on.
 There seems to be widespread agreement that interpretation should 
not be seen as entirely constrained nor as entirely free, but as “limited” 
(as, for example, Umberto eco put it). The point is reasonable, but exces-
sively vague. In order to overcome this vagueness, one might conceive of 
interpretation on the model of a mathematical function. along the x-axis 
there are different possible interpretations—representational, thematic, 
or emotive. along the y-axis there is the plausibility of any given inter-
pretation. The most likely interpretations are those with the highest 
value on the y-axis; the least likely interpretations are those with the 
lowest value on the y-axis. an absolutely unequivocal utterance would 
be a single point at 100 (or whatever number is used to mark certainty). 
There would be no line because the likelihood of all other interpreta-
tions would be zero. In contrast, an absolutely ambiguous utterance 
would be graphed with a single horizontal line very close to the x-axis. 
This is because all interpretations would be equally likely, which is to 
say, they would all have a nearly (but not quite) zero likelihood.
 Suppose I get out a pack of gum, take a piece, and then turn to my 
wife and say, “Want a piece of gum?” one might say that the ambiguity 
function for this utterance is pretty close to a single point. In contrast, 
suppose I deliver a lecture on narratology in a place where many audi-
ence members’ grasp of english is not firm. after the talk, I imprudently 
ask someone, “Well, what did you think?” he replies “hmm” and nods. 
his response is highly ambiguous—indeed, virtually a flat line.
 When people talk about interpretation and meaning, they often 
appear to be looking for a simple point ambiguity function, like that 
found in the offer of gum. In other words, they seem to underestimate 
ambiguity. When people criticize the idea of validity in interpretation, 
they appear to overestimate ambiguity; they seem to act as if the ambi-
guity function is a flat horizontal line, as if literary works were like the 
“hmm” from my imaginary audience member. In fact, neither is true. for 
any work, there is always a range of possible interpretations—a profile of 
ambiguity.9 What differs from work to work is the gradient of plausibility. 
Some works present fairly steep and relatively narrow curves. In other 
words, the number of plausible interpretations is limited and sharply 
distinct from surrounding possibilities. This occurs, for example, when 
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it is not clear whether a work is ironic or not. one curve represents the 
straight interpretation; another represents the ironic interpretation. We 
might refer to works of this sort as having discrete ambiguity. other works 
present much more gradual slopes, such that there is a wider range of 
plausible interpretation and a much less sharp distinction between more 
and less plausible alternatives. We might refer to the ambiguity of such 
works as relatively continuous.
 most often, when interpreting a work, critics are interested in isolat-
ing what they take to be the best supported meaning. This is certainly 
a legitimate, indeed important project. however, another interpretive 
task is outlining the work’s profile of ambiguity. The following analyses 
will be concerned with both tasks, specifically as they are bound up with 
discourse.
arrative appears in a range of contexts and forms. In many 
cases, stories are told only once or twice because they concern 
events of interest to the speaker and perhaps the addressee, but to rela-
tively few people beyond that. In other cases, stories may have greater 
general appeal and may be repeated by a range of tellers to a range of 
addressees because of their humor, pathos, or other engaging qualities. 
narratives of verbal art are, prototypically, works that are widely dis-
seminated beyond their initial teller and his or her associates to a broad 
and various audience. In keeping with this, they are recounted for their 
emotional and thematic impact, not for their direct relevance to some 
current situation. In line with these purposes, a narrative of verbal art 
is likely to have been rehearsed and revised, made more thematically 
nuanced and more emotionally powerful as the author generated and 
evaluated details of the story and ways of telling it. This is particularly 
clear in written narratives or literature (as opposed to orature). as a 
result, both what is told in literary narratives and how it is told tend to 
become increasingly complex. but that complexity is not random. It is 
the product of the human mind and human social interaction. Thus it 
follows the general principles that guide human cognitive processing, 
human emotional response, human interaction, and so on. It is the pur-
pose of the present chapter to outline some basic components of this 
complexity in the case of narrative discourse.
21
Who Is Speaking to Whom
The Communicative discourse of narrative art
Chapter 1
N
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 as already noted, within narratology, “story” refers to the events 
recounted in a narrative, events as they, so to speak, “really” occurred. 
“discourse,” in contrast, refers to the way in which they are told. as Sey-
mour Chatman puts it, “In simple terms, the story is the what in a nar-
rative that is depicted, discourse the how” (Story 19). In david herman’s 
words, it is “the difference between the chronological series of events 
recounted . . . and the manner in which those events are organized in the 
recounting” (Story 214).
 discourse may be divided into two broad categories. The first con-
cerns who speaks to whom. The second concerns what is said. The former 
is sometimes termed “narrational,” but that is somewhat misleading, as 
it may suggest only the operation of narrators and narratees. It is per-
haps better referred to as the “communicative” part of discourse. The 
other part of discourse—thus, what is communicated—is often referred 
to as “plot,” but is perhaps better thought of as the “representational” 
component.1 This and the following chapters are concerned specifically 
with the communicative part of discourse, though of course the two 
parts overlap, and one cannot discuss who speaks to whom in a particu-
lar case without also talking about what is said. In Jakobson’s terms, who 
speaks to whom is a matter of a sender relaying a message to a receiver 
(see 66). but, in narrative discourse, who speaks to whom is somewhat 
more complicated than the division between sender and receiver may 
suggest.
The Basic Components of Narrative Discourse
Though there is certainly disagreement about parts of the structure, nar-
ratologists generally see the communicative part of narrative discourse 
as involving the following basic components:
real author [Implied author [narrator [focalizer [story [embedded 
discourse [embedded story]]]]2 narratee] Implied reader] real reader
 The real author is, of course, the flesh-and-blood person who com-
posed the narrative. The real reader is any given flesh-and-blood person 
who reads the narrative. The real author and the real reader are com-
monly seen as being “outside” the text. This is marked by the fact that 
they are outside the square brackets. Thus the outermost square brack-
ets in some sense mark the bounds of the text, or perhaps more properly 
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the textual world. The implied author and the implied reader are, then, 
commonly understood as part of the textual world (rather than the real 
world) in the sense that they may be inferred (at least primarily) from 
what is given in the text. (The following discussion will complicate and, 
in significant ways, alter this standard characterization.)
 There has been considerable controversy over just what an implied 
author is and whether such a thing exists. Some writers see the implied 
author as just what a reader construes from a text. for example, bal 
writes that “the implied author is the result of the investigations of the 
meaning of a text, and not the source of that meaning” (18). but this 
would seem more appropriately termed an “inferred author,”3 as Chat-
man points out (Coming 77). “Implied” suggests a norm that defines the 
validity or invalidity of readers’ inferences—what bal tacitly presupposes 
when she refers to investigating “the meaning of a text.”
 In keeping with the suggestions of the word “implied,” it is com-
mon to see the implied author as a complex of norms. Thus the implied 
author is often understood as the standard against which one may judge 
the reliability of narrators. but then there is controversy over whether 
those norms are to be understood as “anthropomorphic,” or more accu-
rately whether they are to be understood as tied to a person or as some-
how purely textual. put differently, there is controversy over whether 
linking norms to an author, in whatever form, simply reintroduces an 
intentional fallacy. moreover, if one opts for “tied to a person,” then one 
faces the further problem of distinguishing the implied author from the 
real author. Some writers, such as James phelan, see the implied author 
as “a streamlined version of the real author, an actual or purported sub-
set of the real author’s capacities, traits, attitudes, beliefs, values, and 
other properties” (Living 45). other writers see the implied author as an 
idealized version of the real author (see, for example, dan Shen’s sum-
mary of Xiangjun She’s work [172]).
 The following section will present an argument for a close relation 
between the implied author and the real author. The distinction between 
them will be drawn not in terms of personal traits, but in terms of types 
of intent. a crucial part of that intent is the author’s understanding of 
his or her readership—which leads to the implied reader.
 In any act of communication, the speaker has a certain conception of 
the addressee. Clearly, in literary works with any sort of success, the real 
author does not envision his or her real readers.4 Those readers are nec-
essarily too numerous and diverse. but he or she does tacitly assume that 
the reader will have certain sensitivities, certain capacities, certain sorts 
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of knowledge. at minimum, the author conceives of a reader who will be 
able to follow the story, detect ironies, infer thematic concerns, and so 
forth. put in terms of the model thus far, the author writes for a reader 
who will be able to infer the implied author. Just as the implied author 
is (primarily) an implication of the text, the implied reader is (primar-
ily) an implication of the text. Implied readership is most obviously 
marked by anything that provides evidence for inferring the implied 
author. however, it is also marked by such communicative strategies as 
providing or not providing background information and highlighting or 
not highlighting important points. In, for example, explaining (or not 
explaining) a historical event, a text may suggest something about the 
implied reader and about (the implied author’s) expectations regarding 
that reader’s knowledge.
 The implied reader and the implied author should not be taken as 
defined in all details. The implied author presumably involves a great 
deal of indeterminacy. likewise, real readers may adhere to the norms 
of the implied reader but still maintain considerable leeway in just 
how they understand and respond to a given text. for example, a given 
story may present a narrator as unreliable. Suppose the character is a 
politician who makes certain campaign promises. Suppose he or she is 
defeated in the election so that no one ever finds out exactly what he or 
she would do in office. The implied author may indicate that the reader 
should not simply believe the campaign promises. he or she should 
expect that often the character would not follow through on the prom-
ises if elected. but there may be indeterminacy for the implied author as 
to whether the politician would follow through on any of the promises 
and, if so, which ones. readers may adhere to the norms of the implied 
reader and still disagree among themselves on this issue. Indeed, this is 
one of those points where the difference between the implied author and 
the real author becomes clear as well. Specifically, the real author may 
have an opinion on this issue, which is not necessarily more valid than 
that of any other reader. of course, to say that a particular aspect of the 
implied author/implied reader is indeterminate is not necessarily to say 
that the textual evidence for all alternatives is equal. here, as elsewhere, 
there is a profile of ambiguity.
 The next level of communicative discourse is that of the narrator 
and narratee. The narrator is the voice telling the story. narratologists 
distinguish different sorts of narrator. for example, the narrator may 
be “homodiegetic,” thus part of the story, or “heterodiegetic,” thus not 
part of the story (see abbott “narration” for this and other ways of cat-
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egorizing narrators). The narrator also may be unreliable or reliable 
and, related to this, he or she may be treated with or without irony. 
Irony is commonly understood as a certain sort of discrepancy between 
the implied author and the narrator. a standard example is Jonathan 
Swift’s “a modest proposal.” In that work, the speaker (equivalent to 
the narrator) suggests that the problem of Irish poverty may be solved 
in part by using Irish babies for food. The speaker proposes the idea 
with apparent seriousness. however, based in part on the assumption 
that no english person of the time would seriously advocate cannibal-
ism, and based on the common association of cannibalism with bar-
barism, one infers an attitude different from that of the narrator, an 
attitude that is critical of british policies in Ireland—so critical, indeed, 
as to view those policies as barbaric. That inferred attitude is held by 
the implied author, and it is relative to that implied author that one 
judges the text ironic. one does not need to read any other works by the 
real author (e.g., letters, a diary) to learn that he was not an advocate of 
cannibalism.
 The narrator is, so to speak, on the cusp of the storyworld. 5 as the 
names indicate, the heterodiegetic narrator is just outside the story. The 
homodiegetic narrator is inside the story, or rather inside a story. In this 
way, the narrator may be part of the represented storyworld or not—or 
both, if the narrator appears in a frame story but not in the embedded 
(perhaps main) story.
 The narratee is the addressee counterpart to the narrator, just as the 
real reader is the counterpart of the real author and the implied reader 
is the counterpart of the implied author. on the other hand, there are 
some significant differences among the three. as already noted, the real 
reader is not in fact addressed by the real author, who cannot possibly 
envision even a fraction of his or her readers. moreover, the implied 
reader is perhaps not so much an addressee for the implied author as 
a set of sensitivities that allow accurate construction of the implied 
author, or of the story as guided by the implied author as a norm. In con-
trast, the narratee is the addressee of the narrator. one important role 
of the narratee comes when a homodiegetic narrator tells versions of an 
embedded story to more than one narratee, thereby revealing different 
aspects of the embedded events and of his or her own character through 
differences among the tellings (or between one such telling and informa-
tion about the event gleaned from elsewhere).6 on the other hand, one 
may infer implicit narratees as well. as will be considered in more detail 
below, it is sometimes possible to infer a narratee from the information 
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or attitudes presupposed by a narrator. In this way, the narratee too is 
marginal to the represented story. like the narrator, he or she may be 
represented or only implied by the representation.
 While the narrator and the narratee may be part of the repre-
sented discourse, they are part of the communicative discourse as well. 
This is not precisely the case for the focalizer. The focalizer is located 
more squarely within the storyworld. moreover, the focalizer does not 
directly communicate story representations with anyone. The focalizer 
is still important for discourse and is appropriately studied within dis-
course analysis because the focalizing function is part of the selection 
and organization of information. Specifically, the focalizer is the center 
of consciousness that orients the narrator’s treatment of the storyworld. 
(There may be more than one focalizer, of course. but the same points 
hold for multiple focalization.) for example, the narrator may report 
only the information that bears on the condition of the focalizer. In a 
war, for example, the narrator may leave aside information on the battle 
except insofar as it has an impact on the focalizer (usually the protago-
nist). Going further, the narrator may report information only insofar as 
it is actually available to the focalizer, representing the focalizer’s psy-
chological states, but not those of anyone else.
 We might briefly consider where these components fit within an 
interpretation of hemingway’s “a very Short Story.”7 The real author 
is obviously hemingway. an interpretation focusing on the real author 
would pay attention to the sources of the story in hemingway’s own 
life. It would be a case of biographical criticism. The implied author is 
a bit more complex. Indeed, this case suggests that implied authorship 
may be understood at different levels—a point explored in the follow-
ing chapters. The simplest is at the level of this story alone. but there 
is also at least the level of the book. This possibility is complicated by 
critical disagreement as to whether In Our Time (which includes “a very 
Short Story”) should be considered a collection or something more like a 
novel (see moddelmog for the second view; for discussion, see barloon). 
There are several differences these levels might make. In this story con-
sidered alone, it is difficult to ascertain much of any attitude toward war 
in general or toward the first World War in particular. however, a more 
broadly construed implied author may contextualize the story in such a 
way as to make it less about relations between men and women gener-
ally and more about men and women in wartime. (for example, barloon 
notes that the book “invites a question . . .—to what extent is In Our Time 
about the Great War, or war generally?” [5].)
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 In any case, the narrator here seems very close to the implied author 
(and, indeed, to the real author, as a number of critics have stressed 
[see, for example, Scholes Semiotics 121–26]). on the other hand, there 
are points at which the two are not identical, points at which the reader 
needs to infer an implied authorial view beyond what is stated by the 
narrator. Take, for example, the statement that “they agreed he should 
go home to get a job.” The verb “agree” can mean either “formally 
accept” or “genuinely share the conviction.” after being convicted of 
misconduct, Jones might “agree” to apologize to his opponent, but that 
does not mean that he genuinely shares the conviction that he should 
apologize. Similarly, here, the decision about the soldier returning home 
alone may suggest genuinely shared conviction or formal acceptance 
only. The narrator leaves the phrase ambiguous. Contrast, for example, 
“After some disagreement they agreed to her recommendation that he should 
go home to get a job.” one might begin to construct an implied author 
who understands the phrase in the sense of formal acceptance only, thus 
an implied author whose views go beyond what is stated by the narra-
tor. note that this does not say they contradict the narrator. We often 
think that there is a narrator/implied author difference only in cases of 
contradiction. The point of choosing an example such as this is in part to 
indicate that the differences may be more subtle.
 more strikingly, the subsequent elaboration—“It was understood,” 
and so on—could mean that the two were of one mind on the issue. how-
ever, it could also mean that the dominant partner made it a tacit condi-
tion for the marriage. The reader gets some idea that the implied author 
may have the latter in mind after reading that the restrictions were 
entirely on the soldier, not on luz. The suggestion, then, may be that 
luz made it understood. moreover, the restrictions are very extreme. 
The understanding is, first, that he will not drink. That seems fair and 
prudent. but it is not followed by, say, “and she would try to be brave.” 
rather, it is followed by the rather difficult restriction that he would 
not “see his friends.” Though a bit extreme, it may be plausible in the 
context of giving up alcohol, if his friends were drinking buddies. but 
the extremity of the requirement is indicated by the extension of his 
isolation to include “anyone in the States.” In connection with this, we 
might infer an implied author for whom luz is being overly demanding 
and even somewhat authoritarian (especially given her later behavior). 
Indeed, the exact phrasing of the sentence is even more extreme than 
just indicated. The precise statement is, “It was understood he would not 
drink, and he did not want to see his friends or anyone in the States.” he 
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could hardly want to condemn himself to solitary confinement. but the 
“understanding” goes so far as to govern not only his behavior, but even 
his emotional attitudes.
 The issue of focalization in the story is complicated. probably the 
simplest account makes this a case of dual focalization where the narra-
tor alternates between luz and the soldier.8 however, there is clearly a 
stronger orientation toward the soldier, since the reader is given some 
information about him that luz does not have, but, it seems, no infor-
mation about luz that he does not have. In keeping with this, Scholes 
has demonstrated that the story translates easily into first-person nar-
ration from the soldier’s point of view (substituting “I” for “he”), but not 
from luz’s point of view (substituting “I” for “luz” or “she”). This bias in 
focalization may suggest a preference on the part of the implied author.
 most readers would probably say that there is no narratee in this 
work. however, there seems to be a narratee in the same sense that 
there is a (heterodiegetic) narrator. There are hints of this narratee 
from the information that the narrator presupposes, but that is clearly 
not presupposed for the implied reader. In other words, one can isolate 
a narratee through its difference from the implied reader. The intro-
duction noted that “a very Short Story” does not include an “orienta-
tion” explaining who the soldier and luz are. Indeed, the reader is never 
given the soldier’s name. The phrasing from the start suggests that the 
addressee is supposed to know who “he” is and who “they” are. It seems 
clear that that addressee is not the implied reader because no reader, 
not even an “ideal” reader (e.g., in the Structuralist sense [see eagleton 
121]), could know who the soldier is at the beginning of the narrative. 
The addressee, then, is a narratee—a heterodiegetic narratee. The nar-
ratee presumably shares the narrator’s interest in the soldier prior to 
the beginning of the story. Indeed, the fact that the soldier is always 
referred to by a pronoun, while luz is identified by name, suggests that 
this narrative may be viewed as implicitly part of a larger discourse. 
The topic of that larger discourse would not be luz, but the unnamed 
(because familiar and unmistakable) soldier.
 The implied reader is, again, different from the narratee. however, 
this implied reader is able to piece together the story background from 
the clues in the text. Thus he or she can arrive at the information already 
familiar to the narratee. The implied reader is also able to sense the 
ironic distance between the implied author and the narrator, drawing 
out the implications of such phrases as “It was understood.” arguably, 
the implied reader is more closely aligned with the soldier than with 
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luz—to use murray Smith’s term for increased “access to the actions, 
thoughts, and feelings” of a character (220). This is what one would 
expect, given that the focalization of the text is biased in that direction. 
but it does not follow that one needs to have an allegiance with the sol-
dier (again, drawing on murray Smith’s distinction). The implied reader 
follows interpretive norms. Thus the implied reader understands the atti-
tudes and evaluations of the implied author. but there is no requirement 
of sharing or not sharing those attitudes and evaluations. put differently, a 
real reader can be mistaken about an implied author’s compassion for a 
character. for example, in my view, it would be mistaken to say that the 
implied author lacks sympathy for luz. but a real reader cannot be spo-
ken of as mistaken in his or her own compassion for a character. Thus I 
cannot say that a student is mistaken if he or she has no sympathy for 
luz.
 as the last point makes clear, the real reader of the story will differ 
from the implied reader in many ways. most simply, the real reader is 
free to fill in or imagine indeterminate details as he or she wishes. more 
significantly, as just indicated, he or she can reject the attitudes and eval-
uations of the implied author (and the real author). The real reader can 
even decide to reject more fundamental aspects of the implied reader. 
he or she may decide that one part of the work is a fair representation 
of male–female relations, but that another part is guided by patriarchal 
ideology. In connection with this, real readers sometimes contradict the 
apparently clear determination of the story, saying things such as “no, 
luz would never do that. She must have done . . . instead.” This does not, 
I believe, violate principles of the narrative as long as the reader realizes 
that he or she is contradicting the implied reader and implied author. 
(needless to say, the reader does not have to formulate this realization in 
these technical terms.) on the other hand, a reader may fail to correctly 
infer the implied author and implied reader, or, more simply, the story. 
So it is indeed possible for real readers to be mistaken. Indeed, real read-
ers usually are mistaken to some degree. Thus this model of narrative 
discourse suggests that there is genuine freedom of reader imagination 
and response in that readers are free to reject even the straightforward 
formulation of story elements. but that does not mean that there is no 
issue of getting things right or wrong. While there are, again, many inde-
terminacies, there are also aspects of the story that are indicated by the 
discourse with greater or lesser certainty.
 leaving aside a few theoretical ideas (e.g., the “profile of ambiguity”) 
and elaboration, the preceding outline is largely consistent with com-
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mon views in mainstream narratology. however, there are difficulties 
that arise in connection with each of the preceding components. more-
over, there are aspects of narrative discourse that are not captured by 
this analytic. The remainder of this chapter will go through the compo-
nents in greater detail reformulating them in response to some of these 
problems.
Real Author/Implied Author
perhaps the most obvious question about the idea of the implied author 
concerns whether it is simply redundant. Isn’t the implied author cov-
ered by the real author? In one sense, the answer to this question is 
“yes.” The implied author must, in some way, be the result of the goals 
and interests of the real author as he or she puts together the narra-
tive. for example, if there is irony in a work, this is presumably because 
the real author put the work together in such a way that there is some 
untrustworthiness of the narrator. however, there is another sense in 
which the answer to this question is “no.” It is not necessarily the case 
that the untrustworthiness of the narrator is untrustworthiness relative 
to the real author himself or herself. In other words, there may actually 
be a difference, indeed an opposition between the real author and the 
implied author.
 Consider the following variation on the case of Jonathan Swift. Imag-
ine another author, call him Jonathan Sloe, a politician who is trying to 
appeal to a group of voters who are concerned about Irish poverty and 
object strongly to british policies. Sloe writes his “modest proposal” in 
which he recommends eating Irish babies. The irony is clear. anyone 
reading or hearing the piece would grasp its irony immediately. They 
would rightly infer that the implied author is harshly critical of british 
policies in Ireland. but, in fact, Sloe wholly supports those policies. Sloe’s 
own feelings do not affect the irony of his pamphlet. however pro-brit-
ish he may be, he has put together a treatise that is ironic and in which 
the author implied by the text is opposed to british policy.
 as this indicates, the role of the implied author is easiest to isolate 
when a real author has written insincerely. one could give a techni-
cal definition of insincerity in terms of distance between the implied 
author and the real author, just as one can give a technical definition 
of irony in terms of distance between the narrator and the implied 
author. Indeed, generally, these distinctions become consequential to 
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the degree that there are differences. It is important to distinguish the 
implied author from the narrator to the extent that the implied author 
establishes a norm from which the narrator deviates. When the narrator 
adheres to the norms of the implied author, the distinction is not terri-
bly consequential.
 Indeed, there seems to be a general principle here. readers seem to 
distinguish narrator/implied author/real author only to the degree that 
they diverge. moreover, such readers judge them to diverge only when 
given reason to believe that they diverge.9 In other words, a basic principle 
of discursive interpretation is that the default assumption is congruence 
of narrator, implied author, and real author. moreover, even when there is 
incongruence (thus irony or insincerity), readers generally assume this 
is limited to the points where there is evidence of divergence. Thus one 
may say that inference to incongruence is motivated and localized.
 “Congruence” seems to be the appropriate term here rather than 
“identity” for the technical reason that the narrator may be spoken of 
as asserting certain situations or events to be facts, whereas, for many of 
those situations or events, the real author is asserting only that they are 
part of the story. on the other hand, the implied author is also usually 
making some claims about the real world. In this way, the implied author 
may be understood as always theoretically different from the narrator 
in part because he or she can make claims about the real world and not 
merely about the storyworld.
 The difference between claims about the fictional world and claims 
about the real world is important in a number of areas, including under-
standing the relation between the implied author and the real author. 
for example, it seems that one only counts a work as insincere to the 
extent that it suggests certain implied authorial claims about the real 
world that the real author does not hold to be true. If there is a discrep-
ancy between the implied author and the real author in a claim confined 
to the fictional world, readers would most likely consider that uninten-
tional and thus some sort of flaw in technique rather than insincerity.10
 Consider again hemingway’s story. one might first look at a claim 
that is particular to the fictional world—for example, the claim that luz 
wrote a dear John letter to the soldier. obviously, the narrator commu-
nicates this. There is no indication in the text that the implied author 
has a different idea (i.e., that the narrator is unreliable on this). Sup-
pose, however, it was discovered that, in hemingway’s view, the letter 
was made up by the soldier. Since there is no indication of this in the 
story, most readers would probably consider it a flaw in the execution.
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 In contrast, the story suggests that attachment deprivation or lone-
liness can drive people (perhaps women particularly) into imprudent 
attachment relations. It also suggests that anger at attachment rejection 
can lead people (perhaps particularly men) into imprudent sexual rela-
tions. If it turned out that hemingway did not believe either of these 
things about the real world (perhaps he just thought readers would like 
these ideas), readers might be inclined to see some sort of insincerity in 
the narrative.
 If one were to try to isolate objective rules here—following the exam-
ple of rabinowitz11—one would probably come up with something along 
the following lines. a real author may be judged sincere or insincere for 
any implied authorial claim about the real world. These claims need not 
be articulated explicitly. rather, unless there is specific reason to believe 
otherwise, one generally assumes that the real author is claiming truth 
for general causal principles, for ethical norms, and for explanations 
and evaluations of actual events, as well as some particulars bearing on 
actual events (e.g., when a fictional film about an actual war massacre 
suggests that superior officers were aware of the massacre).12 “reason to 
believe otherwise” would include, for example, genre conventions (e.g., 
those of fantasy) that allow for the changes in physical, psychological, 
historical, or other principles.
 as just indicated, the hemingway story provides an example of gen-
eral causal principles—in this case, general psychological causal princi-
ples (perhaps gender-based). but some readers may have been inclined 
to question the extent to which such psychological generalizations could 
really justify a judgment of insincerity (if it turned out that hemingway 
did not believe them). It certainly does not seem to be as strong a case 
as that of Jonathan Sloe, with his misleading implications of anti-impe-
rialism. In connection with this, one would probably have to hierarchize 
these components. It is probably the case that, on the whole, readers 
consider discrepancies in ethical/political principles or judgments to 
be more insincere than discrepancies in ethically and politically neutral 
facts or empirical generalizations. readers also seem to be more inclined 
to label an author insincere if he or she gains materially by the discrep-
ancy, as in Sloe’s case. To capture this, one would need to further qualify 
the rule.
 on the other hand, all of this may suggest that a very different 
approach is in order. In judgments of insincerity, people are probably not 
guided by objective rules at all. rather, such “rules” approximate some-
thing else—feelings and the cognitive developments that are connected 
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with those feelings. Specifically, a reader has an emotional response to a 
story. part of that emotional response is to fictional aspects of the story. 
but part of that response bears on the real world. This is manifest most 
significantly in one’s attitude toward the world after one finishes read-
ing the fiction and resumes daily life. That attitude may involve one’s 
judgment of political policies, one’s understanding of other cultures, 
one’s view of historical events, one’s expectations about romance, or 
many other matters.
 In this context, a plausible hypothesis is that readers tacitly judge 
a real author’s sincerity by reference to their own emotional response 
to the real world, as that is affected by the narrative at issue. In other 
words, readers tacitly react to certain aspects of the work as if they were 
claimed true about the real world in ways that those readers care about. 
Those reactions guide readers in evaluating the author’s sincerity. Spe-
cifically, one judges an author to be insincere—or, rather, condemns an 
author for being insincere—to the degree that one feels one has been 
misled by the author on some issue of emotional significance.
 however one understands the nature of insincerity, the very possibil-
ity of real authorial insincerity leads back to the more general issue of 
the relation between the implied author and the real author. on the one 
hand, the possibility of insincerity indicates that the implied author is 
not simply the real author. on the other hand, it also indicates that they 
cannot be entirely different. If they were entirely different, one would 
not judge the real author by reference to the implied author at all. more-
over, there are cases where knowledge about the real author has con-
sequences for one’s understanding of the implied author. for example, 
suppose Jonathan Sloe is a well-known imperialist politician. he pub-
lishes his “modest proposal” in the context of many anti-Irish speeches 
and votes. readers would certainly take this into account in interpreting 
the work. readers would probably not conclude that he is really advocat-
ing cannibalism. however, readers may infer that the implied author is 
trying to create mirth by dehumanizing the Irish.
 These points are related to the disagreement among narratologists 
regarding the nature of the implied author.13 as nünning notes (“Implied 
author” 240), there is a conflict between the view of the implied author 
as “a construct inferred and assembled by the reader” (rimmon-Kenan 
87) and the view of the implied author as “a streamlined version of the 
real author” (phelan Living 45). The preceding discussion has already 
pointed out a problem with too close an identification of real and implied 
authors. There are cases in which the implied author is directly opposed 
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to the real author. It might seem that this leads to the reader-response 
version of the implied author. It is certainly true that the implied author 
has existence only as imagined by readers. but the issue is whether the 
implied author is wholly constructed by readers or, so to speak, recon-
structed by them. The difference is that, in the case of “reconstruc-
tion,” there is a norm, a possibility of getting the implied author right or 
wrong. This leads back to the connection with the real author, since the 
real author would seem to be the obvious place where that norm could 
be defined. moreover, the example of a publicly anti-Irish Sloe suggests 
that readers do commonly understand the implied author in relation to 
the real author. In certain contexts, a change in one’s understanding of 
the real author produces a change in one’s understanding of the implied 
author. but still the possibility of insincerity indicates that the implied 
author cannot simply be the real author, even part of the real author.
 To complicate matters even further, there is a longstanding tra-
dition in literary study that the author’s self-conscious ideas about a 
work—even the most sincere ideas—have no special status among pos-
sible interpretations. If the author’s interpretation of his or her work 
is not necessarily valid, then it would seem that the real author cannot 
stand as a norm for the implied author or anything else. at the same 
time, some theorists (e.g., e. d. hirsch) have maintained that the only 
reasonable norm for interpretation is authorial intent, while Knapp and 
michaels have gone so far as to maintain that we always interpret for 
authorial intent no matter what we think we are doing.
 These problems may be at least partially resolved by refining ideas 
about authorial intent and the processes involved in meaning. The cru-
cial, fundamental distinction here is between “productive” and “recep-
tive” meaning. most people have probably had the experience of saying 
something that they thought would be clever or funny, but that sounded 
crude or silly once actually uttered. Sometimes, one is able to sense this 
before committing the faux pas. In that case, one does something like 
hearing the words in one’s mind before actually saying them. These 
are instances of a conflict between one’s own productive and receptive 
meanings. more complicated cases of this come in revising something 
one has written. When I revise a book chapter, I am often trying to align 
my productive and receptive meanings, my sense of what I want to say 
and my sense of what I am likely to be understood as saying. In fact, 
my revision may go further. as I experience my text receptively, I may 
see connections and implications that I had missed initially. I may reject 
some of those, and elaborate on others. I may also change my mind about 
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some of my initial ideas. In this way, one may distinguish my initial pro-
ductive intent from my subsequent, receptive intent.
 This simple division provides a way of speaking about real authors 
and implied authors more clearly and with greater explanatory rigor. 
Specifically, the implied author may be understood normatively as the 
final receptive meaning of the real author, the receptive meaning of 
the author when he or she feels satisfied that the work is complete or 
“right.”14 This has several beneficial consequences.15
 first, it indicates that the meaning is indeed understood from a read-
er’s point of view. however, it does not thereby avoid norms (thus the 
possibility of saying that a particular interpretation is inaccurate), since 
it makes one particular receptive or reader-based meaning the stan-
dard. Indeed, this form of authorial intent preserves the central cases 
of determinacy that almost everyone sees as relevant. for example, crit-
ics generally believe that interpretations of a text should be confined to 
the meanings of words at the time the text was produced. Within most 
reader-oriented approaches, there is no reason for the reader not to 
bring in current meanings (e.g., twenty-first-century meanings when 
reading a medieval tale). from the perspective of authorial receptive 
intent, however, then-current word meanings are crucial. at the same 
time, however, this account largely filters out idiosyncratic meanings, 
such as personal associations that may have led an author to choose a 
particular word or image when producing the text initially.
 In keeping with these points, this account has the advantage of giv-
ing particular importance to the text of the literary work. various sorts 
of information will be significant and consequential for the receptive 
intent of the author, thus for the implied author. These would include 
what the author assumes to be common knowledge, including common 
knowledge about his or her own political views (as in the case of a pub-
licly imperialist Sloe). but the bulk of the relevant information is almost 
certain to derive from the sentences that compose the narrative, from 
the utterance itself. In this way, it still makes sense to take the “implied 
author” as implied by the text—though it is now necessary to qualify 
that as “primarily” or “largely,” not wholly. moreover, this allows one to 
conclude that some interpretations are warranted by the text and others 
are not—again, with the proviso that interpretation cannot be a matter 
of “the text alone,” even if it is primarily a matter of the text.
 It is also worth noting that this division does provide a place for bio-
graphical criticism. biographical criticism would have particular rele-
vance for the productive intent of the work. Specifically, it is perhaps 
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the best way to isolate the causal antecedents of productive intent (e.g., 
in idiosyncratic associations). In this way, it is valuable for the compre-
hension of literary “making,” the psychology of creation, the particular 
generative processes of individual writers, and other topics. It is usu-
ally not as important to the interpretation of the literary work, since 
its focus tends to be on aspects of an author’s experience that were not 
public and thus not part of his or her receptive intent. on the other 
hand, it may be interpretively relevant insofar as it informs the reader 
of parts of the author’s life that were public but have been forgotten. 
again, such public aspects of an author’s life may bear on the implied 
author.
 In relation to this, such a receptive account also helps to filter out 
the author’s self-conscious statements about his or her meanings. In 
other words, it helps to explain and avoid the “intentional fallacy.” It 
might at first seem that authors must have direct introspective access to 
the reasons why a particular work feels right, thus why they receptively 
accept a particular revision as the completed work or final version. but, 
in fact, people are fairly bad at isolating such reasons for their feelings 
and evaluations. even for some fairly simple responses, one’s stated rea-
sons are often more akin to rationalizations.16 The problem becomes 
much worse for a highly complex behavior such as literary creation and 
evaluation. Consider the far simpler operation of forming regular plurals 
in english. Whenever an english speaker hears or utters a regular plural, 
he or she follows a rule. Thus any english speaker can fill in the plural 
of “gerb”—one gerb, two ____—even though he or she has never heard 
of a word “gerb.” however, if asked what the rule is, he or she is almost 
certain to get it wrong. he or she has self-consciously learned an ortho-
graphic rule—“add s.” This rule is therefore available to working mem-
ory. however, he or she processes english utterances by a more complex 
rule. Specifically, in regular english plurals, one adds [s] after unvoiced 
nonsibilants (as in cat/cats), [z] after voiced nonsibilants (as in dog/dogs 
or gerb/gerbs—spelled “s,” but pronounced [z]), and [əz] after sibilants 
(as in bush/bushes—spelled “es,” but pronounced [əz]).17 how likely is it 
that an author can formulate the reasons governing his or her receptive 
satisfaction with an entire novel when he or she probably cannot even 
formulate the reasons governing his or her receptive satisfaction with 
the plural “gerbs” or even “dogs”? Thus a receptive intent account of 
implied authorship fits well with current accounts of cognitive process-
ing in such a way as to avoid the intentional fallacy.18, 19
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Narrator and Narratee
In some ways, the situation with the narrator and narratee is much sim-
pler, since there is no issue of a real person. but in some ways the issue 
is more complex for the same reason. The narrator and the narratee are 
part of the communicative discourse structure. but, of course, they are 
not actually communicating with one another. They are a fiction. how 
such fictional entities function to mimic communication is clear enough 
when both are overt. but things are much less clear when one or both 
are implicit, as in “a very Short Story.”
 To address these issues, one must first consider the basic function of 
a narrator. perhaps here too it is helpful to compare the narrator with 
the author—not only the implied author, but the real author. of course, 
the real author exists as a person in the material world and the narrator 
does not. but that is not functionally relevant here. from the perspective 
of the reader, the narrator, the implied author, and the real author are 
imagined people. readers, of course, know that narrators are not real. 
but in order to respond to a narrator (e.g., to trust or distrust him or 
her), readers need to imagine him or her as a person. Thus the key dif-
ference here is not that authors are real and narrators are not. There has 
to be some other difference, a difference that is relevant to the response 
of readers—including the normative response of the implied reader.
 as a first approximation, one might say that the basic function of a 
narrator is to report the story, to represent (or misrepresent) a story-
world that is in some way separate from the narrator’s representation 
of it. The author, rather, creates the story, defines a storyworld that is 
not separate from his or her definition. The narrator chooses what to say 
about what happens in the storyworld. In contrast, the author chooses 
what actually does happen in the storyworld.
 as it turns out, things are slightly more complicated than this sug-
gests. authors often assert that their characters act independently, take 
over the story, force the author to follow a certain path. as mey puts it, 
“authors frequently complain that their personae assume independent 
lives and voices, and that the plot starts to develop by an inner logic of 
its own, with the author as a bemused spectator on the sidelines, follow-
ing the antics of his or her creatures and chronicling them as best he or 
she can” (794). This has a certain point and, indeed, complicates the rela-
tion between the author and the narrator. It is therefore worth consider-
ing in greater detail.
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 once the author has imagined the personality and circumstances of a 
character, his or her normal cognitive processes will produce a relatively 
automatic anticipation of that character’s action. again, when people 
create fiction, they use ordinary cognitive architecture. This architec-
ture includes structures and processes for anticipating one’s own and 
other people’s actions. I know Smith; I have a sense of how he acts in 
various situations. I am thinking about asking him to observe my teach-
ing and write a letter of recommendation. I try to imagine how Smith 
would respond to my class, how this would affect a letter, and so forth. 
note that the entire (evolutionary) function of such imagination is lost if 
I simply make up Smith’s response to suit my preferences. Indeed, that 
is precisely the difference between such hypothetical imagination and 
fantasy.20 rather, the imagination has to be constrained by my under-
standing of Smith. In order to proceed with adequate speed, particularly 
in pressing circumstances, imaginations of this sort have to be more 
or less automatic as well (i.e., they are not usually or primarily mat-
ters of effortful calculation). for that, the understanding and familiarity 
must be largely implicit—based, for example, on memories that I do not 
inspect self-consciously, but that give me an implicit sense of how Smith 
would act.21 It is also important to stress that my understanding of Smith 
and my inferences about his likely behavior are both open to dispute. 
Thus it may be quite reasonable for someone to tell me that I am, say, 
crazy to trust Smith with a teaching evaluation.
 It seems extremely likely that this is just what occurs with real 
authors and fictional characters. authors create a character by imagin-
ing traits, a history, interests, and current conditions. These are partially 
considered self-consciously and partially remain implicit. moreover, 
they are bound up with complexes of authorial memories. These memo-
ries need not concern the character’s (fictional) history, but may bear on 
other, real or fictional individuals who are parallel to the character in 
some way. Such memories are almost entirely un-self-conscious.22 Those 
imagined properties and conditions, along with the associated, un-self-
conscious memories, produce the sort of semimechanical trajectories of 
character action that one finds in everyday hypothetical imagination (as 
in the case of Smith observing my class).
 by this analysis, there are two sets of inputs to the imagination of 
character trajectories. one set is textual—including the character’s traits 
and conditions. but the second set derives from an author’s or reader’s 
own memories. Those memories will, of course, differ. as such, various 
readers may imagine the arc of a character’s actions differently. often, 
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readers’ imaginations will be vague enough to fit with authorial imagina-
tions. however, sometimes they will contradict authorial imaginations. 
When this contradiction results from divergence in noncharacter memo-
ries, it seems there is no reason to believe that the author is necessar-
ily correct or normative. Indeed, in some cases one may say that, given 
what is known about the character from the text, the author’s imagina-
tion is less plausible than a given reader’s imagination. In other words, 
many people have the intuitive sense that readers can reasonably criti-
cize an author’s character development—saying, for example, “oh, mr. 
Gallstone would never have accepted a bribe to marry lucinda—at least 
not such a small one” or “The screenwriter and director simply don’t 
understand lucinda. She would certainly have boarded the boat for bue-
nos aires, at least after she found her evil stepmother’s letter to Gall-
stone.” This analysis suggests one way in which such statements can 
indeed have force, and why it is possible for authors to misunderstand 
their characters. Character trajectories are a function of the characters’ 
own histories and conditions, supplemented by the author’s memories. 
Those memories, used tacitly as models for the characters, may be biased 
or otherwise misleading.
 here, it is possible to treat the functional relation between narra-
tors and authors more precisely. first, there is a crucial similarity. both 
authors and narrators to a certain extent represent a storyworld that 
is beyond their control. In other words, authors also to some extent 
report—rather than choose—what their characters do in imagined 
trajectories.23
 but authors do choose the conditions of the storyworld, select from 
the possible character trajectories, and fill in further details that are 
undefined by the initial conditions and trajectories. In contrast, the 
narrator is the witness and communicator of the trajectories produced 
by authorial imagination. but, of course, the narrator may be—usually 
is—more than this as well. Specifically, as communicator, the narrator 
manipulates that information.
 There is, presumably, certain information that the implied author 
takes to be crucial for the reader. There are two primary ways in which 
that information may be manipulated—through the sequence and manner 
in which it is given. Thus some piece of information may be given early 
or late in a narrative, directly or by implication, and so forth. The narra-
tor may be understood as the speaker who determines this sequence and 
manner of the communication, with the caveat that the narrator may be 
trustworthy or untrustworthy. If the narrator is untrustworthy, then the 
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relevant information must still be communicated, but it must be commu-
nicated, not only indirectly, but, so to speak, inadvertently relative to the 
narrator. (This issue will be considered in chapter 4.) note that the nar-
rator can be unreliable precisely because the narrator is not the author. 
If the author changes the story, then the story is actually different. If 
the narrator changes the story, then that is a misrepresentation. even in 
cases where the author misunderstands his or her characters, that mis-
understanding affects one’s evaluation of the story, not one’s interpreta-
tion. In the preceding hypothetical narrative, for example, Gallstone did 
accept the derisory bribe in the storyworld, however inconsistent that is 
with his character.
 many narratologists take the fundamental division of narrators to be 
that between those who are within the story and those who are outside 
the story. This is certainly important. however, it does not seem to be 
the most crucial for one’s understanding of communicative discourse. 
rather, a different, if partially related, distinction seems to be the essen-
tial one. Specifically, one question arises immediately when one speaks of 
a narrator describing a trajectory—is there really an agent there who can 
be spoken of as doing such describing? Clearly, there is such an agent in 
the case of a first-person narrator. however, one may wonder what sense 
it makes to speak of such an agent in the case of a third-person narration. 
The issue here does not seem to be one of whether the narrator is inside 
the story or not. rather, the issue seems to be whether the narrator is 
the sort of entity one would think of as making choices, selecting the 
order and manner of information. In other words, the difference seems 
to be between whether the narrator is personified or nonpersonified.24
 of course, if there is a narrator, then there is some choice, some 
selection. however, that choice is not invariably accompanied by an 
imaginative objectification or constitution of the narrator, to use the phe-
nomenological term. (Constitution is the mental integration of informa-
tion to form an object of thought—as when one synthesizes different 
glimpses of, say, a chair to form an image of that chair.) put differently, 
narration implies a constituting subjectivity, but it need not involve any 
self-objectification of that subjectivity—thus the presentation of any 
physical or psychological attributions, even the minimal attribution con-
tained in the personal pronoun “I.”25
 Generally, it is easy to envision a personified narrator as select-
ing information, phrasing it in a certain way, and so forth. Indeed, an 
author’s imagination of personified narrators is just like his or her imag-
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ination of characters. The author both explicitly and implicitly envisions 
properties, histories, interests, and circumstances for the narrator. The 
author’s mind tacitly associates these with memories and allows imagi-
nation to produce behaviors and circumstances for the narrator—in this 
case, behaviors of storytelling. Thus what the personified narrator says 
or writes is the result of imaginatively generated trajectories of the same 
sort that one finds in the story itself.
 Indeed, the narratee fits here as well. The narratee is, fundamentally, 
the addressee for the narrator. The function of the narratee, however, 
is somewhat different from that of the narrator. The narratee does not 
operate so much as an independent agent. rather, he or she operates 
as a sort of regulative principle for what information the narrator has 
to provide, what sort of rhetorical techniques he or she has to use, and 
so forth. In other words, speakers always aim at some sort of audience. 
a speaker cannot communicate everything about any topic. he or she 
assumes certain sorts of knowledge. moreover, a speaker does not adopt 
the same rhetorical strategies with everyone, since a speaker does not 
assume that everyone begins with the same prejudices or emotional pro-
pensities. The narratee is the imagined guide for the narrator’s informa-
tion and rhetoric.
 In this sense, the narratee is embedded within the imagination of the 
narrator. This is just what one would expect, since this is the way peo-
ple speak. people formulate descriptions, adopt a certain tone, press cer-
tain judgments for a particular addressee as they imagine him or her. In 
keeping with this, one’s imagined trajectories of communicative behav-
ior routinely embed “theory of mind” ideas, which is to say, simulations 
of other people’s imaginations of speakers and addressees (sometimes 
along with some more self-conscious inferences).26 Suppose I know that 
professor Jones, an academic advisor, will be speaking with ms. Smith 
about satisfying her mathematics and science requirements. In imag-
ining how the conversation will go, I implicitly take into account what 
Jones believes about Smith and vice versa. I will imagine the conversa-
tion differently if I know that Jones believes Smith is unmathematical, if 
Jones believes that Smith is considering a major in physics, and so on. It 
is important to note that part of this simulation is emotional. I imagine 
Jones’s emotional attitude to Smith as well as his conception of her. for 
example, I may imagine that Jones likes Smith and genuinely wants to 
help her plan out the best course of study for her future, or that he finds 
her an irritating pest.
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 again, people’s usual imaginative practices carry over to literary 
imagination. This occurs most clearly when authors simulate charac-
ters.27 for example, hemingway embeds luz’s understanding of the sol-
dier in her speech to him, just as he embeds her emotional response to 
the major—not only romantic interest, but trust—in her response to him. 
The former embedding comes out clearly in her letter to the soldier. 
She “finally wrote to the States that theirs had only been a boy and girl 
affair,” and so on. The first sentence indicates that luz is envisioning 
him as young, immature, inexperienced. She makes the same statement 
about herself, since she refers to them as a “boy” and “girl” respectively. 
but it is clear that, at least since her relationship with the major, she 
considers herself to be an adult, a woman, whereas—in her imagination—
he is still a boy. This embedded imagination continues throughout the 
rest of the letter, as when she writes that “he would probably not be 
able to understand,” as if his level of intellectual maturity is too low. 
on the other hand, it is difficult to say if one should fully believe luz’s 
expression of her imagination. one might, rather, infer that she has a 
more complex, tacit imagination of the soldier, but has developed a self-
conscious idea of his immaturity as a rationalization of her actions. In 
other words, one might interpret her imaginations as both ambivalent 
and ambiguous.
 In the middle of the letter, there is an indication of luz’s imagina-
tion of the major. but it too is an indication that is rhetorically oriented 
toward a particular audience. It is an indication aimed at the under-
standing of the soldier. Specifically, she writes that her engagement was 
“absolutely unexpected.” The suggestion here is that she did not envi-
sion the major as a possible spouse until he proposed to her. Clearly, this 
is not a claim one can trust. rather, it is a claim made to affect the sol-
dier’s imagination of luz and thereby to guide his subsequent response 
to her. The idea is that he would not imagine she had in any way antici-
pated any of this.28 This, in turn, suggests a much more complex imagi-
nation of the soldier than is overtly expressed in the letter. he is not 
merely a naïve youth who will grow to see the wisdom of her decision. 
he is, rather, a potential accuser. he is also someone for whom she still 
has some feelings, so that she cares about his potential accusations.
 The case of luz illustrates some of the ways in which authors imag-
ine characters imagining addressees—including imaginations of those 
addressees’ imaginations—thereby embedding levels of simulation. as 
usual, the same principles hold for narrators and narratees. Indeed, in 
her letter, luz is an embedded narrator. This leads to several points. 
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first, recognizing luz’s role as an embedded narrator imagining the sol-
dier shows an ambiguity in the notion of a narratee. Within the story, 
the soldier is actually not a narratee, but a real reader. The narratee is, 
most importantly, the addressee imagined by the narrator. ordinarily 
narratees are not developed in enough detail for this to be an issue. In 
keeping with the general principles governing narrators and authors, 
one assumes a congruence of readers and narratees within stories unless 
one is given reason to distinguish them. but one may be given such a rea-
son—sometimes in embedded narrations, such as luz’s letter.
 This example also leads back to the issue of personification. It is 
clear that behind this personified narrator (luz), there is a nonpersoni-
fied narrator, the narrator of the entire story. The point appears to be 
generalizable. In other words, the point holds not only for such local-
ized, embedded narrations, but for larger personified narrations as well. 
This would be in keeping with nielsen’s view that “behind every homo-
diegetic narrator is a ‘nonpersonified voice’ of the fiction and that some-
times the homodiegetic narrator gives way to this voice” (as phelan and 
booth [“narrator” 391] put it; see nielsen).29 perhaps more importantly, 
it is also in keeping with the phenomenological understanding of con-
stituting subjectivity as necessarily underlying constituted subjectivity 
(as well as the lacanian idea of a subjectivity underlying the ego and the 
cognitive view of a self as underlying any self-concept). of course, here 
too there is a general presumption of default congruence. nonetheless, 
there is always a possibility of incongruence.
 needless to say, this does not solve all problems about the nature of 
narrators. most obviously, it leaves the task of understanding the non-
personified narrator. Indeed, the preceding discussion leads to positing a 
nonpersonified narratee with this nonpersonified narrator, which inten-
sifies the difficulty. In the case of hemingway’s story, one may envision 
the soldier as embedded within the imagination of luz in writing her 
letter. That is parallel to what one does in ordinary life. but how does 
one embed a nonpersonified narratee in a nonpersonified narrator? That 
does not seem parallel to anything one does in ordinary life, since people 
at least seem to imagine only personified speakers, themselves simulat-
ing only personified addressees.
 In fact, the issue of the nonpersonified narratee might be fairly easily 
resolved. people do alter their speech and writing for fairly amorphous 
addressees—such as particular individuals whom they do not know, or 
groups (e.g., one may write a report for an archive without any sense of 
who might read it, but one still tries to give necessary information, not 
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to give unnecessary information, and so on). as long as one has a per-
sonified narrator, a nonpersonified narratee may not be a problem.
 but what about that nonpersonified narrator? It might at first appear 
that such an entity is not even possible. but literary works clearly do 
incorporate nonpersonified narrators, with embedded nonpersonified 
narratees. one sees this, for example, in presumptions about knowledge. 
The point is obvious at the start of hemingway’s story, as already noted. 
but it continues all the way to the end, when the addressee is tacitly 
expected to know that the soldier was in Chicago.30 again, the implied 
author has organized everything so that real readers are able to infer 
this. but the information is not foregrounded in the way it would ordi-
narily be if the addressee were not already familiar with the soldier 
and his hometown. Thus there is a clear discrepancy between whoever 
is speaking and the implied author, since the latter recognizes that the 
reader does not have such prior familiarity.
 for a cognitive account, one primary way of resolving such a 
dilemma is isolating a real-world situation in which people engage in 
a process of understanding or imagining a nonpersonified narrator. In 
fact, people frequently engage in understanding or responding to such 
a situation along these lines—when they overhear conversations, spe-
cifically conversations in which the speaker is telling a third-person 
narrative. The general relation between everyday overhearing and 
one’s response to literature has been developed by richard Gerrig and 
deborah prentice in their concept of the reader as a “side participant” 
(“notes”). however, it does not seem that narratologists have recog-
nized the relation of such overhearing to the understanding or imagi-
nation of a nonpersonified narrator (and embedded, nonpersonified 
narratee). This is somewhat surprising, given that many overheard con-
versations are genuinely nonpersonified in the sense that, other than 
what one gathers from his or her speech, one does not know anything 
about the speaker beyond his or her being a person (perhaps in a par-
ticular location). rather, one begins with a fairly minimal sense of this 
being a speaker, a speaker who has some addressee in mind. from here, 
one is able to follow what the person says more or less well (despite the 
fact that there is no implied author checking this narrator for communi-
cative problems).
 If there is in fact continuity between overhearing, on the one hand, 
and understanding a nonpersonified narrator, on the other, this indi-
cates that the nonpersonified narrator is, in principle, a full person. 
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again, as far as one’s explicit knowledge goes, he or she is simply a 
voice—hence the label “nonpersonified.” but he or she is a voice that 
is tacitly imagined as part of a communicative scenario, thus a voice 
that has knowledge and motivation—even though one does not initially 
know much about what these are, as in real cases of side participation or 
overhearing.
 The preceding analyses have considered the nonpersonified narra-
tor only from the reader’s perspective. again, this is the crucial perspec-
tive, since it includes the receptive intent of the author. however, it is 
worth turning briefly to the perspective of the author as creator. The 
author can generate a nonpersonified narrator’s voice in many differ-
ent ways. one way is by simulating an overheard conversation. however, 
that is probably very rare. It seems more likely that authors unreflec-
tively take up an emotional orientation, presumptions about narratee 
knowledge, a vocabulary, and so forth, through the priming of a range 
of narrative models stored in memory. (priming involves partially but 
not fully activating some mental content or process, which is to say acti-
vating it below the threshold of self-conscious awareness.) These mod-
els, drawn from a range of precursor works, may guide the production 
of the narrator’s voice without the author reflecting self-consciously on 
them. of course, the effects of these different imaginations and memo-
ries are not all the same. Thus there are different degrees and kinds of 
influence. What is crucial overall is that the author probably does not 
have a developed character self-consciously in mind. as a result, his or 
her relation to the nonpersonified narrator’s voice is comparable to one 
of overhearing.
 more generally, people do things like this when they shift into, say, 
a regional dialect (e.g., a boston accent) or imitate technical speech (say, 
deconstructive vocabulary) for comic effect. They are taking up the voice 
of a narrator—one distinct from the “author” (themselves)—a narrator 
who is clearly following principles of some sort, even though the speak-
ers do not really know anything about the “personality” of that voice. In 
other words, the speakers are, in effect, adopting the voice of a nonper-
sonified narrator.
 In the case of literature, of course, the assumption of a voice is far 
more prolonged. Throughout its extended development, the assump-
tion of that voice is repeatedly subjected to the constraint, organization, 
and direction of the implied author. This in effect makes the produc-
tion—or at least revision—of such a nonpersonified voice in fiction into 
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something even more like a case of overhearing or side participation. 
Specifically, the author has to receptively respond to the narrator’s voice 
in such a way that it consistently unfolds the story in an appropriate way 
(i.e., in a way appropriate to the experience that the author wishes to 
produce or feels is right for a particular work). This is necessarily a pro-
cess of (tacitly) understanding a nonpersonified narrator’s knowledge, 
interests, imagination of a narratee, and so forth.
 In isolating the operation of the nonpersonified narrator and nonper-
sonified narratee in hemingway’s “very Short Story,” the preceding dis-
cussion considered how one may infer some beliefs of the narrator about 
the knowledge of the narratee. but there are important issues surround-
ing the narrator’s own knowledge (as narratologists have stressed), as 
well as his or her interests. It is important to consider some of these in 
the context of focalization.
 before going on, however, we might note the expansion of part of 
the diagram of narrative discourse. That diagram now includes the 
following:
Real Author [Implied Author [Nonpersonified Narrator {Personified 
Narrator {Focalizer} Personified Narratee} Nonpersonified Narratee] 
Implied reader] real reader
 again, the nonpersonified narrator is often congruent with the 
implied author, and the personified narrator is often congruent with 
the nonpersonified narrator. but this does not mean that the status of 
all these discourse agents is the same. personified narrators and narra-
tees, as well as focalizers, are optional elements of a fiction. by the pre-
ceding analysis, there is always a narrator and a narratee,31 even if they 
are congruent with the implied author and the implied reader.32 This is 
because there is always some manipulation (at least selection and phras-
ing) of information from a storyworld. That manipulation is a function 
of the narrator oriented toward a narratee. finally, there is a difference 
in degree of story embedment between the nonpersonified narrator 
and narratee, on the one hand, and the personified narrator and nar-
ratee, on the other, just as there is a difference in narrative or textual 
embedment between the real author and reader, on the one hand, and 
the implied author and reader, on the other. (roughly, square brackets 
indicate implication by the text, thus embedment within communica-
tive discourse, while curly brackets mark representation in the text, thus 
embedment in a storyworld.)
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Focalization and Topicalization
as is well known, Gérard Genette distinguished focalizers from narrators. 
The narrator is the “agent who produces a narrative” (herman “Glos-
sary” 280). focalization, in contrast, “denotes the perspectival restric-
tion and orientation of narrative information relative to somebody’s 
(usually, a character’s) perception, imagination, knowledge, or point of 
view. . . . hence, focalization theory covers the various means of regu-
lating, selecting, and channeling narrative information” (Jahn “focaliza-
tion” 173).
 “perspectival” is the key word here. It indicates the relation of the 
narrator to some point of view on which that narrator focuses his or 
her attention. for example, narrators sometimes confine their narration 
to what a particular character experiences or thinks. Suppose a story 
includes the following lines: “Jones was feeling apprehensive. Smith 
seemed preoccupied and distant all morning. Jones walked out of the 
office, worried about what Smith might be thinking.” Jones is not the 
narrator. but the perspective of the narrative is at least quite close to 
that of Jones. The narrator reports what Jones sees, thinks, and feels. The 
narrator does not report what Smith sees, thinks, and feels—except inso-
far as these are inferred by Jones. Jones is, then, the focalizer.
 Genette distinguished three types of focalization. The first is “zero-
focalization.” In this case, there is no focalizer. The narrator relates 
events and scenes without any filter from a character in the story. The 
second is “internal focalization,” which restricts the narrator to the 
experiences (perceptual, imaginative, etc.) of one or more characters. 
The third is “external focalization,” where the narrator does not have 
access to inner thoughts, but reports only external facts about the story-
world insofar as these are available to the focalizer.
 mieke bal and others have criticized this distinction, arguing, for 
example, that “even typical ‘non-focalized’ passages are rarely entirely 
free of point of view” (Jahn “focalization” 101). Jahn cites an exam-
ple from James michener’s Hawaii as an example. The passage begins, 
“across a million years, down more than ten million years [the island] 
existed silently in the unknown sea” (qtd. in Jahn “focalization” 97). 
Jahn’s point is that even this small piece of narration involves selection. 
It is not simply a part of a statement of everything. Thus it is focalized.
 but this seems problematic. If “focalization” becomes so broad that it 
encompasses all forms of selection, then it has ceased to serve its initial 
theoretical functions, both explanatory and descriptive. perhaps this is a 
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point where it is valuable to return to an older distinction, that between 
omniscient and limited narration. It is true that focalization is not iden-
tical with limited narration and that the isolation of focalization is an 
important advance in narrative theory. however, that does not mean 
that the omniscient/limited distinction should simply be discarded. It 
addresses something different from focalization—and perhaps, when 
adequately refined, it may help clarify focalization and the issue of zero 
focalization.
 as seen in the preceding section, when one speaks of a narrator, even 
a nonpersonified narrator, one is not speaking of a mechanism or an 
abstract principle, but tacitly simulating a human or humanlike agent. 
That humanlike agent—as one simulates him or her—should have certain 
properties. The properties do not have to be precisely the same as those 
that characterize real humans. but they should presumably be of the 
same general sort. humans gain information about the world through 
sensory perception, thus without direct access to other minds. more-
over, human perception is limited spatially and temporally. If one takes 
a narrator to be humanlike, one may assume that he or she has some 
way of gaining knowledge about the world. That way may be limited to 
sensory perception or it may not. It also may or may not be spatially or 
temporally limited.
 This already begins to solve some of the problems. one could use 
the phrase “internal focalization” to refer to cases where the narra-
tor’s knowledge of the storyworld is not confined to sensory percep-
tion but is focalized by one or more characters. one may use the phrase 
“external focalization” to refer to cases where the narrator’s knowl-
edge is confined to sensory perception, and is also focalized by one or 
more characters. Cases of the latter sort are fairly common in film. for 
example, a romantic comedy may involve dozens of characters. but it 
may show only scenes where one of the lovers is present. If one is given 
no internal thoughts of these characters (e.g., through voice-overs), then 
one is probably dealing with an external focalization.
 but what about “zero focalization”? That does not seem to be a mat-
ter of limited knowledge. Indeed, that is presumably why Genette’s dis-
tinction has intuitive appeal. on the other hand, it seems clear that, even 
if some narrators know everything, no narrators say everything. In this 
way, there is some limitation. of course, if one defines every form of lim-
itation as a form of focalization, then this means there is focalization. 
however, if one wishes to keep the sharpness of the concept, one should 
probably confine use of the term “focalization” to characters (or charac-
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terlike components) in a story. In that case, it seems clear that passages 
such as michener’s are not focalized. but how then does one describe 
their limitation?
 In fact, this problem is already in effect solved. again, if one spon-
taneously simulates narrators as humanlike, one tacitly understands 
their minds as having the same sorts of structures that human minds 
have. human minds include not only knowledge—perception, memory, 
language, inferential capacities, and so on (thus the omniscient/limited 
distinction). They also include emotion. Without emotion, one would not 
speak or listen, direct one’s attention to one thing rather than another, 
select some information as being of interest and ignore other informa-
tion. Zero-focalization, then, is a situation in which there is a narrator 
with emotions—emotions that lead him or her to select certain facts of 
the storyworld and not others—but whose reports are not focalized to 
any character in the story.33
 What about cases such as The Great Gatsby, where there is a homodi-
egetic narrator, nick Carraway, who focuses a great deal of his attention 
on another character, Gatsby? In other words, Gatsby is in some sense 
a “focus of interest” for the narrator. but it is clear that the narrator is 
not in any sense confined to Gatsby. This arises as a possible issue due 
primarily to an accidental coincidence of terms—“focus” and “focalizer.” 
There seems to be no focalizer in Gatsby other than the personified nar-
rator, nick. but what is the status of Gatsby, then? Though not a focal-
izer, he is not simply a character at the same level as the others. one 
might say that Gatsby is the protagonist of the novel, since much of the 
plot is organized around his goals and their possible fulfillment. but this 
does not suggest his relation to the narrator.
 borrowing (and altering) a term from linguistics, one may refer to 
Gatsby and similar characters as topicalizers. Topicalizers guide narrative 
development, but do not constrain narration. put differently, they have 
intrinsic interest for a narrator. In other words, the narrator attends to 
one set of characters because their attitudes, perceptions, ideas, and so 
on, have instrumental significance for other characters. Thus the vil-
lain may be important because he or she has an impact on the hero. In 
contrast, the narrator attends to another set of characters because they 
are significant on their own. Thus the hero’s ideas and attitudes are val-
ued in their own right as productive of narrative trajectories. In conse-
quence, the hero is commonly topicalized.
 focalizers are often topicalizers, but they need not be. They are 
clearly of interest to the narrator. but their interest is perspectival. as 
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such, the focalizer’s ideas, attitudes, and so forth, may or may not drive 
the story line.
 In addition to differentiating focalization from topicalization, the 
preceding analysis suggests the possibility that focalization may come in 
two varieties. Given that narrators select according to interest and pref-
erence, it may be that focalization—internal or external—is not always a 
matter of limitation in knowledge. It may equally be a matter of limita-
tion in interest. In other words, one may distinguish between epistemic 
and affective focalization. This may, in turn, have interpretive implica-
tions regarding a narrator’s emotion-based encoding sensitivities. for 
example, suppose there is a love story with dual focalization on the lov-
ers. one may consider asymmetries in the selection of information for 
the two focalizers, exploring these in both epistemic and affective con-
texts. This may have social and political consequences insofar as such 
asymmetries relate to gender or other social hierarchies.
 here it is valuable to return once again to hemingway. The precise 
nature and degree of the narrator’s epistemic limitations, if any, are not 
entirely clear. however, there are suggestions that he or she has inter-
nal access to characters. for example, he or she reports that the patients 
“all liked luz” and that luz and the soldier both “felt as though they 
were married.” moreover, the narrator knows that the major never mar-
ried luz, “in the spring, or any other time.” (Though stated in the past 
tense, the narrator’s claim presumably covers the all possible story time. 
To avoid this suggestion, hemingway could have written something like 
“The major did not marry her in the spring. eventually, they broke off 
the engagement.”) Though ambiguity remains, these points suggest that 
the narrator may not have epistemic limits. Whatever limits he or she 
has, then, are presumably affective.
 In part, this limitation is the result of the topicalization of the nar-
rative to the lovers—just what one would expect in any romantic nar-
rative. but it goes beyond topicalization. The internal access we have to 
others is very limited. for example, we know merely that the patients 
liked luz—a very general attitude. In contrast, we know that as the sol-
dier “walked back along the halls he thought of luz in his bed.” This is a 
much more specific internal access. It is also far less ambiguous (i.e., it is 
far more difficult to understand this as inference). It therefore suggests 
internal affective focalization.
 here, the issue arises as to whether there is internal affective focal-
ization on both characters or on only one. The narrative seems ambigu-
ous on this score. as already noted, it is possible to read the narrative 
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as having only a single focalization on the soldier (recall Scholes’s point 
about rewriting the work in first person). but it is not necessary to read 
the story that way. Indeed, as already noted, there are points at which 
we seem to have internal access to both luz and the soldier. at the same 
time, however, those moments may be reinterpreted as inferences based 
on overt statements. for example, they presumably both said that they 
felt as though they were married. overall, then, single focalization seems 
more likely. nonetheless, a profile of ambiguity remains. This is almost 
certainly consequential—to both one’s interpretations and one’s emo-
tional responses.
 more exactly, even at points where there seem to be clear indications 
of two focalizers, there are discrepancies between the two. These dis-
crepancies may be construed epistemically. but they are probably best 
understood as affectively motivated. for example, at times, an appar-
ent focalization on luz shifts to a focalization on the soldier. Consider 
the opening of the fourth paragraph, “luz wrote him many letters.” This 
seems to involve a clear epistemic limitation. It is something known, first 
of all and for some time exclusively, to luz. but the sentence continues—
“luz wrote him many letters that he never got until after the armistice. 
fifteen came in a bunch to the front and he sorted them by dates and 
read them all straight through.” retrospectively, one can see the opening 
of the sentence as focalized by the soldier, as he infers the unobserved 
process of writing. either way, the crucial matter here is not knowledge 
of facts. It is affective orientation. Indeed, the focalization here is doubly 
affective, for the narration is guided by the narrator’s emotional interest 
in the specifically emotional perspective of the focalizer. When readers 
go on to learn about luz’s feelings, reported in the letters, they do so in 
a context where the (emotionally saturated) reading presence of the sol-
dier has been rendered salient. This at least makes possible an affective 
focalization on the soldier, even if the soldier’s own affective topicaliza-
tion is on luz.
 The point is clearer when hemingway repeats the technique later. he 
begins a sentence by treating luz’s affair with an Italian major, appar-
ently focalizing her, but then continues the sentence with a dear John 
letter (“and finally wrote to the States that theirs had only been a boy 
and girl affair”). here, again, there is an epistemic shift. What seems at 
first to be focalization on luz becomes—or is revealed to have been—
focalization on the soldier; the reader is told, not what luz knows alone, 
but what the soldier knows through her report and perhaps his infer-
ences from her report. more importantly, this has emotional signifi-
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cance. as readers receive the rest of the letter implicitly filtered through 
the soldier’s reading, it is difficult not to be aware of and affected by the 
soldier’s anger and resentment. The light-hearted “she expected, abso-
lutely unexpectedly, to be married” feels insensitive; the use of “boy” 
appears belittling, and the explanation that she “believed in him abso-
lutely” seems patronizing. presumably the epistemic content of the let-
ter is equally available to luz and the soldier.34 The focalization, then, is 
more a matter of emotion than of knowledge.35
 on the other hand, this is not to say that this affective focalization 
is absolute and determinative. first of all, one need not read the story 
as having a single focalization. Indeed, it is possible to read the story as 
concerning information shared by the lovers—luz tells the soldier that 
the hospital administrators are “glad to let her” stay on night duty; the 
soldier tells luz that he thinks of her in his bed as he walks back along 
the halls at night. In this respect, focalization on either lover would give 
information about both. only at the end does the reader get informa-
tion that is not shared—in keeping with their emotional alienation. first 
there is the report that luz and the major do not get married, perhaps 
known only to luz. Then there is the final sentence reporting the sol-
dier’s affair with the sales girl and his gonorrhea, presumably known 
only to the soldier. of course, even this is not entirely clear, since the 
second sentence of the final paragraph is ambiguous. The narrator 
explains that “luz never got an answer to the letter to Chicago about 
it.” It is not clear what “it” is. “It” may refer to the initial engagement. 
In that case, there is only one letter and only luz knows that the mar-
riage does not occur. however, “it” may also refer to the fact that the 
marriage did not take place. In that case, there were two letters, and the 
soldier did know about the ending of the engagement, thereby allowing 
single focalization on the soldier.
 In any case, the work’s profile of ambiguity extends to narration. 
That ambiguity is not only a matter of aspects of the storyworld. It bears 
on the nature of the work’s focalization.
 Indeed, even an affective focalization of the story on the soldier 
embeds an affective topicalization of luz. Specifically, the soldier’s own 
affective focus is on the feelings and plans of luz—her story, in effect. 
This leaves both the focalization and the topicalization available for 
interpretation and reader response—one as a “surface affective focal-
ization”; the other as an “embedded affective topicalization.” for exam-
ple, many readers undoubtedly suspect that the soldier’s affair with the 
salesgirl is not an expression of lust, but something more like revenge, 
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an attack aimed at luz, even if it is never communicated to her. perhaps 
more significantly, there is sympathy in the narrator’s treatment of luz’s 
abandonment by the major and a lingering sense of attachment that 
highlights her loneliness after the soldier leaves. That, in turn, may com-
plicate the understanding of the gender ideology of the work (thus the 
Critical discourse analysis of the work). This topic will come up again in 
relation to real readers and critics.
The Implied Reader, Sahṛdayas, and Gaps
as already indicated, the implied reader is parallel to the implied author. 
Indeed, one could see the implied reader, first of all, as a version of 
the implied author. (The afterword will show that the implied author–
implied reader relation is more complex than this indicates, but the gen-
eralization is a useful starting point.) The implied reader is, in this sense, 
a receptive attitude that may be adopted by real readers in keeping with 
the receptive intention of the author. put differently, when one stud-
ies literature and learns how to read more competently (to use Culler’s 
term [see Structuralist 113–30 and “Competence”]), one of the things 
one learns is how to approximate the experience of an implied reader/
implied author. fundamentally, this involves such things as encoding 
certain features of a text, drawing particular sorts of inference, paying 
attention to certain aspects of a work, and asking particular kinds of 
questions.
 To examine this process more fully, one needs to consider some of the 
cognitive operations involved in reading and understanding/response. 
like authors, readers tacitly encode and process some features of texts 
but not others. In part, this encoding is enabled by attentional orienta-
tion. Cognitive structures, such as scripts and prototypes, partially guide 
attentional orientation as well as the processing of encoded informa-
tion (a point stressed by herman; see chapter 3 of Story).
 Imagine, for example, that Jones is watching a crime drama. one 
character is eating at an Indian restaurant, consuming delectable-seem-
ing dum aloo and lamb saag. having begun his slimming program that 
morning, Jones is famished after three meals of celery and radishes. he 
stares longingly at the steaming cubes of meat smothered in delicate, 
creamy spinach, the crumbling, crimson bits of potato, the crisp papa-
dum (which, when it breaks, makes a sound like kisses). Someone enters 
and murders the character at his dinner (at least he died happy). but 
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Jones never lifts his eyes from the plate and thus does not know the iden-
tity of the murderer. as a result, he never understands the tension or the 
tragedy of the rest of the story, in which an innocent man is framed for 
the murder. In this case, he has failed to orient his attention properly, 
which is to say, he has deviated from the norm of the implied reader (or 
implied viewer) with respect to attention.
 a less crude example might be the following. In watching detec-
tive stories, one general principle readers acquire is to pay attention 
to—thus encode and store—any distinguishing features of any charac-
ters. one character may have a tendency to use a certain phrase (e.g., 
“you know”). another may sometimes make a particular nervous ges-
ture (e.g., rubbing his nose). a third may drag his foot ever so slightly 
when he walks. It would be easy to ignore these features, particularly 
if they are not foregrounded. (If the filmmaker cuts to a close-up of a 
character’s nose when he rubs it in a nervous gesture, then one does not 
have to be paying particular attention to encode it.) but, having seen a 
number of detective stories, one learns that these are just the sorts of 
clue that may be important later in the story. one learns, furthermore, 
that the clues are likely to be covered up. This leads to more complex 
forms of attention—roughly, attention to absence (which is extremely 
difficult to maintain). If the criminal drags his foot slightly, then one 
should become more suspicious of any suspect who only sits or stands—
but never walks—when the detective is present (and the viewer sees him 
or her).
 The implied reader is, first of all, the norm (established by the 
implied author) that involves this sort of encoding and processing. 
but that is, so to speak, the mechanical part of the implied reader. The 
implied reader, like the implied author, also imagines and feels. as, for 
example, roman Ingarden stressed, readers “concretize” what they read. 
readers fill things in perceptually, and emotionally. readers do not sim-
ply rely on the basic statements of a text. They expand and particularize. 
They imagine how a character feels at a particular moment, they tacitly 
envision what he or she looks like, and so on. like the encoding of a text, 
this is only in part a matter of self-conscious reflection. for example, one 
may not realize that one has imagined a character’s appearance until 
one sees a movie version and says, “That’s not at all the way I pictured 
Gallstone.” here as elsewhere this imagination is probably the result of 
a confluence of memories, a network of past perceptions that results 
in one’s tacitly assuming certain features. The same point holds for the 
simulation of character emotions.
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 moreover, readers not only imagine appearances and simulate emo-
tions, they experience emotions themselves. This is obviously true of 
real readers. but it is also true for implied readers. Stowe creates her 
portrait of Tom in Uncle Tom’s Cabin in order to produce compassion. 
That compassionate response is part of the implied reader. of course a 
real reader may have any number of responses. he or she may find the 
portrait maudlin and be repulsed; he or she may delight in the suffer-
ing of someone else; he or she may be bored and indifferent. but the 
norm established by the text is one of compassion. again, that norm does 
not mean that the real reader must actually feel what the implied reader 
feels. It means that the real reader should understand that there is a par-
ticular normative emotion. moreover, it means that there is some fail-
ure when the real reader does not experience the same emotion as the 
implied reader. The failure may be in the reader or in the text.
 leaving aside the case where the fault is in the text, it is worth con-
sidering what is going on with the implied reader with respect to emo-
tional response. Clearly, actual emotional response is not simply a 
matter of inference or encoding. again, a reader may perfectly under-
stand that Tom is supposed to inspire compassion, and yet not feel com-
passion. Compassion in these cases is the result of two primary factors. 
first, there is the imaginative effort to simulate the experiences of the 
character. I might know that Stowe wishes me to empathize with Tom, 
but I may simply fail to simulate Tom’s condition. Second, there is the 
complex of emotional memories that are cyclically activated by and, in 
turn, guide the further development of such empathy—such as memories 
of physical pain or discrimination.
 This leads to a particularly interesting and complex feature of the 
implied reader. The implied reader has such memories. When the real 
author judges that the work has the right receptive impact—that is, 
when he or she is satisfied with the work as an implied author—he or 
she tacitly assumes that the reader will experience a range of emotional 
memories and that these will enable his or her emotional response to the 
work. Without those memories, the real reader will not be able to take 
up the emotional role of the implied reader. for example, when portray-
ing someone suffering, an author tacitly assumes that readers will have 
their own memories of suffering that will contribute to their emotional 
response.
 of course, the particular memories of real readers are necessarily dif-
ferent. In keeping with this, one may distinguish a relatively fixed part 
of the implied reader. This part involves, among other things, encod-
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ing, attentional orientation, and cognitive structures (such as scripts) 
that guide processing. of course, this is not entirely fixed. but there 
seems to be relative uniformity here. In contrast, there is a more sig-
nificantly variable part as well—memories and what follows from memo-
ries, including concretization. This variable part of the implied reader 
suggests, for example, why certain works are more likely to inspire an 
intense response at one age, but not at another. Some works rely on 
emotional memories that are most intense when one is young. others 
rely on emotional memories that develop significantly only in later life.
 on the other hand, to say that particular emotional memories and 
concretizations are variable is not to say that there are no commonali-
ties. Indeed, the very possibility of the implied authorial response pre-
supposes such commonality. In order to understand this, it is necessary 
to consider emotional response to fiction more fully.
 first of all, to some extent, genuinely personal memories are not 
wholly idiosyncratic. for example, virtually everyone has experienced 
some sort of attachment loss and virtually everyone has experienced 
fear, anger, and sadness in connection with that loss. The precise pro-
portion of those emotions may be different, and that may affect individ-
ual responses to a story treating attachment loss. however, it is not the 
case that one’s personal emotional memories all treat wholly individual 
types of experience.
 moreover, in treating emotional response in relation to emotional 
memories, I have been tacitly relying on the work of the great tenth-cen-
tury Sanskrit theorist abhinavagupta, along with more recent cognitive 
developments of his ideas.36 abhinavagupta stressed that these memo-
ries are drawn not only from personal life but from literature—and, one 
might add, other aspects of culture—as well. In this sense, the memo-
ries presupposed by the implied author (for the implied reader) may also 
concern more directly common experiences. Crucially, they include a 
partially shared body of literature. This is part of the reason why lack of 
familiarity with a literary tradition may inhibit one’s ability to respond 
emotionally to works in that tradition.
 In keeping with Sanskrit poetic theory generally, abhinavagupta 
took up the term “sahṛdaya”—explained as one who enters “into iden-
tity with the heart of the poet” (Gnoli xlivn; more technically, one might 
say “the implied poet”). he used this term to refer to the reader who has 
the appropriate cognitive orientation and emotional experience, both 
literary and personal, and who makes the right effort in responding to 
the literary work. one could in principle take the implied reader to be 
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a sahṛdaya. However, it is perhaps more useful to interpret the implied 
reader more minimally. Thus one might say that the implied reader cor-
rectly understands the storyworld, thematic concerns, and normative 
emotions of the work. The sahṛdaya, in contrast, feels the appropriate 
emotions in response to the work.
 There are two things to say about the idea of appropriate emo-
tions. first, these are related to the receptive response of the implied 
author. however, they are not necessarily determined by that receptive 
response. Just as one can reasonably complain that an author misun-
derstood his or her own characters, one can reasonably complain that 
an author has responded inappropriately to his or her storyworld. Thus 
the sahṛdaya is a sort of “ideal reader” in the sense that he or she is 
emotionally sensitive to the concerns of the implied author. (This 
usage obviously takes up a term used by earlier narratologists, such as 
prince [see “Introduction”], while giving it a somewhat different mean-
ing.) but his or her responses need not necessarily coincide with those 
of the implied author. Second, the necessary variability in individual 
emotional experience means that a range of responses may manifest 
emotional sensitivity. In other words, there is a, so to speak, profile of 
ambivalence in the sahṛdaya, with different readers fulfilling the func-
tion of the sahṛdaya somewhat differently. At the same time, the notion 
of a sahṛdaya suggests that there are norms. For example, regarding an 
antislavery novel, one may say that anger over the treatment of slaves, 
compassion for the slaves, disgust over collaboration with slave-owners 
and other responses are all part of the normative profile of ambivalence 
and different real readers may fulfill the role of sahṛdaya in feeling one 
or the other more strongly. however, most readers would probably be 
inclined to say that a response of complete indifference or of Schaden-
freude at the slaves’ suffering would fall outside the norms defined by 
the sahṛdaya.
 Up to this point, the analysis has focused primarily on spontaneous 
processes that may or may not reach conscious awareness. but read-
ers also engage in self-conscious, effortful processes. This is important 
because readers’ processing of works is not straightforward, unproblem-
atic, and uniform. It is often marked by bafflement, questions, reconsid-
erations. moreover, that is not merely incidental. Such responses are a 
central part of one’s understanding of literature; the communicative dis-
course of literature does not occur without it.37
 drawing on Wolfgang Iser’s terminology, one may say that read-
ing or viewing processes encounter gaps, points at which one’s sponta-
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neous processing falters. Typically, this is due to a contradiction in or 
lack related to information or emotion. The real reader must then con-
sider this contradiction or lack in relation to the implied reader/implied 
author. Specifically, he or she must determine whether the contradic-
tion or lack is his or her own (i.e., whether it lies in the real reader), 
whether it is a matter of the implied reader (the case Iser had in mind), 
or whether it is a matter of the real author (thus some sort of error or 
flaw). It is worth considering each of these.
 an informational contradiction or lack in the reader is probably the 
simplest case. for example, many readers of hemingway’s story simply 
do not know what “arditi” refers to. Thus they come upon a reference 
to “arditi” and experience a contradiction between the implied reader 
assumed by the implied author (an implied reader who understands the 
reference) and their own knowledge. This gives rise to working-memory-
based reflection. In this case, the problem is readily resolved by simply 
looking up the reference.
 an emotional contradiction or lack is more complex. There is an 
emotional lack when one’s experience simply does not give one the emo-
tional responsiveness to react appropriately to a particular feature of a 
narrative. for example, I recently read Jhumpa lahiri’s The Namesake. 
lahiri treats the experience of a woman in labor. The manner in which 
the section is developed indicates to me that it is supposed to be highly 
emotional. however, I am largely emotionally indifferent to the passage. 
This suggests some sort of fault. either lahiri has failed to communicate 
the emotion of the scene adequately, or I am lacking in sensitivity to 
the events, due in part to an absence of emotional memories. Given the 
response of others to the novel, I am forced to conclude that the emo-
tional lack is in me and the force of the section is different for women 
and men who have been more intimately involved with giving birth.38
 In other cases, informational or emotional contradictions may be 
attributed to the real author. There are many ways in which this may be 
the case. It is valuable to distinguish two. The first is a flaw in knowledge 
or craft on the part of the author. This bears on the aesthetic value of the 
work. The second is a broader, ideological contradiction, thus the sort of 
gap stressed by marxist writers such as althusser and balibar (symptom-
atic invisibility; see, for example, 25–27) or macherey (incompleteness; see, 
for example, 130–35). This sort of gap bears on the political or ethical 
value of the work.
 Instances of the first sort include cases where one would say that an 
author misunderstood his own character. an example may be found in 
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Born of the Sun by Joseph diescho (with Celeste Wallin). This novel con-
cerns a Kavango man, muronga, who travels from his village in namibia 
to work in the South african mines. diescho (with Wallin) makes a great 
deal of muronga’s belief that airplanes are birds. This leads him to fear 
that he will be eaten by them and to believe that he is inside a bird when 
he boards a plane. Some readers may not question this. however, the 
sequence seems obtrusively implausible. first, muronga is fully familiar 
with cars, carts, trucks, and trains. Thus he has some concept of man-
made vehicles; he does not believe, for example, that trucks are some 
sort of elephant. Second, muronga maintains his belief that it is a bird 
even after he boards and travels in a plane. These contradictions lead 
me as a reader to conclude that diescho (with Wallin) has failed in the 
imagination of muronga’s capacities for inference and understanding. as 
such, there is a flaw in the imagination of the character, which is to say, 
an aesthetic flaw in the novel.
 In reflecting on the characterization in this way, I am confin-
ing myself to the text. however, one might also expand consideration 
beyond the text to, for example, the suggested inferential and imagina-
tive capacities of illiterate african villagers. In this context, one might 
infer that, despite general political commitments and sympathies, die-
scho (with Wallin) has been guided by an ideologically consequential 
misunderstanding of such villagers. Thus the gap is not only aesthetic, 
but also ideological.
 for most students of literature, the most interesting and significant 
gaps in a literary work are not to be found in the inadequacies of the 
reader or the author. They are, rather, internal to the text itself. They are 
part of the experience of the implied reader. as such, they are moments 
where the text provokes hermeneutic reflection. This is broadly the sort 
of gap that Iser had in mind. as he explains, gaps give rise to a “frus-
tration of expectations” that “blocks the flow of sentences” such that 
“we are led off in unexpected directions” and “bring into play our own 
faculty for establishing connections” (279–80). The reflection provoked 
by a gap may concern character motivation, the causes of a particular 
event, the nature of social relations within the fictional society, or a wide 
range of other topics. In this way, they affect one’s precise construal of 
the story from the discourse, as well as one’s emotional response to that 
story. no less important, such moments of reflective consideration often 
bear on the thematic concerns of a literary work, thus the ethical impli-
cations of the work for one’s daily life or its political implications for 
one’s social relations.
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 There are numerous gaps in the hemingway story. one of the most 
obvious is the entire development of the marriage of luz and the major. 
on first reading, I suspect most readers imagine that luz’s engagement 
with the major was fixed. however, the phrasing is equivocal. The narra-
tor says that the major courted luz and luz writes in the letter that “she 
expected . . . to be married in the spring.” readers are actually given 
contradictory clues here. The word “expected” suggests that there has 
not been a formal engagement. however, the reference to a particular 
time for the wedding suggests that there has been such an engagement, 
since the time of the wedding would hardly be determined before the 
couple decided to get married at all. one can resolve this by interpreting 
the sentence to mean that they were definitely getting married, but that 
the uncertainty (indicated by the word, “expected”) only concerned the 
precise timing. on the other hand, this is qualified by the fact that the 
marriage never took place. There is, of course, no logical contradiction 
between a fixed engagement and no subsequent marriage. however, the 
latter does bear on one’s reflective interpretation and one may conclude 
that there never was a formal engagement. perhaps luz falsely inferred 
that they would marry, or perhaps they spoke informally about it, but 
never went through the formal process—for example, issuing the mar-
riage banns mentioned earlier in the story.
 The gap is not inconsequential. Thematically, it points toward a sort 
of contradiction in engagement and marriage themselves. on the one 
hand, marriage suggests equality of the partners—such equality that 
they can even be spoken of as, in some sense, “one.” but the real human 
relations of the couple almost always involve some degree of inequal-
ity or dominance. That inequality renders the union unstable. Indeed, in 
this story, the dominated partner apparently overestimates the stabil-
ity of the relationship in both cases. In keeping with this, the dominant 
partner ends that relationship—luz breaks things off with the soldier, 
and the major ends his relationship with luz. moreover, the inequality is 
itself unstable. When luz is thrown over by the major, it may be that she 
writes to the soldier about it. In another gap, the reader is not told what 
she wrote (if she did write). but he or she might reflectively infer that 
luz expressed penitence over her action, perhaps even hinting at a rec-
onciliation. If so, she is no longer the dominant one in the relationship. 
as newly dominant, the soldier now forecloses the possibility of reestab-
lishing his relationship with luz, first by not responding to her letter 
and second by choosing a new partner.
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 It is important to note that gaps may be emotional rather than infor-
mational. oliver hirschbiegel’s film Der Untergang provides numerous 
examples. The film concerns hitler’s last days and often portrays hit-
ler and his associates as much more normal and human than one would 
expect. Contradictions arise between the film’s cultivation of empathy 
with some of the characters and most viewers’ prior emotional attitude 
toward the historical figures they represent. Goebbels is perhaps the 
most striking instance. Goebbels had a central role in some of the most 
unspeakable acts of brutality in human history. yet the film portrays 
him as a man with tender familial attachments and, most importantly, 
with a love for and devotion to hitler that outweigh any self-interest. In 
contrast with some other prominent nazi leaders, he remains committed 
to hitler even when it is clear that defeat is imminent. The film portrays 
that loyalty as admirable, even though it is loyalty to perhaps the worst 
mass-murderer in history.
 for many viewers, this portrayal is likely to generate a contradiction 
with their prior emotional response to Goebbels as a historical figure. 
as such, it produces a gap, something incompatible and unreconciled, 
that requires reflective consideration. In this case, the norm for this 
reflection is not entirely clear. one could view the film as partially reha-
bilitating some nazi figures. elsewhere in the film, there is a benevo-
lent physician, also based on a historical figure, who could be cited as 
evidence for this view. my inclination, however, is to take the implied 
author/implied reader as simply assuming that nothing about Nazism 
should or could be rehabilitated. The thematic project is, rather, two-
fold. first, it is to suggest that even the worst atrocities committed by 
people are still committed by people. The nazis were human, however 
much one would like to deny it. They were not some sort of mutants 
with no relation to people today. Thus we cannot so easily segregate 
their crimes from actions we ourselves undertake. Second, the film 
points to some of the reasons for these atrocities. It may or may not 
be accurate in the case of Goebbels, and that is not insignificant. but 
the point, I take it, is not to exculpate him. It is, rather, to indicate that 
one cause of a complete obliviousness to the cruelty of one’s actions—
actions that, in the case of Goebbels, extend even to murdering all his 
children—can result from one’s complete emotional subordination to 
another person, a subordination in which all one’s motivations and 
understandings come to rest on the motivations and understandings of 
that other person.
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The Real Reader and the Critic
The consideration of gaps and reflection clearly leads to both the real 
reader and the critic. The real reader, after all, is the one who engages 
in reflection, even if it is reflection that in part seeks to ascertain the 
norm of the implied reader—though it may also be reflection that evalu-
ates the author or the real reader himself or herself. The critic, in turn, 
is the one who systematizes and elaborates the interpretive inferences, 
as well as the aesthetical and ethical evaluations, produced by reflection. 
Indeed, these are probably the central functions of the real reader and 
the critic, insofar as they are of general interest.
 nonetheless, there still are a few things that it is worth adding about 
both the real reader and the critic. first, it is important to stress once 
again that the norm provided by the implied reader is a norm of compre-
hension, not of actual response. most critics would probably be inclined 
to say that a reader does not understand a work if he or she mistakes 
the implied reader—for example, if he or she sees Der Untergang as rep-
resenting loyalty in a bad light, thus preferring the nazi leaders who 
abandoned hitler. however, readers are entirely free to diverge from 
the implied reader emotionally—or even inferentially, insofar as this 
bears on character autonomy and related matters. In other words, there 
is no need for viewers of Der Untergang to sympathize with Goebbels or 
even to understand his behavior as driven by loyalty (rather than, say, 
an inability to think of any way to save himself). The same points hold 
for the sahṛdaya. Readers may recognize and reject the emotional sen-
sitivities assumed by the implied author. (as this phrasing suggests, one 
might think of such a rejection as denying the implied author’s assump-
tions about the ideally sensitive reader, rather than rejecting such an 
ideal itself. for example, one might say that a truly sensitive viewer 
would not sympathize with a mass murderer such as Goebbels, no mat-
ter what the film’s implied author may assume.)
 Indeed, in recent decades, feminist and other politically engaged the-
orists have often advocated that a reader should be “resistant.” In terms 
of the present analysis, one could say that such a reader would not adopt 
the position of the implied reader, but would oppose it in certain key 
respects. like response generally, such resistance can either be spon-
taneous or self-conscious. for example, sometimes theorists and critics 
suggest that women, directly as a result of being women, are resistant 
readers for patriarchal texts. This indicates that women will spontane-
ously reject the adoption of the implied reader’s ideas or attitudes inso-
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far as these are guided by patriarchal ideology. In contrast, some critics 
would accept the basic marxist view that class (or sex) origin does not 
determine class (or sex) stance. In other words, one’s membership in a 
certain group does not determine one’s attitude toward social issues con-
cerning that group. rather, a stance must be cultivated. In this respect, 
one might say that feminist resistance is a reflective opposition to the 
implied reader.
 The culmination of reflective analysis is found in the systematic 
interpretive and evaluative practices of critics, in particular theoreti-
cally oriented critics. Critics set out to do two things. first, they examine 
and articulate features of a work to which readers respond un-self-con-
sciously, features that readers encode and process, but do not formulate 
explicitly.39 In this way, critics are parallel to linguists, who describe and 
explain the features of speech spontaneously produced and unself-con-
sciously understood by speakers and hearers of a language. but critics 
go beyond this also. They seek to isolate features of the work in order to 
change spontaneous readings, in order to produce either further encod-
ing on the part of readers or different processing. In connection with 
this, critics often seek to make gaps salient in order to produce further 
reflection on the part of readers. These critical undertakings may con-
tribute to the development of readers’ experiences of a work (e.g., their 
response to its emotional force), their interpretive comprehension of the 
story or its thematic concerns, their evaluative judgment of its aesthetic 
or political/ethical value, even their acceptance of or resistance to the 
norms of the implied reader.
 In summary, it is possible to give a more complete version of the dia-
gram presented earlier for the communicative part of discourse:
real author [Implied author, guided by partially “autonomous” imag-
ined agents [Nonpersonified Narrator {Personified Narrator {Focalizer 
{Topicalizer}} Personified Narratee} Nonpersonified Narratee] Implied 
Reader/Sahṛdaya] Real Reader/Critic
he preceding discussion of discourse is, of course, far from exhaus-
tive. There is a great deal more to say about each of its components. 
This chapter and the next take up some complications and extensions of 
implied authorship. Specifically, the present chapter examines the con-
sequences of bringing the idea of implied authorship into the analysis of 
works in two other media—painting and cinema. as with other aspects 
of discourse, one would expect the idea of an implied author to have 
consequences outside its original domain of narrative fiction. however, 
critics and theorists rarely extend the concept beyond novels and short 
stories. That is unfortunate, because a broader application should com-
plicate and enhance the theoretical understanding of the implied author 
(and other aspects of discourse) while simultaneously deepening com-
prehension of and response to nonliterary works. In other words, such 
an extension should challenge and improve ideas in both areas.
 This chapter first takes up the relevance of narratological discourse 
analysis for painting.1, 2 focusing on some of rabindranath Tagore’s work, 
it considers such theoretical issues as what an implied painter may be 
and what relation the implied painter may have to a narrator in paint-
ing. In connection with this, it explores the consequences of “implied 
paintership” for interpreting Tagore’s famously enigmatic works. These 
paintings have been widely admired, but infrequently analyzed, and, 
it seems, rarely understood. many years ago, asok mitra pointed out 
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that the center of Tagore’s creative work shifted to painting in his later 
years. for this reason, it is crucial to understand Tagore’s paintings if 
one wishes to gain an understanding of Tagore. moreover, mitra main-
tained that Tagore is “one of the greatest painters we shall ever have” 
(62). Thus, understanding his painting is intrinsically important as well.
 one of the main conclusions of the first part of this chapter is that 
there is a level of interpretive relevance, thus cognitive unity or pat-
terning, above the individual work—the level of an author’s or painter’s 
canon. Thus, just as one may refer to the implied author of an individual 
text, one may also refer to the “cross-textual implied author” of a body 
of works. This concept is obviously closely related to the idea of a film 
“auteur.”3 on the one hand, this link with auteurism confirms the signifi-
cance of the cross-textual implied author. on the other hand, there are 
well-known problems with the idea of a film auteur. These arise primar-
ily due to the highly collaborative nature of film production. The sec-
ond half of the chapter examines some of these problems. It begins with 
a discussion of how the receptive account of authorial intent resolves 
some of the more obvious dilemmas about auteurism. nonetheless, dif-
ficulties remain. These lead to a partial reformulation of the idea of a 
cross-textual implied author and, indeed, a partial reunderstanding of 
authorial receptive intent.
Painting as a Challenge to Narrative Discourse Analysis
The differences between painting and verbal narrative appear so obvious 
and extensive that one may ask whether they should even be compared. 
What can be learned by bringing together such disparate phenomena? 
In fact, there are considerable continuities between verbal narrative and 
representational painting. moreover, they are continuities that fit well 
with narratological concerns. but there are, of course, crucial differences 
as well. The similarities indicate the possibilities for extending discourse 
analysis to paintings. The differences suggest the possibilities for alter-
ing and developing discourse analysis through this extension.
repreSenTaTIonal paInTInG aS narraTIve dISCoUrSe
for present purposes, the most fundamental connection between ver-
bal and visual art is that representational works imply a represented 
66 | Chapter 2
world. viewers do not simply see that represented world directly. They 
construe it by processing the information given on the canvas. In short, 
there is a discourse and an inferred world—perhaps not a story in the 
restricted, prototypical sense, but something at least parallel to a story-
world. moreover, the purposes of this construal are the same as in verbal 
art—emotional response and thematic reflection.
 a wide range of examples could be cited to illustrate these points. 
obviously didactic works come to mind, such as picasso’s Guernica or 
Goya’s Third of May. These are clearly painted to inspire aversive emo-
tions in viewers—horror, anger, disgust, fear—and to connect those 
aversive emotions with a normative/thematic condemnation of the vio-
lence they represent. The entire range of devotional paintings and sculp-
tures fits here as well—Christian depictions of Jesus’s crucifixion, hindu 
paintings of Rāma or Kṛṣṇa, and so on. These foster feelings of devotion 
(bhakti, in the hindu lexicon) and thematically suggest the divinity, as 
well as the humanity, of their subjects.
 of course, the thematic point of a painting is not always entirely 
clear or open to formulation in precise, unequivocal terms. perhaps it 
is never so, except in the crudest instances of propaganda. but that too 
only means that it is like literature.
 needless to say, not all works of visual art have thematic implica-
tions. but, if they do not have thematic implications, then their raison 
d’être derives from something else—emotional effect. here, too, the emo-
tional effect is of two sorts. The first relates to the storyworld. I see a 
lover touching his beloved—say, a couple kissing in a painting by Cha-
gall—and, as a result of emotional memories or facial mirroring,4 I feel 
some of their joy. The second is related to the discourse. In part, this is 
a matter of “narration,” for example, the visual perspective—is the sub-
ject close or distant, facing toward or away from the viewer, seen from 
above or below? It is also in part a matter of how much information one 
is given, thus, roughly, the plot: does the painting suggest events that 
preceded or will follow? To what extent are these unequivocal, and to 
what extent will any tension (or suspense) aroused by the work remain 
unresolved?5
 of course, there is still the issue of narrative as a sequence of caus-
ally linked events. after all, representational art is not necessarily sto-
rytelling art. Indeed, narrative painting proper—in the sense of painting 
that sets out to represent even two or three episodes from a story—is 
clearly not the most ordinary form of painting (though it is not as rare as 
one might initially believe).6 on the other hand, the paintings mentioned 
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above are clearly embedded in narratives. Guernica and The Third of May 
depict moments from larger historical stories of violence. The point is 
obviously crucial for their thematic import. If the pain in Guernica simply 
arose, then disappeared, with no cause or consequence, it would be con-
fusing rather than damnable. If there were no story of fascist bombard-
ment, there would be nothing to condemn. The point holds no less for 
the emotional impact of a work. The initial emotional force of a particu-
lar painting or sculpture may derive from a facial expression or bodily 
posture. but as one reflects on the work, one must be able to elaborate 
on it imaginatively, bringing it into connection with a wider range of 
precedents and consequences. The point holds no less obviously for the 
depictions of Jesus crucified, or paintings of Kṛṣṇa and Rādhā, which sug-
gest their surrounding stories.
 needless to say, not all such surrounding stories are elaborated and 
particularized. In some cases, narrative reconstruction is more general 
and prototypical. but it is still there. for example, it may seem that one 
does not engage in narrative elaboration around a work such as Cha-
gall’s The Birthday. but in fact one does, even if one is not self-consciously 
aware of it. viewers so readily integrate the episode into a prototypical 
romantic narrative and a prototypical set of birthday events that they 
may not even notice they have done so.
 In this respect, paintings are very similar to lyric poems. lyric poems 
often represent junctural moments in implicit narratives.7 a junctural 
moment is a moment of particular emotional intensity associated with 
a change in a character’s pursuit of goals (e.g., when lovers are sepa-
rated). It seems that moments of particular emotional intensity are often 
isolated for representation in paintings.8 moreover, these frequently do 
seem to be narrative junctures—as in the cases of the crucifixion, or the 
dance of Kṛṣṇa and his beloved gopī devotees.9
 In these respects, then, visual art is well-suited for comparison with 
verbal art in terms of the components and operation of discourse. There 
are some clear and significant continuities across the two, continuities 
that are illuminated by narratological concepts. but, of course, this does 
not mean that there are not striking differences as well.
 perhaps the most significant difference between works of visual 
art and works of verbal art, even lyric poems—the difference stressed 
by lessing—is that paintings and sculptures are so severely limited in 
the time frame of explicit information. a lyric poem may focus on lov-
ers’ leave-taking. It may not even tell the reader anything outside the 
time of that leave-taking. but it can at least spread across the minutes 
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of that separation. a painting or sculpture is usually confined to an 
almost extensionless point in time. of course, it may give much more 
information about that single moment. but it remains confined to the 
moment nonetheless. The result is not simply a loss of information, but 
often a loss of specifically disambiguating information. moments may be 
embedded in many narratives. The differences in those narratives entail 
different understandings of the moment itself, different thematic impli-
cations, different emotional responses. Consider a photograph of people 
crying outside a church. one’s understanding and response are likely to 
change if one assumes it is after a funeral but is then told it is after a 
wedding.10
TWo paInTInGS by TaGore
To work out these implications of ambiguity in visual art, it is helpful 
to consider concrete cases. In some ways, Tagore’s paintings are par-
ticularly well suited to this task. In 1932, Joseph Southall wrote that 
“Tagore’s drawings constrain us to pause and ask ourselves anew, what 
is the purpose of drawing, of painting, of art generally?”11 one reason for 
Southall’s question is that Tagore was generally very nondirective in ori-
enting the viewer’s interpretation of his works. he did not title his paint-
ings, rarely dated them, and did not generally rely on standard stories, 
such as that of Kṛṣṇa and his gopīs. In considering Tagore’s paintings, 
a critic is likely to become acutely aware of just how important titles 
and shared topical allusions are.12 Knowing the story of Jesus, in the case 
of michelangelo’s Pietà, or having the title Guernica and the date of the 
painting, in the case of picasso’s work, are crucial for understanding the 
depiction, explicating the thematic concerns, and emotionally respond-
ing to these works. looking at Tagore’s art tends to highlight the ambi-
guity of individual paintings. at the same time, it may suggest ways to 
expand the understanding of individual works and further enrich the 
conception of discourse.
 The first piece to consider is plate 9 from robinson13 (fig. 2.1). It is 
an ink and watercolor work in black and shades of tan. The background, 
covering the top third of the paper, is a landscape, a horizon with foli-
age and hills. In the foreground, occupying the bottom two-thirds of the 
paper, there are nine figures. Though one or two may be female, these 
figures appear largely male. Immediately behind them is a black surface. 
The heads of the figures are just below the ground level of the landscape. 
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This suggests either a cliff or some sort of a tunnel. most of the figures 
are faceless; many are turned away from the viewer. figure three (from 
the left) seems to be walking with a staff. figure four seems to be sitting 
down or getting up, perhaps with difficulty. figure six is tensing away 
from the central figure (figure five). The central figure (five) is also the 
highest, giving him an apparent position of authority. he sits with his 
hands on his thighs, his legs spread, looking in the direction of figures 
three and four. The smile on his relatively clear face does not appear 
benevolent. figure eight, the lowest, also has a clear face. he is concen-
trating on his work, which seems to involve hammering.
 a careful description of the picture suggests a few things. There may 
be some sort of hierarchy here. There is a dominant figure who is not 
working and who appears to have a rather unempathic attitude toward 
the other figures. The face of figure eight is likely to draw a viewer’s 
attention and interest. but his facial expression does not seem to have 
much emotional force. Indeed, figure six may be the most emotionally 
communicative. but it is difficult to say precisely what his apparently 
tensed muscles and withdrawal express—or even if they are genuinely 
tensed muscles and withdrawal. To complicate matters further, the 
seated figures seem to blend with blocks on which they are sitting as if 
they are not people at all but statues.
 different titles or stories would help to disambiguate this work. but 
there is no title (say, “Johannesburg,” suggesting South african gold 
mines) or story. Thus the picture remains disturbingly ambiguous. but 
that does not imply that one can make nothing of it. The figures are not, 
say, lovers; the place is not a battlefield. The painting allows a number of 
interpretations and a number of emotional responses. but some are nor-
matively excluded. moreover, of those that are not excluded, some seem 
more likely than others.
 as indicated in the introduction, works of art—both verbal and 
visual—are all to some extent ambiguous. That ambiguity may involve 
a limited range of closely related and highly plausible interpretations, a 
broad range of interpretations with low plausibility, or some other con-
figuration. again, each work has a profile of ambiguity rather than a strict, 
unequivocal meaning. Indeed, some of the effects of artworks rely on 
just that ambiguity. my own engagement with plate 9 (fig. 2.1) is in part 
a matter of the way my mind runs through the different alternative con-
struals of the figures, their relations and possible actions.
 on the other hand, this does not mean that ambiguity is a good in 
itself. In fact, generally, when viewing paintings, viewers engage in strat-
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egies to reduce ambiguity. after all, when it becomes too great, ambi-
guity ceases to be intriguing and becomes simply disorienting. most of 
these strategies involve embedding the work in a larger, relatively well-
established set of meanings, usually linguistic or semilinguistic. again, 
titles and well-known stories come to mind. The stories may be signaled 
by various sorts of allusion or by iconography (e.g., in Indian tradition, 
blue skin and a flute indicate Kṛṣṇa).
 another obvious alternative is symbolism (cf. Wolf 432). This oper-
ates most straightforwardly when the symbols are already socially estab-
lished and fairly clear. for example, the use of a halo to represent a saint 
or buddha is immediately identifiable. Such a symbol is, in fact, virtually 
linguistic since it has been assigned a conventional meaning. Interpreta-
tion of putative symbolism that does not rely on established convention 
is more problematic. The lack of disambiguating information in Tagore’s 
paintings has led a number of critics to rely on symbolism. but, as robin-
son rightly remarks, the results are questionable (56).
 Two concepts that seem potentially more appropriate for interpret-
ing paintings are metaphor and dhvani. dhvani, or “suggestion,” is a 
fundamental concept of Sanskrit literary theory. It refers to the associa-
tive network that surrounds a word, image, event, or any other topic. 
That associative network includes emotional memories and therefore it 
is a crucial component in producing rasa (usually translated as “senti-
ment”), the emotional response to a work of art (see bharatamuni for 
the foundational discussion). The difficulty with both metaphor and 
dhvani (including rasadhvani, dhvani that produces rasa) is that these 
are as ambiguous as the rest of the work. It seems very likely that the 
cavelike area in Tagore’s painting has metaphorical resonances. one can 
begin to suggest what some of those resonances might be (e.g., burial). 
but one needs a better sense of the painting as a whole before one can 
infer which possible metaphorical meanings are plausible and which are 
not—or even just what their target might be, what any metaphor might 
apply to (e.g., just what might be buried).
 here, it is useful to consider a second work, plate 156 (fig. 2.2), an ink 
drawing of six women. The background is black, suggesting a night sky. 
The foreground is black and white, suggesting the ground at night. The 
women are all seated on the ground. each is clothed in an apparently 
single piece of cloth. figures one, two, four, and five have their heads 
uncovered. The colors of their clothes are also similar. figures one and 
four have a sort of batik print. figures two and five have a blackened red 
garment.
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 figures three and six stand out from the rest. They have their heads 
covered. moreover, their clothing is distinctive. figure three is in dark 
blue; figure six is in a bright rose and red. These figures are also placed 
highest on the paper. figure six is further differentiated by the fact that 
her skin is noticeably darker than that of the other women. more signifi-
cantly, figure three is the only one who is facing the viewer. The other 
five women are turned away.
 figure three draws particular attention. She rests her head in her 
hand in a gesture that seems sorrowful. but there is no face beneath her 
head covering, just a tan oval. So, here again, one encounters ambiguity 
or at least uncertainty. This woman is not precisely central (the number 
of figures being even). but she is approximately centered and is, very 
slightly, the highest on the paper, the tip of her head rising just above 
that of figure six. She is thus roughly parallel to the central figure in 
the first work (plate 9/Fig. 2.1). But the differences are striking. While 
the central man is genuinely central, the “central” woman is not. While 
the central man sits erect and angular, the woman gently curves down-
ward. While the central man smiles as he looks at the others (who may 
be in pain), the woman presents the viewer with no face, but a sorrowful 
gesture.
 moreover, as already noted, the figure to the right of the central man 
seemed to be pulling away painfully. In contrast, the woman to the right 
of the focal female figure is actually leaning toward her, pressing her 
shoulder against the focal figure’s back. The relation between the contig-
uous male figures seems to suggest fear. In contrast, the relation between 
the contiguous female figures seems to suggest warmth, attachment.
 one may begin to get a sense here that plate 9 (fig. 2.1) is, narratively 
and thematically, a painting about a world of hierarchy and mutual iso-
lation, largely a world of men. It is also about labor, as suggested by the 
man with the hammer. In contrast, plate 156 (fig. 2.2) suggests mutual 
connection, but also sorrow, in a group of women. This fits with a 
broader sense of Tagore as an author. his stories, poems, plays, and nov-
els recur continually to the condition of women in India, to their con-
straints and trials. Thus one would expect to find these concerns once 
more in his paintings. as Satyajit ray wrote, in painting, Tagore’s “spe-
cial field remained the study of women” (13).
 one recurring motif in Tagore’s treatment of women was their physi-
cal confinement within the home, their constraint to live in the inner 
rooms, away from light and life.14 once one remembers this, the blank 
darkness of the background in plate 156 (fig. 2.2) takes on new reso-
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nances. The background for the men is the open horizon of the world. 
even if they have sunk themselves in some sort of tunnel, the light is 
there, available to them. The women face only an impenetrable wall of 
black.
 of course, none of this entirely disambiguates either work. how-
ever, it begins to give the viewer a sense of what their thematic concerns 
are, as well as their implied narratives. The story of the men, it seems, 
concerns pride in social hierarchy—perhaps even Schadenfreude—and 
interpersonal fear in the public world; the story of the women, it seems, 
concerns attachment and sorrow in the home.
CroSS-TeXTUal ImplIed aUThorS, moTIfS, and 
oTher ComplICaTIonS of vISUal dISCoUrSe
These feelings and themes will be considered again below, along with 
other aspects of the second work particularly. for now, it is valuable to 
isolate a few implications of the analysis thus far. The first and most cru-
cial involves the scope of evidence cited in the preceding interpretations. 
most obviously, the preceding analysis took up recurring issues in Tago-
re’s writing and painting. This may seem to suggest a return to the real, 
biographical author and a rejection of the implied author, but it does 
not. It is very different to look at Tagore’s other works for disambigu-
ating information and to look at, say, his private family life.15 In effect, 
when looking at Tagore’s other works, one is appealing to the implied 
authorship of those works and assuming a certain degree of continuity 
across that implied authorship. In this way, it is an extension of the idea 
of implied authorship to an entire canon of works. This may be referred 
to as cross-textual implied authorship.16
 The second implication of the preceding analysis is related. Indeed, 
it is the converse or “objective” side of the continuity in (subjective) 
implied authorship. The preceding examination of Tagore’s two pieces 
drew on recurring features in order to group the two works together. for 
example, both involve a planar composition of figures forming a single 
line parallel to the viewing space. This is in part a feature of the story-
world, since the men and women are arranged in that formation in the 
represented world. but it is also a discursive feature because it relies on 
a particular point of view given in the discourse. In this way, it is a recur-
ring complex of interrelated storyworld features and discourse features. 
one may refer to recurring complexes of features—from the storyworld, 
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the discourse, or both—as motifs. motifs may be of particular significance 
for interpretation, especially in cases where a work is highly ambiguous, 
as in Tagore’s paintings.
 The mention of point of view brings up a further feature of paint-
ings that is important and requires development before it is possible to 
continue with Tagore’s art. The precise point of view on the subject of a 
painting, like the precise choice of words in a text, is that of a narrator. 
here it is important to draw a couple of distinctions. first, it is valuable 
to distinguish perceptual from verbal (or, perhaps, semantic) narrators. 
films may have both, though they always have perceptual narrators. lit-
erary works have only verbal narrators. What about paintings? It may 
seem that paintings have only perceptual (specifically, visual) narrators. 
but things are more complicated. first, there are ways in which a work 
of visual art may suggest narratorial commentary through visual means. 
In other words, there are often suggestions that a visual image has been 
organized verbally, that it is not purely perceptual, but gives the viewer 
a perception designed in relation to speech. The use of well-established 
symbols, such as halos, provides a case of this sort. put simply, a viewer 
of, say, Jesus would not actually see a halo. The halo is, therefore, a nar-
ratorial comment, rather than a narratorial perception.
 more commonly, a work of visual art may use some amount of text. 
This occurs most obviously in titles. one’s default assumption about 
titles tends to be that they are the product of the implied author. but 
viewers can and do interpret titles ironically. That fact alone suggests 
that titles are best understood as spoken by a narrator, since they can be 
evaluated relative to an implied authorial standard.
TaGore’S narraTIon: Three CapTIonS
It is now possible to return to Tagore. Though he did not use titles, 
Tagore did sometimes include sentences with his paintings (see robin-
son 71). These are much more evidently and consistently equivocal than 
titles, much more complex in their relation to the paintings. yet, as such, 
they serve to highlight some of the issues surrounding the relation of 
titles to narrative voice, including the issue of irony.
 The first problem with Tagore’s sentences is that it is not entirely 
clear what their status is. They undoubtedly represent some sort of voice 
commenting on the paintings. but the precise status of that voice is not 
self-evident. Tagore decided that it would be valuable to pair some paint-
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ings with sentences when they were published in Chitralipi. Thus he made 
a judgment that the sentences should bear on viewers’ response to the 
works, at least in that context. however, just how they should bear on 
one’s response is far from obvious. for example, though the sentences 
are paired with individual paintings, they sometimes seem to bear on a 
larger set of works and to provide a broad context for the viewer’s emo-
tional or thematic orientation, rather than a particular interpretive ori-
entation. more generally, they rarely seem to be parts of the painting in 
the way that a title is part of the painting. rather, they seem more like 
the sort of commentary a painter might give when asked about his or 
her work in an interview. Indeed, these sentences sometimes even point 
toward Tagore’s inability to articulate what he experiences when faced 
with his own paintings.
 a good instance of this concerns plate 12 (fig. 2.3). This ink and 
watercolor work is a portrait of a woman’s face, blotchy and darkened, 
wrapped in a black chador. her expression involves a subdued sadness, 
like that in so many of Tagore’s portraits of women. The quality of the 
emotion suggests an enduring condition, not an acute episode. She looks 
off to her right, without turning her head. It is as if she is avoiding a 
potentially confrontational meeting of eyes. but at the same time, she is 
not signaling submission, for she does not turn her face or head down.
 Tagore’s sentence for this painting is “The phantoms of faces come 
unbidden into my vacant hours” (robinson 202). The simple fact that 
this refers to faces (plural) suggests that the comment is more general 
than this particular painting. more importantly, the reference to “unbid-
den” indicates that the appearance of the faces is not something in the 
artist’s self-reflective control. Indeed, it is not something that Tagore 
himself can fully explain or evaluate. here, there is the peculiar situ-
ation that the apparent narrator converges with the real author and 
both are distinct from the implied author. They are not distinct by irony, 
however. rather, they are distinct by ignorance. recall that the implied 
author is, so to speak, the real author’s receptive intent, his or her expe-
rience of the work as a reader—or, in this case, his or her experience of 
the painting as a viewer. That implied painter judges that the painting 
is somehow “right,” that it produces the desired effect. but this does not 
mean that the real author can articulate precisely why or how such an 
effect comes about or even precisely what that effect is. Indeed, typi-
cally the real author cannot do this. The point is particularly obvious in 
an author’s or painter’s commentary on his or her work. Such commen-
tary commonly arises in a creator’s post facto pronouncements about a 
figure 2.3. Tagore, ink and watercolor.
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work. Those pronouncements are often taken as untrustworthy. Tago-
re’s sentences here point toward that commentatorial unreliability. at 
a theoretical level, what is perhaps most striking here is that this real 
authorial unreliability with respect to implied authorship is directly par-
allel to the well-known unreliability of narrators.
 In other cases, the sentences suggest a post facto attempt to inter-
pret the principles that guided implied authorial judgments at the time 
of the painting. In principle, these might provide a broader context, par-
ticularly some elements of a story. There is an example of this in plate 
151 (fig. 2.4). This is a red and black ink drawing. In the middle, there 
is a couple in profile, facing left. The faces of the figures are outlined in 
white against the black background (a recurring technique in Tagore, as 
several critics have noted [see robinson 61]). To some extent, this recalls 
photographic “edge lighting,” where the contour of a figure is more 
brightly illuminated than the rest of the figure. among other things, 
this technique allows the viewer to see the figures distinctly while at the 
same time placing them in near total darkness, which usually hints at 
either threat or intimacy. The man’s features are sharply angular with 
straight lines and right angles. The woman’s features are more curved. 
She wears a chador over her head. he wears a shawl over his shoulders. 
neither face is strongly expressive, but the slight elevation of the pupil 
in the woman’s eye may hint at wateriness, and her lips seem less tight 
than those of the man. Thus there may be a hint of sorrow in her face 
that is absent from that of the man. The background is primarily black. 
but the left third of the work has an irregular column of red. It is easy to 
see this as either dawn or sunset.
 Tagore’s sentence for this painting is “The day’s gains and losses are 
lost to their sight when they gaze at an unrevealed promise gleaming out 
from the dark” (robinson 208). here, one is tempted to say that Tagore 
has just not done a very good job of interpreting his own painting. The 
sentence seems to suggest a certain amount of hope. but it is not clear 
that the two people are experiencing any hope. on the other hand, the 
sentence is so obscure that it is difficult to say if it really does suggest 
hope. The couple forgets not only temporary “losses,” but also tempo-
rary “gains.” There is something “gleaming out of the dark,” but it is also 
“unrevealed.” viewers would probably be inclined to identify a “prom-
ise gleaming out from the dark” as dawn. but why would dawn be con-
trasted with the day’s gains and losses? That contrast suggests that the 
glow is sunset—but then why is sunset a promise? These apparent incon-
sistencies seem to indicate that the author/narrator here is not reliable. 
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There is the same lack of knowledge as in the previous painting, but this 
time the accompanying sentence in effect denies that lack of knowledge. 
The painting is hauntingly beautiful, but opaque. Tagore’s narratorial 
comment does not render it less opaque.
 a related example may be found in plate 79 (fig. 2.5). The sentence 
reads, “The eyes seeking for the enigma of things explore the boundless 
nothing” (robinson 205). This black and white etched print presents a 
seated woman beneath a black sky and beside or above the swirling cur-
rents of a river. She is turned away from the viewer, staring, it seems, 
into the black void. The figure forms a soft arc, which is a recurring motif 
in Tagore’s depictions of women. The caption is as obscure as the work 
itself. both suggest some sort of sorrow. but the statement provides few 
clues as to the nature of the sorrow. Indeed, one almost wonders if the 
author is making fun of the viewer here, saying, in effect, “you want pro-
found meaning—here’s some.” In other words, the caption may be ironic. 
but it seems unlikely that it is simply suggesting the opposite, as irony 
sometimes does. rather, the unreliability is primarily a matter of con-
cealing information, “underreading,” as James phelan would put it (see 
“Rhetoric/Ethics”). The sentence indicates that the woman is searching 
for an answer to some question. but to say that the question concerns 
“the enigma of things” is only to render it more enigmatic. It may con-
tribute to the sense of sadness. but that sadness remains vague, if none-
theless affecting.
 a peculiar feature of the drawing is that the woman’s breast is lighter 
than her clothing, as is her face and the exposed part of her neck. The 
slight hint of an areola at the end of the breast may suggest that it is 
uncovered. If so, this may give some indication of the precise nature of 
her suffering. To explore this further, however, one must turn again to 
the cross-textual implied author and the recurring motifs in Tagore’s 
work. Indeed, these are precisely what one needs to consider in further 
exploring plate 156 (fig. 2.2).
The GrIevInG Woman
as already noted, according to Satyajit ray, the condition of women 
was of preeminent importance in Tagore’s painting. ray was not the 
first to notice this. In his valuable study of Tagore as a painter, the emi-
nent novelist mulk raj anand wrote that “always there were echoes of 
the silences of women before the patriarch” (60) and “The pathos” of 
figure 2.5. Tagore, etched print.
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Ta gore’s characteristic “oval faced woman came back again and again” 
(74).17 ray and anand were, of course, referring to the paintings. but both 
were also familiar with Tagore’s literary works. In the terms introduced 
above, they were making reference to recurring motivic and thematic 
concerns of Tagore as a cross-textual implied author (or, more broadly, 
cross-textual implied creator).
 as ray and anand indicate, the condition of women is one of the most 
persistent topics in Tagore’s literary works. yet, it is arguably overshad-
owed and to some extent encompassed by another concern—attachment, 
the bonding that most prominently characterizes the relations of par-
ents and small children.18 In Tagore’s work, the tragedies of women are, 
more often than not, the tragedies of broken attachments—frequently 
the attachments of romantic love, but also attachments to parents or 
children.
 Unsurprisingly, then, Tagore’s narratives often treat attachments 
that are shattered. This destruction is frequently the result of social 
identities, dividing people by nation, race, sex, or caste; but the cause 
may also be more personal, as in the scapegoating of someone who is 
vulnerable. In keeping with this, perhaps the most prominent emotions 
in Tagore’s work are those that involve attachments—romantic love 
(or śṛṅgāra, in rasa theory) and parent–child love (vātsalya)—along with 
empathy. Indeed, empathy is already associated with attachment, since 
attachment tends to focus one’s attention on and intensify one’s sensi-
tivity to the emotions of the person one loves.19
 In the context of Tagore’s recurring concerns, it is useful to return 
to plate 79 (fig. 2.5), the woman by the river. even the mention of love 
makes one realize immediately that the most common significance of a 
representation of this sort involves romantic love. The “enigma” would 
then appear to concern the beloved; the “boundless nothing” would be 
his or her absence. but, on reflection, this does not seem right. except 
for the swirls of the river, the piece does not seem to convey passion 
(e.g., in the woman’s posture). The breast may seem to sway the inter-
pretation. but the woman does not appear to be in a condition of specifi-
cally sexual undress.
 Suppose, then, that one considers the etching to address some other 
form of attachment. one might in that case imagine that the bare breast 
refers to the nurturance of a child—a child who is absent, perhaps dead 
or unborn. of course, here too there is not much in the way of evidence. 
either interpretation is plausible.
 This leads back to the cross-textual implied painter. There are recur-
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ring motifs in Tagore’s paintings that point toward enduring represen-
tational, emotional, and thematic concerns. one of these motifs is the 
smooth arc of the seated woman, an arc rendered even more salient by 
its contrast with the angular bodies of men.
 a striking case of this sort is plate 4 (fig. 2.6). This ink drawing in 
orange and black depicts a woman curved into a rocking-chair shape 
(perhaps in a rocking chair). There is the soft arc from legs to shoulders. 
In this case the woman leans forward. her face is black, the features out-
lined in ochre. one aspect of the piece is particularly anomalous. a swath 
of black begins at the woman’s head, suggesting a lock of hair. but it 
ends in flattened breast with a clear nipple. The woman stares down at 
her lap and seems to be smiling. There is nothing to suggest eroticism. 
perhaps one should envision a child below the arm of the chair.
 another work seems to point toward related concerns. This is plate 
162 (fig. 2.7), an ink on paper drawing. This work presents only the wom-
an’s upper body. for this reason, one cannot directly link it with the arc-
ing seated figures. but the woman leans over, about to rest her head on 
her hand, balled into a fist. her eyes are nearly closed; her face is black-
ened. Though she seems to be wearing her scarf and shawl, her breast is 
bare. The resonance is, again, more maternal than sexual. The fist may 
suggest anger. The face could communicate exhaustion or despair. one 
thing seems clear from the fisted arm—the woman is not holding a child.
 The suggestions drawn from the preceding paintings appear to be 
confirmed by plate 145 (fig. 2.8). here there is another seated young 
woman. an arc curves around from her legs to her neck. her head bends 
forward. She rests her cheek on the head of a child at her breast.
 narratively, then, these works point toward some relation of mother 
and child. This does not mean that they are unambiguous. They remain 
ambiguous. but, considered together, they suggest variations on a story, 
along with an associated set of emotions—prominently, sorrow for lost 
attachment or a shared feeling of warmth in attachment.
 all this allows a reconsideration of plate 156 (fig. 2.2). having looked 
at these other works, one cannot help noticing that the central figure is 
seated and partially curved forward, tilting her head, leaning against her 
hand (recall plate 162/Fig. 2.7). Now something about the second figure 
from the left becomes noticeable. She has her left arm raised as if she 
is cradling something. here, too, then, there is the dhvani of maternal 
attachment (figure two) and maternal loss or separation (figure three). 
Indeed, on inspection, it is clear that one could interpret figures one and 
five as preoccupied with something in their laps as well.
figure 2.6. Tagore, ink.
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 The overall “narrative” dhvani, or suggestion, of the piece, then, 
is one of maternal loss. The central, focal figure appears to be suffer-
ing the absence of the child that preoccupies at least some of the other 
women in the painting.20 This does not at all eliminate the ambiguity of 
the work. The viewer does not know the precise nature of the loss (e.g., 
has a child died, or has the woman been unable to conceive?). moreover, 
the loss remains only one of the possible interpretations of the repre-
sented world. on the other hand, the integration of the work into the 
figure 2.7. Tagore, ink.
figure 2.8. Tagore, ink and watercolor.
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receptive intent of the cross-textual implied author foregrounds this 
possible meaning, giving it a more prominent place in the work’s profile 
of ambiguity. moreover, that integration reacts back on one’s encoding 
and explanation of details of the work, altering what one notices about 
the figures and how one understands them. It also bears on one’s emo-
tional response to the work, one’s sense of the third figure’s pensive sor-
row and the intimacy of the third and fourth figures—an intimacy that is 
qualified by the fourth figure’s apparently positive, perhaps even enthu-
siastic interest in something to her left, such as a child in the lap of the 
second figure.
 needless to say, these points bear on the thematic implications of 
the paintings as well. Unsurprisingly, ambiguities arise there too. for 
example, the work may hint at a criticism of the relation between moth-
erhood and family status. at the same time, one might wonder if the 
paintings suggest that women find fulfillment only in giving birth and 
raising children. Certainly, the two works considered at the outset now 
seem to contrast male labor—perhaps the creative labor of sculpture—
with the female labor of reproduction. (The two possibly female figures 
in plate 9/Fig. 2.1—numbers two and seven—are motionless and unin-
volved observers, in contrast with the apparently male figures.) anand 
maintains that, at least in some of Tagore’s pictures, “The feminine prin-
ciple” is “asserted in the mother and Child” (61). however, in the context 
of Tagore’s other works, it seems much more likely that he is suggesting 
the central importance of attachment in human life. The contrast with 
the men, in that case, is not primarily one of reproduction versus pro-
duction. It is, rather, a contrast between relations of hierarchy and rela-
tions of attachment, or even violence and nurturance. note, for example, 
that one male figure hammers between his legs, at precisely the place 
where the women cradle their children.
 moreover, as anand noted, other works by Tagore are highly critical 
of patriarchy and its effects on individual women. Indeed, this is con-
nected with another potentially troublesome feature of plate 156 (fig. 
2.2)—the facelessness of the central figure. Tagore used this motif else-
where, at least at times to suggest the anonymous labors of women, con-
cealed within the house, unacknowledged and unrewarded. This may be 
seen in plate 157 (fig. 2.9). In this ink on paper drawing a seated man 
looks on as a faceless woman serves him.
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Film as a Challenge to the Cross-Textual Implied Author
In contrast with mainstream narratological studies of the implied 
author, the idea of an individual creator’s canonical reach has been quite 
important in film studies. as david bordwell points out, “a body of work 
linked by an authorial signature encourages viewers to read each film 
as a chapter of an oeuvre.” auteur studies stress the “consistency of an 
authorial signature,” including “recognizably recurring devices,” such as 
“camera technique” and “narrational qualities” (Narration 211). In many 
ways, the recognition of such canonical reach means that the idea of a 
film auteur converges with the idea of a cross-textual implied author. 
however, the idea of an auteur is notoriously difficult to spell out in the-
oretical terms—perhaps even more difficult than the idea of an implied 
author. The remainder of this chapter concerns two things. on the one 
hand, it considers the ways in which the preceding analyses can clarify 
the understanding of a film auteur. at the same time, it considers how 
the idea of a film auteur may expand and modify the idea of a cross- 
textual implied author.
aUTeUrISm and reCepTIve InTenT
for many decades, auteurism has been central to the study of film. film 
criticism, histories of film, film retrospectives, and film courses in uni-
versities all routinely recur to the director as a central organizing prin-
ciple. Though critics can and do shape discussions of film in other ways, 
they regularly view the director as the crucial individual behind a film. 
This presupposition often pervades discussions, not only of particular 
films, but of periods, movements, stylistic developments, and, in some 
cases, technical innovations. even writers who reject auteurism as a 
theoretical concept are often drawn unwittingly into auteurist ways of 
speaking and thinking.
 yet, there are notorious theoretical problems with auteurism. The 
problems may be organized under two broad questions. first, who is an 
auteur? more exactly, is there only one, and is it always and only the 
director? Second, what is an auteur? more exactly, just what makes 
someone an auteur, whether he or she is a director or someone else, and 
what properties does one find in films that manifest the operation of 
such an auteur?
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 Classical auteurism is fundamentally a doctrine with three compo-
nent principles. first, there is a guiding intentionality for a film. Second, 
intentionality not only defines films singly but produces a patterned 
coherence across films; in other words, the unit of an auteur’s intention-
ality is not the individual work, or not the individual work alone, but the 
oeuvre. finally, the guiding intentionality of both individual films and 
sets of films is that of the director.
 The problems with auteurism are obvious as soon as one spells out 
these premises. most obviously, the decisions made about a film are not 
made by one person. They are made by many people, at different times, 
in different ways. The point turns up even within auteurism itself. Thus 
virginia Wright Wexman explains the general consensus that “directors 
are . . . the crucial creative force” (9) behind films. however, she also 
notes that producers, writers, editors, cinematographers, production 
designers, and stars have been “put forward as significant authors” (8). 
In contrast, consider literary works. It is virtually impossible to imagine 
someone arguing that the true creative force behind a poem or a novel is 
the publisher, the typesetter, or the copy editor.
 The difficulty here is straightforward. There are many aspects of 
film, and many people are involved in the creation of a film.21 The dif-
ferent people make contributions in varying degrees. of course, this is in 
some ways true of anything. To a certain extent, editors really do con-
tribute to novels. They may suggest revisions of phrasing; they may urge 
that particular sections be cut or elaborated. however, the degree to 
which editors contribute to novels is, in most cases, very limited. In film, 
things are different. To get a comparable situation in a novel, one per-
son would write the basic plot, someone else do the dialogues, someone 
else do the descriptions of scenes (perhaps one person describing the 
light, another describing the organization of the objects, a third revis-
ing everything for point of view); a further contributor might provide 
accounts of how the dialogue is delivered (e.g., inserting adverbs such as 
“sadly” or “with an accusatory tone”), and so on. If novels were created 
in this way, how could one possibly decide that any single person is the 
crucial creative force? as harvey points out, it is very difficult “to assign 
value”—for example, normative value for interpretation—“to the various 
players active in the ‘supply chain’” (81; for some examples, see 83).
 There is a way in which this problem is straightforwardly solved 
by the preceding account of implied authorship in terms of receptive 
intent. one might say that it does not really matter who produces the 
various components of the film. The crucial thing is that there is a uni-
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fying reception. Suppose that the lighting director sets the lights one 
way, then another, then another. The director chooses the manner he or 
she prefers. The costume designer presents various sketches, of which 
the director chooses what he or she deems best, and so on. In each case, 
the director makes his or her decision, thus organizing the entire work 
under his or her receptive intent.
 but this clearly will not suffice. for example, notaro (citing work by 
other researchers) discusses how people create new artistic works sim-
ply by selecting from templates offered by software programs (88). When 
faced with such a work, one is likely to take the intent of the “selector” 
as a guiding norm for interpretation. but interpretation in those cases is 
likely to be very limited.
 for example, suppose little Sally uses a program and produces an art-
work with a cut-and-paste drawing of a little girl, a cut-and-paste heart, 
and a cut-and-paste woman. She then hands the printout to her mother 
and says, “happy mother’s day, mommy!” most people will interpret the 
artwork according to her receptive intent. Sally presumably receptively 
intended to express her love of her mother. The original, productive 
intent of the drawing of the girl may have involved representing a par-
ticular person unknown to Sally. The original, productive intent of the 
drawing of the heart may have been to guide the design of candy pieces. 
These productive intentions are irrelevant. They are normatively over-
ruled by the receptive intent of the artist, Sally.
 To this point, the account of receptive intent works well enough. but 
now a problem arises. perhaps the little girl has blonde hair and Sally 
has black hair. Is that an interpretable detail? does it suggest some self-
image problem on Sally’s part? maybe the mother is wearing an apron, 
but Sally’s mother rarely cooks and never wears an apron. Is this a sub-
tle (thematic) suggestion that Sally would love her mother more if she 
spent more time in the kitchen? In both cases, the answer is “probably 
not.” There are two issues. The first is whether Sally encoded (roughly, 
noticed) these features of the images. The second is whether she had 
alternative choices. In other words, viewers are more likely to say that 
these features are interpretable if Sally receptively encoded these fea-
tures and if she chose them over other available images with different 
features. (actually, things are more complicated, since she could have 
had choices of, say, blonde and black-haired girls, but preferred the 
clothes or posture or height of the blonde girl. but it is possible to leave 
aside these complications aside, since they are merely extensions of the 
same basic issue.)
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 Similar points hold for film, though without the same interpretive 
preference that one may have in the case of Sally. Imagine a very the-
matically oriented cinematographer and a very aesthetically oriented 
director. The director tells the cinematographer to set up the shots for 
a particular scene. Imagine further that the screenplay has a thematic 
concern with the way people are metaphorically blind to one another, 
continually misunderstanding each other. The cinematographer has the 
idea of echoing that theme by having a number of shots with interposi-
tions22 or partial occlusions, something set between the camera and the 
focal person, partially blocking or distorting the audience’s vision of him 
or her. Thus the cinematographer may choose to shoot part of a scene 
through a window or with a curtain fluttering before one of the charac-
ters. The director may heartily approve of the shots. but, for the director, 
the important point is that they are visually interesting; he or she does 
not even notice that they have thematic resonances. Indeed, one could 
imagine an even more extreme case where the director is concerned 
only with whether the viewer can recognize the characters and under-
stand the action. after that, he or she is happy to let the cinematogra-
pher do whatever he or she pleases. one can also envision the reverse. 
In this case, the cinematographer sets up different ways of shooting a 
scene. In one case, it is difficult to get the right angle, so he or she sug-
gests shooting through a window. In another case, a curtain happens to 
keep fluttering before the actress as the scene is being rehearsed. In both 
cases, the thematic resonances strike the director and he or she chooses 
the partially occlusive shots, though the occlusions were never intended 
(for any reason) by the cinematographer. finally, one can imagine a sce-
nario in which the director explains his or her thematic and aesthetic 
concerns to the cinematographer, who comes up with the idea of par-
tially occlusive shots.
 These film examples are not entirely fanciful. Guru dutt’s films seem 
to use interpositions with unusual frequency. It is difficult to tell who 
exactly is responsible for this. The obvious choices are dutt and his 
usual cinematographer, v. K. murthy.23 Thus the frequency of interposi-
tion may have been dutt’s self-conscious directorial plan, or it may have 
resulted from murthy’s unself-conscious aesthetic preference and dutt’s 
relative indifference, or something else.
 In contrast, there are some prominent uses of interposition in bimal 
roy’s film Prem Patra. In that case, the film involves a thematic concern 
with perception, treating literal and metaphorical blindness. It probably 
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alludes to the Vedāntic idea of illusion, with its common image of illu-
sion as a veil, thus a form of interposition or occlusion. a usage of this 
sort is part of roy’s more general tendency to design his cinematogra-
phy in such a way as to echo his thematic and emotional concerns. This 
design necessarily takes different forms in different films. Thus it is not 
always a matter of interposition. for example, in Sujata it is more bound 
up with staging in depth.24 roy’s responsibility is clearer here as this ten-
dency appears with different cinematographers (Kamal bose for Sujata 
and dilip Gupta for Prem Patra).
 The question, then, is how should one interpret these different cases? 
for example, if the cinematographer and the director have different 
understandings of a shot, what establishes the interpretive norm? If the 
cinematographer set up the shots for thematic reasons while the direc-
tor selected them for aesthetic reasons, does that mean that only the 
aesthetic reasons are interpretively relevant?
 In fact, this is not a real problem. It is only a problem if one assumes 
that one intention must have some sort of ontological status that makes 
it definitive. but that is not the case. a particular intention becomes 
definitive only when one names it as being definitive, only when one 
stipulates it.25 put more simply, there is no right answer to the question 
“What is the meaning of these shots?” or “What is the norm governing 
the interpretation of these shots?” There are only the questions “What is 
the profile of ambiguity for these shots in the receptive intention of the 
cinematographer?”; “What is the profile of ambiguity for these shots in 
the receptive intention of the director?”; and so on. (note that the inten-
tional subjects here are not confined to people involved in selecting the 
shots. one can equally ask, “What is the profile of ambiguity for these 
shots in most viewers seeing the film for the first time?” or “What is the 
profile of ambiguity for these shots for such-and-such a director or cin-
ematographer who was influenced by this film?”)
 on the other hand, this still leaves a problem. It is important to rec-
ognize the multiplicity of norms available in any given work, the various 
profiles of ambiguity. but, in any case, critics want to be able to interpret 
the work. part of the advantage of being able to embed a work in a canon 
is that it allows further insight into the work as a whole. by embedding 
Tagore’s painting of six women in his canon, one gains a greater sense 
of the representational, emotive, and thematic concerns of the painting. 
This advantage seems to be lost if one cannot necessarily locate a film 
in the directorial canon and draw on recurring patterns of that canon 
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for interpretation. In other words, it seems that, far from supporting the 
idea of a cross-textual implied author, film (despite auteurism) may par-
tially undermine it.
The prodUCTIon proCeSS and varIeTIeS of InTenT
at this point, one might feel that it is best to discard auteurism. but that 
would throw the baby out with the bathwater. The preceding discussion 
not only suggests problems with auteurism. It also suggests the impor-
tance of clearly and explicitly formulating the interpretive norms for a 
work. In particular cases, that may crucially involve embedding the work 
in a canon. one key point is that the canon need not always be the same. 
This is true even with a single author. one may first embed Tagore’s 
painting of six women in the canon of his paintings and subsequently 
embed it in the larger canon of his creative representations (including 
literature). The problem with cinema is that there are many intents—and 
thus canons—that could in principle be stipulated as establishing norms 
for the interpretation of a particular film (the canon of the director, that 
of the producer, that of the cinematographer, etc.).
 In order to get a better sense of how to respond to these difficulties, 
it is necessary to return to the nature of film production. Such an exami-
nation shows that the production and selection process is more complex 
than indicated earlier. as already noted, film production proceeds in 
stages. but what was left out earlier was that at each stage there are mul-
tiple forms of feedback, thus multiple forms of productive and receptive 
intent. In connection with this, one needs to distinguish at least three 
components of creation, whether one is speaking of films, novels, or any-
thing else. first, there are broad structures that guide creation; second, 
there are ways of developing and instantiating those structures; third, 
there are procedures for evaluating and selecting from developments 
and instantiations. When an author writes a play, these various functions 
are all fulfilled by the same person in almost all cases. Thus the play-
wright decides on the general structure (e.g., a romantic tragedy), begins 
to work out specifics (e.g., that the lovers will be from rival families that 
include violent youths), tries out different possibilities (e.g., regarding 
whether one of the youths is killed and, if so, which one), chooses among 
them, revising in light of receptive response (e.g., scratching “There’s a 
lamp in that room; who lit it?” in order to substitute “What light through 
yonder window breaks?”)—and so on, often through multiple cycles. 
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now and then, an editor might intervene, taking up a small part of selec-
tion (e.g., suggesting that a particular section should be cut) or even gen-
erating a local specification (e.g., proposing some particular phrase for 
a piece of dialogue). but these contributions are, again, very limited in 
most cases.
 What, then, about film? Clearly, these three tasks may be distrib-
uted across different individuals in a film. That is what makes auteurism 
questionable. however, merely characterizing these tasks as separated 
may be overly simple. What is most obviously the case in film is that 
many of the specific possible instantiations of general structures are 
produced by different individuals. In other words, the multiplicity in 
film is, most crucially, a matter of the second component of creation. 
one might, then, revise the first principle of classical auteurism along 
the following lines. There is—or, at least, may be—a guiding intentional-
ity in films, the auteur. That auteur defines the broad structures for the 
film, not only in general, but in particular areas as well. Thus the auteur 
sets out the structures for set design, lighting, music, and other areas. 
he or she assigns individuals (including himself or herself) to specify and 
develop those structures—thus to specify and develop his or her guide-
lines for set design, lighting, music, or whatever. Those individuals then 
generate instantiations, from which the auteur selects just what will 
appear in the film. moreover, this occurs in multiple sequences of feed-
back. The auteur gives broad structures to the set designer, who returns 
with sketches. This allows the auteur, not only to choose from among 
alternatives, but to suggest particular changes, to reformulate the gen-
eral structures that he or she established initially, and so on.
 It will not have escaped the notice of any reader that the preceding 
revision of auteurism is quite consistent with the notion that the auteur 
is the director. after all, the director commonly articulates general struc-
tures for the set designer, the actors and actresses, and the cinematogra-
pher. moreover, in some cases, the director himself or herself undertakes 
that specification as well—acting, directing photography, composing the 
music. These points seem to at least partially salvage auteurism. There is 
a guiding creative force for a film in that there is someone who sets the 
general structures for the components of the film, assigns subordinates 
to work out the particulars, gives instructions for revising those particu-
lars, and finally selects the instantiations of those structures.
 but here two further problems arise. first, the director does not 
monopolize the first and third stages of creativity. Indeed, general struc-
tures may be established at different points by different individuals, and 
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tasks are divided in different ways by different people. a producer may 
set a particular task for a screenwriter and choose a star. he or she may 
determine certain aspects of the development of the film (e.g., insisting 
on specific sorts of special effects). The screenwriter certainly estab-
lishes structures for the director. even if the director revises the script, 
he or she is still instantiating and developing the script’s main orga-
nizing principles and trajectory. In this way, the director is like the set 
designer or the director of photography. They too instantiate structures 
drawn from the script and the producer; they too generate structures 
that they expect subordinates to instantiate and develop.
 The second problem is that the generation of broad structures and 
the selection of instantiations need not involve any crucial creative work. 
Suppose Jones determines that he or she will put together an anthol-
ogy on auteurism, then assigns different topics to different authors. as 
the authors submit their papers, Jones makes suggestions for revision, 
finally accepting the papers when he or she feels that they are ready 
for inclusion. In this case, Jones has established the general principles; 
he or she has engaged in cycles of feedback; he or she has selected the 
specifications. but no one would wish to assign a great deal of credit to 
Jones for the creativity of the work composing the volume. Jones may 
be congratulated for a fine collection, but no one would say that Jones is 
responsible for the new insights or theories provided by the essays, nor 
would anyone make Jones’s receptive intention the interpretive norm 
for understanding those essays.
 This all appears to work rather strongly against auteurism. Indeed, 
the example of the anthology seems devastating. It seems to indicate 
that the director is really not all that important. but only a slight change 
in the example shows that this is not necessarily true. Suppose that Jones 
is an experimental psychologist. he or she determines that several sorts 
of empirical study are crucial for understanding auteurism. he or she 
decides what those studies are and assigns them to technicians in his 
or her lab. Jones is involved at each stage in the design, execution, and 
evaluation of these studies. The interpretation of the findings is guided, 
in each case, by the framework Jones has provided. The studies are then 
written up by the subordinates and included in Jones’s anthology. In this 
case, I imagine most people would be quite willing to credit Jones with 
the overall creativity and insight of the volume.
 What, then, does all this suggest about auteurism? In the example 
of the collection of research writings, the degree to which the editor or 
director of research is the crucial creative force is clearly an empirical 
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matter. one determines it by looking at the specifics of the collection 
and at its history. Though somewhat banal, the same point holds for the 
director—or, for that matter, the producer, cinematographer, editor, or 
star. The degree to which a director may be credited with (or blamed for) 
the creation of a film is an empirical matter. moreover, as the preced-
ing sentence indicates, this is not an absolute, but a relative attribution, 
a matter of degree. Indeed, it is possible to acknowledge that creativ-
ity is distributed, while still retaining a version of auteurism. all that is 
strictly necessary to preserve some form of auteurism is that individual 
(e.g., directorial) creativity be discernible. as a result, the second prin-
ciple of classical auteurism becomes crucial, for the obvious way of dis-
cerning a director’s, producer’s, or other agent’s contribution to a film is 
to abstract from the set of films to which he or she contributed. In other 
words, this account emphasizes the oeuvre—or, rather, multiple oeuvres.
 more exactly, classical auteurism is, so to speak, “maximal.” It asserts 
a single guiding intentionality and it does so a priori. It is possible to 
substitute for this a more plausible “minimal auteurism,”26 which revises 
the three principles of classical auteurism in the following way. first, 
it is possible to discern one or more guiding intentionalities in a film. 
In itself, this revision is not particularly novel. for example, richard 
dyer adopts a “model . . . of multiple authorship (with varying degrees of 
hierarchy and control) in specific determining economic and technologi-
cal circumstances” (187). berys Gaut has defended a multiple authorship 
view through arguments that partially overlap and partially comple-
ment the preceding discussion.
 but it is not enough to point out that there are often several inten-
tionalities in a film. one needs to have a sense of the process through 
which these intentionalities are interrelated. That process may be 
roughly defined by the three recursive subprocesses outlined above. 
The precise ways in which these subprocesses are themselves particular-
ized (what is done by the producer, director, cinematographer, and so 
on) will vary from film to film. Understanding individual cases should 
have both interpretive and theoretical consequences. as to the latter, it 
should allow one to define the nature and varieties of authorial control 
more precisely. for example, it should help to explain how a work may 
be the product of conflict among various authors, as discussed by Gaut. 
Conversely, it should help to clarify how there may be varying degrees of 
“global authorship,” as treated by paisley livingston.
 The second, and in some ways most important, principle of minimal 
auteurism is that authorial intentionalities are expressed or enacted 
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not only in individual films, but in sets of films on which a given auteur 
works in a particular capacity (e.g., as director), thus canons. Indeed, the 
patterns that manifest intentionalities are often discernible only by ref-
erence to the authorial canon. Thus, in studying an auteur—for exam-
ple, a director—one must usually place the film in the context of that 
director’s other works. one then tries to discern a pattern across those 
works—more precisely, a distinctive pattern, a pattern that is not found 
across, say, the producer’s or screenwriter’s works. Insofar as the fea-
tures of the particular film conform to that distinctive pattern, one may 
with some confidence attribute those features to the director as auteur. 
Indeed, one may explain them by reference to the auteur.
 It is important to note that one’s understanding of patterns should 
not be too narrow. If one looks at the cinematography of bimal roy’s 
films, one may not see significant, recurring features. for example, occlu-
sive shots or staging in depth recur, but not, it seems, very prominently. 
This may make it appear as if roy’s cinematography does not involve 
cross-textual authorial patterns. however, many of his films involve a 
coordination of theme and stylistic technique. again, there is prominent 
staging in depth in Sujata, his film about Untouchability (there, stag-
ing in depth gives concrete form to the physical isolation of Untouch-
ables). There is some striking interposition or interference with vision 
in Prem Patra, his film about literal and metaphorical blindness. There 
is an enveloping of figures in mist and the visually similar superimposi-
tion of present and past images in Madhubuti, a film about memory and 
forgetting. These cases do not most importantly share directly perceiv-
able stylistic properties. rather, they manifest a recurring principle—the 
coordination of theme and style—that guides the production and recep-
tive selection of such properties.
 as to the third principle of minimal auteurism, it seems that, in gen-
eral, the most consequential auteur is likely to be the director. however, 
in the majority of films, the director will not be the only auteur. more-
over, there will be films in which the producer, screenwriter, or someone 
else is the most consequential. In all cases, the issue is empirical.
 Cinema, then, complicates the idea of the cross-textual implied 
author. It leads one to recognize that the initial production of the work 
is not rendered irrelevant due to receptive intent. Specifically, initial 
production has consequences for whose intention one considers impor-
tant and in what degree. nonetheless, receptive intent remains interpre-
tively definitive (depending on the stipulated interpretive target). an 
implied author—or implied auteur—still establishes interpretive norms 
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by receptively judging the work (or some section of a work) complete. on 
the other hand, in the case of a film, there may be more than one implied 
auteur and those different implied auteurs may yield different interpre-
tations of the work or features within the work (as when an interposi-
tion has thematic implications for an implied auteur/cinematographer, 
but only aesthetic implications for an implied auteur/director). At the 
same time, the case of film demonstrates all the more clearly the impor-
tance of the cross-textual implied author. Specifically, it indicates that 
the canon of a creator is key for separating out at least some of what 
applies to which potential auteur (director, producer, screenwriter, and 
so on) for any given film.
bImal roy’S MADHUMATI
Clearly, there is not space here to cover the entire range of any film-
maker’s work. nor is there space to cover all the implied auteurs in any 
single film. however, it is important to illustrate auteurial patterning, at 
least briefly.
 bimal roy was one of the major filmmakers in the classic period of 
hindi cinema from the 1940s to the early 1960s. roy’s works show a num-
ber of recurrent, “auteurial” features, not only in style, but in narrative 
and theme as well. first, his films often treat very precisely isolated but 
also broadly human personal problems—for example, the misunder-
standings that repeatedly vitiate human relationships, because one’s 
experience of other peoples’ actions is limited and biased. Commonly, 
these problems manifest themselves in the possible or actual separa-
tion of two people who have some attachment relation to one another 
(either romantic or parental/filial). Second, he recurrently locates these 
problems in the context of some important social or political issue—
for example, caste hierarchization. Third, he often develops this prob-
lem and its consequences in relation to Vedāntic principles, thus early 
hindu ideas of illusion, suffering, rebirth, spiritual liberation, and so on. 
In this way, he tends to give the problem a broader scope and greater, 
so to speak, ontological significance—for example, by connecting human 
misunderstandings with “māyā,” or the illusions of material existence. 
The second and third recurring features give rise to a fourth. Specifi-
cally, the spiritual concerns in part respond to the political problems, as 
when Vedāntic monism suggests the falsity of caste hierarchization. This 
integration of Vedāntic concerns into politics forms a central thematic 
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preoccupation in a number of roy’s films.27 finally and, for present pur-
poses, most importantly, ray develops those thematic concerns not only 
through the story, but through visual and aural elements of narration—
or style—as well.
 as to the final point, as already noted, roy has a sort of generative 
principle according to which the visual and sound patterns should con-
tribute to the thematic concerns of the work. They do this both emotion-
ally and interpretively. The emotional impact tends to be, so to speak, 
implicit. In other words, roy does not need to draw the viewer’s self-
conscious attention to the relevant narrational features for him or her 
to respond to those features emotionally. That is because the emotional 
impact of these features tends to derive from the way they depict the 
storyworld. In contrast, their interpretive effects may require that the 
techniques themselves become to some extent salient.
 There are two obvious ways in which a technique may be rendered 
salient. The first is through increased frequency. When repeated above 
some threshold, a particular device may become obtrusive. To take a sim-
ple example, frequent tight close-ups of hands may, at a certain point, 
lead viewers to notice that there are many tight close-ups of hands. The 
second obvious way of producing saliency is through a single shot that 
is somehow “intensified” so as to draw the viewer’s self-conscious atten-
tion. This may occur in different ways. for example, a filmmaker may 
intensify a shot simply by extending its duration. Thus a single close-up 
of hands may become noticeable if it is sustained for a long time. alter-
natively, a filmmaker may enhance the distinctiveness of a shot by a con-
trast in the normal lighting for the rest of the film or a contrast in the 
use of color (an obvious case would be a shift from black and white to 
color or the reverse). an intensified shot or sequence of this sort may 
serve as a sort of signal to the viewer to attend to a particular tech-
nique. once such a signal has occurred, other instances of the device may 
become more salient even if they are not particularly frequent, endur-
ing, or even contrastive.
 of course, there is another way in which recurring patterns of signif-
icance may become salient to a viewer—more precisely, to a critic. That 
is through the distinctive recurrence of a device in an authorial canon. 
The fact that roy uses theme–style connections in some works serves 
to draw attentional focus to possible theme–style links in other works. 
moreover, there is some overlap across works in the stylistic techniques 
he uses and in some of their metaphysical resonances. These techniques 
include staging in depth, blocked line-of-sight staging (in which charac-
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ters visible to the viewer are not visible to one another), nonface close-
ups (e.g., close-ups of hands), and some form of figural occlusion relative 
to the viewer (i.e., some interference with the viewer’s sight of a char-
acter). The last is particularly interesting and occurs in different vari-
eties, from interposition of various sorts—prominently aperture, sheer 
medium (e.g., a curtain), and latticework interposition—to “enclosure” 
(e.g., in fog) to superimposition of film images. There is also some over-
lap across roy’s films in what might be called “metatechniques,” that is, 
means of rendering interpretable techniques more salient. Specifically, 
in at least a couple of films, he uses a “signal” shot or sequence to cue 
the viewer’s sensitivity to a particular technique.
 The basic story of Madhumati (1958) concerns an engineer, deven-
dra, who is trying to meet his wife (radha) at a train station, but ends 
up spending the night in a strange mansion. on entering the mansion, 
he finds himself filled with memories, apparently from an earlier birth. 
In a flashback, the viewer witnesses the story of anand (devendra in an 
earlier life) and madhumati. madhumati is the daughter of the former 
raja of the place, who has been displaced and impoverished by the new 
raja and the “company” (the characters use the english word), a tim-
ber enterprise. madhumati and anand fall in love, but madhumati is 
abducted by the new raja. She commits suicide in order to avoid rape. 
anand exposes the landlord and then joins her in suicide. In the end, it 
is revealed that anand and madhumati have been reborn and are now 
united as husband and wife.28
 The means by which anand exposes the landlord are somewhat sur-
prising. he meets a young woman, madhavi, who is physically indis-
tinguishable from madhumati. however, there is a systematic change. 
madhumati was a village girl who did folk dances in actual village cel-
ebrations. madhavi is a city girl who does folk dance as part of an artistic 
revival of traditional customs. Inspired by madhavi’s appearance, anand 
devises a plan to make the new raja confess his crimes.
 The discussion of the old raja, the new raja, and the “company” alone 
would suggest some of roy’s thematic concerns here, particularly to 
members of an audience watching the film slightly over a decade after 
Indian independence. The old raja suggests Indian self-rule; the new raja 
suggests the british—or, in this case, those Indians who collaborated with 
the british; and the “company” calls to mind the east India Company, the 
initial agency of british colonialism in India, commonly referred to sim-
ply as “the company.” These links are enhanced by the fact that the new 
regime is associated with extensive corruption (on the notorious corrup-
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tion of the early east India Company, see Wolpert 188–89; the problem 
continued past Company rule and well into India’s independence). In a 
standard allegorical pattern, madhumati is traditional India, or perhaps 
the traditional culture of India, and two men fight over her.29 Somewhat 
surprisingly, she dies—but then the traditional culture she represents is 
revived in an artistic and learned form (through madhavi). That revival 
of traditional culture inspires a rejection of the colonial rule (manifest 
here in anand’s exposure of the new raja). This points fairly accurately 
toward what happens in nationalist movements. as traditional culture 
is threatened by the colonizer, nationalists seek out that traditional cul-
ture to develop in national arts.30 The end of the film points to the new, 
independent India. This is manifest not only in the rebirth and reunion 
of the couple, but in the birth of their child—a standard image of the new 
nation.31
 Turning back to the list of recurring patterns in roy’s work, one may 
wonder just what personal problem is being treated here. The whole 
narrative is organized by devendra’s worry over being reunited with 
his wife and his sense of being haunted by a past that he does not fully 
understand. The course of the narrative involves working through that 
past. The literal problem may be seen as a sort of haunting by a ghost, 
particularly after madhumati dies and begins to call to him and even 
appear to him. but this would hardly be a common human problem of 
the sort roy typically addresses. rather, there is a hint that the recur-
ring human problem is the interference of memory with current life and 
current human relations.
 In keeping with roy’s usual practices, this personal concern is car-
ried into the politics of the film. Specifically, the traumatic memories 
that trouble devendra are the traumatic history that troubles modern 
India. Indeed, for viewers who do not believe in reincarnation, the point 
fits India better than it fits devendra, since history was uncontrover-
sially an experience of people in another lifetime. moreover, patriots 
in effect often did commit suicide in fighting against the unjust rule of 
their country.
 In connection with both the personal and national problems, the 
problems of memory and history, the film seems to urge remembering 
the past without thereby becoming emotionally distorted by it. devendra 
achieves a sort of peace by remembering his traumatic past. When he for-
gets the past, he is anxious. but remembering the past does not inspire 
anger or resentment, as one might have feared. rather, it enhances his 
joy in the present.
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 The metaphysics of the film are more straightforward here than 
in the other films. The story explicitly treats reincarnation and, thus, 
karma. The main idea of karma is that the desires of previous lives carry 
over into new births.32 Specifically, souls continually return to the mate-
rial world, the world of illusion, with all its attendant suffering, because 
they have not overcome the desires of previous lives. These desires 
include not only lust or greed, but also the desire for revenge (in anger), 
the desire for status (in envy), and so on. The desires have their effects 
through memory traces or saṁskāras (see, for example, patañjali). This 
does not mean that the film is necessarily advocating an actual belief in 
reincarnation. It may or may not be doing so. The crucial point is that 
the desires associated with memory are a cause of being drawn back into 
painful illusions. as such, they inhibit one’s ability to achieve mokṣa or 
freedom, with its associated sense of peace.
 The metaphysics of the film clearly bear on the personal problem, 
since devendra is troubled by the saṁskāras of his previous traumatic 
experiences. he only overcomes the anxiety produced by those experi-
ences when he works through the memories, accepts them, and realizes 
that he now has what he desired all along. He and Madhumati/Rādhā 
are now united. These points may be extended to the politics of the film, 
where “freedom” has national rather than personal implications. The 
nation too is troubled by saṁskāras; it too needs to recognize that it 
has achieved the union which it was previously denied (i.e., the union of 
India), and so on.
 The film addresses these thematic concerns through several narra-
tional and stylistic means. first, roy sometimes uses staging in depth to 
separate the lovers. This is unlike the staging in depth that he uses in 
Sujata, as it does not suggest alienation or prohibition. Indeed, the lovers 
clearly respond with joy to even their distant presence. moreover, the 
location of the staging in depth is different. It is not separation across 
indoor spaces (e.g., between rooms), but outside, in large natural set-
tings of water and mountains (see fig. 2.10). Thematically, the lovers’ 
joyful response even to distant connections in nature may suggest—and, 
indeed, inspire—joy in the land of India with its national links across 
great distances. This suggestion and inspiration are enhanced by the cin-
ematography (an aspect of narration) that conveys a close connection 
between the lovers and that land stolen from its rightful raja. related 
to this, madhumati repeatedly leads anand to distant places, barely 
visible across the mountains and valleys (see fig. 2.11). as one might 
expect from the thematic concerns, these are historically and culturally 
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significant places. one is the plateau and cave where her ancestors are 
monumentalized and the family deity is worshiped. another is the local 
village, where the traditional songs and dances are performed. a third is 
her home, where she lives with her father, the deposed raja. The signifi-
cance of these places for the cultural heritage of the new Indian nation 
need hardly be spelled out.
 another technique used by roy is blocked line-of-sight staging. roy 
repeatedly makes Anand and/or Madhumati visible to the viewer, but 
invisible to one another (see figs. 2.12 and 2.13). They shift positions, 
one becoming visible to the other, then disappearing, and so on. There 
may be a hint here of Roy’s recurring Vedāntic concern with illusion and 
ignorance. alternatively, it may merely suggest the nature of memory, 
the way that memory may be elusive. one tries to remember the past, 
but often fails. moreover, a memory can appeal to someone without fully 
revealing itself. These connections are no less relevant in the case of par-
tially remembered history than in the case of partially remembered per-
sonal experience.
 another way of expressing this aspect of memory or history would 
be to say that the past calls to one or one hears a voice from the past. 
This relates to a more unique feature of this film. roy pays much more 
attention to sound in this work than seems to have been typical in his 
other films. often, one lover will hear the other before seeing him or her. 
Indeed, anand’s initial introduction to madhumati is by way of a song 
that he hears in the distance. Thus the voice signals presence, even as 
the visual relation is often troubled by lack of recognition or immersion 
in māyā.
figure 2.10. anand observes madhumati 
from a distance.
figure 2.11. anand and madhumati look 
toward the distant village where they will go 
for a festival.
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 In connection with this last point, roy often interweaves signals of 
auditory presence with another recurring technique—that of an envel-
oping occlusion. again and again, the lovers are obscured in masses of 
white (see figs. 2.14, 2.15, and 2.16). In some cases, this is the foam of 
rushing waters. That most often isolates the figures, rather than envel-
oping and concealing them. more frequently and more significantly, one 
or both lovers are swallowed up in billowing clouds of mountain fog. 
repeatedly, they disappear in or appear out of a white, misty expanse—
though, again, a voice often penetrates the haze even when no image 
is visible. The parallels here with fading and reappearing memory seem 
straightforward. The same point holds for history, which is often spoken 
of as hidden by the mists of time.
 In the context of roy’s works, the connection of this concealing mist 
with illusion may seem, at first, self-evident. however, the watery white-
ness of the fog and the river are not wholly negative. The suggestions of 
the technique are more complex and ambivalent. This becomes appar-
ent if one contrasts the mist and water with the more obvious way of 
engulfing and concealing figures—darkness. In opposition to the more 
stereotypically frightening image of dark night, the engulfing white may 
even suggest a sense of monistic unity. Indeed, the fading of the two lov-
ers into the mountain fog (see fig. 2.16) particularly may point toward 
monism in identifying the lovers with the encompassing and undifferen-
tiated world of nature, thus the material aspect of the absolute. (In the 
Vedāntic school of Absolute Monism, there are two aspects of reality—
nature and spirit. These are ultimately identical. but, viewed from dif-
ferent angles, the absolute appears as one or the other [see, for example, 
figure 2.12. anand and madhumati out of 
each other’s line of sight.
figure 2.13. anand and madhumati invisible 
to each other.
figure 2.14. anand disappearing into the fog.
figure 2.15. madhumati engulfed in mist.
figure 2.16. The lovers emerge from the fog.
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pandit 66].) This identity of the lovers with nature is an important motif 
elsewhere in roy’s work. In Sujata it contributes to the political use of 
monism in criticizing Untouchability. In both Sujata and Madhumati, the 
lovers—the women especially—are closely identified with nature. In the 
case of madhumati, this further associates her with the nation, which is 
not only a population and a government, but also a land.
 all these techniques are repeated with enough frequency to become 
salient. however, roy also includes a pivotal “signal” sequence. more-
over, he includes it at perhaps the crucial point of transition in the dis-
course. Specifically, there is a moment when devendra suddenly realizes 
that he is recalling a past life. a series of memories comes flooding into 
his mind. This is introduced by a curtain covering his face, followed by a 
number of superimpositions that represent the past; those images from 
the past are themselves occluded in turn by the white curtain (see figs. 
2.17–2.20). The sequence is striking in context and certainly calls atten-
tion to itself. This signal quality has implications for viewers’—particu-
larly critics’—reception of the rest of the film. Specifically, the partial 
obscuring of devendra’s face in the white images should help sensitize 
viewers to the obscuring clouds of white in the film. It also suggests the 
association of those clouds with memory.
 This use of superimposition to treat devendra’s past life is themati-
cally resonant in several ways. first, it points toward a sort of paradox 
about memory and history. on the one hand, memories represent the 
past. but at the same time their effects are wholly in the present. more-
over, in the present, they have an illusionlike status. This is all nicely 
suggested by the ghostlike superimpositions, where images from the 
past obscure devendra’s face—and, presumably, his vision—in the pres-
ent. Indeed, when madhumati’s ghost appears later in the film, she is 
superimposed with the same partial transparency as in this sequence of 
memories (see fig. 2.21). Thus, once again, salient and distinctive tech-
niques in the film suggest the complex thematic interweaving of the per-
sonal, the political, and the metaphysical, which is so characteristic of 
roy’s work.
 In short, there are interpretively consequential, recurrent auteurial 
patterns in roy’s work, as there are in Tagore’s. however, in roy’s case, 
the patterns are more complex. Specifically, both Tagore and roy have 
enduring thematic concerns. but, in roy’s case, there is a complex of 
motivic relations among personal, political, and metaphysical ideas along 
with discursive devices bearing on those ideas. moreover, these relations 
are broadly consistent, but not precisely identical from film to film. To 
figure 2.17. devendra is obscured by a white 
curtain as his past-life memory begins.
figure 2.18. devendra’s past-life memory is 
marked by extended superimposition.
figure 2.19. When devendra fades from the 
screen, the white curtain passes in front of 
the memory of madhumati.
figure 2.20. The return to the present is 
marked by the curtain obscuring devendra’s 
face.
figure 2.21. madhumati’s ghost has the same 
translucent quality (of superimposition) as 
devendra’s memories.
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make a terminological distinction, the motivic parallels were not based 
on fixed symbolic correlations but rather on generative principles. Thus, in 
Sujata, roy draws on the metaphysical identity of spirit and nature to 
oppose caste, whereas in Madhumati he draws on the same model to per-
sonify the nation and to address the problem of remembering a trau-
matic history. Similarly, there are different sorts of figural occlusion in 
Prem Patra and Madhumati, and these are used somewhat differently. In 
both cases, they are related to māyā, but the occlusions in Prem Patra are 
wholly negative, wholly a matter of ignorance (or avidya, a succumbing 
to māyā). In contrast, in Madhumati, the māyā-like clouds simultaneously 
suggest the nondifference claimed by absolute monism. In this way, roy 
begins with a set of concerns, models, and techniques that he interre-
lates in different ways in order to address distinct problems (e.g., caste 
or national history). The result is different from the recurring correla-
tion of a particular visual pattern and a particular thematic issue (such 
as the curving posture of a woman and concern about childbearing).
 of course, if one looked at different topics in Tagore’s work, and a 
wider range of his work, one would certainly find such generative prin-
ciples there as well. Indeed, even in the cases just considered, it is really 
a difference of degree, not of kind. even Tagore’s gently curving women 
are not identical with one another, and they differ in whether they have 
or lack children. Thus these figures too have a degree of generativity. 
Conversely, there are undoubtedly more nearly fixed patterns in roy’s 
work as well. (In addition, it is important to say that generativity is not 
in and of itself artistically superior to fixed correlations.) In any case, the 
point is not that roy is somehow unique. In fact, the point is the precise 
opposite. These sorts of patterns—both fixed and generative—recur in all 
authors. They are what give the critical idea of a cross-textual implied 
author or auteur its interpretive value.
Conclusion
an examination of visual art in relation to narratological discourse 
analysis leads to several enhancements of the preceding account of dis-
course. first, and most significantly, it is necessary to recognize the 
importance of cross-textual implied authorship, separating the implied 
author of the entire oeuvre from the implied authors of specific works, 
as well as the real, biographical author. (If one wishes to stress the 
implied author of a particular text, one may refer to the textual implied 
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author.) In correlation with this, it is also important to distinguish 
“motifs,” recurring discourse features and/or story elements. The rec-
ognition of motifs and cross-textual implied authorship may contribute 
to one’s understanding of the represented world and the thematic con-
cerns of a work.33 They may also play a role in criticism that operates to 
enhance or modulate emotional response. These points hold for both 
literature and painting.
 rabindranath Tagore’s paintings are particularly well suited for 
exploration via narratological discourse analysis, due in part to their 
great ambiguity. as such, they highlight something that is true of all 
works, but is not always so obvious. first, these paintings forcefully con-
vey how a work involves not a single expressive meaning but rather a 
receptive profile of ambiguity. That ambiguity is sometimes enhanced 
by narratorial texts (such as titles) or post facto commentaries by the 
painter. Those texts and commentaries manifest various sorts of unreli-
ability and irony. In Tagore’s case, one’s sense of this profile of ambigu-
ity changes as one locates his works in the various levels of receptive 
intent defined by the implied painter and implied author. recurring nar-
rative, emotional, and thematic commitments—here, recurring concerns 
bearing on attachment relations—suggest possible inferences about 
the depicted world while simultaneously altering one’s encoding of the 
paintings themselves (e.g., leading one to notice the lifted left arm of 
the second figure in plate 156/Fig. 2.2).34 recurring motifs also suggest 
that some thematic interpretations are less plausible than they might 
have seemed initially, while others are more plausible. In connection 
with this, the paintings indicate that the study of narrative discourse 
may contribute to the theory and criticism of visual art, just as the study 
of visual art may contribute to the theory and practice of narrative dis-
course analysis. moreover, both sorts of study may enhance the sense 
that Tagore’s paintings are not only aesthetically affecting and interpre-
tively rich, but valuable sources for theoretical reflection as well.
 In film studies, an idea similar to that of an implied canonical author 
was developed in auteur theory. however, there have been many prob-
lems explaining just what an auteur is and how auteurist continuities 
operate across films in a particular oeuvre. These problems are partially 
solved by the idea of receptive, implied authorial intent. however, fur-
ther problems arise immediately.
 first, receptive intent seems definitive only when the same person 
is responsible for the productive intent. That is often not the case in 
film (e.g., the cinematographer may produce the camerawork that the 
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director merely approves). Second, there may not even be a single recep-
tive intent for a film. In any case, there are embedded receptive intents 
(e.g., the director approves the cinematographer’s selection of an option 
proposed by a camera operator). Third, even if there is a “culminating” 
receptive intent (e.g., even if the director receptively approves all con-
tributions), that intent may have encoded selections only minimally. for 
example, the director may approve the lighting based only on the clarity 
of visual information while the lighting director established the lighting 
for its emotional effects as well.
 but, in fact, none of this undermines the idea of an auteur or a cross-
textual implied author. rather, it expands the concept to different pos-
sible auteurs and makes the precise distribution of intentions in any 
given case an empirical question. It also foregrounds the degree to which 
implied authorial interpretations are a matter not simply of patterns 
across an author’s canon but of at least partially distinctive patterns.35 
more exactly, the arguments against auteurism suggest that there may 
be many implied authors in any given film. one understands, interprets, 
and appreciates those authors by reference to different canons—one for 
the director, one for the cinematographer, and one for each of the other 
individuals involved in the production of the work—again, insofar as 
these canons involve distinctive properties. as to a film as a whole, the 
director does remain the most prominent candidate for an encompassing 
receptive implied intent. This is particularly true for directors with great 
autonomy relative to producers, expertise in various aspects of film pro-
duction (e.g., cinematography), involvement in the script (most obvi-
ously as author of an original script), and in general greater integration 
into the various processes that converge to make the film.
 differences in auteurial function may be understood in terms of 
three components of film production—the definition of broad guiding 
principles, the particularization of those guidelines, and the evaluation 
and selection of resulting particulars. This threefold pattern recurs at 
various levels in the production of a work. for example, the first com-
ponent ranges from a large vision for the film as a whole to guidelines 
about lighting for a particular shot. moreover, the various contributors 
to a film engage in cycles of guidance, particularization, evaluative feed-
back with a change in guidance, further particularization, partial selec-
tion, and so forth. here, too, the director is the one who most obviously 
makes the fullest evaluative and selective decisions. he or she is, in the 
usual case, most fully involved in establishing guidelines as well. In some 
cases, he or she may even be deeply involved with particularizations.
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 finally, the case of bimal roy reveals some of the possible complexi-
ties in auteurial canonical patterns. These patterns need not only be a 
matter of relatively fixed, recurring correlations between storyworld 
patterns, thematic or emotional concerns, and discourse techniques. 
They may also be a matter of more diverse, generative principles. These 
principles may produce a variety of mappings from diverse models and 
techniques onto various story interests and thematic issues. In Tagore, 
there was a connection between women in a particular postural orienta-
tion, the emotion of grief, the loss of children (in the storyworld), and a 
thematic concern with the burdens placed on women in an inegalitar-
ian society. In roy, metaphysical ideas were brought to bear on a more 
diverse set of personal and political themes through a range of narra-
tional and stylistic techniques. rather than a fixed linkage, there was a 
looser generative principle requiring that the metaphysics address the 
personal and political dilemmas and that a few highlighted visual and/
or aural techniques contribute to developing or illustrating the thematic 
points of the work and enhancing its emotional effects.
he preceding chapter was concerned with continuities in the 
implied author, not only at the level of the individual work, but 
at the level of the canon. The present chapter argues that the unity or 
consistency of implied authorial intent is greatly overestimated. recent 
accounts of cognitive architecture predict that, rather than a single, 
consistent authorial or implied authorial intent, there are partially con-
tradictory ideas and attitudes. These partial contradictions affect not 
only theme and emotional response, but even some story elements. This 
is not to say that there is no unity in a narrative. There are certainly 
strong tendencies toward continuity within most works. but there are 
various sorts of discontinuity and even contradiction as well.
Authorial Self-Understanding
The first chapter stressed that an author does not have direct, introspec-
tive access to the principles guiding his or her decisions. Thus all english 
speakers are able to judge correct and incorrect regular plurals. but 
only those with some knowledge of linguistics are able to state the rule 
governing such judgments. of course, the limitations of self-knowledge 
should not be overstated. Clearly, authors do know some things about 
why they produced and accepted certain sentences, certain plot devel-
113
Authors, Implied and Implicated
explaining harriet beecher Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin and 
Kabir Khan’s New York
Chapter 3
T
114 | Chapter 3
opments, certain narrative voices, and so on. The point is particularly 
clear in the case of self-consciously political literature. before going on 
to consider the diversity of authorial response, then, it is important to 
briefly reconsider authorial self-understanding.
 again, an author wants to produce a certain sort of effect, a certain 
sort of response in his or her readers. he or she develops the plot, alters 
the narrative voice, revises the phrasing, and so forth, until he or she 
produces, in implicit, imaginative simulation of the reader’s response, 
the effect that he or she desires. That simulated effect may be accom-
panied by explicit, self-conscious goals. for example, Stowe wished to 
oppose the fugitive Slave act. This was a self-conscious purpose and she 
could almost certainly have articulated some of her implied authorial 
reasons—for authorial intrusions, for characterization, and so forth—by 
reference to that goal.
 on the other hand, her introspective access was only partial. after 
all, even in the most apparently overt cases—for instance, in direct argu-
ments against the fugitive Slave act—Stowe’s implied authorial deci-
sions were embedded in a complex of ideas, feelings, and imaginations 
that all contributed to her sense that a particular passage produced the 
“right” effect. one might say that her explicit reason for a particular argu-
ment was itself embedded in a more complex set of mental causes.1 It was 
the entire set of mental causes that gave rise to the decisions involved in 
producing, revising, and accepting the passage at issue.
 Indeed, even authorial reasons are somewhat more complex than this 
suggests, since reasons need not be explicit or self-conscious. a mental 
cause is whatever gives rise to a certain behavior or action. one may 
understand a reason, in contrast, as a justified motivation in context. 
In this usage, the reason must be a genuine motivation (i.e., it does not 
include rationalizations). Thus it must be part of the mental causality. at 
the same time, it must provide a rationale for the action. That rationale 
may be prudential or ethical or something else. but it should cohere with 
some contextually relevant aim. In relation to narrative discourse and 
authorship, reasons are those mental causes that bear on receptive, thus 
implied authorial, intent, with their guiding aim of producing a certain 
effect on the reader.
 authors are self-conscious about some reasons for their decisions, 
but only some. Thus one may distinguish between a self-consciously the-
matized part of the implied author’s reasons and a part that is not self-
consciously thematized. reasons of the former sort are usually open to 
fairly clear articulation. Indeed, they may even have been articulated 
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in the literary work. This articulation may occur through an “autho-
rial intrusion,” where the voice of the author and the voice of the nar-
rator are (temporarily) conflated, or through “authorial ventriloquism,” 
where a character becomes (temporarily) the voice of the author.2 a 
more attenuated form of authorial ventriloquism occurs in what might 
be called “authorial mirroring.” In this case, one or several characters 
manifest the normative emotional orientation of an implied author, 
particularly characters witnessing the relevant event (as opposed to 
characters directly involved in those events). as Suzanne Keen puts it, 
“many novelists call up empathy as a representational goal by mirroring 
it within their texts” by “present[ing] empathetic connections between 
characters” (121). This is a technique used repeatedly by Stowe, who, for 
example, has characters witness a scene of familial separation and weep, 
thereby expressing the implied author’s emotional response and helping 
to guide that of the reader.
 Within the unthematized part of an implied author’s reasons, one 
may distinguish genuine vagueness from recurring features that sug-
gest governing principles. Implied authorial reasons of the former sort 
are imprecise, not fully specifiable. They may fall within a certain range 
of possibilities. but, in many cases, it is difficult to say if any particu-
lar articulation is correct within that range. This is not accidental. It is, 
rather, a key feature of receptive intent, bound up with the profile of 
ambiguity.
 at the same time, not all specifiable reasons are self-conscious for an 
author. The articulation of reasons sometimes requires knowledge that 
the author simply did not have. With adequate knowledge, however, it 
may be possible to articulate principles governing these patterns, thus 
reasons. These may be referred to as “theoretically specifiable,” though 
unthematized, reasons. here it is useful to return to the example of 
english pluralization. regular english pluralization is not vague. It is 
rule-governed. however, most speakers require special knowledge to be 
able to articulate the relevant rule. In the case of authors, similar points 
hold for, say, reasons governing human emotional response, which may 
require knowledge of human emotion systems before they may be ade-
quately formulated.
 These complexities are, in fact, part of the rationale for literary criti-
cism. one task of a critic is, roughly, isolating reasons for the choices 
made by an author. The mental causes that bear on the initial creation of 
a work are all to be found in the real author. In part, authorial biography 
serves to set out some of those mental causes (e.g., in describing the per-
116 | Chapter 3
sonal acquaintances of the author who contributed their idiosyncrasies 
to his or her characters). but the reasons for authorial choices operate 
most importantly at the level of the implied author. Sometimes those 
reasons are genuinely vague and lead to ambiguity. Sometimes those 
reasons are explicit. but often they are implicit and require inference 
and articulation, frequently with the help of knowledge unavailable to 
the author.
Implicated Authors
The preceding chapters have tacitly presupposed that there is a single 
implied author for a literary work. In a sense, there is only one implied 
author for a particular work taken as a whole, the textual implied 
author. Indeed, in a sense the unity of a work is a function of the unity of 
the implied author. at some point, an author makes a judgment regard-
ing his or her receptive response to a work—the judgment that the work 
is finished. That judgment of completeness defines any global unity the 
work may have.3 Whatever the author had in mind when writing a par-
ticular passage, choosing this word or that, devising one or another plot 
element—all that is now superseded by the final evaluative response. 
That final response is, in some degree, singular. moreover, it undoubt-
edly includes cognitive and affective elements that are relatively con-
stant across the course of the work.
 yet, even in a final reading, the simulative, receptive experience of 
a work is temporally extended. as such, it necessarily involves shifting 
attentional foci, different interests, variable inferences. If one takes seri-
ously what is known about human cognitive architecture, one has no 
choice but to conclude that there is great multiplicity in implied author-
ship throughout the course of an extended work. Specifically, as contexts 
shift, different elements will become salient. In consequence, different 
cognitive structures and affective orientations will become active. Those 
changing structures and orientations produce sometimes radically dif-
ferent understandings and may develop into very different evaluative 
responses on the part of the author/reader.4 one result of these shift-
ing contexts and cognitive activities is that the implied author, even if 
relatively consistent at the global level and consistent within each sepa-
rate context, is unlikely to be fully or ideally consistent across all those 
contexts. Instead, it is likely that local implied authors will be partially 
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inconsistent with others, while some will form themselves into patterns 
of coherence.
 for example, one well-known study showed that people tended to 
support military intervention in a hypothetical political crisis when 
presented with a fictional event that was framed to activate the model 
of World War II. however, test subjects were likely to oppose military 
intervention, given identical relevant facts, when the fictional event was 
presented in such a way as to activate the model of the vietnam War 
(e.g., in having refugees leave by train in the first case and by boat in the 
second case).5 These sorts of shifting contexts occur regularly in novels 
and other creative products. Indeed, precisely these circumstances could 
arise for an author in the course of writing a novel—circumstances that 
prime (i.e., partially activate) models of World War II in some places and 
the vietnam War in other places. In such a novel, one could very well 
find an explicit thematic statement that is pro-intervention (based on 
the tacit activation of a World War II model). but, even a few pages later, 
one may find a case that is implicitly anti-interventionist (based on the 
tacit activation of a vietnam War model).
 Indeed, things are even more complicated. most importantly, there 
are other influences on one’s judgments beyond exemplary models. one 
of the most frequent is simply common beliefs or common emotions. one 
often, so to speak, believes that one believes something or feels some-
thing because one has heard that so many other people believe or feel 
it. Such an “asserted belief” or “asserted emotion” may be entirely at 
odds with one’s actual “operational beliefs” and “operational emotions,” 
which guide one’s thought and behavior—including one’s creation of lit-
erary narratives.
 at this point, it would be good to have a terminological distinction in 
order to help keep these differences clear. I will continue to use “implied 
author” for the explanatory coherence that governs a larger work. but it 
is necessary to distinguish that global explanatory coherence from the 
more local receptive intentions. I will refer to the latter as “implicated 
authors.” Thus it is possible to say that any given work has one globally 
implied author, but many locally implicated authors.6
 It is important to note that a degree of diversity in the implied 
author has been suggested by some critics and theorists, if usually with-
out cognitive development and without a systematic treatment of variet-
ies of intent. for example, Susan lanser has rightly commented that one 
should not “assume that a text has a singular, coherent implied author” 
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and that “implied authors can be—and perhaps more often are—multi-
ple personalities” (“(Im)plying”). booth himself notes that “The flesh-
and-blood author is already full of conflicts” and that “many voices are 
present in every published work” (“Is There” 125)—though, in the terms 
presented here, booth seems to have in mind a multiplicity in expressive 
rather than receptive intent.7
 a crucial point here is that explicit, thematized reasons, given 
in authorial intrusions or authorial ventriloquism, are, as such, only 
(locally) implicated authorial ideas or attitudes. The fact that they are 
explicit does not give them special status in determining (more global) 
implied authorial meanings. Indeed, it seems rather that concrete, nar-
rative representations are the crucial part of literary work, not the 
authorial statements.8 as such, one’s interpretations should give greater 
weight to the former than the latter. This is most obvious when the 
statements appear to be concessions to a particular audience, such as 
government censors, or restatements of commonplaces (that authors 
may simply believe that they believe).
 more complex and interesting cases occur when the contradictions 
among implicated authors are not a matter of explicit statement versus 
implicit narrative development, but of one implicit narrative develop-
ment versus another implicit narrative development. These cases are at 
the center of interpretation and are crucial to understanding the implied 
author. In part, the task of interpretation is a matter of isolating these 
discrepancies, these divisions and contradictions. but that is not the 
entire task of interpretation. The task of interpretation is equally a mat-
ter of ascertaining just what it is that underlies those contradictions and 
connects them.
 In most cases, such “reconciliation” will be a matter of finding some 
principle that governs the contradiction. for example, in the case of the 
hypothetical prowar/antiwar novel, it would be a matter of isolating dif-
ferent historical models for military intervention—Germany and viet-
nam. note that, in this case, the contradiction remains. Some sections 
of the novel are still prowar and others are still antiwar. but interpreta-
tion has been able to account for the contradiction by reference to the 
models.
 This does not mean that the implied author equally favors all the 
mutually contradictory options. he or she may have clear preferences 
without thereby entirely eliminating ambivalence. Indeed, this is just 
what one would expect, given the general operation of the human mind. 
people like to think of themselves as consistent and univocal in their 
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beliefs and attitudes. however, people are usually ambivalent, even if the 
ambivalence may be more or less strongly weighted toward one option.
 of course, people are in some cases aware of or at least sensitive to 
their own ambivalence. This tends to occur when the different options 
are more equally balanced. When an author thematizes his or her ambiv-
alence, this produces what might be called a “dialectical” work. a dia-
lectical work is a work in which different emotional attitudes, different 
political or ethical positions, or other sorts of contradictory options are 
developed in such a way as to highlight their relative advantages and 
disadvantages. This occurs most obviously in works where the different 
positions are articulated explicitly, often by way of characters who may 
even engage in literal debate. however, it may also occur implicitly or by 
a combination of implicit and explicit representations.
 In some cases, apparent contradictions may be bound up with the 
simulated readership. It is often important to recognize the degree to 
which an implicated author is bound to an implicated reader. again, 
implied authors are defined by a receptive simulation of readers. In 
consequence, there are implicated, local readers as well as implicated, 
local authors. divergence across implicated readers may occur serially 
or simultaneously. for example, Stowe clearly envisions both northern 
whites and Southern whites reading her book (with perhaps a smattering 
of free blacks as well, though blacks are clearly not her main simulated 
audience). To some extent, her goals with respect to different white read-
erships are the same. Specifically, she wishes to cultivate self-criticism 
in both northern and Southern whites while simultaneously appealing 
to their compassionate inclinations. however, she does not equally sim-
ulate all audiences at all times. When writing about the bird family in 
ohio, she is appealing primarily to the humane impulses of northerners. 
When writing about ophelia, she is first of all addressing antislavery new 
englanders. When representing mr. Shelby, she may be trying to pro-
voke greater self-criticism among the more liberal segment of Southern 
whites.9
 Conflicts among implicated authors also often involve some social 
ideology. The obvious case of this occurs when an author explicitly states 
some criticism of dominant ideology, but goes on to manifest dominant 
ideology in his or her narrative and characterization. for example, an 
author might affirm feminist views in authorial intrusions, while simul-
taneously portraying female characters in stereotypical ways or tacitly 
endorsing patriarchal social structures through his or her guidance of 
readers’ expectations and preferences in the emplotment of events. This 
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sort of discrepancy is a central concern in marxist and related forms of 
ideological critique (e.g., feminist ideological critique), though it is not 
usually framed in narratological terms.
 In some ways the more interesting case occurs in the opposite direc-
tion. Then, the author explicitly asserts some dominant ideological posi-
tion. however, his or her representation of actual conditions and events 
contradicts that assertion. This is the case of repeating standard beliefs, 
as mentioned above. for example, an author might overtly state that a 
particular national war was a noble venture. but he or she might go on 
to present the concrete development of the war as degraded, cruel, and 
cowardly. again, one’s usual inclination is simply to accept the overt 
statements as the view of the implied author—and they are part of that 
view. however, the concrete development of the story is usually far more 
consequential.
 This has been recognized in the marxist tradition. Specifically, Georg 
lukács argued that the self-conscious political “tendency” of an author 
does not necessarily determine the political orientation of his or her 
“portrayal” of society in a literary work. Citing engels, he considers the 
example of balzac—“his conscious intention was to glorify the declining 
class of the french ancien régime, but in actual fact he was ‘compelled 
to go against his own class sympathies and political prejudices,’ and 
present a correct and exhaustive picture of the society of his time. his 
‘tendency’ thus stood in contradiction with his portrayal” (40). In keep-
ing with this—and in keeping with the general possibility of ideological 
critique—an author’s observation and imagination are not wholly con-
strained by his or her ideological predispositions.
 Consider race or gender. an author has certain self-conscious beliefs 
about race or gender. he or she also imagines characters. perhaps he or 
she begins with racial or gender types. but as he or she develops these 
characters—imagining their inner lives, for example, or drawing on 
characteristics of real people—they become increasingly individuated. as 
such, the stereotyping will tend to become less pronounced, in keeping 
with the general cognitive tendency for particular information to sup-
press generalizations (see holland and colleagues 215). The result may 
be a set of characters who do not fit the stereotypes—even though the 
author may continue to assert those stereotypes explicitly.
 before continuing on to specific cases, it is worth making one final 
point about contradiction. Sometimes an author will have a sense of the 
contradictions he or she is expressing. even if he or she has not fully 
recognized and formulated the problem, he or she may have a more or 
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less vague feeling that something is not quite right. (Such a feeling is 
obviously in keeping with the operation of authorial receptive intent and 
evaluation.) This feeling often gives rise to forms of explicit or implicit 
elaboration in which the author seeks to reconcile possible difficulties 
in the ideas or emotions of the text. Such elaborations are, of course, 
encompassed by the implied author’s final judgment of the work. none-
theless, they often have the status of rationalizations and may diverge 
considerably from the patterns a critic may be able to isolate.
The Many Implicated Authors of Uncle Tom’s Cabin
Uncle Tom’s Cabin is, as leslie fiedler once remarked, “an astonishingly 
various and complex book” (Love 264). It is a sign of that complexity that 
it includes a good deal of discontinuity across its implicated authors. To 
a great extent, these are straightforward contradictions between overt 
general statement and particular narrative depiction. an obvious case 
of this is the view that africans are not industrious—a view explicitly 
stated, but not borne out by the african characters. a more nuanced case 
concerns the putatively “childlike” quality of africans. The comments 
about african lack of industry seem incidental to the work’s purposes. 
In contrast, the view of africans as children—equally contradicted by 
actual depictions—seems more important in implied authorial reasons.
 readers familiar with criticism of the novel will recognize that these 
points are closely related to debates about the work’s politics and ideol-
ogy. Some critics have condemned the novel, stressing its racialist com-
ments. others have praised its cultivation of sympathy, its real political 
effects,10 and its feminist sensibilities. as Tawil puts it, “perhaps the most 
enduring problem in Stowe criticism over the past several decades has 
been to find a way to analyze her most famous novel’s assault on the 
practice of slavery, and at the same time to come up with some satisfying 
account of its particular brand of racialism” (154).
 a common solution is to see the novel as manifesting “romantic 
racialism,” in which racial differences are asserted, but in a nondemean-
ing way (see frederickson; see also otter). There is certainly an element 
of this in parts of Stowe’s novel. In other words, this view does appear to 
have been held, self-consciously, by one or more implicated authors of 
the work.
 The same point holds for Tawil’s account of the novel’s racialism. 
Tawil engages in a painstaking analysis, arguing that Stowe’s racial ide-
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ology attributes to “the negro” a highly imitative and malleable nature. 
There are some weaknesses in Tawil’s analysis. for example, it is not 
clear that an ability to mimic (which characterizes some of the black 
characters) is the same thing as a susceptibility to influence. Indeed, self-
conscious mimicry seems to suggest a degree of control over the imita-
tion that is incompatible with malleability. more significantly, it is not 
clear that Tawil has gotten hold of the precise property at issue. It does 
not seem that africans are centrally malleable in the novel. rather, in 
certain contexts, the implied author understands africans according to 
a childhood model. That model includes a propensity toward mimicry as 
well as some degree of malleability—or, put more positively, openness to 
change and development. (This model will be considered further below.) 
nonetheless, it seems clear that Tawil is partially correct. he has isolated 
an aspect of implicated authorship in the novel—though only one such 
aspect.11
 early treatments of Stowe tended to be much less nuanced than 
those just mentioned. referring to such interpretations, Cindy Wein-
stein laments that they “hermeneutically contained” the novel, creating 
“a critical paradigm in which Stowe can only be trapped or transcen-
dent” (6). but even the more subtle, recent readings have something of 
this effect. a more complex, differentiated understanding of the implied 
author and implicated authors may help to preserve the insights of these 
discussions while avoiding the tendency toward reductive binarism.
a SImple ConTradICTIon of ImplICaTed aUThorS
as just noted, one straightforward contradiction in the text involves 
the commonplace that africans are not enterprising. In an apparent 
authorial intrusion, the narrator explains that africans “are not natu-
rally daring and enterprising” (108). In the following paragraph, the 
narrator elaborates on the point, claiming that “the african” is “natu-
rally patient, timid, and unenterprising” (108). later, St. Clare, often a 
ventriloquized voice of the implicated author, says that africans need 
to be given “an idea of that industry and energy which is necessary to 
form them into men” (358). The idea is a commonplace of american rac-
ist ideology. like much ideology bearing on group identities, it can be 
expressed in more or less demeaning terms. The more demeaning ver-
sion is that “blacks are lazy.” Stowe’s narrator presents the same idea 
in the less overtly derisive form of “unenterprising.” The difference is 
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related to the explicit model of africans as children (discussed below). 
Seeing africans as children has a modulating effect on such racist attri-
butions, since children may be educated and thus outgrow these puta-
tive inclinations.
 What one finds here, then, is the implicated author expressing an 
ideological commonplace, modulated by a common model of africans 
as children. This is what one would expect from a certain sort of lib-
eral white attitude toward africans.12 but Stowe’s novel communicates 
a much more complex attitude, for her representation of africans—and, 
indeed, europeans—seems entirely contradictory with this view. There 
are at least two ways in which one could construe “enterprising” or hav-
ing “industry.” The first is the simple pursuit of accumulating wealth. 
The second involves a broader sense of self-advancement and advance-
ment of one’s family, community, or society.
 first consider the monetary construal. It is true that africans are 
not generally presented in the novel as seeking to accumulate wealth. 
at the same time, europeans are not generally presented that way. The 
whites who are represented as “enterprising” in this sense fall into a 
small number of categories, all of which are despicable. one character of 
this sort is haley. haley is the epitome of rational profit maximization. 
he is not particularly cruel to his slaves, but his treatment of them is 
guided entirely by the calculation of what will make them most salable. 
Stowe’s implicit model here seems to be that of a machine, as haley lacks 
natural life (haley is “alive to nothing but trade and profit” [39]). The 
other obvious character of this accumulative sort is legree. In contrast 
with haley, legree treats his slaves with consummate cruelty, exacting 
every drop of productive labor from them. In economic terms, the differ-
ence between them is that haley profits by trade whereas legree profits 
by production. Their different treatments of slaves and their different 
sorts of accumulative industry are the result of their different locations 
in the economy. Stowe’s model for the productive sector, thus legree, is 
explicit—he is Satan and his plantation is hell.13
 before going on to the other, and more significant, sense of “enter-
prising,” it is worth remarking on something about these two models. 
They are in part models explicitly or implicitly employed for africans 
in white american racist ideology. The case of Satan is particularly 
clear. blacks were commonly assimilated to devils in white racist ideol-
ogy. Stowe reverses that standard characterization, which was based in 
part on the supposed blackness of devils. for Stowe, the proper applica-
tion of the model is moral, not physical. While she draws many parallels 
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between the slave-owning planter and Satan, the crucial one is that both 
are the antithesis of the moral ideal.
 The more implicit mechanical model is no less significant to the 
themes of the novel. of course, the machinelike nature of the capital-
ist had been a commonplace since at least the beginning of the roman-
tic movement (see, for example, Schiller). but it is particularly germane 
here because it represents haley as a more or less feelingless object. This 
unfeeling quality is particularly stressed in connection with attachment 
relations, as when mr. Shelby remarks that haley would “sell his own 
mother at a good percentage” (39). of course, within the system of slav-
ery, it was precisely africans who were treated as feelingless things, who 
would be untouched by the sale of mothers—or husbands or children 
(Stowe has characters repeat this view, which she clearly condemns; see 
197). moreover, legree’s attitude toward his slaves is precisely an atti-
tude toward machinery. Its entire function is to produce. It is only right 
for such machinery to be used up in production (this being legree’s view 
of slaves [386–87]). after all, what is the point of saving and protecting 
your equipment? Thus, in this case too, Stowe is taking up a model that 
has operated against africans and in the service of slavery (as shown by 
legree). however, she is reversing it to apply to whites involved in the 
slave system.
 but, of course, this is not the primary sense in which the impli-
cated authors of Stowe’s text are using words such as “enterprising” 
and “industry.” When St. Clare speaks of training africans in industry, 
he is suggesting that they need training for self-improvement or self-
advancement, both individual and collective. but this simply does not 
fit the characterization of africans elsewhere in the novel. for instance, 
in terms of advancing one’s family, there could be no more striking case 
of such a commitment than eliza escaping with harry. Indeed, the char-
acterization of african enterprise is quite general. a lovely instance is 
found in dinah, the St. Clares’ cook. much to ophelia’s dismay, she shows 
the careless disregard for structure that was so celebrated in the roman-
tic cult of genius. The results of her efforts are also in keeping with 
romantic accounts of genius. her dinners are, St. Clare avers, “sublime” 
(241). Some readers may be inclined to take this as ironic. but there is 
nothing in the text to suggest this. rather, it is important to take St. 
Clare’s comment entirely seriously, as both an antiracist and antisexist 
claim. Clearly, a dinner does not have the enduring quality of a painting 
or a poem. but, Stowe suggests, cooking can manifest the same sort of 
aesthetic brilliance and creativity. Within the astonishingly narrow con-
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fines of possible self-cultivation, dinah has manifested the very highest 
form of artistic industry.
 The two characters who are most obviously relevant here, however, 
are Tom and George. both are, in fact, remarkable for their industry and 
enterprise. for example, when Tom comes to the St. Clare home, he is 
struck by “the wasteful expenditure of the establishment.” In contrast, 
St. Clare is “struck with [Tom’s] soundness of mind and good business 
capacity” and ultimately “all the marketing and providing for the fam-
ily were intrusted to” Tom (230). Indeed, subsequently, ophelia explic-
itly characterizes Tom as “industrious” (369). Similarly, once George is 
free, he “devote[s] all his leisure time to self-cultivation” (487), eventu-
ally going to a university (491) and committing himself to work in liberia 
(494).14
 There are two particular incidents that stand out with these charac-
ters. With George, it is his youthful invention of “a machine for the clean-
ing of the hemp, which, considering the education and circumstances of 
the inventor, displayed quite as much mechanical genius as Whitney’s 
cotton-gin” (13). This is industriousness of the highest order—or, rather, 
the highest order within the economic system. George here shows a keen 
devotion to advancing himself and the firm where he is employed.
 Tom shows an even greater degree of industriousness toward the 
self-advancement of africans. despite the common use of the phrase “an 
Uncle Tom,” Tom is deeply committed to the freedom of africans.15 This 
is shown by the culminating commitment of his life. he devotes himself 
fully to the protection of emmeline and Cassy. he literally allows himself 
to be tortured to death, but he will not betray them and thus prevent 
them from escaping a life of slavery. If this is not properly spoken of as 
“enterprising,” then it is a form of striving for social betterment that is 
elevated above enterprise and industry.
 here it is worth returning to the conceptual domains and models 
drawn on by Stowe. It is no accident that George exhibits his enterpris-
ing nature in a positive way by inventing a machine. This stands in direct 
contrast with the machinelike nature of the slave-trader haley and the 
reduction of africans to machines by legree and other planters. It is not 
a metaphor, but a literal statement that contradicts the racist models 
that were pervasive at the time. The case of Tom is even more striking. 
If legree represents the worst sort of striving, Tom represents the best. 
Just as legree is metaphorically assimilated to Satan, one central model 
for Tom, noted by many critics, is Jesus (see, for example, Gilmore 72, 
Karcher 207, and Tompkins 138). Indeed, his death has liberatory conse-
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quences beyond Cassy and emmeline, for it inspires young George Shelby 
to free all his slaves (see 498–500).
 finally, Stowe is careful to indicate that this is not simply a fictional 
idealization. The final chapter of the book includes a series of real cases, 
testimonies to the industry and enterprise of real africans and people of 
mixed african and european ancestry (see 508–9). She also stresses that 
her characters are to a great extent based on real people (Stowe explains 
that she herself “or her friends have observed characters the counter-
part of almost all that are here introduced” [500]). moreover, George’s 
invention is itself based on a real case (13n.).
 Thus, it seems clear that the great weight of the novel is against the 
claim that africans are unenterprising. yet there does not seem to be 
anything suggesting irony in those passages where the unenterprising 
claim is made. The contradiction holds—even if the explicit statement is 
belied by virtually the entire narrative (in a very lukácsian fashion).
ImplICaTed aUThorS, ThemaTIC elaboraTIonS, and 
ConTradICTIon
again, Stowe’s articulation of racist ideology in this case is bound up 
with her use of a racist model—that africans are children or are child-
like. Statements about the supposedly childlike nature of africans per-
vade the novel (see, for example, 33 and 83). They too are almost entirely 
inconsistent with her actual portrayal of africans. The general operation 
of such a contradiction is clear from the case of industriousness. how-
ever, there are some significant properties of this particular contradic-
tion that are worth considering.
 first, as noted earlier, there are characters who seem to speak, at 
moments, with the voice of the author. but there are also characters 
who seem to represent the precise opposite of the author’s view, char-
acters that the author is clearly setting out to criticize. marie St. Clare 
is one of the most mercilessly lampooned characters in the novel. She 
is pathologically self-obsessed, incapable of even basic empathy with 
others, hypocritical, superficial in her judgments, and unaffectionate 
even to her family—not to mention being hypochondriacal. She is also 
the one responsible for Tom being sold to legree. readers can expect 
anything coming out of marie’s mouth to be highly suspect. yet marie 
prominently asserts that her slaves are “children” and “childish” (197). 
This is an astonishing development that I am inclined to read as a highly 
Authors, Implied and Implicated | 127
localized yet sincere self-criticism on Stowe’s part. It suggests, in other 
words, the employment of an implicated author to express a nagging 
self-doubt on the part of the real author, a doubt of roughly the form 
“perhaps even I am not that different from marie St. Clare.”
 but this apparent self-criticism is far from the only significant aspect 
of Stowe’s development of this child model for africans. as noted ear-
lier, an author will sometimes elaborate on an ideological assertion in 
an attempt to reconcile it with contradictory depictions in the narra-
tive. This is more likely to occur when the conflict is sharp and to some 
degree evident. The conflict between Stowe’s statements about african 
childlikeness and her depictions of africans is often quite stark.
 for example, Stowe portrays africans fairly consistently, not as more 
childish than whites, but as more parental than whites. one instance of 
this portrayal comes with the St. Clares. When eva returns home after 
a long journey with her father, she runs to marie shouting “mamma!” 
however, marie quickly disengages from her, complaining, “you make 
my head ache” (186). a moment later, the child spies her half-african 
nurse. She cries “mammy!” and runs to the woman. as the narrator 
explains, “This woman did not tell her that she made her head ache, but, 
on the contrary, she hugged her, and laughed, and cried” (187). It is clear 
that mammy is the motherly figure, not mamma.
 The point is not confined to older black women and young children. 
It applies to black and white men as well. Thus Tom’s relation to mr. 
Shelby does put Shelby in the social position of a patriarch. but the per-
sonal relation of the two men is the opposite of what one would pre-
dict from their social position, despite their relative similarity of age. 
This contrast is brought out strikingly in one scene. Shelby has sold Tom 
to haley. before haley takes possession, Shelby tells Tom that, for the 
interim, “Go wherever you like, boy.” particularly to a modern reader, 
the “boy” seems gratuitous. however it sounded to the original read-
ers of the novel, it clearly signals the childhood model of africans. Tom 
responds by recounting a story. “I was jist eight years old,” he explains, 
“when ole missis put you into my arms and you wasn’t a year old. ‘Thar,’ 
says she, ‘Tom, that’s to be your young mas’r; take good care on him.’” 
Though Shelby replies “my good boy” (62), the anecdote makes clear 
that Tom is the real father there, not Shelby.
 The sharpness of this contradiction makes it particularly likely that 
it will be troublesome for the author’s receptive response. but the issue 
here is really why Stowe did not simply do away with the general state-
ments linking africans with children. Was she so wedded to the domi-
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nant racial ideology in this respect? perhaps in a way she was. but in 
order to consider this topic more fully, it is necessary to consider the 
nature of ideology more fully.
 as is well known, there are more and less derisive versions of ide-
ology bearing on disprivileged or exploited groups. Indeed, there are 
commonly positive as well as negative aspects to stereotypes about such 
groups.16 both function generally to preserve social hierarchies. despite 
this conservative function, it is sometimes possible to push the posi-
tive aspects of stereotypes to the point where they actually threaten the 
dominant social hierarchy. This is just what Stowe attempts to do with 
the ideology of african childlikeness.
 before elaborating on this, it is worth pointing out something that 
the preceding analysis does not imply. It does not imply that Stowe has 
no taint of paternalistic liberalism, no inclination to think of whites as 
adults and blacks as children. She almost certainly did have such ten-
dencies. These would become dominant in certain contexts and certain 
moods. but she also undoubtedly had inclinations that contradicted this. 
The issue is, given that she clearly manifested strong inclinations to 
think of africans not as children, but as parents, why did she not choose 
to eliminate expressions that clearly contradicted this? part of the rea-
son she did not eliminate these expressions is presumably that she par-
tially accepted them. but, if this were sufficient, then the contradiction 
itself would presumably not appear so starkly. In other words, the belief 
would have more strongly affected her representation of blacks. rather, 
part of the reason for Stowe’s inclusion of the “africans are children” 
model is that she was able to use the model counterideologically.
 Specifically, Stowe’s clear moral orientation in the book is Christian. 
She begins with the view that what is Christian is good and what goes 
against Christianity is bad. moreover, she is envisioning an (implied) 
Christian readership who will at least potentially be swayed by an appeal 
to Christian principles. a well-known teaching of Jesus is that “unless 
you . . . become like little children, you will not enter the kingdom of 
God” (matthew 18:3, New American Bible). The ideology that made afri-
cans into children must necessarily have cut both ways for Stowe. It 
deprived africans of worldly status; yet it also elevated their spiritual 
status. even the good white characters lack the fully spiritual elevation 
of Tom. St. Clare has no religious feeling, and complains that it is “given 
to children and poor, honest follows, like” Tom. In response, Tom quotes 
the biblical passage according to which God has “hidden from the wise” 
and “revealed unto babes” (343, referring to luke 10:21). The passage 
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clearly reveals the politically problematic nature of this model, since it 
excludes Tom from “the wise.” but it suggests why Stowe would find a 
childhood model valuable for her political purposes as well. This com-
plexity is revealed on the next page also, when St. Clare addresses Tom 
as “foolish boy” (thus the opposite of the wise man), but then goes on to 
link what Tom is trying to teach about Christianity with what St. Clare’s 
(spiritually idealized) mother taught him.
 moreover, as ashis nandy has pointed out, one ideological use of 
the child model for africans concerns their “civilizational” status. It is 
part of a large historical narrative in which the eastern civilizations rose 
early in history, but are now old and decrepit. In contrast, african civ-
ilization is, according to this model, still in childhood. only the euro-
pean is adult, thus rightfully in charge of the superannuated asian and 
the infantile african. a clear implication of this model is that european 
civilization will age and be replaced by africa. however, this implica-
tion seems to have been developed only rarely. Stowe is one of the few 
writers to have recognized it.17 Indeed, in what is almost certainly an 
authorial intrusion, she writes of africa that “come it must, some time, 
her turn to figure in the great drama of human improvement.” Then, she 
continues, “the negro race, no longer despised and trodden down, will, 
perhaps, show forth some of the latest and most magnificent revelations 
of human life.” Indeed, “they will exhibit the highest form of the pecu-
liarly Christian life” and God may even make “poor africa . . . the high-
est and noblest in that kingdom which he will set up, when every other 
kingdom has been tried, and failed” (204). The idea is repeated later, 
ventriloquized through the voice of George harris, who suggests that 
the development of african “civilization and Christianity” will be of “a 
higher type” than what went before (493). The point is perfectly logical 
in light of the generational model. If europe superseded the east, then it 
follows that the child africa will grow up to supersede an aging europe.
 but, again, this logic does not eliminate either the contradiction or 
the racist ideology. There is a degree of rationalization in these appeals 
to the bible and to a putatively teleological element in history. here, it 
is necessary to add yet another consideration, an emotional one. This 
consideration also does not entirely mitigate the racism of the model. 
but it helps to explain its rhetorical operation in the context of Stowe’s 
novel. Stowe almost certainly wished to create among her (white) read-
ers a protective attitude toward africans, even a motherly attitude.18 She 
repeatedly appeals directly to the parental feelings of readers, as when 
she writes, “If it were your harry, mother . . . that were going to be torn 
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from you by a brutal trader, to-morrow morning . . . how fast could you 
walk?” (56).19 The book presents very few true models for white readers 
to emulate, since so much of the book is aimed at fostering self-criticism 
among whites. but one of those characters is rachel halliday, who helps 
eliza escape and “naturally” calls the escaped african “my daughter” 
(153). a childhood model of africans thus had an emotional function for 
Stowe as an implied author as well: It should help to inspire parental 
care.
 Though the contradictions and problems remain, this analysis sug-
gests some of the political, moral, and emotional complexity of this 
aspect of the novel. It also leads to the issue of the overarching unity of 
reasons that give coherence to the implied author. This unity is insepa-
rable from the emotions of parent–child relations and some of the ethi-
cal principles connected with those emotions.
The ImplIed aUThorIal CoherenCe of UNCLE TOM’S CABIN
Clearly, Uncle Tom’s Cabin is fundamentally an antislavery novel. To 
understand its implied authorial unity of reasons, then, one needs to 
begin by considering just what Stowe viewed as the most objectionable 
aspect of slavery. It was not the physical hardship, the beating, the back-
breaking work. She certainly wishes readers to feel badly for the slaves 
subjected to such treatment. but that is not the central point of her hor-
ror at that institution. her horror focuses rather on what slavery did to 
the most intimate relations of human life. I take it that Stowe herself is 
engaging in authorial ventriloquism when one of the characters states 
that “The most dreadful part of slavery, to my mind, is its outrages on 
the feelings and affections,—the separating of families, for example” 
(139). This is why the separations of husbands and wives, parents and 
children, brothers and sisters are the repeated, heart-rending scenes of 
the novel. as an affective scientist might put it today, for the implied 
author of Uncle Tom’s Cabin, the greatest crime of slavery was its devasta-
tion of attachment relations, because they are the only things that can 
make bearable the physical miseries of slave-owners’ brutality. Indeed, 
without the security of attachment relations, life is unbearable even if 
one is not subjected to brutality. due to the nature of slavery, the slave 
was almost endlessly in a state of attachment deprivation or, at least, 
attachment vulnerability.
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 Today, many readers would probably note that spontaneous human 
empathy should have worked against the operation of slavery, and they 
might ask just what prevented it from doing so. Stowe in effect asked the 
same question, though inarticulately, without modern affective science 
to guide her. In the South, there was clearly some inhibition on empathy, 
a blocking of spontaneous response, particularly relating to the terrible 
pain of attachment violation. This blocking is manifest in the repeated 
statements of Southern whites that africans simply do not form per-
sonal relations in the same way that white people do (see, for example, 
197). It might seem, then, that this lack in Southern whites is the sum 
total of the problem. but Stowe’s analysis of the problem is more subtle. 
She equally criticizes northerners, not for blocking their empathy, but 
for feeling disgust at africans. ophelia is outraged by slavery and the 
treatment of slaves, which so prominently includes the violation of their 
attachment relations. but she is also repulsed to see eva’s attachment 
relation with an african, manifest in eva’s hugging and kissing mammy 
(in fact, it “turned her stomach” [187]).
 These points lead to the central ethical and political view of Stowe’s 
implied author. from the beginning to the end of the book, despite the 
various contradictory ideas and attitudes of the implicated authors, 
there is a consistent implied authorial view that is both thematic and 
emotional. Specifically, the implied author holds two emotional/cogni-
tive attitudes to have profound moral and social value. These attitudes 
are the opposites of the great Southern and northern faults. The first 
great virtue is attachment sensitivity. This virtue is an ability to recognize 
attachment bonds, attachment anxieties, attachment needs, wherever 
they occur, in whatever identity group (here, whatever race). It is also 
an ability to value those bonds, not merely intellectually, but emotion-
ally. It is the opposite of the empathic insularity that characterizes the 
emotional lives of so many Southern whites in Stowe’s novel. The second 
great virtue in this work is attachment openness. This virtue is the willing-
ness to accept and potentially reciprocate attachment bonds, again inde-
pendent of the identity group to which the other person belongs. This 
openness is the opposite of feeling disgust at the thought of any intimacy 
with members of out-groups, the disgust that characterizes the righteous 
new englander, ophelia.20 In short, there is implied authorial consistency 
here along with the implicated authorial inconsistency. moreover, the 
consistency and the inconsistency are closely interrelated, both themati-
cally and emotionally.
132 | Chapter 3
Profiles of Intentional Coherence, 
Implied Authorial Misdirection, and Filmic Narrators
The issues of multiplicity and coherence that arise in literature are only 
intensified and made more complex in film. again, any given film is likely 
to have multiple implied authors. The preceding discussion indicates 
that these implied authors will themselves comprise multiple implicated 
authors. This multiplication of intentions, so salient in film, suggests a 
general, theoretical point. Just as each work has a profile of ambiguity, 
one may say that each work has a “profile of intentional coherence.” In 
the case of film, one prominent part of that profile involves the distri-
bution of productive and receptive intent across different individuals 
involved in the production process. as in the case of a profile of ambi-
guity, one can think of this in terms of a graph. In some cases, there 
will be fairly uniform contributions by many people, perhaps following 
general craft-based principles. This will give a relatively flat line. one 
could then say that the director, cinematographer, producer, and oth-
ers were all contributing in fairly nondistinctive ways to the productive 
and receptive intent of the work. In contrast, some works could be envi-
sioned as having one sharp peak marking the very distinctive contribu-
tion of a director who is perhaps the screenwriter and producer as well, 
or who greatly influenced the emotional and thematic orientation of the 
screenplay and the cinematography. There are also possibilities for two 
or three such peaks.
 In addition to this profile across all those involved in the production 
of a film, there is also a profile of intentional coherence for implicated 
authors. This is true for both literary works and films. however, a film 
is shorter than a novel. In other words, a filmmaker can watch a rough 
cut of his or her film in a couple of hours. a novelist may take several 
days to read a draft of his or her novel. put very simply, a filmmaker is 
less likely to forget details of part one when viewing part three forty-five 
minutes later (in contrast with a novelist who may read part three two 
or three days after reading part one). as such, in film, there is less scope 
for variation in authorial receptive intent. as with literature, different 
attitudes, models, and so on, arise in different contexts. Sometimes these 
can vary radically. however, it is perhaps relatively easy for an author 
to fail to recognize contradictions across a large novel (which, again, 
may take many hours to read across many days). Such a failure should 
be more difficult when the span of time is two hours. Indeed, this point 
holds generally. Thus one would expect less divergence of implicated 
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authors in short stories than in novels and very little in lyric poems. on 
the other hand, in the case of film, the actual production is very complex 
and reconciling parts may be very difficult. If an author sees a problem 
between two scenes in a novel, he or she only needs to rewrite. If a film-
maker sees a problem between scenes in a film, he or she may have to 
raise money for extra days of shooting. Indeed, if the crew has already 
dispersed, even money may not suffice. Thus there are complications in 
the nature of cinematic implicated authorship as well.
 finally, there is another possible level of intentional inconsistency. 
richard maltby has discussed the ways in which some scenes in holly-
wood movies project two audiences based on age and moral attitude. 
one may add that they project different implied or implicated authors 
as well. Consider, for example, a sequence of scenes in which two people 
are alone. There is a fade to black. When the image returns, they are 
lounging in different chairs, jackets removed, collars unbuttoned, and 
one is leaning back and smoking. In at least some cases, a sequence of 
this sort has two meanings, thus two implied authors/implied audiences. 
In one, it suggests sexual relations. In the other, it suggests only infor-
mality after some passage of time. often, this difference may simply be 
part of the ambiguity of the work. In some cases, however, there may be 
a “true” alternative, thus a privileged implied author and a privileged 
implied audience. brian richardson has recently explored differences in 
implied readers, noting that “there is often a distinct hierarchy among 
these readers” such that “one reader knows both what the other per-
ceives and what it alone can know” (“Singular Text” 263).21
 Chapter 1 considered the case of someone running for office who 
wished to conceal his own views. This involves insincerity. but it does 
not involve any complexity in the implied author. If Sloe wants to project 
an image of being anticolonial, then the implied author of his speeches 
is anticolonial even if the real author is not. but now suppose that Sloe 
wants to appear anticolonial to some voters, but wants other voters to 
understand his real (colonialist) views. In that case, he projects two audi-
ences and two implied authors. one implied author so to speak subsumes 
or encompasses the other. Specifically, the colonialist implied author is 
the genuine implied author, whereas the anticolonialist implied author is 
a pseudo-implied author. put differently, the work is designed to produce 
a certain sort of misreading for a particular group. It is designed to lead 
some people to interpret an ironic narrator as the implied author. one 
may say that this is a form of implied authorial multiplicity that occurs 
through misdirection.22
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 This sort of misdirection certainly occurs in literature. but it is 
perhaps more obvious in film, in part because films involve large 
investments of money and are (in general) more tightly regulated by 
governments. The financial investment involved in a film often means 
that real authors have to be much more concerned with the potential 
financial success of their final product, thus the breadth of audience 
reception. regulation by governments means that filmmakers must be 
very sensitive to the sorts of representation that would be likely to trig-
ger censorship.
 The precise operation of misdirection is, of course, bound up with 
processes of narration. here, too, there are differences between litera-
ture and film. Specifically, as a number of writers have indicated, the 
primary selection of information given to the film audience is percep-
tual. as, for example, Scholes and Kellogg note, film “does not present 
a story directly, without narration, but always through the medium of a 
controlled point of view, the eye of the camera, which sharpens or blurs 
focus, closes up or draws off, gives the image its color and shading, and 
provides, through its synchronous sound track, a continuous commen-
tary of words, music, noise or silence, along with the voices of the dra-
matis personae” (280). The agency of this selection may be referred to as 
the “perceptual narrator.” as discussed in chapter 2, the perceptual nar-
rator may be distinguished from the verbal narrator. The latter is always 
the narrator in verbal art.
 Gregory Currie has argued against the ubiquity of narration in film. 
It is worth considering this briefly before continuing. Currie’s argument 
is roughly that the perceptual aspects of the film cannot be the text pro-
duced by a narrator. That would be possible only if one assumes that 
the narrator “has gone to the trouble of recreating” the events “on cam-
era, spending millions of dollars, employing famous actors,” and so on 
(22). first, even if true, this is beside the point. The important thing is 
that information from the (author-created) storyworld has been selected 
and organized in the film presentation. The audience is not given some 
sort of direct and all-encompassing access to the storyworld. That selec-
tion and organization are narrator functions. Second, the fiction of film 
is that we are actually seeing the characters, etc., not that we are seeing 
actors playing the characters. Whatever we decide is the status of the 
narrator’s “text,” it does not involve “employing famous actors.” finally, 
there is no reason to suppose that the perceptual narrator is confined 
to real-world filmmaking constraints in presenting images, whether of 
actors or of characters. readers accept that a verbal narrator can know 
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peoples’ thoughts or recount long stretches of prehistory or be in two 
places at once. There is no reason to suddenly become strict realists 
when it comes to perceptual representation. 
 despite these theoretical issues, perceptual narration is, in some 
ways, fairly straightforward. verbal narration, however, is more obscure 
in film. In order to understand cinematic verbal narration, it is useful to 
draw a couple of distinctions. first, one may distinguish the frame narra-
tor from the commentator narrator. The frame narrator is a (visible) char-
acter, voice-over,23 or text that sets up an embedded story. When that 
narrator is a character, one is inclined to think that the frame narrator is 
the narrator of the embedded story. however, he or she is rarely if ever 
the perceptual narrator (that would be the case only if the story were 
presented entirely through point-of-view shots). Indeed, often the frame 
narrator merely serves as a transition to an independent story. If the 
embedded narrative retains some relation to a personified frame narra-
tor, it is often through focalization. Indeed, the frame narrator often has 
very little impact on the viewer’s ongoing response to an embedded nar-
rative. In contrast, a commentator narrator may repeatedly qualify or 
explain what the viewer is seeing or hearing, thus modulating his or her 
perceptual response. This commonly occurs through a voice-over. often, 
the two forms of narration are combined and the commentator narrator 
is identified with the frame narrator. Indeed, where there is a personi-
fied frame narrator and a personified commentator narrator, they are 
almost always the same.
 finally, it is worth noting that there is usually a significant differ-
ence between a verbal narrator that is vocal and one that is textual. The 
textual narrator gives, for example, identifying titles (such as “new york 
City, September 10, 2001”). In comparison with the vocal narrator, he or 
she is much more likely to be entirely nonpersonified and omniscient. 
The vocal narrator may present the same content (i.e., the same words). 
but the very fact that this content is generated by a distinctive human 
voice tends to give it an air of personification, even when there is no 
information about that individual.
 by default, viewers tend to assume that nonpersonified narrators—
particularly perceptual narrators—are trustworthy. as margolin writes, 
“If anonymous,” the narrator’s “voice is equated with the voice of truth” 
(“person” 423) or, as macCabe puts it, “a visual discourse . . . guaran-
tees truth” (11). viewers only question the reliability of the percep-
tual narrator when given reason to do so. Typically, this occurs when 
the perceptual narrator is in some way personified, as when viewers are 
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informed that they are seeing a character’s dream. but there are cases 
where a nonpersonified narrator may be problematic. Such cases may 
be involved with the projection of multiple implied authors. Indeed, a 
problematic nonpersonified narrator is sometimes crucial for the cre-
ation of implied authorial misdirection. Kabir Khan’s New York presents 
a subtle case of this sort, relying on the interplay of different types of 
narrator.
Narrators and Implied Authors in Kabir Khan’s New York
The film begins with panoramic shots of new york behind the titles. The 
use of perceptual narration is not necessarily consistent in any given 
film. moreover, the titles sequence is often visually and aurally separate 
from the rest of the film. nonetheless, if this indicates anything about 
the perceptual narrator,24 it suggests a sort of godlike omniscience as the 
viewer is taken through various visual perspectives not ordinarily avail-
able to real people. The titles sequence ends with the camera following 
a yellow taxicab. This begins to hint at surveillance and a sort of “omni-
science” that is not associated with God, but with the police. Indeed, this 
impression is quickly verified when the camera cuts to a second perspec-
tive, revealing an fbI helicopter.
 another cut gives a clear pov shot from the helicopter, again track-
ing the taxi. now the audience hears words transmitted to the inside of 
the helicopter, an oral report of the movement of the taxi. The effect 
here is of a gradual narrowing of the knowledge of the narrator, from 
the apparently divine omniscience at the start, to the complex of partic-
ular, observing and communicating fbI agents. among other things, this 
gives the chase both a sinister or foreboding quality (already foreshad-
owed by the music of the titles sequence) and a possible sense of human 
fallibility.
 Subsequently, the perceptual narrator moves to street level; the black 
opacity of the limousine following the taxi repeats that of the fbI heli-
copters. The entire sequence is ambiguous between an orwellian vision 
of massive governmental observation and a heroic image of smart and 
painstaking police work foiling a dangerous plot. This ambiguity, with 
its associated emotional ambivalence, continues through much of the 
opening of the film. It is undoubtedly part of the receptive intention of 
the implied author and it begins to suggest a tacit simulation of distinct 
implied audiences—one inclined to worries over state terror, the other 
to worries over nonstate terror.
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 In a massive show of force, the taxi is surrounded by fbI vehicles. 
members of a SWaT team, almost all white, pour out of the vans, training 
their rifles on the driver. The officer in charge barks orders at the driver, 
a pudgy middle eastern man. In apparent confusion, he asks what he has 
done. The officer immediately has the trunk of the car opened. It con-
tains weapons. The man protests that they are not his. The officer orders 
his subordinates, “Get rid of him!”
 The scene is fascinating in a number of ways. It suggests a certain 
sort of temporal complexity to the implied author. Specifically, I suspect 
that the director’s receptive intent here runs along the following lines: 
Initially, the viewer is uncertain as to the precise nature of this action. 
again, some viewers will be inclined to assume a heroic story of police 
officers foiling crime or terrorism. others will be inclined to infer the 
orwellian tale of massive governmental surveillance. but both will ini-
tially take the discovery of weapons to “confirm” the first, heroic read-
ing. Subsequently, however, the audience learns that the fbI has planted 
the evidence to coerce the cab’s owner, omar, into serving as an fbI spy. 
In retrospect, it is clear that the driver’s protests were sincere. moreover, 
the speed with which the officer moves to opening the trunk appears 
suspicious. how did they know precisely where the weapons would be? 
finally, after the detailed treatment of fbI torture later in the film, the 
officer’s order, “Get rid of him!” appears ominous.
 This opening sequence suggests the complexity of the perceptual 
narrator’s relation to the implied author, and it indicates that there may 
be particular sorts of temporal extension for implicated authors. Specifi-
cally, the author, on the one hand, simulates the moment-by-moment 
interpretation and response of a viewer. on the other hand, he or she 
also simulates such a viewer’s recurring revision and reconsideration of 
earlier inferences and feelings. Those revisions may reflect initial uncer-
tainties or indeterminacies in the meaning or emotional force of the 
work. In other words, as one views a section of the narrative, one may 
favor one of the ambiguous possibilities. however, later events may lead 
one to favor another possibility. That change is part of implied authorial 
intention. putting the point technically, one might say that the profile 
of ambiguity for a work may involve initial and retrospective implicated 
authors. 
 The general idea is hardly a new one. It is widely recognized that 
viewers and readers come to reinterpret earlier sections of a work in 
light of later information. The point here is primarily a theoretical one 
about the nature of that reinterpretation and its relation to local and 
global implied authorial intentions.
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 The following scene presents the SWaT team breaking into some-
one’s home and training their laser-guided rifles at his head. here, too, 
there is the same ambiguity between efficient crime-prevention and gov-
ernmental terrorism. The film cuts to fbI headquarters in new york. The 
audience sees the man who was just arrested, omar, first through a video 
surveillance camera. The examining officer, a Hindi/Urdu-speaking 
Indian, serves at this point as the voice of the implied author explaining 
that, by the provisions of the paTrIoT act, omar has virtually no legal 
rights. Indeed, he indicates that the usual presumption of innocence is 
reversed in such cases and the “detainee” is responsible for proving his 
or her innocence.
 The interrogator, roshan, wants omar to tell him in particular about 
his school friend “Sam.” here, there is a sort of teasing ambiguity as 
well, since Sam could be a european or Jewish american. as it turns out, 
he too is muslim—Samir Shaikh.
 roshan’s question about Sam leads to an embedded narration frame 
in which omar begins to recount his arrival at new york State Univer-
sity. The perceptual narration cuts to the university, presumably seven 
years earlier. omar is having his photo taken at a large sign for the uni-
versity, giving a peace sign. The brief scene suggests omar’s perhaps 
naïve enthusiasm on his first visit to america.
 The embedded story begins with the continuation of the verbal nar-
ration, seamlessly moving from frame narrator to commentator narra-
tor. however, when omar meets the fourth main character, maya, the 
commentary stops and the viewer is entirely immersed in the embedded 
storyworld. Khan marks this in the aural presentation of dialogue. omar 
had exchanged a few words with the young woman who took his photo-
graph earlier. but the volume of that dialogue was roughly at the level of 
the background, suggesting that it was part of the perceptual narration, 
but not the information explicitly communicated in the dialogue of the 
frame story. When he begins to speak with maya, however, the dialogue 
has the same volume as the narrative commentary, which it replaces, 
as the nondiegetic music is reduced to the level of background accom-
paniment. perhaps even more important than the aural cues, there are 
several pov shots from omar’s perspective. These partially serve to pro-
vide a transition between the commentator narration and the internal 
focalization25 on omar in the embedded storyworld. Techniques of this 
sort are common in films, signaling shifts in narration, though viewers, 
it seems, rarely notice them self-consciously.
Authors, Implied and Implicated | 139
 The next sequence introduces Sam. Sam is involved in an apparently 
wacky college competition. but it has obvious thematic resonance. There 
is an annual race to see who can raise the U.S. flag most quickly. Show-
ing great physical prowess, Sam wins. more importantly, the film shows 
him proudly gesturing toward the flag. The suggestion is that his pride is 
not only in winning the contest, but in being american. The perceptual 
narrator not only presents this information. That narrator frames Sam’s 
relation to the flag in a stereotypical posture of a national hero. This is 
one of moments in the film designed to show that Sam is “all-american” 
(as he later calls himself).
 Subsequent scenes present the developing friendship of Sam, maya, 
and omar, particularly stressing Sam’s all-american qualities. In keep-
ing with this, his multicultural and multiracial pals play football on a 
field with the twin towers prominent in the background. This unobtru-
sive selection of information serves to highlight that this is before Sep-
tember 11. These scenes generally stress his heroic excellence as well. 
omar explains that Sam was good at sports, spoke well, and was a good 
student. In one sequence, he rescues maya’s purse from a mugger and is 
wounded in the process. In part because of these virtues, but in part sim-
ply because he is sweet and charming, maya is in love with him. This last 
point provokes omar’s jealousy. That jealousy is continually suggested 
as a possible underlying motive for omar’s subsequent cooperation with 
the fbI. finally, this entire sequence serves to establish the hopefulness 
of these young people who anticipate a happy, well-integrated life as 
americans in america.
 a peculiarity of this part of the film involves the relation between 
the Indian americans, on the one hand, and european americans, on 
the other. In one rather strange scene, Sam and omar speak in hindi 
while their european american friends join the dialogue speaking 
english. There are several ways in which one could read this scene. It 
could be that the viewer is supposed to assume that the whole conver-
sation is in english (even though Sam and omar are actually speaking 
hindi). This would take up a common convention—what allows ancient 
Greeks to speak english in an american movie about ancient Greece. but 
this does not fit the fact that the white characters are clearly speaking 
english. alternatively, one could assume that the white characters actu-
ally understand hindi. but that seems empirically unlikely and there 
is no evidence that they ever speak it. finally, it may suggest that this 
portrayal of pre–September 11 america is inaccurate, an idealization 
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designed to make a point about what happened in post–September 11 
america. more exactly, this may suggest two audiences for the implied 
author, thus two implied authors (one genuine implied author and one 
pseudo-implied author). for one audience, this discrepancy is invisible. 
They should simply accept the utopian vision. for the other audience, 
this discrepancy serves primarily to prepare the viewer for an untrust-
worthy epilogue that follows the main action of the film.
 after this, roshan explains that the fbI suspects Sam of operating a 
terrorist sleeper cell in new york. he also accuses omar of being part of 
that cell. however, this already seems highly unlikely, given the attenu-
ated relations between omar and Sam in the intervening years. omar 
shouts that roshan is framing him. The audience subsequently learns 
that this is indeed the case.
 Generally, the internal focalization on omar is limited to perception. 
however, the audience is at this point given fragmentary access to some 
of his internal thoughts as he remembers roshan’s claims and accusa-
tions. This leads to a recollection of Sam’s defeat of the mugger and 
maya’s confession of her love for Sam. The context leads the viewer to 
assume this is a recollection by omar. but here something else strange 
happens. omar stops seeing maya and Sam with the excuse that school 
is about to end and he is packing. as omar is explaining this to maya, he 
hears a scream. They run into a common room on campus and witness 
many distraught students watching the breaking news about the destruc-
tion of the twin towers. The middle eastern and South asian students are 
as overwhelmed with sorrow as the european students. The scene ends 
with a transition to frame narration in which omar is announcing that 
this day changed everything.
 The problem here is no doubt obvious to every reader. The school 
year (in both the United States and India) ends in early summer. The 
events of September 11 took place on September 11. It is very difficult 
not to interpret this as a deliberate challenge to the reliability of omar’s 
memories. In itself, that is not terribly theoretically interesting. how-
ever, it again suggests that the idealization of america prior to this 
moment of complete change is to some degree problematic. The point 
has consequences for the ending (which does not involve personified 
narration of any sort).
 In the following scene, roshan threatens both omar and his family. 
he thereby coerces omar into cooperating with the fbI in an investi-
gation of Sam. omar soon manages a (seemingly) chance meeting with 
maya, who is now married to Sam. They have a young son to whom Sam 
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is a devoted and loving father. following his fbI cover story as a radical-
ized militant, omar convinces Sam that he desires some sort of revenge 
against america. Sam then introduces omar to his friends. It turns out 
that Sam is indeed running a sleeper cell. To test omar, Sam has him 
actually kill someone—an act that omar carries out, with the subsequent 
approval of his fbI contact.
 This leads to Sam’s story of the preceding seven years. before going 
on to this, however, it is important to mention another character— 
Zilgai. maya is working in a law office giving legal aid to people who were 
detained and tortured following the September 11 events. The audience 
hears the testimony of Zilgai. he explains the various techniques used by 
his interrogators. many of these techniques are familiar to viewers from 
reports on abu Ghraib and Guantanamo.
 Sam’s story in effect corroborates that of Zilgai. The main differ-
ence is that Zilgai’s story is a testimony spoken into a camera operated 
by maya. In contrast, Sam serves as a frame narrator for the percep-
tual narration of an embedded story. The framing narration is delivered 
beneath a waving american flag, selected by the perceptual narrator in 
parallel with the scene where Sam is introduced. he prefaces the story 
by referring to himself as formerly “all-american” and now a “terror-
ist,” asking, how did the change occur? In the frame, he explains that it 
was ten days after September 11 and he was taking a train to meet maya. 
The film then cuts to the flashback. The perceptual narrator shows Sam 
looking at the train schedule. a woman approaches and leads him to an 
empty part of the station where he is hooded and handcuffed. he is sub-
sequently taken to a detention facility, stripped, and chained to a chair. 
The perceptual narration shows the dogs outside the facility, the barred 
doors closing, the clothing being cut from his body. The perspective is 
clearly not that of Samir, since the audience sees these things while his 
eyes are covered by the hood. however, at least the central images are 
information inferentially available to Samir as he would have heard the 
dogs, the clanking of the doors, the slicing of the scissors, just as the 
audience hears them. In this way the perceptual narrator does not pres-
ent Samir’s optical point of view, but does presumably present his audi-
tory point of view and his (inferential) knowledge of the situation.
 finally, the hood is removed and the interrogation begins. Sam is 
accused of involvement in the terrorist attacks because he took pho-
tographs of the twin towers. despite his explanation of the photos as 
work for a class—and despite the more important fact that photos of the 
towers hardly constitute criminal or even suspicious activity—Sam is 
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still presumed guilty and tortured. The commentator (Samir in a voice-
over) explains that he was one of 1,200 people who were subjected to 
this treatment. Subsequently, the audience is shown the various tortures 
reported by Zilgai and others—waterboarding (suffocating with water-
soaked cloths), hanging by the wrists, sleep deprivation through blaring 
music and lights, guards urinating on his hooded face and leaving him 
for the night to choke on the urine. The mutually re-enforcing nature 
of the perceptual and verbal narrations tends to enhance the viewer’s 
sense of their reliability—not only with respect to the storyworld, but 
with respect to the real world as well.
 The perceptual narration reveals a clear change in Sam. at first, he is 
defiant and self-confident. by the end, he is weeping and helpless. This is 
what first makes him susceptible to the suggestion of joining a militant 
organization. (another prisoner tells him what he can do if he wishes to 
take back his “izzat” or honor, precisely what is taken away in humili-
ation.) When he is finally released after nine months in detention, he 
is listless and deeply traumatized. The perceptual narration presents 
what are apparently nightmares derived from the torture and show 
his clear susceptibility to anxiety and concrete fear. With maya’s sup-
port, Sam regains confidence and enters back into life in the world. but 
his attempt to find a job leads only to further humiliation as employers 
reject him, perhaps because he is muslim or perhaps because they have 
been informed of his detention. he eventually makes the terrorist con-
tact suggested to him in prison.
 omar confronts roshan with Samir’s detention and torture. roshan 
admits that Samir was not a terrorist, that no one could remain the same 
after such an experience, and that following this detention and tor-
ture Samir became what he was not previously, a terrorist.26 omar then 
says that such torture and detentions have produced terrorism. for a 
moment, roshan is silent. he then gives a speech about how he is mus-
lim and that he is deeply pained by muslims leaving the way of peace. 
Indeed, he goes so far as to say that if one supports Islam, one supports 
peace. he then explains that only in the United States could he be put in 
charge of such a sensitive case, even as a muslim.
 The scene is fascinating because it is difficult to say just how it should 
be read in relation to the implied author. on the one hand, there is some 
truth to what roshan is saying. Whatever the U.S. government has done 
to some innocent people, that does not justify killing other innocent peo-
ple. at the same time, the ringing support of peace seems, at best, forced. 
It comes from the mouth of someone whose profession is inseparable 
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from violence. The point is particularly clear in context, since roshan 
has just finished telling omar that it was perfectly fine for him to shoot 
a man. moreover, while the United States does provide many opportuni-
ties, it is simply false that governments never employ members of a tar-
geted, “enemy” group in their attack on that group. Indeed, employing 
collaborationists is fairly routine. moreover, the viewer already knows 
that his ability to speak Hindi/Urdu is crucial for his work on this case. 
There is also the obvious fact that there are plenty of countries in the 
world where muslims hold such positions—not only muslim-majority 
countries, but even countries where they are a discriminated-against 
minority, such as India.
 my own inclination is to read the scene in one of two ways. The first 
possibility is that this is genuinely dialectical. In other words, there is 
one implied author and he or she is suggesting the moral complexity of 
the problem. There is no moral complexity to torture—it is wrong. There 
is no moral complexity to terrorism—it is wrong. but judgments about 
individual people are often more difficult than judgments about their 
acts.
 The other possible reading is that there are two implied authors 
here. one implied author accepts omar’s accusations; the other accepts 
roshan’s rebuttal. In this case, it is difficult to discern just where the 
subsuming or encompassing implied author may come out. The viewer 
can only get a fuller sense of this retrospectively, at the end of the film.
 most of the remaining story concerns the development of Sam’s ter-
rorist plot. It turns out that he has managed to have his company hired 
to clean the fbI building. he explains to omar that he has no interest in 
killing random people. his fight is with the fbI, so he is attacking them. 
The argument is not without plausibility. however wrong, it shows that 
Sam is, in some ways, morally (or perhaps merely intellectually) superior 
to his antagonists. he is not striking out at, say, european Christians or 
at some other identity group, blaming everyone in that group for what 
he suffered. he is, rather, striking at the institution that tortured him 
and that subsequently continued those heinous practices.
 The climax of the film comes with the attempted bombing of the fbI 
building. The plot nearly succeeds. Indeed, it is foiled due only to coin-
cidence. This indicates that the apparently ubiquitous fbI surveillance 
is just as much of a failure at preventing terrorism as is detention and 
torture. The coincidence is that maya happens to be in the fbI building. 
She has agreed to cooperate with the fbI to prevent a terrorist attack. 
She happens to see Sam outside the building. When Sam is informed of 
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maya’s presence, he cannot detonate the explosives. he drops the deto-
nator and is immediately shot many, many times by the fbI, although 
he is no longer a threat. Just before the firing begins, maya runs toward 
Sam. She is therefore killed as well. roshan receives a medal for prevent-
ing a terrorist attack, although the fbI created the terrorist and the ter-
rorist himself decided not to detonate the explosives.
 The movie is to this point an utterly despairing tragedy. The fbI bru-
talizes an innocent, and indeed heroic, man. This and broader social iso-
lation lead him to terrorism. The fbI actually fails to learn of an attack 
he is planning and it is only by chance that he himself decides to call it 
off. at this point, fbI agents murder him and his wife, orphaning their 
young child. The final result is that the very agency responsible for this 
brutality is celebrated.
 This leads to the ending. The transition is marked by a single title, 
a very minimal textual narrator that reports a time lapse, “Six months 
later.” after this, there is only a perceptual narrator. With no personi-
fied narrator, it may seem that there could be no discrepancy between 
the narrator and the implied author. In other words, it may seem that, 
when not personified, the perceptual narrator could not be untrust-
worthy. however, the ending of New York suggests something else. The 
final scene begins with danyal, the son of maya and Sam, happily play-
ing baseball. omar has taken over the role of his father and everything 
seems perfectly fine. danyal has not changed in any visible way since 
his parents were murdered. roshan comes to the baseball game. Ini-
tially, omar is cold. but roshan delivers another speech about the mar-
velous opportunities given by this country. he goes so far as to claim 
that the work of the fbI has enabled a muslim boy (danyal) to play on 
an american team and be celebrated, even though his father was a ter-
rorist. roshan meets danyal, who is immediately drawn to this friendly 
stranger. danyal invites roshan to join them for dinner and the three go 
off together as friends.
 The ending takes up some of the uncertainties from earlier in the 
film. The utopian vision of the United States is here again, though it 
presents a post- rather than pre-9/11 utopia. As noted earlier, there 
are hints that this utopian vision may be mistaken with respect to the 
period before September 11. Is it possible that the implied author really 
feels that the country has fully overcome those problems—that preju-
dice against muslims has really been so eradicated, that there would be 
no bias against someone known to be the son of a terrorist? Then there 
is the personal story of danyal—is it really plausible that he would be so 
totally unaffected by the murder of both his parents?
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 perhaps this is, instead, a case of implied authorial misdirection, 
thus a dual implied author for a dual implied reader. for one implied 
author, thus for one audience, this is a perfectly plausible conclusion, 
one entirely fitting to the situation in the United States after the initial 
hysteria of September 11 declined. but for another implied author and 
audience, this is straightforwardly ironic. The personal emotional rela-
tions are incredible; the social situation is idealized beyond recognition.
 one possible reason for this split is that the subsuming or genuine 
implied author holds to the position of the second implied author, but 
has to assuage the sensibilities of precisely the forces that brutalized 
Sam. put simply, the first implied author may be understood as implied 
for the fbI, the CIa, and their supporters in the general population. 
This possibility actually has a polarizing effect on one’s understanding 
of these two implied authors. Conditions in the United States diverge 
from the happy communal harmony depicted in the film precisely to the 
extent that the subsuming implied author fears retribution for his por-
trayal of the fbI.
 The film ends with the more significant introduction of a textual nar-
rator. again, textual narrators are generally judged highly trustworthy. 
Given no reason to believe otherwise, one’s default response to a textual 
narrator is to see it as the voice of the (subsuming or genuine) implied 
author. In this case, the textual narrator explains that more than 1,200 
“men of foreign origin” were detained and tortured after September 11. 
It goes on to state that the government did not find evidence linking 
any of them to the September 11 attacks. The textual narrator notes that 
“eventually, more than a 1000 were released.” The statement seems to 
suggest a sort of reconciliation. however, it also suggests that some 200 
of these men—along with many others like them—remained imprisoned 
at the time of the film’s making. moreover, “To this date, most of [those 
released] suffer from depression and stress . . . and have not been able to 
focus enough to hold a job . . .” (ellipsis marks in the original).
 These statements arguably make the preceding scene almost entirely 
implausible. They may even suggest that viewers should disregard the 
scene, just as they would disregard anything inserted at the insistence 
of a censor. of course, one may disagree about whether the textual 
narrator’s challenge to the perceptual narration here is that extreme. 
however, the point at least suggests that discounting a nonpersonified 
perceptual narrator is possible, even to the extent of disregarding an 
entire plot sequence without any replacement. at the very least, this 
seems to be part of the film’s profile of ambiguity. In other words, this 
profile includes at least the possibility of implied authorial misdirec-
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tion. put somewhat simply, the film should lead one audience to infer 
an implied author who represents a post–September 11 “overreaction” 
and who now sees that “overreaction” as a historical incident that the 
nation has overcome. Indeed, for that audience, the implied author is 
a sort of cheerleader for the United States. however, at the same time, 
the film suggests another implied author. This second implied author 
believes that the terrible actions of the U.S. government after Septem-
ber 11 have not been resolved. moreover, this implied author may even 
feel that there is enough remaining danger that he must conceal his real 
views and in effect wrap himself in the american flag.
 The film does conclude with a moment of hope. Specifically, the tex-
tual narrator reports that “on the 22nd of January 2009, just two days 
after being sworn in as the new president of the United States of amer-
ica, barack obama signed an order to shut down the infamous symbol of 
detention and torture, Guantanamo bay.” It seems clear that the (sub-
suming) implied author did see the possibility of a future that was at 
least better, if not necessarily utopian. The real author has undoubtedly 
been deeply disappointed by what has actually been done by the obama 
administration since that time.27
Conclusion
In sum, both productive and receptive choices by an author are the result 
of complex mental causes. Some of those causes are also narratively, emo-
tionally, or thematically justified—thus reasons. Some implied authorial 
reasons are thematized in that the author is able to articulate them accu-
rately. many others are theoretically specifiable. Thus critics can in prin-
ciple articulate these reasons by relating patterns in the author’s work to 
abstract knowledge not available to the author.
 The unity of a work comes, first of all, from the enduring emotional 
attitudes and thematic commitments of the textual implied author as 
these are manifest in his or her final judgment that a work is complete. 
however, that final authorial response does not necessarily reconcile all 
authorial receptive responses to the work. an author does not read and 
evaluate a work in a timeless “now.” he or she responds to a work not 
only globally, but locally as well, not only as a whole, but moment by 
moment. These local authorial receptions define “implicated authors.” 
The striking feature of implicated authorship is that it entails different 
sorts of continuity and discontinuity. The highest level of continuity is 
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encompassed in the implied author. but implicated authorial views form 
various patterns of coherence and contradiction on their own.
 The most obvious type of implicated authorial contradiction involves 
incompatibility between particular developments of story events or char-
acter traits, on the one hand, and self-conscious generalizations, on the 
other. These generalizations are often expressed by authorial intrusions 
(through the narrator) or authorial ventriloquism (through characters). 
Contradictions of this sort may operate in any ideological direction. for 
example, opposition to dominant racist ideology, articulated in autho-
rial intrusions, may be belied by racist portraits. but, by the same token, 
dominant racist ideology may surface in the overt statements only to be 
contradicted by the more nuanced and humane depictions of characters. 
When sensitive to contradictions, authors may elaborate on the self-con-
scious statements, often producing rationalizations rather than express-
ing actual justificatory reasons. Contradictions may also arise across 
different story events or character portraits. These more particular con-
tradictions are often due to changing contexts and the resulting shifts in 
cognitive models.
 Uncle Tom’s Cabin manifests contradictions of implicated authorship, 
particularly between overt statements and depictions. perhaps the most 
striking case of such a contradiction concerns the putatively childlike 
character of africans. Stowe elaborated on this idea by drawing out 
the implications of the racist model of africans as children—including 
implications that are inconsistent with the ideology of white suprem-
acy. (These implications are made possible in part by the fact that dom-
inant ideologies about exploited groups commonly have both negative 
and positive versions.) perhaps most importantly, she used the model 
of africans as children to foster parental emotions in her white read-
ers. In doing so, she also sought to foster the two primary virtues that 
tacitly guided her implied authorial ethics. These are, first, attachment 
sensitivity, or enhanced empathy toward the attachment vulnerabilities 
of others, and, second, attachment openness or emotional availability for 
the formation of attachment relations, particularly attachment relations 
with members of despised groups.
 film further complicates the issues surrounding implied and impli-
cated authorship. again, films have many authors. moreover, any film 
author shares the local diversity found in implicated literary authors. 
There are two variables affecting this local diversity. The first is sim-
ply length. Shorter works tend to produce less diversity in implicated 
authorship; thus films will tend to have a higher degree of unified 
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implied authorship than novels. Second, and partially balancing the first 
variable, some works are more difficult to alter than others. It is much 
more onerous to reshoot and edit a scene in a film than to rewrite a 
scene in a novel.
 The study of film in this context also gives prominence to several fur-
ther types of authorial multiplicity. The first is the “profile of intentional 
coherence.” as discussed in the preceding chapter, one cannot simply 
say that a film has a single implied author. on the other hand, it makes 
even less sense to claim that every collaborator contributed equally 
(e.g., the caterer who made the sandwiches for a scene is probably not as 
interpretively significant an implied author as the screenwriter). rather, 
any given film involves a complex set of relations among contributors. In 
some cases, there will be a fairly broad distribution of intentional coher-
ence. Thus, in some cases, the screenwriter, director, producer, cine-
matographer, main actors and actresses, and so on, will all be similarly 
interpretively relevant. In other cases, however, there will be one or two 
more prominent peaks (often including one for the director). This profile 
is also affected by the diversity of implicated authorship. Thus, again, the 
implied director himself or herself manifests multiplicity. Generally, the 
profile of intentional coherence for a literary work is only of the second 
sort (i.e., a matter of implicated authorship). exceptions occur in cases of 
collaboration or in instances where an editor has made truly extensive 
changes in a literary work.
 beyond this, there are cases where there may be multiple implied 
authors in a work. or, rather, there are cases where the implied author 
distinguishes two (or more) sets of implied readers. This implied author 
then may misdirect one group of implied readers to infer a particular 
(pseudo-)implied author, typically by identifying an ironic nonpersoni-
fied narrator as the implied author. he or she then properly directs a 
second group to understand the implied author quite differently (and 
correctly), typically while also recognizing that many other readers will 
infer a very different implied author; in this way, the genuine implied 
author subsumes or encompasses the pseudo-implied author. This divi-
sion is most prominent in theme, but occurs also in emotional force and 
even in storyworld construction. The multiplication of implied authors 
or the misdirection of implied author inference is not confined to film. 
however, it may be more prominent in film due to the commercial need 
to reach a broad audience and due to possibilities for censorship.
 Isolating implied authorial misdirection in film is connected with 
understanding the nature and operation of cinematic narration. first, 
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one needs to distinguish the perceptual narrator, the selector of visual 
and auditory information. Second, one needs to distinguish differ-
ent types of verbal narrator. one distinction is between vocal and tex-
tual narrators, that is, narrators who speak and narrators who supply 
text—main titles, intertitles, superimposed identifications (e.g., “delhi 
1947”), and so on. among speaking narrators, frame narrators may be 
distinguished from commentators. frame narrators provide a transition 
between a frame and an embedded narrative. They are most often per-
sonified and explicitly introduced in some frame story. That introduc-
tion commonly suggests that they narrate the main story. however, they 
rarely do. They may become focalizers or commentators. Commentator 
narrators provide voice-overs or silent-film intertitles at points in the 
course of a film. These are often personified. but they need not be (thus 
they may be comparable to nonpersonified verbal narrators in fiction). 
Still, the mere fact of an individual voice tends to give commentator 
narrators at least a hint of personification. different sorts of verbal nar-
rators have different degrees of presumptive authority for viewers. Tex-
tual narrators typically have the greatest authority.
 In New York, Kabir Khan presents a complex interplay of different 
sorts of perceptual and verbal narration. at some points—prominently, 
when dealing with the mistreatment of young muslim men after Sep-
tember 11, 2001—this contributes to a sense of the reliability of the nar-
ration. at other points—prominently, when treating the integration of 
muslims in U.S. society before September 11—it contributes to a sense 
of unreliability. This unreliability is not precisely that of the narrator. 
rather, there is at least a possibility of unreliability in a pseudo-implied 
author. This possibility becomes particularly intense with the ending of 
the film. Specifically, the perceptual narrator presents an apparently 
true ending, but, in part through textual narration, the film simultane-
ously provides hints that viewers—or, rather, some viewers—should not 
take that ending seriously. In other words, the ending of the film sug-
gests implied authorial misdirection bearing on different sorts of implied 
audiences for the film.
 finally, film makes the temporal process of narration particularly 
salient. This foregrounds temporal differences in implied authorial 
meaning, though these occur just as widely in literature as in film. Spe-
cifically, the implied authorial profile of ambiguity for a given scene or 
sequence may shift over the course of a work. In connection with this, it 
is important to distinguish initial from retrospective profiles of ambiguity, 
along with their associated implied and implicated authors and readers.
s the preceding chapter begins to suggest, one of the most fun-
damental interpretive questions about discourse concerns reli-
ability. Indeed, the very distinction between narrator and implied author 
is in large part motivated by the desire to clarify the difference between 
reliable and unreliable narrators. Specifically, here as elsewhere, the 
implied author provides a norm against which one may judge the nar-
rator. fundamentally, the narrator is unreliable to the extent that he 
or she diverges from the implied author or “is at virtual odds with the 
implied author,” as Seymour Chatman put it (Story 149).
 on the other hand, this may not tell very much. as nünning points 
out, “Critics who argue that a narrator’s unreliability is to be gauged 
in comparison to the norms of the implied author just shift the bur-
den of determination” (“reconceptualizing” 91). This is particularly 
problematic because the very idea of an unreliable narrator, like that 
of the implied author itself, should serve an explanatory function. as 
Tamar yacobi points out, for any given reader facing a particular text, 
the notion of an unreliable narrator is a “hypothesis” that is “formed 
in order to resolve textual problems” (110). but this, in turn, raises the 
need for a “systematic account of the clues to unreliable narration”—
in other words, the “textual data” and their relation to “interpretive 
choices” (nünning “reconceptualizing” 105). To begin with, there is a 
need for a clearer sense of what constitutes unreliability.
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What Is Reliability?
people routinely consider real individuals to be unreliable informants. 
To say that someone is unreliable in ordinary life is, first of all, to say 
that he or she misinforms one about the real world.1 In other words, an 
unreliable informant is someone whose discourse leads one to imagine 
some aspects of the world incorrectly. The idea of unreliability is fun-
damentally the same in fiction. a fictional narrator is unreliable to the 
extent that he or she misrepresents the storyworld, leading one to imag-
ine the storyworld incorrectly. recognizing unreliability is, then, insepa-
rable from recognizing this incorrectness. as Shen puts it, “a narration 
is regarded as unreliable precisely because the reader has come to the 
conclusion that things are not or cannot be as the discourse represents 
them” (“Story-discourse” 567).
 There is, however, a difficulty here. In the case of real life, there are 
facts. In real life, if I am told that Jones married Smith, there is a fact 
about whether she did or did not marry Smith. but when the narrator of 
Surfacing says that she got married, what determines the fact that she did 
not?
 by this point, readers will not be surprised to discover that narratolo-
gists do not entirely agree on the topic. Some stress authorial intent. The 
facts of the storyworld are, in this view, determined by the author. So too 
are the facts about the narrator, and his or her reliability or unreliabil-
ity. In contrast with this, there is a “reader-centred . . . approach.” This 
posits “an interpretive strategy that naturalises textual anomalies by pro-
jecting an unreliable narrator figure” (nünning “reliability” 496). but, 
in order to make a distinction between reliability and unreliability, one 
needs a norm of some sort. It is difficult to see how a reader’s “naturaliza-
tion” of “an interpretive strategy” constitutes such a norm. here, again, 
the different views are at least partially reconciled in the implied author, 
understood as the receptive or reader-simulating intent of the real author.
 but here another problem arises—how is it even possible to recognize 
unreliability in fiction? In the real world, one discovers unreliability by 
discovering facts, usually by some means outside the report of the unre-
liable informant (e.g., by meeting Jones and finding out that she did not 
marry Smith, despite what one was told by Gallstone). but how does this 
occur in fiction, since the only source of information is often that unreli-
able informant?2
 In order to consider this problem, it may be helpful to distinguish 
different sorts of unreliability. In fiction, as in real life, an unreliable dis-
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course is likely to have one of three faults. first, it may directly mis-
represent the facts of the story. This is “misreporting,” in phelan’s 
terminology (see “Rhetoric/Ethics” 205). Second, an unreliable discourse 
may leave out information that is crucial for valid inference (“underre-
porting,” in Phelan’s terms [“Rhetoric/Ethics” 205]; not being “forthcom-
ing,” as bordwell puts it [60]; limiting communicativeness, as Sternberg 
would say). finally, such a discourse may misdirect attention, promoting 
mistaken inferences.3
 The first “mode of factual unreliability” is the simplest. having been 
given a piece of information (or misinformation), one is most likely to be 
given a piece of directly contradictory information (or misinformation). 
In some cases, this involves a narrator’s self-contradiction; in other 
cases, there may be a shift in narrators; in other cases, the contradictory 
information may be reported by a character in dialogue. In Surfacing, 
the narrator first reports that she was married, and then subsequently 
reports that she was not. This sort of direct contradiction signals to the 
reader that the narrator is unreliable in one of those two reports. It 
thereby requires the reader to infer which report is correct.
 The complete withholding of information is usually fairly straight-
forward as well. In this case, the reader is most often faced with a gap in 
the Iserian sense. he or she simply cannot figure something out and ulti-
mately realizes that information is lacking. This situation is a bit trickier 
for the author in that he or she typically must provide enough clues that 
the reader can infer the withheld information (though some works sim-
ply leave the information incomplete, making it part of the profile of 
ambiguity).
 The misdirection of attention is perhaps the most interesting of the 
three. The direction of attention is one of the main concerns of liter-
ary authors and film directors, since readers simply cannot notice every-
thing, as rabinowitz discusses (Before 47–52; on direction of attention 
in film, see bordwell On the History). one may distinguish two types of 
attentional misdirection. In the cruder case, some true information is 
made salient and that information suggests a false inference. This hap-
pens all the time in detective fiction, though it may be developed in such 
a way that the reliability of the narrator is not impugned. for example, 
suppose Jones has been shot. The reader then learns explicitly (and accu-
rately) that Smith had a fight with Jones the previous day and that he 
had a rifle. This may lead the reader to infer, falsely as it turns out, that 
Smith was the killer.
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 This form of “misdirected foregrounding” is commonly paired with 
the second sort of unreliable direction of attentional focus—the reduc-
tion of salience or “misdirected backgrounding” of information that 
is crucial to valid inference. Thus, along with the misleading informa-
tion about Smith, a reader may find himself or herself distracted from 
information that would lead to valid conclusions. In the case of film, the 
information may be literally foregrounded or backgrounded. for exam-
ple, the audience might be shown Smith cleaning a rifle, while in the 
case of doe (the real killer) rifles appear in the background on a wall in 
his home.
 Usually, the trick with foregrounding and backgrounding of infor-
mation is manipulating the relation between spontaneous encoding and 
processing, on the one hand, and self-conscious inference, on the other. 
If the reader is explicitly told that Smith went out and bought a rifle 
after the fight with Jones, that will almost certainly lead to self-con-
scious reflection on the likelihood that Smith is the murderer. Given the 
nature of detective fiction, that may actually lead the reader or viewer 
to reject the inference as too straightforward. on the other hand, simply 
showing rifles in the background of a shot may not lead to encoding. In 
other words, the viewer may simply not notice the rifles. In that case, 
the conclusion of the story—in which doe is exposed as the murderer—
may not produce the required feeling of “retrospective necessity,” which 
is to say, the feeling that, once revealed, it makes perfect sense that doe 
is the culprit.
 Whether the narrator provides false information, fails to provide nec-
essary, true information, or misdirects attention, his or her unreliability 
may result from deceit or incompetence, as Chatman notes (Story 149). 
It may also arise from cognitive or emotional bias (e.g., in-group prefer-
ence). Incompetence—or fallibility—is further divisible into “range and 
depth of knowledge,” as bordwell explains (Narration 60) or, one might 
add, articulateness. a reader’s emotional and cognitive response dif-
fers across these types of narrator. one is likely to feel antipathy toward 
deceitful or biased narrators. In contrast, one may feel a sort of iden-
tification with ordinary fallibility and compassion or pity for a cogni-
tive or perceptual disability. In response to deceit, people typically look 
for motives, particular interests that would guide the narrator’s misrep-
resentations. Understanding these motives may help to correct for the 
misrepresentation. If the problem is a disability—as in the case of benjy, 
a mentally challenged narrator in faulkner’s The Sound and the Fury—the 
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reader may try to infer what facts would lead this particular character, 
with his or her particular disability, to this particular misunderstanding. 
In any case, one is likely to seek further information, from the same or 
other narrators.
 The topic of emotional response leads to another key issue regarding 
unreliability—trust. for example, as noted above, a reader or viewer of 
detective fiction often does not trust the narrator who gives apparently 
definitive information in a highly salient form. Indeed, trust is arguably 
the initial basis of readers’ and viewers’ sense of reliability or unreliabil-
ity. Talking about unreliability solely in terms of facts may make the pro-
cess appear too inferential, particularly at the start. perhaps one’s first 
sense of reliability or unreliability is not an abstract, cognitive relation 
to ideas, but rather a concrete, affective relation to a person.4
 Indeed, it seems very likely that, in fiction and in life, emotional trust 
or mistrust of a person precedes a rational, self-conscious inference 
regarding the likely validity of particular statements. This is roughly the 
same process that is found in the well-known experiments testing ven-
tromedial frontal damage. Test subjects are presented with four decks 
of cards. Unbeknownst to the subjects, the decks are rigged. normal test 
subjects develop a spontaneous, emotional aversion to the losing decks 
and a spontaneous, emotional attraction to the winning decks “before 
they could consciously articulate the best strategy” (oatley, Keltner, and 
Jenkins 136, discussing work by bechara and colleagues). one may guess 
that things operate similarly in the case of trust. Indeed, one could con-
strue normal subjects’ response to the different stacks of cards as one of 
trust and mistrust.
 There is one possible difference between trusting a stack of cards and 
trusting a person. It appears that one’s default response to strangers is 
a mild and tentative distrust. people only “build up trust” (or enhance 
the response of distrust) over the course of personal interactions—or, 
in some cases, by just seeing the other person repeatedly even without 
interaction (see oatley Emotions 73). however, there may be an excep-
tion to this. It seems likely that people feel a default trust for people 
placed in positions of institutional authority. The point is suggested by 
the “dr. fox lecture” experiment. In that study, test subjects were pre-
sented with an actor playing the role of an academic. Simply because of 
his stated position as an authority (the participants were not told he was 
an actor), they accepted what he said and responded positively to this 
(pseudo-)learning experience, forgoing their usual spontaneous distrust 
for strangers (see naftulin, Ware, and donnelly).
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 The point about authority is consequential because narratives place 
narrators in a position of structural authority. Thus, in all likelihood, 
readers begin with a presumption of narrator reliability and lose trust in 
a narrator only once they have reason to do so. This leads us to the issue 
of just how such distrust develops. however, before considering this, we 
need to address a logically prior issue. even if an affective relation of 
trust is primary, it seems clear that distrust is connected with a sense of 
discrepancy between what the narrator reports and what the facts of the 
storyworld appear to be. The nature of such facts is fairly straightfor-
ward in the case of nonfiction. but the case of fiction is less clear. Thus, 
before addressing the development of distrust, we need to consider the 
nature of fictional facts—thus how there can even be anything to distrust 
a narrator about.
Fiction’s Facts
In considering the facts about a fictional world, it is helpful to begin with 
a broad division between general principles and particular instances. 
General principles are the patterns that govern physical events, individ-
ual actions, group dynamics, and so forth. for example, people generally 
act in such a way as to further their goals; people generally experience 
empathy when they witness the face of someone in pain; people gener-
ally have five senses. Such principles range from strict laws, such as the 
law of gravitation, to looser tendencies, such as the idea that empires 
tend to become overextended and disintegrate. particular instances are 
cases of these principles—Smith is a case of a person with five senses, or 
perhaps four senses, if he is blind or deaf; Imperial rome is a case of an 
empire; Jupiter’s orbit is a case of the law of gravitation.
 people create or understand a fictional story most obviously by con-
structing or reconstructing particulars. To a great extent, these par-
ticulars are explicitly stated in the discourse. or, rather, the discourse 
presents enough information so that one may draw on general principles 
to reconstruct “nondefault” or unique aspects of the story’s particular-
ity. Indeed, this is true in nonfictional storytelling as well. In a fictional 
story, one might read “Jane tripped when running up the stairs. now she 
had a prominent, bluish bump on her cheek.” Similarly, if this happens 
to a real person, she may explain her prominent, bluish bump by saying 
“I tripped on the stairs.” In both cases, recipients use general principles 
about the world to fill in the causal connections. They have, however, 
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been given enough information to know what is unique about the situa-
tion, what is not simply part of the world generally.
 most often, the general principles in a work of fiction are those of the 
real world. as marie-laure ryan has discussed, readers follow a “prin-
ciple of minimal departure” in their assumptions about the relations 
between the real and fictional worlds. however, there are exceptions to 
this continuity of principles. one may distinguish three types or levels 
of general principle. The first is most easily identified as the level of the 
real world, but that may not be quite right. It is more accurate to say 
that it is the level of the real world as understood by the implied author. for 
example, some works may rely on a belief in the miraculous intervention 
of saints. a reader need not believe that saints really do cure illnesses 
from beyond the grave in order to recognize that this is a principle pre-
supposed in some narratives (e.g., in the hindi blockbuster Amar Akbar 
Anthony, where the heroes’ mother is cured of blindness after—and pre-
sumably because—her son prays at a Sufi shrine).
 The second level comprises general principles derived from some 
category in which the work is located. The obvious case of this is a genre 
category. In science fiction, for example, one commonly assumes that 
there are civilizations roughly like one’s own on other planets. In this 
context, “roughly like one’s own” means that real-world psychological 
and sociological principles apply unless we are given other, differenti-
ating information. Categories here also include groupings by culture or 
discourse mode. for example, when reading Sanskrit literature, one may 
reasonably expect the appearance of cakravāka birds to anticipate the 
separation of lovers. This is presumably not a belief that ancient Indians 
had about the real world. but it is part of the shared literary world of 
such works.
 finally, there is the level of general principles that are unique to 
the story at hand. like particulars, these must be specified in adequate 
detail. That specification may be explicit or implicit. for example, in 
Salman rushdie’s novel Midnight’s Children, people do not generally have 
supernatural powers. however, each of the children born at the hour of 
India’s independence has some special capacity. This is a straightforward 
general principle that guides the (implied) reader’s understanding of the 
story.
 I speak of these as “levels” because they form a hierarchy. In gen-
eral, information given in narrower contexts displaces information that 
applies more broadly. Thus the (conventional) principles of a genre dis-
place any contradictory principles from the real world. Similarly, any 
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principles particular to a story displace principles from a genre or other 
category. put differently, in cases of conflict, the more narrowly con-
fined principle is the one that applies.
 In addition to principles, particulars enter at all these levels as well. 
It may seem initially that information from the real world enters only at 
the level of principles, not at the level of particulars. however, on even 
brief reflection, it becomes clear that this is not true. Indeed, authors 
and readers assume extensive particular information in constructing and 
reconstructing a story. This particular information ranges from the exis-
tence of commercial products (e.g., a certain type of chewing gum) to 
world-changing historical events (e.g., Indian independence). 
 needless to say, this does not mean that all potentially relevant par-
ticulars of the real world are carried over into the fictional world. Just as 
the author may change general principles, he or she may change particu-
lars. here, however, a complication arises. particulars in the real world 
are, one might say, “referential.” There are real people, real actions, real 
experiences there. Some particulars include other particulars—thus the 
Second World War includes particular battles, which include particu-
lar troop movements, which include particular individual soldiers, and 
so on. for any given level of referential particularity, there are certain 
things that are readily knowable and others that are not. moreover, 
there are certain things that are widely known and other things that are 
not.
 for instance, virtually every russian reader of War and Peace would 
have known the outcome of the battle of borodino. In contrast, the pre-
cise disposition of troops is presumably known by experts, but not by the 
average reader. finally, one can assume that no one does or can know 
the identities or actions of all individual soldiers—even of all individual 
soldiers who engaged in particularly significant actions.
 Such differences regarding historical knowledge have a bearing on 
the facts of a fictional world and on the reader’s response to that fic-
tional world. In a fictional account of the battle of borodino, an author 
may create wholly fictional soldiers as he or she likes. at the other end 
of the spectrum, when there is common knowledge, the reader or viewer 
automatically assumes that the particulars hold. When watching a film 
about World War II, treating some event in may 1944, one automatically 
assumes that the end of the war is one year away, that the end is a tri-
umph for the allies, and so on. readers or viewers connect relevant story 
events with those facts from the real world, even though the events are 
still an indeterminate future within the story itself. of course, an author 
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may create a fiction in which the war had a different outcome, as in 
philip K. dick’s novel The Man in the High Castle where the fascists have 
won the Second World War. In this case, readers implicitly (or explic-
itly) recognize that this is a case where fictional information excludes 
real information. Intermediate cases, however, are less clear. If Tolstoy 
presents napoleon as giving certain sorts of order, as having a particular 
knowledge or lack of knowledge about the battle, one may take this to be 
a partial fictionalization that further specifies known facts, a complete 
fictionalization of unknown facts, a counterfactional fiction (i.e., a fic-
tionalization that alters known facts)—or perhaps unreliable narration. 
 In sum, the facts of a storyworld result from the interaction of quite 
extensive extratextual information with some minimal textual informa-
tion. The minimal textual information serves primarily to signal where 
the storyworld deviates from common knowledge about the real world. 
That deviation is largely a matter of particulars, but it may include more 
general principles. There are complications and ambiguities with respect 
to real-world particulars and principles that are knowable, but not com-
mon knowledge. Technically, the role of such particulars and principles 
for the implied reader may be unclear. The crucial point in each case, 
however, is that the real and fictional worlds are always tightly interre-
lated, with the default presumption being one of continuity between the 
storyworld and the real world rather than discontinuity. This presump-
tion of continuity is often of crucial importance in one’s distrust of a 
narrator.
Distrusting the Narrator
again, the default attitude toward the narrator appears to be one of 
trust. Thus one needs some reason to doubt the narrator. Indeed, empiri-
cal research suggests such a strong tendency toward trust that, bor-
tolussi and dixon explain, “the precise nature of the features in a text 
that lead the reader to interpret the narrator as unreliable” constitutes 
a “puzzle” (84). Technically, automatic processing has to be interrupted 
by some sort of contradiction—or, more precisely, a felt contradiction, 
something one experiences emotionally as a contradiction, something 
that has a motivational component. That requirement is not as restric-
tive as it may seem. as already noted, readers or viewers generally have 
an interest in understanding the storyworld, and if faced with mutu-
ally exclusive descriptions, they are likely to want to reconcile them. of 
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course, one needs to have encoded those descriptions and brought them 
into connection with one another in order to recognize the contradic-
tion. That is not insignificant. but readers and viewers do this readily 
with aspects of a work that are salient.
 The point is clearer if one recalls that an emotional contradiction 
need not be a logical contradiction. Indeed, it seems likely that relatively 
few literary quandaries are logical contradictions. The contradictions 
that inspire effortful, working-memory-based processing—thus self-con-
scious interpretive work—are fundamentally task contradictions. read-
ers (including the author as reader) need to imagine some object, explain 
some event, understand some emotion through imagination. ordinarily, 
they accomplish this task automatically. however, sometimes something 
goes wrong. In heidegger’s terms, something is “broken” and the text, 
rather than being “ready to hand” for story construction, suddenly faces 
the reader as something “present at hand.” In Iser’s term, there is some 
gap. one tries to fill that gap through self-conscious interpretation.5
 The judgment of a narrator as unreliable begins with this sort of gap 
or task contradiction. Clearly, a gap does not imply that the narrator is 
necessarily unreliable. It may simply mean that one has to draw com-
plex inferences, that one needs to learn something about history or cul-
ture that is carried over from the real world to the text, that one needs 
to familiarize oneself with genre conventions, and so on. (The relation 
to reality, culture, and genre are commonly recognized in discussions of 
unreliable narration; see nünning “reconceptualizing” 98–99 and yacobi 
110–11.) moreover, the absence of any sense of contradiction does not 
mean that the narrator is reliable. for example, I may fail to see that a 
narrator is unreliable in reporting cultural or historical events from the 
real world because I myself lack relevant real-world knowledge. rather, 
as the preceding example suggests, without a sense that something has 
inhibited automatic processing, one will never begin to distrust a narra-
tor and thus to engage in effortful inference.
 There are different sorts of task contradiction or gap that may arise 
in connection with constructing a story from discourse. The most obvi-
ous is some sort of apparent incompatibility. again, this need not be a 
strict logical contradiction. It is more often a matter of unlikelihood or 
lack of explanation. for example, a reader may learn that a character is 
opposed to war and then learn that he has joined the army. This is not 
a logical contradiction. but it is unlikely and requires some particular 
explanation. as such, it will probably to give rise to effortful thought—to 
the asking of questions, as noël Carroll stresses (see “narrative”).
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 It is important to note here that gaps almost invariably involve real-
world principles and/or particulars. Thus they are bound up with the 
continuity between the storyworld and reality. Some gaps may seem 
to arise wholly internally to a story. for example, it may seem that an 
antiwar character joining the army is an anomaly purely internal to the 
storyworld where it occurs. but, in fact, one cannot even recognize that 
armies are involved in war unless one incorporates real-world informa-
tion into the storyworld.
 It is also important not to understand gaps too narrowly. The exam-
ples just given come fairly close to contradictions. however, gaps may 
arise due to unexplained coincidences or, more generally, problems of 
probability. They may arise because, for certain events or characters, 
reference is vague or identity is unclear (e.g., if the shooting of a scene 
makes it unclear whether certain actions were performed by one or two 
characters). In each case, readers or viewers are motivated to under-
stand something further about the story and they find that there is some 
difficulty in achieving that understanding.
 having identified a problem, one needs to first isolate its source. In 
technical, narratological terms, the first question concerns whether the 
source of the gap is the narrator, the implied author, or the real author. 
one may decide that the gap was produced by the real author, but has 
gone unnoticed by the implied author. If so, then one is likely to see the 
gap as a flaw in the narrative, perhaps an important one, perhaps not. 
alternatively, one may interpret the gap as occurring in the implied 
author. In other words, one may view the implied author as, in effect, 
choosing to make something anomalous. In this case, there is no fact that 
the implied author is concealing. The anomaly is part of the profile of 
ambiguity. however, since the implied author is always free to resolve 
incompatibilities, one must infer some motivation for this gap. It is typi-
cally thematic, though it may also be emotional.6
 finally, and most importantly for present purposes, one may attri-
bute the gap to the narrator, judging that he or she is unreliable. (In 
fact, readers or viewers almost certainly try to resolve any anomaly at 
the level of the narrator before turning to the implied author, and they 
almost certainly turn to the author only after failing at the level of the 
implied author.) again, once one determines that the narrator is unre-
liable, one undertakes further interpretation. one determines whether 
the narrator is lacking in knowledge or in good will or is in some way 
biased. one tries to infer what the fictional facts are in opposition to 
what the narrator has (unreliably) reported. perhaps most importantly, 
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one tries to determine the limits of the unreliability, because one gener-
ally continues to accept most of what the narrator recounts. The point 
holds whether the unreliability is motivational or epistemic, though of 
course one determines the limits of unreliability somewhat differently in 
the two cases.
How Does One Infer the Fictional Facts?
This leads to the question of how readers or viewers resolve gaps, how 
they determine just what the fictional facts are, once they have run up 
against a problem. here too it is valuable to distinguish two levels of 
adjudicative processing. one is more automatic; the other is more effort-
ful, but also more general.
 The more general and effortful approach is the scientific one. here, 
one relies on the usual principles of scientific inference to reach a con-
clusion. There is nothing magical here; there are no simple solutions. 
There is, rather, a synthesis of empirical evidence, the generation of 
hypotheses, evaluation by criteria of logic and simplicity, revision of 
hypotheses, and so forth. This is more likely to be the province of the 
literary critic than the ordinary reader.
 before undertaking such a highly effortful process, readers almost 
certainly begin by relying on some simplified, heuristic procedures. In 
the case of fictional narratives, these heuristics often involve what might 
be called default preference hierarchies. drawing on holland, holyoak, nis-
bett, and Thagard’s account of default hierarchies, one may understand 
these as pragmatic orderings, such that there is a default preference, 
but alternatives that displace the default when particular circumstances 
arise. more exactly, readers appear to have default sources of informa-
tion and default types of information, with specified alternatives for cer-
tain “marked” conditions. The narrator is obviously the primary default 
for the source of information. The primary trigger for condition mark-
ing, thus for a shift from the default, is narrator unreliability, itself made 
possible by distrust.
 The point is in keeping with the general operation of the human 
mind. The default for a bird is something like a robin. In one’s back-
yard in the american midwest, the sort of bird one expects is a robin or 
something similar. however, in the context of the florida seacoast, one 
is more likely to expect a gull (cf. Kahneman and miller 140). one would 
expect similar processes—of shifting from a default—elsewhere. Indeed, 
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with respect to trust or judgments of reliability, people engage in pro-
cesses of this sort all the time. I might generally trust Jones’s character 
judgments, but (shifting out of the default) not with respect to his ex-
wife (an instance of emotional bias). I may trust police officers with giv-
ing directions or dealing with theft, but (shifting out of the default) not 
with respect to an antiwar demonstration.
 Consider a simple literary example. Suppose there is a contradiction 
between the statements of the narrator and the statements of a charac-
ter. It seems that, other things being equal, readers are likely to prefer 
the claim of the narrator, who of course has access to both views (since 
he or she is presumably the one who has reported the character’s state-
ment). however, if one judges the narrator to be unreliable due to a lack 
of knowledge, one may prefer the character’s statement, if it falls into 
the right epistemic area—as when the narrator is a child who does not 
understand the topic under consideration (e.g., sex, finances, transcen-
dental phenomenological reduction). If the narrator is motivationally 
unreliable, then readers are likely to trust the version that is least in 
keeping with the speaker’s biasing motivations or self-interests.
 of course, these default-replacing alternatives may be overridden 
also. They may generate their own gaps. Those gaps may, in turn, be 
resolvable by further alternatives in one or another preference hierar-
chy, or they may require more effortful hermeneutic work.
 again, this shifting of a default preference hierarchy is intermedi-
ate between spontaneous processing and effortful interpretation. In this 
way, there is a difference from the prototypes governing what sort of 
bird one expects in what location. Those prototypes operate automati-
cally, with no prior sense of contradiction or gap. In the case of a narra-
tive, one must first come to challenge a source of information or sense a 
conflict in types of information before one shifts from a default. The shift 
involves some disruption of normal processing, even if it is not a matter 
of complex, extended reflection. In this way, the situation with unreli-
ability in narrative information is parallel to first learning of some real 
person’s unreliability, insofar as there is a relevant standard/prototypi-
cal alternative for trust in that case. I know that Jones is generally a fair 
judge of character. however, I come to realize that he is unreliable with 
respect to his ex-wife. This constraint is easily assimilated to prototypi-
cal cases of embittered ex-spouses. I do not have to spend a great deal of 
hermeneutic effort on the case, though it also does not occur spontane-
ously. In other cases, I may have to engage in more complex and difficult 
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inferences. This appears to be what happens with shifts from defaults in 
narratives as well.
 drawing on, but altering, hermeneutic terminology, one may refer 
to the three types of narrative processing in the following terms. first, 
the great majority of one’s reading is necessarily as simple and straight-
forward as one’s competence in the language allows. This may be called 
“spontaneous understanding.” It is the basis of the other hermeneutic 
processes, in part because it is necessary to the experience of gaps. for 
example, readers rely on spontaneous understanding to receive story 
information that allows for a sense of incompatibility. In this respect, one 
always has to rely on the narrator to some degree. once one senses a gap 
and experiences distrust, however, one shifts from the default through 
what might be called “interpretive adjustment.” relative to spontane-
ous understanding, this is an effortful process. however, it is effortful 
in a limited way, for it operates through a heuristic shift to a preset 
alternative that is itself largely unquestioned. In contrast, some gaps or 
some implications of gaps do not have, so to speak, “standard” solutions, 
particular and ordered alternatives to the default. They require a more 
diverse, vigorous, and creative exploration of possible solutions. This 
might be called “critical explication.”
 as the terms indicate, the first process is undertaken by any reader 
who makes any sense out of a literary work. The second process is more 
variable and in many cases requires a reader who has some degree of 
skill and experience. This does not mean that the reader has to be an 
academic. Insofar as the default hierarchies rely on genre knowledge, a 
grammar school youth may be highly competent at interpretive adjust-
ment with respect to, say, the mininarratives of rap songs, and a profes-
sor of literary theory may be almost entirely incompetent in that area. 
finally, critical explication is the sort of sustained analysis that more 
typically characterizes criticism than the isolated reading process. here, 
too, criticism is not confined to articles published in academic journals. 
It includes blogs, chat-room discussions, or even conversations among 
friends, though articles and books do tend to offer the largest scope for 
expansion and elaboration of critical explication.
 Since this is a bit abstract, it is worth giving a brief example before 
continuing. as will be clear from the following discussion, Surfacing faces 
the reader with several anomalies. The central gaps concern the memo-
ries of the narrator—did she marry and have a child, or did she have 
an affair and an abortion? I have encountered students who fail to rec-
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ognize the contradiction here and assume that both happened. They 
have obviously processed the novel at the level of spontaneous under-
standing, since they recognize the sequences of events. however, they 
have not noted the contradiction. Some know there is a contradiction, 
but are not quite sure of the solution. most, however, sense the gap and 
the solution. I take it that this is because they recognize the narrator 
as motivationally and epistemically unreliable, with the particular sort 
of combined inhibition that results from (psychoanalytic) repression. If 
her unreliability were solely motivational or solely epistemic, it would 
be far more difficult to understand. (how could one simply not know 
that one had an abortion? alternatively, why would one make up a story 
about abandoning one’s child?) It would require effortful critical expli-
cation. In contrast, if the unreliability is a matter of repression then all 
one needs is some basic psychoanalytic heuristics. one heuristic may be 
that people are more likely to repress something sexual than nonsexual; 
another may add that people are more likely to repress something trau-
matic than nontraumatic. Both heuristics favor the affair/abortion as 
the repressed content. (There are other heuristic reasons for this choice 
as well, reasons that do not rely on any knowledge of psychoanalysis. 
Some of these will be taken up in the following section.)
 of course, even with the psychoanalytic heuristics, critical explica-
tion enters. for example, the reader still needs to understand the story 
told by the narrator as a substitute for the memory of the abortion. a 
critical explication may explore some of the ways in which the imagery 
of the novel is consistent with the psychoanalytic heuristics. more signif-
icantly, a critical explication may go on to consider a further difficulty. 
Understanding the story relies on a sort of psychoanalytic schema. but 
there is a problem with this, because the operation of repression here 
does not quite fit psychoanalytic principles. nor is it entirely in keep-
ing with the general understanding of traumatic memory loss, which 
typically involves an experience that was unexpected, terribly painful, 
and incomprehensible (for example, Christianson and lindholm cite 
“rape and extreme and prolonged acts of violence” [772–73]). This may 
lead back to the implied author or the real author and the question of 
whether this discrepancy has an emotional or thematic function or is 
simply an error.
 before going on to explore Surfacing in greater detail, however, it is 
important to get a more concrete idea of what the usual preference hier-
archies are. as already noted, such hierarchies may bear on sources of 
information or on types of information. In addition, gaps may arise due 
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to different sorts of relation between internal and extratextual informa-
tion. This may be termed the epistemic context of the gap. Thus we may 
distinguish three varieties of hierarchy—bearing on source, type, and 
context—which might be briefly considered in turn.
 regarding information source, as already discussed, readers seem to 
begin with a default, tacit assumption that the narrator is reliable. but 
there is a complication here, since there are different sorts of narrator. 
most importantly, one may distinguish between nonpersonified and per-
sonified narrators. This is probably the most basic division that bears on 
narrator reliability. Specifically, in cases of conflict, we assume that a 
nonpersonified narrator is to be preferred over any personified figure, 
either a narrator or a character.
 This hierarchy fits with the common view that “If anonymous,” the 
narrative voice “is equated with the voice of truth.” In contrast, “In first-
person narrative . . . the teller is individuated, and his or her vision con-
sidered subjective. Such a teller normally has access to their own mind 
only, and the completeness or reliability of any information or judgment 
they provide can be questioned” (margolin “person” 423; see also mar-
golin “Authentication” 33, citing Doležel). This appears to overstate the 
case, however. nonpersonified narration is not absolutely unquestion-
able, even in comparison with personified narration (e.g., when one is 
embedded in the other). at the very least, as nünning explains, “there 
is an ongoing debate about whether unreliability is a property of first- 
person narrators only, or whether it can also be attributed to third- 
person narrators” (“reliability” 496). In any case, it seems clear that 
readers are far more likely to distrust a person when faced with some 
incompatibility. It is both emotionally unlikely and cognitively difficult 
to question a nonpersonified narrator. When a nonpersonified narrator 
delivers a particularly secure type of information (e.g., visual percep-
tion), then it is almost impossible—almost, because the ending of New 
York indicates that unreliability can arise even in this context.
 among personified figures, one tends to prefer some types to oth-
ers. It seems likely that, other things being equal, one will first follow 
the communicative discourse hierarchy of embedding. Thus, after non-
personified narrators, one will tend to trust the information provided 
by a personified narrator or a focalizer, then a character who is a topic 
or protagonist. for example, when, in his role as narrator, nick directly 
or indirectly contradicts a statement from Gatsby, we are, it seems, 
more likely to trust nick than Gatsby. a rather subtle case of this occurs 
when Gatsby says, “I suppose daisy’ll call too.” The comment expresses 
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a belief that daisy will call. nick comments, “he looked at me anxiously, 
as if he hoped I’d corroborate this” (218), suggesting that the comment 
is more a desire than an expectation. I suspect that most readers auto-
matically process the passage in such a way as to accept nick’s implica-
tion. note that this involves accepting nick’s view at two levels. first, a 
reader accepts that Gatsby looks anxious. Second, he or she accepts that 
Gatsby looks anxious because he doubts whether daisy will call (he could 
be anxious about many other things, given the nature of the preceding 
conversation, and given recent events).
 This may be a specifically discourse-related hierarchy, or it may be 
part of a general heuristic hierarchy of sources whereby one prefers 
information from those one knows well over information from those 
one knows less well. The latter is most obvious with two characters who 
operate as embedded narrators. for example, in book 10, chapter 35 of 
War and Peace, Kutuzov and Wolzogen, the second reporting from bar-
clay de Tolly, both summarize the battle of borodino. Their accounts 
are radically incompatible, with Kutuzov evaluating the battle positively 
and Wolzogen/de Tolly evaluating it negatively. The reader is strongly 
motivated to resolve this incompatibility. much greater familiarity with 
Kutuzov seems to be a factor biasing a reader in favor of his account.
 This preferential trust in familiar personified figures is precisely 
what one would expect from research on people’s response to familiar 
and unfamiliar people in real life. This same research suggests that peo-
ple respond with fear or vigilance to people from out-groups (see oat-
ley Emotions 73; see also Ito and colleagues). Thus one would generally 
expect an in-group/out-group hierarchy to occur in fiction as well. In 
the preceding example, the association of Wolzogen and de Tolly with 
German language and ethnicity could readily contribute to at least a rus-
sian reader’s preference in this case. Indeed, this identity-group divi-
sion is highlighted in this chapter (for Wolzogen) and elsewhere (book 9, 
chapter 9, and book 10, chapter 25) for de Tolly.
 of course, there is also a potential motivational issue in this case. 
even when readers do not have evidence that a particular narrator is 
unreliable, they have a general preference for information that is con-
trary to the self-interest of the speaker. In the case of Kutuzov and Wol-
zogen/de Tolly, this partially favors the latter. Kutuzov, in command of 
the russian troops, is motivated to view the results of the battle posi-
tively. on the other hand, de Tolly is a rival of Kutuzov, which some-
what taints his version as well. moreover, Kutuzov does not seem to be 
interested in any material rewards for success. rather, his interested-
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ness is a function of his sense of loyalties. In this way, his version is self- 
interested without being morally faulty. That does not mean it is fully 
trustworthy. however, it may mean that readers will be less critical of it 
on motivational grounds.
 To some extent, these heuristic preferences share a single emotional 
basis. readers have an emotional response of trusting some narrators 
and not others, some characters (who may contradict narrators) and not 
others. Spontaneous feelings of trust or distrust arise easily in relation to 
familiarity/unfamiliarity and in-group/out-group categorization. Deci-
sions about a narrator’s self-interest may require somewhat more effort-
ful, self-conscious processing, but they are often relatively simple and 
spontaneous. moreover, they certainly bear on one’s feelings of trust or 
distrust.
 It is possible to summarize the usual trust hierarchy as a preference 
hierarchy of the following sort. (a superior item in a preference hierar-
chy is chosen when all other factors are held constant. Thus the prefer-
ence rule a > b means that, if everything else is equal, choose a.)
nonpersonified narrator > personified narrator > focalizer > protagonist 
> other characters
If personified, then
familiar > unfamiliar
in-group > out-group
disinterested > self-interested
as this suggests, there do not seem to be general conditions in which a 
nonpersonified narrator is distrusted. This can only result from an accu-
mulation of evidence, making it extremely rare.
 The second area in which one finds a default preference hierarchy 
concerns types of evidence. This is in some ways more straightforward 
than the hierarchy of sources of information. It has a fairly clear relation 
to everyday experience, and is also closely related to the grammatical 
operation of evidentials. (evidentials are grammatical markers indicat-
ing, for example, whether one witnessed or was told about the informa-
tion one is conveying [see aikhenvald].) Generally, it seems clear that 
people trust current perception more than they trust memory. Within 
current perception, people tend to trust vision over hearing (the other 
senses enter less often). Within memory, people trust current mem-
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ory more than distant memory. people seem to generally trust mem-
ory more than empirical inference. Within empirical inference, people 
trust empirical inference by experts more than that by nonexperts.7 
for example, the narrator of a crime investigation might be skeptical 
of the scientific contraptions used in the lab. but, other things being 
equal, readers are likely to give initial credence to the findings of the 
lab. of course, if the narrator is a seasoned detective, the whole point 
of the story may be to show that the instincts of the seasoned detec-
tive are more accurate than those of technicians. but then readers have 
two types of expertise and this preference hierarchy does not come into 
play. finally, below the level of empirical inference, there is something 
like hearsay—roughly, ideas for which there is no evidence other than 
someone’s assertion.
 The hierarchy in types of evidence may be summarized in the follow-
ing diagram:
perception [visual > auditory] > memory [recent > distant] > empirical 
inference [by experts > by nonexperts] > hearsay
of course, like all default hierarchies, this can be overridden in particu-
lar circumstances.
 The final default preference hierarchy concerns epistemic context. 
Given certain sorts of contradiction, people give preference to one type 
of consistency over another. most fundamentally, in life and in litera-
ture, people prefer to preserve logical coherence over any other sort of 
coherence. This is simply a presupposition of all adjudication of gaps. If 
people did not seek to preserve the principle of noncontradiction, they 
would not even recognize gaps. for example, there would be no ten-
sion between Jones opposing fascism and joining the nazi party. anyone 
might empirically expect that someone who opposed fascism would not 
join a fascist party. but, without the principle of noncontradiction, there 
is no reason to balk even at the statement “he signed a party card and 
he attended an induction ceremony and he never signed a party card and 
he never attended an induction ceremony”; there is no reason to deter-
mine which alternative is correct or whether they somehow have differ-
ent meanings.
 In real life, below this founding assumption about logic, there are 
the laws—or at least generalizations—of various sciences or, more gen-
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erally, modes of knowledge. These include not only the laws of phys-
ics, but general principles of psychology, and to some extent sociological 
or other patterns. for some authors and readers, they may also include 
supernatural principles, such as divine providence. These too tend to 
be hierarchized, with physics given preference over biology, which is in 
turn given preference over the psychological and social sciences, though 
this subhierarchy rarely has consequences in literature. The relation 
between natural and supernatural principles is more vexed. even read-
ers who reject supernatural causality in life must accept that it does 
often occur in literature. I suspect, however, that when natural and 
supernatural explanations are both available, authors and readers gen-
erally prefer the natural explanations. I suspect that this is the case even 
for authors and readers who accept supernatural causality in real life.
 In literature, another epistemic context intervenes between logic 
and laws of nature particularly. These are category-specific conven-
tions, such as principles of genre. In cases where the conventions of a 
genre come into conflict with general laws of physics (drawn from the 
real world) readers give preference to the former. Indeed, this is usu-
ally so automatic that no one is likely to notice. In that sense, it does not 
give rise to a gap. particular genre conventions may also complicate the 
relation between natural and supernatural causality. They can certainly 
make the invocation of supernatural causality more (or less) likely than 
usual.
 The final epistemic context is that of empirical particulars—not gen-
eral laws, but specifics of history, culture, biography, and so forth. of 
the various epistemic contexts, readers seem most willing to forgo these 
when reading fiction. on the other hand, these are also likely to prove 
the most troublesome because this is the level at which most fictional 
deviation from reality occurs. as already noted, at this level, it is some-
times difficult to tell whether a contradiction with facts is meant to 
indicate unreliability of the narrator, a fictionalization by the implied 
author, or an aesthetic or ideological problem deriving from the real 
author.
 The default preference hierarchy for epistemic contexts may be sum-
marized with the following diagram:
logic > principles of genre or other category > natural laws > supernatural 
principles > particulars of society, history, etc.
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Unreliable Narration in Surfacing
margaret atwood’s Surfacing, published in 1972, is a prime example 
of a novel with an unreliable narrator.8 but, at the same time, it is a 
novel where it seems fairly clear what the actual story really is. In 
other words, the narration gives enough information to infer the cor-
rect story. Indeed, the narrator herself gives this information as she 
corrects the story and, in effect, becomes reliable. In this respect, the 
novel is nicely designed to illustrate the various ways in which readers 
may judge and limit unreliability, and the ways readers may adjudicate 
incompatibilities or resolve problems arising through gaps. put simply, 
the narrator changes her mind about things. This allows one to consider 
the question—why do readers (or critics) trust one version and not the 
other?
 It seems likely that most first-time readers of Surfacing are unaware 
that the narrator is unreliable almost until the moment where she her-
self more or less announces that she has gotten the story wrong. This is 
in part because the contradictions are largely “unnarrated” (in prince’s 
sense) until the point where the narrator begins to “denarrate.” (denar-
ration is “the narrator’s denial or negation of an event or state of affairs 
that had earlier been affirmed” [prince “disnarrated” 118; see also chap-
ter 3 of prince Narrative].) moreover, it seems likely that, even then, most 
readers engage in relatively quick interpretive adjustment, rather than 
critical explication, more or less automatically assuming that the new 
statements by the author are reliable—even as they make further inter-
pretive adjustments to allow for her increasing peculiarity of behavior 
and apparent hallucinations. The following analysis, however, will fol-
low roland barthes’s “last freedom” of the critic, “that of reading the 
text as if it had already been read” (15). Thus it will be concerned with 
how someone who has previously read the novel could critically expli-
cate both the narrator’s limited unreliability and the implied reader’s 
adjustment to this.
 There are two basic areas of the narrator’s unreliability. The follow-
ing discussion will explore only one of these. The first area of unreliabil-
ity, outlined briefly above, concerns her memories of her relationship 
with a lover and their child. Initially she recounts that she and this man 
were married; they had a child; and the narrator left both the husband 
and the son. Subsequently, the reader learns that she did not get mar-
ried. rather, she had an affair with this man, who was married to some-
one else. She did become pregnant, but had an abortion.
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 as she recovers these memories, it becomes clear that she had 
repressed them and substituted a fantasy, if an ultimately rather 
unpleasant one. The idea that there is a repressed memory works well 
with various aspects of the book. for example, in psychoanalytic theory, 
repressed contents will repeatedly manifest themselves in symptoms, 
symptomatic acts, ways of speaking, and so on. The repressed ideas 
or impulses will partially orient one’s trains of thought, behavior, and 
word choice. Thus one’s speech and action will often contain hints of 
those ideas and impulses of which one remains unaware. This is found 
throughout the narrator’s false narration of her marriage.
 on the other hand, as already noted, there are important ways in 
which the narrator’s case does not fit psychoanalytic theory. most 
importantly, the repressed memories are not infantile. of course, there 
are cases of repressed traumas in later life. but these are usually much 
more limited. Thus it is not impossible that she would suppress some 
aspects of the abortion—for example, aspects that were particularly 
physically painful. This might be parallel to a soldier losing memory of 
certain parts of a battle. but the narrator has repressed the memory of 
the entire abortion, and the entire pregnancy, and the lover being mar-
ried. It would require quite severe, pervasive, and probably debilitating 
psychological problems for someone to have repressed so much of her 
recent life (cf., for example, the rape victim discussed by Christianson 
and lindholm [773]). but, for most of the novel, the narrator exhibits no 
signs of such severe, pervasive, and debilitating problems. This produces 
a gap requiring critical explication and suggesting some thematic points 
of the novel.
 before going on to this, however, it is important to briefly mention 
the second area of unreliability. This concerns supernatural experiences. 
at the end of the novel, the narrator sees the spirits of her dead father 
and mother.9 This could be understood as the result of a severe psycho-
logical disorder, manifest also in the distorted memories. however, it 
has a simpler explanation. She has taken hallucinogenic mushrooms. She 
clearly identifies the mushroom in conversation (see 177). The informa-
tion is presumably included by the implied author to provide an under-
standing of the narrator’s hallucinations. on the other hand, this too is 
not entirely simple. The mushroom in question was perhaps involved in 
ojibway spiritual practices (see navet). This is particularly germane as 
the narrator is clearly imitating Native American/First Nations’s prac-
tices at this point.10 This too involves a sort of interpretive gap, also with 
thematic consequences. for example, it bears on whether one reads the 
172 | Chapter 4
end of the novel as hopeful or hopeless (a point of conflict in the crit-
icism11). These are obviously important issues for one’s understanding 
of and response to the novel. however, in order to keep the discussion 
within manageable limits, the following analysis will focus on the narra-
tor’s unreliable memories.
 Though impossible to tell before reading the novel, the title already 
suggests the submerged nature of the narrator’s memories. It also points, 
quite literally, to the ways in which they will reappear eventually—when 
she is below the water. even before one reads the novel, one knows that 
“surfacing” suggests something or someone temporarily concealed, then 
reappearing.
 already, on the first page or two, there are several points at which 
one could question the narrator’s reliability, if one did not have an ini-
tial, default trust in her. The narrator and three friends—including her 
current boyfriend, Joe—are driving to northern Canada, where she grew 
up. her father has disappeared and may be dead. They pass “the city.” 
first, she explains that they have not gone through; then she describes 
its “one main street with a movie theater.” relying on memory, she 
explains that the movie theater was “the itz, the oyal, red R burned out” 
(3). The theater was presumably either the ritz or the royal, not both. 
She presents this as if it were a trustworthy memory. but the duplica-
tion of the theater’s name indicates that it is not entirely trustworthy. 
She goes on to recount a memory from “before I was born” (3), a memory 
that also seems dubious. her brother “got under the table and slid his 
hands up and down the waitress’s legs while she was bringing the food” 
(3). This simply does not fit with the verb “bringing” (with its suggestion 
of walking from the kitchen to the table). but even if “bringing” means 
“serving,” it hardly seems likely that the waitress would simply accept 
this behavior. Then there is a third memory of her and her brother hav-
ing no shoes in winter (4). The image of them running barefoot through 
the snow once or twice is plausible enough. but how likely is it that her 
parents would leave them entirely without shoes in a north Canada 
winter?
 The points are all small and apparently insignificant. however, 
they suggest that the narrator may not be trustworthy even at the out-
set. Though a reader may not self-consciously notice any of these small 
uncertainties, they may provide some preparation for the larger gaps in 
memory that follow. In other words, few readers will reflectively con-
sider any of these points as genuine contradictions or errors. however, 
there is something strange about them. readers may begin to sense at 
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least a “tall tale” element to the narrator’s memories, which may unre-
flectively prepare them for what follows. as a result, her eventual rev-
elation about her memories of marriage and divorce may be surprising, 
but not incomprehensibly anomalous.
 The end of the chapter introduces a peculiar self-consciousness about 
the narration. Given that there is no narrational frame and no overt nar-
ratee, it is strange to find the narrator reflecting on her own practices as 
a narrator. Specifically, at one point, she refers to something “they” used 
to do (11). She then corrects herself, saying, “That won’t work, I can’t 
call them ‘they’ as if they were somebody else’s family” (12). again, at 
least some readers are likely to respond to this with an implicit question 
about just whom she is addressing and when. It is as if there is narra-
tion to an implicit narratee that is interrupted by a shift to the inter-
nal consciousness of the narrator. however, without the involvement of 
some at least moderately motivated task, a reader is unlikely to follow 
through on such a momentary question, particularly in the context of 
default trust. The plot thickens when she goes on to suggest that she 
has an impulse to misrepresent something. The next sentence is “I have 
to keep myself from telling that story” (12). at the same time, this hint 
of untrustworthy motives is mitigated by the narrator’s stated commit-
ment to not being unreliable. Thus, here as elsewhere, the hint might 
serve to prepare the reader for the narrator’s unreliability without yet 
directly provoking distrust.
 In the second chapter, the reader supposedly learns about the narra-
tor’s recent past—her marriage and divorce. She recounts that she sent 
her parents a postcard about the wedding. While certainly not impos-
sible, this is clearly an unusual situation (by real-world standards) and 
requires clarification. a neighbor of her father’s, paul, seems to know 
about the marriage, and the narrator explains this by reference to the 
postcard. This apparently confirms the story (i.e., makes it less anom-
alous, less likely to appear doubtful). however, she also notes that she 
is wearing a wedding ring. In retrospect, one may understand that paul 
simply inferred the marriage from the ring.
 Just after this, the narrator has a sudden memory of the “husband.” 
Its location and time are unclear. She figures that “it must have been 
before the child” (22). This uncertainty highlights the fallibility of mem-
ory (a point stressed in recent memory research; see Schacter). Though 
not specific to the narrator, such fallibility clearly bears on the degree 
to which we can trust her recollections. merely noting this fallibility is 
unlikely to provoke questions about her reliability. but it probably does 
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help to prepare the reader for what occurs later. The general point is 
recapitulated—and the preparation enhanced—subsequently, when the 
narrator thinks about Joe. She makes the strange statement “though 
I can’t reconstruct our first meeting, now I can” (28). The sentence 
simultaneously reasserts the uncertainty of memory and the subjective 
conviction that any given reconstruction is correct. It fits with the nar-
rator’s apparent confidence in her memories and what we will discover 
to be their frequent falsity.
 readers are soon given more information about the marriage. She 
explains that her parents did not understand her marriage and that she 
herself “didn’t understand it.” She goes on to state that her son “wasn’t 
really mine” (29). most of the earlier incompatibilities are probably 
ignored by first-time readers. but these last points may require some 
minimal interpretive effort. one can make some sense out of the state-
ment that she did not understand her own marriage by assuming that 
the marriage was undertaken on the basis of a misconception. but that 
is not entirely adequate, since the misconception would presumably be 
about the man or about the reality of married life, not why she married 
this man at this time. The statement about the child is tougher. readers 
may assume that the child has been made into the image of its father. 
but that would seem to suggest a child who is somewhat older than indi-
cated in the rest of the text. (later, the narrator says that she got mar-
ried about nine years earlier. Could the child already be recognizably 
identical with his father at the age of, say, six or seven, when the narra-
tor would have been contemplating the divorce?)
 The chapter ends with a memory of her brother drowning. She 
explains that “It was before I was born but I can remember it as clearly 
as if I saw it” (32). people do in effect fabricate memories from things 
they are told. her assertion, in that sense, is not precisely untrust-
worthy, since she indicates that the memory is false. but this does estab-
lish that her memories are at least sometimes untrustworthy—and it is 
far from clear that she will always recognize this fact. Indeed, at this 
point, a careful reader may be starting to have a fairly strong, if prob-
ably still un-self-conscious, sense that the narrator’s reported memories 
are far from reliable. or, rather, some readers may be starting to feel 
their trust in the narrator disturbed, even if they could not say precisely 
why.
 not by coincidence, right after the clause about her memory of her 
brother drowning, the narrator introduces the idea of “an unborn baby” 
with “its eyes open” looking out from “the mother’s stomach, like a frog 
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in a jar” (32). This is a crucial image because it prepares readers for the 
“surfacing” of her actual memories of an abortion. particularly in the 
psychoanalytic context implied by the text, these become, in retrospect, 
small, unconscious expressions of the repressed memory. of course, this 
sort of rhetorical patterning can occur even outside a psychoanalytic 
context. Specifically, of all the possible expressions open to a narrator, 
the implied author may choose just those words and images that serve to 
prepare the reader for something that is concealed, thus making it more 
plausible later on.
 The beginning of the next chapter offers an explanation of the child 
not being hers. first, she points out that she “didn’t name it before it 
was born” (34). That is plausible in itself. but, at the same time, it may 
draw attention to the fact that one never learns any name for the child. 
Clearly they must have named the child at some point, so why is the 
reader never told the name? moreover, if it was a boy, why does she con-
tinue to say “it”? This seems very out of keeping with ordinary biological 
responses to one’s offspring.
 The rest of the passage presents what was at the time something of 
a cliché about male domination. The husband uses the wife as a baby 
machine. (needless to say, something can be a real and important prob-
lem and nonetheless be turned into a cliché.) She particularly complains 
that “he imposed it on me” (34). It is true that he did impose something 
on her. but what he imposed on her was the abortion, thus not having 
the child. The point is significant thematically. perhaps particularly in 
1972, the women’s movement was deeply concerned with men trying to 
restrict women’s access to abortion. but if women’s choice is really the 
issue, then their freedom to have children should be similarly important.
 The next chapter gives further imagistic manifestations of the 
repressed memory. Thinking about the end of her marriage, the narrator 
reflects, “a divorce is like an amputation, you survive but there’s less of 
you” (44). That makes sense, certainly. all the lost projects and aspira-
tions, with their foundations in emotional attachment, are aptly analo-
gized to a part of oneself. but it should be clear that the phrase applies at 
least as clearly to an abortion.
 later in the chapter, her emotional response to her husband 
“surprise[s]” her. She is angry and resentful, even though “he didn’t do 
anything to me” (50). Clearly, her emotional response is in conflict with 
her explicit memory here. There does not seem to be a standard hierar-
chy to resolve this dilemma, so one is left with an ambiguity about which 
to trust—the emotion or the memory.
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 She goes on to note that “there aren’t any pictures” of the baby 
(again, referred to as “it”) and that she hasn’t mentioned him/it to Joe 
or her other friends (david and anna). She then reflects on how “the 
baby . . . was taken away from me, exported, deported” (51). The idea is 
strange. her claim up to this point is that she left the child. So it hardly 
makes sense to say that the child was taken away. The words “exported” 
and “deported” both suggest a separation across national lines as well. 
This “nationalization” of her separation may, in turn, serve to associ-
ate the “husband” with america. If so, this would relate to her extreme 
antipathy toward americans, an antipathy that is almost pathological, 
even considering the historical context of the vietnam War. The ameri-
cans and americanism are consistently associated with violence, cruelty, 
senseless killing—which, in the end, is precisely how the narrator thinks 
of her abortion.
 The following lines recur to the imagery of abortion. She charac-
terizes her separation from her child as “my own flesh canceled” and 
“my own life, sliced off from me” (51). here again one sees the narrator 
choosing images that may be construed as fitting her abandonment of 
her child. however, they are more fitting manifestations of an uncon-
scious memory. The abortion does slice off her own life and cancel her 
own flesh in a literal way that abandoning her child does not.
 many of the same issues of memory recur in the following pages. at 
one point, for example, she thinks how safe she felt in the city. She then 
immediately tells herself “That’s a lie,” recalling that she was often “ter-
rified” (82). In this particular case, she reflects on memories and how 
she has problems discriminating between her own memories and “the 
memories of other people” that she’s been told (82). The passage draws 
explicit attention to the fallibility of memory and thereby may fos-
ter thematic reflection. however, for present purposes, it most impor-
tantly continues to prepare readers for the revelation about her own 
false memories. In other words, it creates a complex of memories and 
emotional responses in the reader that affect his or her sense of trust in 
the narrator (just as the events in the experiment with the cards create 
memories and emotional responses that affect the test subjects’ sense of 
trust in the different stacks).
 The narrator’s memories of the “birth” are along the same lines. The 
entire process is associated with being “dead.” The doctors are “butch-
ers” who “take the baby out with a fork like a pickle out of a pickle jar” 
(92). by this point, it is actually becoming difficult not to recognize that 
this is an abortion rather than a delivery—even though first-time read-
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ers probably still do not recognize this. She goes on to explain that “he 
wasn’t there” but “he brought his car to collect me afterward” (92–93). 
here, the narrator herself is very close to recognizing that this was not 
a delivery. The procedure she recalls is what she understands of her 
abortion. her departure, apparently immediately afterward, seems to 
fit with abortion more than a delivery. finally, and most significantly, 
she remembers that he collected “me” after the procedure, not “us.” 
The reader still is probably not self-conscious about most of this at this 
point. for example, he or she is free to imagine “afterward” as referring 
to a day or so afterward. he or she can imaginatively envision the “hus-
band” picking up the narrator with the child in her arms. In short, the 
reader need only make slight interpretive adjustments. but atwood is 
constructing a set of associations that will make the subsequent change 
in memory believable and that will encourage readers to judge the abor-
tion memory true and the birth/divorce memories false.
 a crucial point comes soon after this. The narrator is supposedly 
remembering her “wedding.” They fill out forms, which prominently 
include blood type (101). The place smells of “antiseptic” (102). In ret-
rospect, one may realize that this is not the justice of the peace. It is the 
abortion clinic. The following dialogue makes no sense at a wedding. The 
man asks if she feels “better” now that “It’s over.” he consoles her, say-
ing, “it’s tough . . . but it’s better this way.” her legs shake and she has 
an ache, presumably in the region of her legs. Crucially outside there 
is a “fountain” with “dolphins and a cherub with part of the face miss-
ing” (102). at least some readers will remember that this is precisely the 
fountain she sees on her drive, “dolphins and a cherub with part of the 
face missing” (9).12 Thus one is presented directly with a memory and a 
perception. It seems extremely unlikely that both are true. by the usual 
default hierarchy, the perception is more trustworthy.
 of course, the abortion is more often misremembered as a birth, not 
a marriage. The links connecting this medical procedure (birth or abor-
tion), the title, and memory are made clear subsequently. She explains 
that the procedure involved anesthetic that “was like diving, sinking.” 
as a result, “I could remember nothing” (131).
 finally, searching in the water, she sees something, perhaps her 
father’s corpse—readers never know. but it triggers a series of memories. 
She now in effect explains the strange images that had permeated her 
(pseudo-)memories up to this point. She did not remember her brother 
drowning, contrary to her claim (see 32). moreover, the association of 
the “unborn baby” with a “frog in a jar” (32) was fabricated. rather, 
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she had envisioned the aborted fetus in a jar. Indeed, for a moment, she 
thinks that is a memory. but she corrects herself. Suggesting the image 
of the baby being removed with a fork, she recalls that the fetus was 
“scraped . . . into a bucket.” It flowed “through the sewers . . . to the 
sea” (168), from which it was now surfacing as a memory. She goes on to 
explain why “he” was not there. he had children of his own, and there 
was a birthday party for one of them (168). She goes on to recall that the 
fountain “with the dolphins and the cherub” was not there. She recurs to 
the image of feeling “amputated” (169, cf. 44) and to the smell of “anti-
septic” (169, cf. 102).
 again, faced with this contradiction, how does one determine which 
story is true? at this point, the reader is no longer in the realm of small 
interpretive adjustments. however, some heuristics do come into play. 
for example, as already noted, the incompatibility between memory 
and current perception in the case of the fountain weighs heavily in 
favor of the perception (i.e., given the unlikelihood that both are cor-
rect, there is greater reason to trust the perception than the memory). 
more importantly, a reader’s sense of conviction in the story of the 
abortion results to a significant extent from the narrator’s creation of a 
network of associations that makes the new story plausible. at the very 
least, the prior narrative creates a wide range of gaps—tensions, ques-
tions, uncertainties, if not outright contradictions—and these, gradu-
ally diminishing the reader’s trust, prepare readers to find the earlier 
narration unreliable. moreover, whatever one may think of psychoana-
lytic theory, the novel is readily categorized as relying on psychoana-
lytic ideas. like principles of genre, the principles connected with this 
categorization take on an important adjudicative function. Thus repres-
sion and the recovery of memories become highly plausible explanatory 
principles here.
 finally, there is the larger, effortful, critical processing that goes 
beyond these heuristics. It operates here in the usual fashion, with the 
usual hierarchies. for example, in the adjudication of theories, people 
generally prefer the one that provides the more encompassing expla-
nation. here, readers have been given two accounts of the story—one 
in which the narrator was married; one in which she had an abortion. 
as presented, with its implication of a psychoanalytic context, the lat-
ter serves to explain the former, but not vice versa. In other words, if 
one assumes that the narrator’s story actually involved an abortion, one 
is able to explain why she would have the feelings, memories, and con-
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ditions (e.g., no baby pictures and no wedding pictures [127]) reported 
earlier. put differently, one can infer the nature and limits of her unre-
liability. one can link the epistemic limitations to her motivations, and 
circumscribe her motivated distortions to the sexual, traumatic, and 
guilt-ridden memories. Indeed, the fact that she feels guilt about the 
abortion (“Whatever it is, part of myself or a separate creature, I killed 
it” [168]) serves to explain why a sense of guilt seeps into her “screen 
memories,” that is, the apparent memories that both conceal and indi-
rectly reveal a repressed memory (for a concise treatment of the concept 
of screen memory, see laplanche and pontalis 410–11). In contrast, if one 
assumes that the story of the marriage is true, one is left with a wide 
range of gaps, unexplained points of irresolution in the story.
 of course, the explanation provided by the abortion story is incom-
plete. It too leaves some gaps. again, the novel tacitly invokes psycho-
analytic principles of repressing memories connected with sexuality, 
trauma, and guilt. but, in psychoanalytic theory, it is, first of all, child-
hood memories that are repressed. This is clearly not a childhood mem-
ory, nor assimilated to a childhood memory. In these ways, the novel 
deviates from psychoanalytic accounts. nor does it appear to be consis-
tent with what is known about traumatic memory loss in adulthood. This 
could simply be a mistake on atwood’s part. It seems more likely, how-
ever, that this deviation from psychoanalysis has thematic implications.
 Specifically, there seem to be three important thematic complexes 
in atwood’s novel. one is feminist. This is clear in the repeated discus-
sions of the place of women, the sexual relations of men and women, the 
humiliating treatment to which women are subjected by men, and so on. 
a second concern is, roughly, nationalist. It is manifest in the repeated 
discussions of U.S. violence and excess, and the relation of Canada to 
the United States.13 The third concern is ecological. It is manifest in the 
attention to nature and the treatment of animals, among other things. 
each of these thematic concerns is partially explicit in the novel. The 
narrator reflects on feminist, national, and ecological issues; characters 
discuss them.
 The gaps created by discrepancies with psychoanalysis could con-
tribute to any thematic concern. however, the relation of the narrator 
with her lover and the topic of abortion bear most obviously on fem-
inist issues. The man appears domineering and manipulative. he uses 
the narrator sexually and belittles her talent as an artist. as noted ear-
lier, the narrator represents him as something of a cliché as a husband—
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particularly, as someone forcing her to have a child. This fits well with 
standard feminist views at the time. due in part to political activism 
related to reproductive rights, many feminists rightly saw (many) men 
as trying to control women’s reproduction by outlawing abortion and 
forcing women to have children. In this standard view, however, one 
could reasonably argue that another issue had been repressed. a wide 
range of men would want women to have abortions. It is not really plau-
sible to think that a normally functioning woman would entirely repress 
an adult memory of an affair, pregnancy, and abortion. but it is quite 
plausible to see mainstream feminism as metaphorically repressing the 
story of women who do not want to have an abortion, but are coerced 
into doing so. Indeed, it is relatively easy to explain why this would hap-
pen. fearful of restrictions on access to abortion, many feminists may 
have been inclined to avoid stories that lent themselves to anti-abortion 
use.
 This does not mean that atwood is “anti-abortion” (or “pro-life”) 
in any usual sense. The novel does not seem to take a consistent stand 
on the status of the fetus. Sometimes, the narrator views the fetus as a 
baby who perceives the world in much the way an infant does (32). at 
other times, she insists that a fetus “wasn’t a child,” though “it could 
have been one” (168). perhaps the most plausible interpretation is to 
see atwood, at least in this novel, as pro-choice in the fullest sense of 
the term. In practice, “pro-choice” is used to mean “in favor of access to 
abortion.” but it should mean “in favor of women being able to choose 
whether to continue a pregnancy to term or not.” Thus they should not 
be forced to have a child when they do not want to—but they also should 
not be forced to abort a child when they do not want to. When faced with 
such a statement, I suspect that few if any feminists would disagree. but 
the suggestion of atwood’s novel is that part of the story of choice has 
been repressed, and replaced with the single story of women being used 
as baby machines.
 The point may be suggested when the narrator begins to question her 
own recollections and cautions herself. “I have to be more careful about 
my memories,” she says. “I have to be sure they’re my own and not the 
memories of other people telling me what I felt” (82). Such distortions 
are most obvious in patriarchal ideology. They turn up in the novel in 
the narrator’s notebooks as a young girl, her imagination of what she 
should be—“ladies . . . holding up cans of cleanser, knitting, smiling, 
modeling toeless high heels and nylons with dark seams” (105). but false 
memories can arise from political correctives to patriarchy as well.
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Conclusion
a narrator is unreliable, first of all, to the extent that he or she is 
untrustworthy regarding the facts of the story. Those facts are defined 
by the receptive intent of the author. but that receptive intent is not 
simply a function of what the narrator says. In fact, the readers’ and 
implied author’s construction of the story involves the extensive inte-
gration of real-world presuppositions with deviations that are marked 
by the text—that is, the text serves primarily to indicate the points at 
which the story differs from the real world. The narrator may misrep-
resent facts, exclude important facts, or divert the reader’s attentional 
focus from some important facts that are presented. In connection with 
this, the narrator may be unreliable for epistemic reasons (error) or due 
to some motive, deceitful or emotionally biased (as in the case of out-
group representation).
 readers begin with a default assumption that the narrator is trust-
worthy—or, more properly, a default sense of trust in the narrator. They 
tend to retain this sense even as incompatibilities or “gaps” accumu-
late. These incompatibilities need not be logical contradictions. They 
are, rather, primarily a matter of what readers experience emotionally 
as incompatible. Specifically, ordinary textual processing proceeds in 
a relatively routine way until one encounters a gap. at this point, one 
needs to resolve the incompatibility. most often, readers do this with 
very minimal effort, following heuristic preference hierarchies. one may 
refer to this as “interpretive adjustment.” (Such adjustment temporarily 
displaces the process of “spontaneous understanding.”) preference hier-
archies may be isolated for sources of information (e.g., nonpersonified 
versus personified), types of information (e.g., direct perception versus 
memory), and epistemic context (e.g., genre conventions versus real-
world laws of nature). however, as gaps accumulate and become more 
complex, readers may have to engage in more extensive and sustained 
reasoning of the general sort used in scientific inference. This is the sort 
of process that a professional critic commonly engages in. but it is also 
practiced by ordinary readers in conversations about books or films. It is 
commonly what leads to the clarification of a work’s thematic concerns 
or emotional strategies. This may be referred to as “critical explication.”
 atwood’s novel shows some of the ways in which narrator unreli-
ability is established through the development of gaps. Specifically, it 
presents a complex series of limited incompatibilities. These prepare the 
reader to find the narrator unreliable, to distrust the narrator. however, 
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for the most part these gaps seem to remain below the level of self-con-
scious awareness. Thus they probably do not provoke a self-conscious 
response to unreliability before the narrator makes the issue explicit. 
When the full extent of the unreliability becomes clear, the novel nicely 
illustrates how readers come to adjudicate between alternative pos-
sibilities. In this case, the reader is likely to recognize that the second 
story line (about an abortion) allows the means for explaining a great 
deal of both story lines, while the first story line (about a marriage) 
does not. In keeping with this, the novel also presents a complex case 
of epistemic and motivational misrepresentation, due to the narrator’s 
repressed memories and un-self-conscious confabulation of a false mem-
ory. finally, it presents a good example of how thematic explication may 
result from effortful interpretation of gaps that remain even after prob-
lems of unreliability have been resolved. In this case, the gap in ques-
tion bears on a particular aspect of the relation between the story and a 
theoretical category (psychoanalysis) drawn from the world outside the 
story.
hen thinking about narration, people commonly imagine 
a single narrator. but many works have multiple narrators. 
Indeed, multiple narration in some form is found in almost every narra-
tive of any length. This chapter begins by distinguishing three forms of 
multiple narration—embedded, collective, and parallel. It then explores 
parallel narration in greater detail, leaving embedded multiple narra-
tion for chapter 6.
Multiple Narration
The most common way of having multiple narrators is through embed-
ding. as William nelles explains, embedding is “the structure by which 
a character in a narrative text becomes the narrator of a second text 
framed by the first one.” he goes on to comment that “While this might 
seem a rather specialised topic . . . embedded narrative is ubiquitous in 
the literature of all cultures and periods” (“embedding” 134; on some 
mechanisms of embedding, see, for example, bal 43–75). most often, 
the main embedding involves the insertion of a personified narration 
into a nonpersonified narration. for example, this is typically the case 
with trial narratives, where the individual testimonies are included in a 
larger narrative of the trial that has a nonpersonified narrator. In addi-
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parallel narrators in William faulkner’s  
The Sound and the Fury and david lynch’s Mulholland Drive
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tion, personified narration itself may embed narratives by other char-
acters. In cases of this sort, the embedding story operates as a frame 
for the embedded story. The most obvious use of this device is in works 
such as The Canterbury Tales, where the frame presents a context in which 
multiple speakers tell their tales.
 as the preceding examples already suggest, a narrative may have 
multiple narrators that are not embedded in one another. In some cases, 
such narrators tell the story collectively. (We will consider this case in 
chapter 6.) more commonly, such narrators are parallel. Indeed, the cases 
mentioned above—testimonies in a trial narrative and the various tales 
of the Canterbury pilgrims—are themselves parallel to one another, even 
if embedded in an encompassing narrative. If these parallel narrators are 
treating the same storyworld—as in a trial narrative—this parallelism 
may be called conjunctive.1 The different stories are conjunctive in that 
readers are required to integrate them in inferring the story, thematic 
concerns, and normative emotions. If these narrators are treating dif-
ferent storyworlds—as in The Canterbury Tales—they are disjunctive. (The 
following analysis focuses entirely on conjunctive parallelism. for sim-
plicity of exposition, then, “parallel narration” will be used to refer to 
specifically conjunctive parallelism, unless otherwise noted.)
 The distinction between personified and nonpersonified narrators is 
important for parallel narration as well as for embedded narration. by 
far the most common form of parallel narration involves two or more 
personified narrators. a straightforward, albeit complex, case of parallel 
personified narration may be found in The Sound and the Fury.
 The case of nonpersonified narrators is, of course, more complex. 
Though they are rare, it is possible to discern cases of parallel nonper-
sonified narration. The most striking instances of this come when a work 
divides into sections that apparently give different versions of the same 
events, thus the same storyworld, but these versions have nonpersoni-
fied narration. There is a case of this sort in david lynch’s film Mulholland 
Drive. (for a partial, schematic overview of types of multiple narration, 
see fig. 5.1.)
Parallel Narration
again, (conjunctive) parallel narration occurs when there are two or 
more narrators telling versions of the same story or treating the same 
storyworld. Such multiple narrations are, in general, of interest to the 
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degree that they diverge from one another—through contradiction, dif-
ferences in emphasis, filling in or leaving out different details, and so on. 
When evaluating diverse narratives of the same story events, readers do 
what they always do in inferring the story, particularly when faced with 
an unreliable narrator. The default assumption is that all the narratives 
have some relation to the facts of the storyworld—through experience, 
memory, inference, hearsay. however, this relation may be distorted 
by self-interest or error. In other words, one or more of the narratives 
may be affected by motivational or epistemic unreliability. When faced 
with an emotionally consequential tension between two versions—thus, 
a gap—people first rely on heuristics. When unconnected narrators give 
the same details, readers tend to assume they are true; when narrators 
give divergent details, readers tend to accept the ones that do not serve 
the self-interests of the narrator who reports them. When heuristics fail, 
readers undertake more effortful explications, trying to formulate the 
best explanatory account of the narratives.
 even when there are not direct representational contradictions or 
tensions, readers may see the mere joining of the parallel narratives as 
constituting a gap that requires interpretive engagement. for example, 
if there is a series of parallel narrators who treat different aspects of 
the storyworld (for example, different time periods), the issue arises as 
to why the parallelism is organized in precisely this way. Thus even in 
cases where the different parallel narratives create compatible versions 
of the storyworld, their parallelism alone will probably lead one to think 
of them together, to look for similarities or contrasts, particularly with 
an eye on emotional or thematic purposes. Indeed, the same point holds 
for disjunctive parallelism.
 In short, all works with (conjunctive or disjunctive) parallel narra-
tors potentially invite the reader or viewer to relate the individual nar-
ratives to one another. This is perhaps the major difference between 
works of parallel narration and collections (e.g., Selected Stories by William 
Faulkner). Simply put, collections do not presuppose that a reader will 
read all the works or do so in the order provided. They allow for selec-
tive reading. In contrast, works of parallel narration commonly assume 
complete and directional reading. more technically, the implied reader of a 
work understands and responds to a work—including works with paral-
lel narration—as both a particular sequence and as a whole. There is no 
implied reader for a collection; there are only the implied readers of the 
individual works. parallel to this, there is no textual implied author for 
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a collection; there are only the textual implied authors for the individ-
ual works and the various levels of cross-textual implied author. There 
are also no initial and retrospective implicated authors across works in 
a collection, while these often figure importantly across parallel narra-
tions (e.g., the implied reader’s understanding of the first testimony in a 
trial narrative may alter after the second testimony).
 In the case of parallel narration with personified narrators, one may 
assume a nonpersonified narrator who is constant across the voices of 
the parallel narrators. This nonpersonified narrator commonly provides 
hints about the reliability or unreliability of the personified narrators. 
obvious cases of this include what the camera reveals about a crime or 
about suspects in a criminal investigation, separate from embedded tes-
timonies. In addition, all the usual heuristics for personified narrators 
apply to the embedded, parallel narrators.
 In contrast, when a narrative has parallel nonpersonified narrators, 
many of the usual clues about story correctness are missing. In other 
words, if the nonpersonified narrators disagree, it is difficult for a reader 
to discern just what is correct in the storyworld. here, readers follow the 
same sequence of experiencing task conflict (a gap), shifting to heuristics 
and then engaging in effortful explication. however, many heuristics are 
simply unavailable—for example, that concerning a (personified) narra-
tor’s self-interest and that concerning a (personified) narrator’s exper-
tise. on the other hand, some heuristics remain in place. for example, 
the heuristic of overlap would seem to hold. presumably, whatever is 
common to the different versions is true in the storyworld. moreover, 
the “mimetic” heuristic holds. as discussed in the preceding chapter, 
fiction may be understood as a specification of difference from the real 
world. Thus the real world always stands as a default case for the story. 
When there is no other disambiguating information, readers are likely to 
choose the version of story events that requires less deviation from the 
real world. finally, readers are still able to apply general inferential and 
evidential processes.
 of course, here as elsewhere, when inferences fail, when one cannot 
determine the storyworld at one or another point, readers may turn to 
a functional explanation; readers may consider what emotional or the-
matic implications this indeterminacy has. Indeed, that is true even for 
cases where one feels that disambiguation is finally possible. Then too 
readers may be concerned with the emotional and thematic implications 
of narrational and other gaps—thus why there is a gap in the first place.
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Mentalistic Narration
William faulkner’s The Sound and the Fury is one of the most important 
works employing parallel, personified narration. The novel is divided 
into four sections, each of which has a different narrator. The first sec-
tion is narrated by benjamin “benjy”—also called “maury”—Compson, 
a mentally challenged man of thirty-three. The second is narrated by 
benjy’s brother, Quentin, a suicidal harvard student. The third is nar-
rated by another of the Compson siblings, Jason. The final section has a 
nonpersonified narrator, partially focalized on Jason and the Compson 
domestic servant, dilsey. each section concerns a particular day (given 
in the chapter title), though many of the events recounted are memories. 
The first section is april 7, 1928; the second occurs eighteen years ear-
lier; the third occurs on april 6, 1928; and the final section takes place on 
easter Sunday, april 8, 1928.
 The events recounted by the different narrators are by no means 
identical. however, they do overlap to some extent. In terms of estab-
lishing the story, a reader has several interpretive tasks. he or she needs 
to establish which events reported by one narrator correspond with 
which events reported by another narrator. In connection with this, he 
or she needs to infer what actually happened in the storyworld and what 
is uncertain or ambiguous. he or she also needs to place various events 
in temporal and causal relation with one another.
 again, the processes used by a reader in inferring the story are basi-
cally the same as those used in works with a single narrator. but there 
are some partial exceptions. an important and consequential case con-
cerns initial trust of a narrator. again, the default for judging the par-
ticular facts of the storyworld appears to be that the assertions of the 
narrator are trustworthy unless there is reason to believe otherwise. The 
point holds to some extent for multiple personified narrations. however, 
the existence of different points of view on the storyworld tends to fore-
ground the biases, thus unreliabilities, of individual narrators. at the 
very least, the prospect of multiple versions of the same events makes 
the possibility of contradiction much more salient. readers are almost 
necessarily more aware of that possibility in works of parallel narration. 
This may not provoke out-and-out skepticism. however, it seems likely 
to sensitize readers to the cognitive and affective biases of the different 
narrators, even before conflicts appear.
 Indeed, in some cases, multiply narrated works so foreground diver-
gent points of view that they can shift attention away from the events 
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themselves to the psychology of the narrators. In these cases, the events 
of the storyworld may remain highly ambiguous as readers use the dif-
ferent narratives to draw inferences about and respond emotionally to 
the narrators themselves. This is particularly likely in works that set out 
to represent the ongoing mental experience of these narrators.
 These points are perhaps particularly clear in a work such as The 
Sound and the Fury. To understand the interpretive complexity of this 
work, it is useful to begin with some distinctions in what might be called 
“mentalistic narration.” “mentalistic narration” is any sort of narration 
that seeks to represent the mental processes of the narrator as he or 
she represents the storyworld. of course, this is a relative distinction. all 
forms of personified narration could be thought of as doing this in some 
degree. however, some narratives do this much more extensively than 
others.
 The basic and minimal form of mentalistic narration is first-person 
narration; perhaps the most prototypical form is interior monologue.2 
first-person narration is self-conscious narration in which the personi-
fied narrator explicitly formulates his or her representation of events 
in relation to his or her self-conscious perception, inference, memory, 
and so on. It may seem that this simply involves the use of the word “I.” 
however, a narration may not be first person and yet may use the first-
person singular pronoun. This occurs in interior monologue, which is 
typically not a form of self-conscious narration. leopold bloom (in James 
Joyce’s Ulysses) is certainly conscious of himself. but he is not a self-con-
scious narrator.
 So, a first important distinction is that between self-conscious and 
un-self-conscious or implicit narration. first-person narration is self-
conscious. Interior monologue is un-self-conscious. This distinction is 
related to a division between retrospective and ongoing narration. This is 
not necessarily a distinction in the use of tense. retrospective narration 
in particular may use present tense. however, it gives a sense that the 
events narrated are complete already and thus understood as a whole 
by the narrator. In contrast, in ongoing narration, the narrator does not 
know the outcome of events until those outcomes occur. first-person 
narration is often retrospective. Interior monologue is ongoing in that it 
isolates the moment-by-moment thoughts of the narrator.
 another way of putting this is to say that first-person narration 
always tacitly presupposes a narrating situation. There is always some 
implied narratee. There is always some context, even if it is wholly 
implicit. The (often implicit) narratee and context provide principles for 
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selecting and shaping what is told in a first-person narration. narratees 
and narrating situations may be embedded in interior monologue (e.g., if 
a character explicitly reflects on how he or she will recount an event to 
someone else). but the interior monologue itself is, in principle, removed 
from such contextual and addressee-oriented selection. In principle, 
interior monologue gives the character’s thoughts as they occur, without 
choosing those that fit a particular narrative purpose. (of course, by the 
account given in chapter 1, interior monologues are shaped by a nonper-
sonified narrator with the usual implicit, nonpersonified narratee.)
 Interior monologue is considerably more significant for representing 
the mental processes of the narrator than is ordinary first-person narra-
tion. moreover, there are different forms of narration related to interior 
monologue, with somewhat different properties, highlighting somewhat 
different cognitive and affective processes. Though not all of them are 
found in The Sound and the Fury, it is important to have a sense of this 
variety in understanding mentalistic narration.
 Interior monologue is a representation of the ongoing sequence of 
verbal thoughts in a character’s mind. These thoughts presumably rep-
resent events in the storyworld—events that the character perceives, 
remembers, infers, desires, fears, or whatever. but they also, and often 
more importantly, manifest the mental processes of the character/nar-
rator—hence the status of interior monologue as prototypical for men-
talistic narration.
 Given this definition, interior monologue may seem to be relatively 
straightforward. however, there are several levels at which interior 
monologue may be, so to speak, “transcribed.” The simplest is a direct 
reporting of subvocalization. people think in sequences of sentences dur-
ing their ordinary, waking lives. These sentences are referred to as “sub-
vocalizations” because people mentally articulate them without actually 
opening their mouths and saying them out loud. Joycean interior mono-
logue is, generally, a form of transcribed subvocalization.
 but there are other ways in which verbal thought may be repre-
sented. a slightly extended manner of representing interior monologue 
involves filling in perceptions, experiences, and so on, that are, so to 
speak, verbally formulated without being subvocalized. for example, if 
I see my department head, I recognize him and say hello. That does not 
mean that I think “There is Wayne” or even “Wayne.” but I still in some 
sense identify him by name and by title. In cognitive terms, one may 
say that the complex of verbal associations is primed (or partially acti-
vated), even if they are not fully activated and brought into subvocalized 
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sentences. Thus one form of interior monologue may represent one or 
more of the words that are part of a linguistic network associated with 
experience, even though they are not subvocalized. This may be called 
associative reformulation. In associative reformulation, the nonpersoni-
fied narrator supplies words that are part of the character’s/narrator’s 
thought, but are not specifically part of subvocalization.
 We find associative reformulation in some of virginia Woolf’s work. 
for example, Septimus Smith is suffering from trauma from the first 
World War, along with hallucinations. he is out with his wife and hears 
a sound. Woolf writes, “It is a motor horn, he muttered; but up here it 
cannoned from rock to rock, divided, met in shocks of sound which rose 
in smooth columns” (Mrs. Dalloway 103). evidently, “It is a motor horn” is 
actually vocalized. What follows may be subvocalized. however, the mili-
tary terms are probably best thought of as primed associations. Septimus 
experiences the echoing sound and links that to his ongoing preoccupa-
tion with the war. This leads to the partial activation of words such as 
“cannoned,” “columns” (which has a military as well as an architectural 
usage), and “shock” (linked with the unmentioned but clearly primed 
“shell,” as in “shell shock”). It seems that the discourse only returns to 
something close to strict interior monologue (with minor, third-person 
rephrasing) in the immediately following parenthetical insertion, “that 
music should be visible was a discovery” (103).
 Stream of consciousness involves a still more inclusive representa-
tion of the ongoing experiences of a narrator/character. This potentially 
includes all such experiences—verbal, perceptual, imaginative, and emo-
tional.3 note that there is a, so to speak, “pure” case of interior mono-
logue—the transcription of subvocalization. but there is no pure case for 
stream of consciousness. first, the representation of ongoing experience 
is necessarily partial. Second, in literature, that representation is neces-
sarily limited to language, “the unalterable fact . . . that literature uses 
words,” as dorrit Cohn puts it (109). Thus there is always some degree 
of reformulation—specifically, verbal encoding—of nonverbal aspects of 
stream of consciousness.4
 This limitation is partially lifted in film, where some aspects of visual 
and aural stream of consciousness may be represented directly. how-
ever, there are complications here. for example, it is very difficult to 
film point-of-view shots with realistic movement. In this way, there is 
always some degree of “reformulation” in the cinematic representation 
of even visual stream of consciousness. The somewhat unnatural quality 
of attempts at representing visual experience directly may be one reason 
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why extended stream of consciousness is relatively rare in film (as, for 
example, Chatman has noted [Story 194]).5
 Typically, the implied author chooses a fully idealized verbalization in 
stream-of-consciousness writing. In other words, stream-of-conscious-
ness narration is not typically confined to what the character might have 
said had he or she articulated the entire stream of consciousness himself 
or herself. rather, in stream of consciousness, the implied author—or, 
rather, the nonpersonified narrator—commonly makes use of all his or 
her verbal resources to articulate the ongoing mental experience of the 
character/narrator in its various perceptual, imaginative, and emotional 
facets. 
 Consider, for example, bernard’s thoughts about Susan in Woolf’s 
The Waves. he follows her across a field, unobserved. She “begins to run 
with her fists clenched in front of her. her nails meet in the ball of her 
pocket-handkerchief. She is making for the beech woods out of the light. 
She spreads her arms as she comes to them and takes to the shade like 
a swimmer. but she is blind after the light and trips and flings herself 
down on the roots under the trees, where the light seems to pant in and 
out” (14). It seems unlikely that bernard has explicitly formulated much 
of this to himself or that the phrasing closely tracks his verbal associa-
tions. rather, he has perceived Susan running and implicitly imagined 
the trajectory (“making for the beech woods”). emphasizing the “shade” 
stresses just what bernard sees, but also reveals his general sense that 
Susan is seeking to hide. The choice of words here manifests his emo-
tional and causal understanding rather than his specific, subvocal for-
mulation or his primed verbal associations. The detail of the nails and 
handkerchief is almost certainly something he cannot see, but some-
thing he, perhaps, implicitly experiences by imaginatively mirroring 
her actions—a spontaneous response (as recent research shows [see, for 
example, Iacoboni]). likewise, the image of the light panting in and out 
may reflect a mirroring response to Susan’s labored breath as bernard 
tacitly imagines it after her run. The verbalization is, then, idealized in 
the sense that it reflects bernard’s stream of consciousness in a way that 
bernard presumably could not.
The Sound and the Fury
faulkner’s 1929 novel is a paradigmatic case of mentalistic narration. as 
such, it particularly invites the reader to examine the psychology of its 
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three personified narrators—benjy, Quentin, and Jason. put differently, 
the psychology of those narrators is more important than the story itself 
for understanding and explaining their various narrations.6
 benjy is often spoken of vaguely as mentally challenged. he does not 
seem to have generalized cognitive disorders. his perception is intact, 
as is his linguistic capacity. his physical inability to articulate speech 
sounds does not appear to affect his general capacity for understanding 
language or thinking linguistically.7 however, he does have some severe 
cognitive limitations. These limitations are principally a matter of causal 
inference.8
 first, it seems that benjy is able to attribute causality only very 
short term and only in perceptually continuous contexts such that the 
sequence may be understood as a single complex event. The duration of 
that event is perhaps roughly what would now be characterized as the 
duration of working memory. Thus he can recognize that dilsey “lifted 
me down” and “wiped my face and hands with a warm cloth” (19). but 
causal connections of any greater extent seem to be beyond him. even 
such continuous, but extended, actions as feeding break down into frag-
mentary moments, separate and apparently unrelated. Thus he reports 
that “The bowl steamed up to my face, and versh’s hand dipped the 
spoon in it and the steam tickled into my mouth” (19).
 In this particular case, the continuity of the events is complicated by 
the fact that it involves (unperceived) mental causes—versh’s judgment 
that the food is hot enough but not too hot, his intention to transport a 
suitable quantity of food to benjy’s mouth, and so on. another case of 
this sort occurs when dilsey calls to versh, “bring his bowl here.” benjy 
hears and reports this. but he fails to connect it with his next experience, 
“The bowl went away” (19). all hidden causes are difficult for benjy. This 
may be seen, for example, in his understanding of disease as a percep-
tible object—“I could smell the sickness. It was a cloth folded on Mother’s head” 
(47). but benjy seems particularly inhibited in his ability to infer other 
people’s mental states. on the other hand, even this is not an absolute 
inhibition.
 Cognitive scientists commonly distinguish between two means by 
which people understand other minds. That understanding is called 
“theory of mind.” one account of theory of mind, called the “theory the-
ory,” asserts that a person makes theorylike inferences about other peo-
ple’s mental states. The other account says that a person simulates other 
people’s experiences and then attributes his or her reactions to them. It 
is increasingly recognized that people do both (see, for example, doherty 
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48–49). Suppose I hear that a colleague has been denied tenure, despite 
receiving the unanimous support of his department. I have to draw some 
inferences about his state of knowledge—for example, that he does not 
know yet and is anticipating a positive decision. I am then likely to rely 
on my own feelings about receiving tenure and my own sense of disap-
pointed expectations in other areas to judge how he will respond when 
he does hear. There may also be extenuating circumstances (perhaps 
he has another career) that would lead me, inferentially, to qualify my 
own emotional response—though, here too, I understand his response to 
those extenuating circumstances in part by reference to my own feel-
ings. Thus I begin with some theorylike inferences, engage in some simu-
lation based in part on the theorylike inferences, then further qualify 
the simulations by reference to further theorylike inferences, which 
themselves lead to another set of simulations.
 despite the usual integration of inference and simulation, one may 
distinguish two extreme forms of theory of mind response. one extreme 
is emotion contagion. This is pure simulation without any theoretical 
inference. as a result, the person experiencing emotion contagion does 
not even attribute the emotion to the target, but simply feels it himself 
or herself. for example, suppose little Sally breaks her toy and starts to 
cry. little betty hears Sally and begins to cry. betty has not inferred any-
thing about Sally’s state and has not attributed anything to Sally. rather, 
she has simply begun to feel the distress herself. The other extreme the-
ory of mind response is pure inference without empathic simulation. 
Someone who is successfully cruel (e.g., a torturer) may be able to infer 
just what will cause pain to a victim. at the same time, he or she may 
avoid any sort of simulation, which might lead to empathic sharing of 
that pain.
 benjy seems to be particularly lacking with respect to theoretical 
inferences in theory of mind. however, he seems to have a greater capac-
ity for nontheoretical simulation. of course, his simulations are very lim-
ited, since they cannot be initiated or guided by theoretical inferences 
(except perhaps of a very short-term variety). on the other hand, he is 
very prone to emotion contagion. Indeed, this tendency toward emotion 
contagion is enhanced by the fact that he largely lacks the inhibitory 
operation of theoretical inference. In the hypothetical example given 
above, I was able to modulate my sympathetic simulation of a colleague’s 
distress by a theoretical inference that he had other career opportuni-
ties. In many cases this modulation is quite reasonable. In other cases, 
it is merely a rationalization, a way of avoiding an unpleasant emotional 
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response. In the case of benjy, the lack of inferential capacity means that 
he is generally more prone to spontaneous and unmodulated emotion 
contagion.
 as a narrator, this proneness to emotion contagion makes benjy more 
reliable than others in certain respects, though of course less reliable in 
other respects. Specifically, he is more trustworthy in cases where other 
characters’ simulative responses are distorted by rationalization. an 
instance of this occurs in his response to the events surrounding damud-
dy’s death. he hears a sound that he apparently does not self-consciously 
categorize. nonetheless, he begins to cry (18). others debate whether it 
was mrs. Compson crying or singing. but benjy’s response clearly indi-
cates the emotional valence of his mother’s expression—it manifests 
grief, not joy. This is why other characters attribute a sort of prophetic 
quality to his responses, as when Quentin thinks, “benjy knew it when 
damuddy died. he cried” (70).
 by the same token, however, his responses are less reliable to the 
degree that spontaneous impulses should be modulated by inferential 
and elaborative processes. This extends even to simple cases of putting 
oneself in another person’s place when simulating their point of view—
their knowledge, inferences, expectations, and so forth. benjy shows a 
striking inability of this sort when he grabs the schoolgirl. She screams 
and he may sense her fear. but he seems unable to recognize what the 
cause of her fear must be, what terrifying inferences she must be draw-
ing about this enormous, drooling man who has grabbed her.
 benjy’s inferential limitations lead to other affective propensities as 
well. Specifically, some emotions rely on more extensive imagination 
and inference than others. Some require greater causal elaboration. an 
emotion such as attachment and the related separation anxiety are quite 
direct. Separation anxiety requires only the activation of attachment 
feelings along with the perceptual absence of the attachment object and 
the correlated inability to engage in any action to end that absence (e.g., 
by walking into the next room). benjy’s inferential inhibitions make such 
corrective action almost impossible. Thus he tends simply to moan and 
weep when separated from his one key attachment figure, Caddy.9
 The most striking contrast with benjy is Jason. While benjy is unable 
to project intentional causes, Jason overgenerates such inferences.10 
When he fails at the stock market, he infers that he has been cheated by 
“a bunch of damn eastern jews,” who “sit up there in new york and trim 
the sucker gamblers” (149). Indeed, he conjectures that Western Union 
telegraph has actually joined in a conspiracy with the new york Jews to 
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sucker country folk out of their money (176, 182). In inferring causes, 
Jason simply does not accept chance (not to mention bad judgment). In 
effect, everything is planned, the product of foresight and design.
 This comes out clearly when he meets a man from the traveling show 
and assumes that this man is sheltering his niece, Quentin, and her lover 
with the red tie. he asks “Where are they?” as if the man would have any 
idea what he was talking about. even if the man did know anything about 
Quentin and her companion, what would allow him to understand that 
“they” refers to those particular people? The man asks, “Where’s who?” 
(240) and Jason accuses him of lying. The passage is striking for two rea-
sons. first, again, it manifests Jason’s tendency to overextend intentional 
causal explanation. here, since he has not found Quentin, he infers that 
this man must be hiding her. Second, it shows that, despite his propen-
sity to generate such inferences, he has some severe theory of mind limi-
tations himself. his theory of mind inferences are often bizarre. In this 
way, those inferences are highly unreliable.
 as the reference to Jews suggests, Jason has a strong propensity 
toward out-grouping as well. Indeed, he is the most insistently and 
vehemently racist character in the book, and the most misogynist. out-
grouping tends to severely inhibit empathy. In keeping with this, Jason’s 
empathic responses are limited to nonexistent. Indeed, the inhibitions 
on Jason’s emotional responsiveness are not confined to in-group/ 
out-group relations. he shows an astonishing incapacity to feel any 
empathy with his sister, Caddy, and his niece, Quentin. he steals their 
money with no evident qualms, his only worries being a practical mat-
ter of whether he will be caught. of course, both Caddy and Quentin are 
part of a gender out-group. Jason is very concerned about his status 
as a man, and he seems particularly humiliated that “the whole world 
would know that he, Jason Compson, had been robbed by Quentin, his 
niece, a bitch” (240). later, he is ashamed “that he had been outwitted 
by a woman, a girl” (239). Thus perhaps this too can be understood in 
terms of in-group/out-group divisions. However, his empathic inhibi-
tions are so extensive that in the end it seems as if he forms an in-group 
of one. Indeed, he is virtually pathological in his absence of empathic 
response. In other words, while benjy lacks inferential capacities in the-
ory of mind, Jason seems to lack spontaneous emotion simulation—or, at 
least, his limited capacities for emotion simulation have been disabled 
by inhibitory processes. These inhibitory processes include generalized 
out-grouping.
 It seems that Jason’s primary emotion is a form of humiliation-based 
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anger. This may be seen most clearly when he responds to Quentin and 
the man with the red tie. he does not appear particularly worried about 
Quentin’s feelings, future, or safety. rather, he is angry that she is “let-
ting [her] own uncle be laughed at” by a man who would “come into 
town and call us all a bunch of hicks” (188).
 Jason feels profound shame for his family’s actions and his associa-
tion with them. This results from his inferences regarding what other 
people might think. for example, when he goes out “without any hat,” 
he worries that other people will infer that “I was crazy too.” after all, 
“a man would naturally think, one of them is crazy and another one 
drowned himself and the other one was turned out into the street by her 
husband, what’s the reason the rest of them are not crazy too” (180–81).
 he is equally ashamed over his related decline in social status. he suf-
fers from the thought that his family is disdained by “town jellybeans.” 
In fact, it seems very likely that he has merely imagined this disdain. In 
any case, he insists, in his angry and humiliated response, that “my peo-
ple owned slaves here when you all were running little shirt tail country 
stores and farming land no nigger would look at on shares” (185). 
 Jason is perhaps most profoundly affected by his sense of his own 
failure. he blames that failure on other people, particularly on their 
moral faults. he is filled with a “sense of injury and impotence feeding 
on its own sound” leading to a “violent cumulation of . . . self justifica-
tion and . . . outrage” (235). (These points hold not only in the specific 
context of the quotation—when he reports being robbed—but generally.) 
Thus, for Jason, Caddy’s promiscuity led to the divorce that cost him a 
job opportunity through herbert. rather than having any sense of his 
sister’s pain, her humiliation, her sorrow at separation from her daugh-
ter, he construes her only as a cause of his failure—and as a source of 
money that may partially compensate for that failure. he characterizes 
her as “The bitch that cost me a job, the one chance I ever had to get 
ahead” (236).
 he also envisions other people’s response to his failure and decline 
in status as derisive. Indeed, he has a strong inclination to view other 
people’s judgments as mocking and to respond to that supposed mock-
ery with anger. anger generally tends to inhibit empathic responses. 
Indeed, a sense of humiliation tends to promote a complementary rather 
than a parallel response to other people’s emotions, thus a response of 
countering rather than sharing their emotions. (for example, a parallel 
response to someone else’s happiness would be happiness. Complemen-
tary responses would include envy, resentment, or indignation.) Thus 
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one would expect an intensified inhibition of empathy in someone who 
feels mocked by the “town jellybeans.”
 In short, Jason clearly does not suffer from the same cognitive 
impairments as benjy. as such, some of his narration is more reliable 
than benjy’s because it manifests a more complex ability to infer causes, 
particularly intentions. but those causal inferences are severely dis-
torted in cases where they bear on his generalized out-grouping or his 
emotional pathology—particularly his extreme proneness to anger based 
on shame—which lead to a nearly complete absence of simulative emo-
tion sharing or empathy.
 finally, Quentin provides the most opaque case of the three. In one 
sense, Quentin’s narration is quite straightforward. he records the 
events of his day and his memories with the usual sorts of causal and 
intentional inferences. he feels empathy and is able to modulate his emo-
tions—or at least to recognize what modulating those emotions would 
involve. but there is one striking peculiarity about Quentin’s narration. 
It almost entirely leaves out the central motivating force. his entire day 
is oriented toward his suicide. but that suicide turns up, for the most 
part, only indirectly or opaquely in his thoughts.11 moreover, there is lit-
tle in his ongoing narration to suggest depression, anxiety, or another 
emotion that would underlie and explain that suicide.12
 The contrast with Jason in particular is striking. Jason fills in the 
detailed causes of his behavior—for instance, his anger over the lost 
job and the resulting failure. In contrast, Quentin seems to skirt those 
causes, hinting at them without naming them. This contrast is presum-
ably related to the cognitive and emotive tendencies that characterize 
Quentin. These both overlap with Jason’s tendencies and contrast with 
them. Quentin shares with Jason an inclination to overgenerate causal 
attributions. however, whereas Jason overestimates the causal impor-
tance of other people’s intentions, Quentin seems to overestimate the 
causal importance of his own actions. The peculiarity here is that he 
makes causal attributions in ways that he knows are false. despite this, 
he seems to take those causal attributions seriously. The most notewor-
thy case of this is his insistence that he has committed incest with Caddy, 
as when he told mr. Compson, “Father it was I it was not Dalton Ames” (62).
 In keeping with this tendency to overvalue his own causal role in 
events, Quentin parallels Jason in his overstatement of blame. In con-
trast with Jason, however, the most important form of this blame is self-
blame or, more properly, guilt. Quentin seems to feel a terrible sense of 
guilt. This is what allows him to hold to such a false causal attribution. 
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he, of course, knows that he did not commit incest with Caddy. but he 
is able to attribute the violation to himself because he feels guilt over 
Caddy’s condition.
 finally, whatever feelings of attachment Jason might have had appear 
to be undermined by his anger and humiliation, as well as in-group/out-
group divisions. In contrast, Quentin shares benjy’s deep attachment 
bond with Caddy. however, since he understands the nature of Caddy’s 
disappearance and is able to fill in the (not terribly complicated) causal 
sequence, his emotional response is not so much a matter of mere sepa-
ration anxiety. It is a rage provoked by jealousy. of course, jealous rage 
typically involves three people—the rival, the beloved, and the lover. In 
keeping with this, Quentin does initially threaten to kill dalton ames. 
he also urges Caddy to agree that he kill her, then kill himself. but this 
hardly explains the suicide. after all, he does not kill the rival; he does 
not kill the (betraying) beloved. he only kills himself.
 There are at least three possible explanations for Quentin’s feeling of 
guilt here. The first is the simplest. he should have protected his sister 
from sexual shame and the subsequent public humiliation of rejection 
by her husband. This is bound up with the standard reading of Quentin 
in terms of a Southern honor system (see, for example, Singal). but this 
does not seem very plausible. he proposes claiming that they have com-
mitted incest, which would hardly protect his sister from shame or the 
family from dishonor. as to humiliation, he envisions the benefits of the 
incest story as including their joint exclusion from society—“we’ll have to 
go away amid the pointing and the horror” (115).
 a second possibility is that Quentin feels he is somehow responsible 
for her having sex with other men. There is perhaps a hint of this in 
the anecdote about Quentin and natalie. after being chastised for “kiss-
ing . . . some darn town squirt,” Caddy replies “I didn’t kiss a dirty girl like 
natalie anyway” (104). Caddy is in this way justifying her relations with 
boys by reference to Quentin’s prior relations with girls. but this is pecu-
liar also. It is the sort of argument one might expect from a couple who 
owe each other sexual fidelity, not from a brother and sister.
 This leads to the third, related possibility. It is the least apparently 
plausible, but it may be closest to the truth. Though it runs contrary to 
usual moral principles, Quentin’s feeling of guilt may have resulted pre-
cisely from not being the one who impregnated Caddy. In this way, his 
claim to have impregnated her is not a claim of guilt; it is a denial of 
guilt. after all, what he wants is a complete unity with her, the two of 
them fused in a single flame13 (“if people could only change one another 
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forever that way merge like a flame swirling up for an instant then 
blown cleanly out along the cool eternal dark” [137]; “Only you and me 
then amid the pointing and the horror walled by the clean flame” [91]), finally 
away from all society (“nobody else there but her and me” [62]), if only 
in the lowest circle of hell (62). In that fantasy, the ultimate Inferno is a 
sort of heaven, an ideal of bliss. It is hell only, it seems, because it vio-
lates standard moral principles. In keeping with this, Quentin reflects, “if 
it were just to hell. . . . nobody else there but her and me. If we could just 
have done something so dreadful that they would have fled hell except 
us. I have committed incest I said Father it was I it was not Dalton Ames. . . . If 
we could have just done something so dreadful and father said That’s 
sad too, people cannot do anything that dreadful” (62–63).
 In any case, it seems clear that Quentin’s cognition is strongly ori-
ented toward overgenerating intentional causal attribution, specifically 
self-blame. In connection with this, his greatest emotional propensity is 
toward guilt, perhaps particularly guilt based on attachment insecurity. 
but his inferences are elliptical, his feelings to some extent concealed 
or misrepresented. as a result, he sometimes seems to blame himself in 
ways that he knows to be false, but which suggest other forms of self-
blame that he presumably takes to be true. In each respect, Quentin is in 
part resembles and in part differs from his brothers. 
 Thus faulkner presents a highly complex set of complementary 
unreliabilities. The bias of one parallel narrator is matched and perhaps 
compensated for by the biases of other narrators. This contributes to 
a nuanced sense of the storyworld. but it does not necessarily resolve 
ambiguities of that storyworld. Indeed, the different narrations, with 
their various unreliabilities, often complicate the reader’s sense of the 
storyworld. even more significantly, this narrational complexity serves 
to place the cognitive and affective psychodynamics of narration at the 
center of at least many readers’ interpretive and responsive interest. In 
some ways, faulkner’s novel is more about the ways the parallel, per-
sonified narrators perceive, understand, and suppress their experiences 
than about the facts corresponding to those experiences. In a sense, the 
“real story” of The Sound and the Fury is to be found less in the storyworld 
than in the discourse.
Mulholland Drive
of course, parallel, personified narration does not necessarily compli-
cate our understanding of the storyworld or turn our attention to the 
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psychology of the narrators. In many cases, the different perspectives 
complement one another and help to disambiguate the storyworld. 
moreover, it is often the case that one can reconcile different narrato-
rial perspectives in an overall interpretation even when the individual 
narrations contradict one another (as in many trial narratives). In both 
cases, when inferring the storyworld, readers commonly rely on their 
comprehension of the narrators as individuals with interests, biases, 
perceptual and inferential limitations, and so on. however, these stan-
dard inferential techniques are unavailable when the narrators are non-
personified—which leads to david lynch.
 In treating david lynch’s Mulholland Drive, it is particularly valuable 
to focus on the (apparently) discrete ambiguity of the work. In a discretely 
ambiguous work, there are two or more peaks in the profile of ambi-
guity. These peaks represent interpretations that are mutually exclu-
sive but also plausible within implied authorial intent. examples would 
include works that are ambiguous between straight and ironic readings. 
Works with parallel, nonpersonified narrators may readily involve dis-
crete ambiguity as well, since the alternative interpretations may be 
paired with the parallel narrations. The presence of discrete ambigu-
ity does not preclude the possibility of arguing for a single, encompass-
ing interpretation. Such an argument remains possible because implied 
authorial intent can involve both discrete ambiguity and a preference, 
even a strong preference, for one of the interpretations. for example, the 
implied author may find the work complete and satisfactory precisely 
because it points toward a particular interpretation, but discourages one 
from being fully confident about that interpretation. alternatively, the 
implied author may be satisfied with the work because its ambiguities 
contribute to the overall emotional impact, even if the reader does, ulti-
mately, feel confident about a particular interpretation. 
 Importantly for present purposes, disambiguating critical explication 
may have a significant narrational component in these cases. Specifically, 
when faced with a work that appears to have parallel, nonpersonified 
narration, readers or viewers often try to explicate—and disambiguate—
the work by making its narrators personified and even nonparallel.14 In 
other words, attempts to provide a single, encompassing interpretation 
of such a work frequently rely on an attempt to identify one or more 
narrators with a personal perspective and to hierarchize the narrators. 
Such an interpretive procedure involves eliminating the nonpersonified 
parallelism. This occurs in criticism on Mulholland Drive.
 lynch’s film has two main parts. The first tells the story of the cheery 
and successful actress betty (naomi Watts), and her amnesiac lover rita 
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(laura elena harring). The second tells the story of the struggling and 
embittered actress diane (Watts) and her ex-lover, the enormously suc-
cessful actress Camilla (harring). one might refer to these as the “opti-
mistic” and “pessimistic” narratives. There are numerous repetitions 
and overlaps between the two narratives, suggesting that perhaps there 
is a single storyworld of which these are two versions. The most obvious 
ways of relating these two narratives, however, are apparently under-
mined by the nature of these overlaps (e.g., some of them appear to point 
in different directions as to which story is real). In any case, the two sec-
tions at least seem to have two distinct, nonpersonified, perceptual nar-
rators. This is the case most obviously due to the contradictions between 
the two stories. Such contradiction is a standard feature of parallel nar-
ration, familiar, for example, from conflicting testimonies in trial narra-
tives. In addition, and perhaps more significantly, there are systematic 
differences in the discourse of the two narratives, as we will see.
 more exactly, the film begins with a scene of young couples doing 
the jitterbug. one obvious way of interpreting this sequence is as nondi-
egetic. films often begin with a sequence that is not strictly part of the 
narrative. for example, a pink panther detective comedy might begin 
with cartoons about a pink panther. In this case, the real dancing fig-
ures appear against a background that includes silhouettes of dancing 
figures which themselves include real dancing figures (see fig. 5.2). The 
inclusion of reality, shadows, and reality within shadows does seem to 
have thematic relevance. but it is difficult to say just what that is. The 
sequence ends with Watts appearing brightly lit and smiling (fig. 5.3), 
ultimately along with an older couple, also smiling. It has the feel of an 
award or celebration.
 In the pessimistic narrative, the viewer learns that diane had won 
a jitterbug contest back in deep river, ontario, and that this sparked 
her interest in show business. In retrospect, this opening sequence sug-
gests that contest and the subsequent award. The point has been noted 
by critics.15 on the other hand, here as elsewhere, the film is not lacking 
in ambiguity. The bright enthusiasm portrayed by Watts is more in keep-
ing with the betty character than with diane. This is compatible with (at 
least) three interpretations: 1) There are two distinct storyworlds and 
this scene occurs in the optimistic story (presumably with a less ideal 
parallel scene in the pessimistic story); 2) The optimistic story is true 
and fundamental, and this (optimistic) opening scene indicates that it 
is (i.e., the reference in the pessimistic narrative serves to confirm the 
validity of the optimistic story); 3) The pessimistic story is true and fun-
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damental, and this scene shows diane’s naïve and fantasy-bound eval-
uation of events at the time of the contest (or her distorted, nostalgic 
memory).
 but, again, this segment is part of the opening of the film, a part of 
the film that is often extradiegetic. The film proper seems to begin with 
a shot of rose-colored sheets and a tan blanket. The camera moves slowly 
toward the pillow; the viewer hears breathing. There is a dissolve to 
black as the camera seems to enter the pillow.
 as critics have recognized, this sequence rather strongly suggests 
that what follows is a dream. In keeping with this, the standard way of 
interpreting the optimistic part of the film is as a dream, with the pessi-
mistic part being reality (see, for example, mcdowell, Shostak, and ridg-
way). Thus mcdowell refers to “the dream that occupies the first half 
of the film” (1037). If one follows this interpretation, one collapses the 
two parallel nonpersonified narrators into a single nonpersonified nar-
rator. In addition, for the first half of the film, one embeds a personi-
fied, stream of consciousness (betty as dreamer) in that nonpersonified 
narrator.
 after the sequence described above, followed by the title, the camera 
follows a car driving at night. a cut to the inside of the car shows rita. 
She says to the driver, “What are you doing? We don’t stop here.” This 
scene is intercut with two cars racing along the road, side by side. back 
in the first car, the driver points a pistol at rita and tells her “Get out of 
the car.” before the men can undertake their obviously nefarious busi-
ness, one of the racing cars crashes head-on into them. This evidently 
kills both the men (as well as the people in the other car). a dazed rita 
stumbles out of the car and walks down the side of a hill. She ends up 
figure 5.2. opening jitterbug. Figure 5.3. Betty/Diane evidently winning the 
competition.
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outside an apartment complex. The viewer eventually learns that she has 
amnesia.16
 before continuing with this story, it is important to switch to the 
other narrative. In the pessimistic version (which is, again, presented 
late in the film), diane is unhappy, cynical, and unsuccessful. She once 
had a romantic relationship with Camilla. but Camilla has evidently 
ended that in favor of a film director. at one point, Camilla has invited 
diane to a dinner party and has sent a car for her. The camera follows 
the car—precisely as in the opening of the optimistic version (as just 
described). There is a cut to diane inside the car, and she says, “What 
are you doing? We don’t stop here.” In this case, however, diane leaves 
the car to meet Camilla, who leads her up a hill to the house of the film 
director, who is having the party.
 The connections between the two scenes are not only clear, but 
obtrusive. The question is, just what do the connections imply? again, 
the viewer may simply understand there to be two storyworlds. alter-
natively, he or she may take one storyworld to be real and the other to 
be derived from that reality. most obviously, he or she may take one to 
be a dream and the other to be the experience that becomes a dream. 
The usual way of interpreting this would be to say that diane’s expe-
rience is the real one while rita’s is the dream version. There are dif-
ficulties with this, however. The suspicion in diane’s question seems 
unfounded, whereas rita’s worry is clearly justified. moreover, the sce-
nario fits a robbery better than a (dreamlike) walk up an unpaved path 
to the backyard of a home. Both points push the cause/effect (reality/
dream) sequence in the opposite direction, suggesting that the optimis-
tic version is reality and the pessimistic version is its derivative dream.
 further complications arise with subsequent events in the optimistic 
story when rita falls asleep outside the apartment complex. Indeed, in 
the first parts of the film, rita repeatedly sleeps. This calls to mind the 
opening pillow and reminds the viewer that one possible interpretation 
of the optimistic story is that of a dream. but here the suggestion is that 
rita (or Camilla) is the dreamer, rather than diane.17
 In the morning, a woman is leaving her apartment for a trip. The 
viewer subsequently learns that this woman is betty’s aunt. as she is 
going back and forth between the apartment and the car, rita sneaks in 
and hides.
 Subsequently, betty arrives at the airport, beaming with joy. She is 
accompanied by the old couple that the viewer may recognize from the 
jitterbug sequence. She has just met this couple on the flight, but they 
Varieties of Multiple Narration (I) | 205
have become great friends. If one interprets the jitterbug sequence as 
the contest ending with diane’s receipt of the award, then this sequence 
seems incompatible with the “real” storyworld. This, in turn, lends sup-
port to the idea that the optimistic story is part of a dream. Indeed, the 
comments made by the old couple seem, in some ways, more appropriate 
to someone saying goodbye to diane in her hometown as she leaves for 
los angeles. In other words, the events in this part of the narrative could 
be understood as actual memories reappropriated for use in a dream. on 
the other hand, this couple turns up again in the pessimistic story, and 
they do so in a way that prevents the viewer from seeing that story as a 
simple perceptual representation of the real storyworld. Specifically, in 
the pessimistic version, they are tiny, Tom Thumb–like creatures who 
walk out of a paper bag, then slip under diane’s door to frighten her and 
drive her to suicide. again, when faced with conflicting storyworld pos-
sibilities, there is a general heuristic preference for the storyworld that 
is more fully continuous with the real world. The miniaturized versions 
of the couple in the pessimistic version then would count against accept-
ing that as the storyworld.
 betty eventually arrives at her aunt’s apartment. She meets the man-
ager (played by ann miller), who says, “Just call me Coco. everybody 
else does.” In the pessimistic story, at the party of Camilla’s film direc-
tor, diane meets the director’s mother (played by ann miller), who says, 
“Well, just call me Coco. everybody does.” again, the parallel is obtru-
sive and suggests a connection between the two events. one option is 
simply some sort of possible-worlds-type counterpart relation. but, here 
as elsewhere, the more obvious possibility is that one is reality and the 
other is a dream based on that reality. In this case, however, the dream/
reality derivation could go in either direction. Indeed, the Coco of the 
optimistic story seems to be more fully developed and to have a more 
natural place there. moreover, there is something dreamlike about the 
director’s party—which not only is approached in a strange way (walking 
up a hill through brush) but includes a somewhat incongruous group of 
characters.
 In the optimistic story, betty goes into the bedroom in her aunt’s 
apartment and sees a woman’s clothes on the floor outside the bath-
room. She nonetheless walks into the bathroom, then, hearing someone 
in the shower, opens the shower door. She is apparently very embar-
rassed and apologetic on finding rita there, naked. but the sequence 
of events is peculiar. having seen clothing outside the bathroom door, 
she might have expected someone to be in the bathroom. having heard 
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someone in the shower, she might have expected the person to be naked. 
here there is a point in the optimistic story that seems to suggest that it 
is a dream and that it presupposes some events of the pessimistic story. 
Specifically, the confidence with which betty goes to the shower may 
suggest the prior sexual relationship between diane (here, betty) and 
Camilla (here, rita).
 The viewer is soon teased by the more overt possibility that the 
optimistic story is a dream. Specifically, betty explains to rita that she 
is from a small town in ontario, but “now I’m in this dream place.” of 
course, “dream place” refers to los angeles, as both a place of one’s 
dreams and a place where dreams are made as movies (as in the case of 
Mulholland Drive). but here the nature of the connection with the story-
world is not entirely clear. one could take this to be a definitive clue. but 
one could also take it to be part of implied authorial misdirection.
 moreover, if it is a dream, there is the peculiar fact, already men-
tioned, that rita is the one who keeps falling asleep, not betty, and one 
might suspect that all this is rita’s dream. Indeed, before the introduc-
tion of betty, there are two events that initially may seem to be dreams 
of rita. first two men meet in Winkie’s. one of them, dan, explains that 
he had two dreams that were “both the same.” In retrospect, this com-
ment clearly points toward the two narratives viewers are seeing. The 
connection would seem to suggest that both narratives are dreams. at 
the same time, it seems odd for the dream to signal not only that it is a 
dream, but that something else is a dream also. In any event, dan’s two 
dreams presented a dangerous figure behind the restaurant. after break-
fast, dan walks to the back of Winkie’s. a dark figure lurches out and the 
man collapses, perhaps from a heart attack.
 This sequence is followed immediately by rita sleeping (see fig. 5.4). 
This suggests that it is her dream as well (cf. Thomas 86). That shot of 
her sleeping is followed by another sequence that the viewer may take 
to be her dream. on the other hand, it is equally possible to take one or 
both episodes as real. Indeed, even if one takes some episodes to be part 
of rita’s dreaming, one cannot take the entire sequence to be part of her 
dreaming, because the viewer is shown rita falling asleep and this pre-
sumably is not part of her dreaming.
 In any case, the second sequence begins with a man in a wheelchair 
informing someone that “The girl is still missing.” The obvious interpre-
tation of this is that he is referring to rita. Thus one might infer that he 
has something to do with the threat posed to her by the driver of the 
car before he was killed in the crash. The man’s message is passed on 
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to unseen figures with shots of two telephones. The second telephone 
(which rings unanswered) sits beside an ashtray and below a red-shaded 
lamp on a side table.
 despite the suggestion that these episodes are rita’s dreams, both 
have connections with the pessimistic story. first, diane goes to that 
Winkie’s. She sees the man who had the two dreams about some-
one behind the restaurant. more significantly, in this scene, diane is 
meeting with a man whom the viewer knows is a murderer. She offers 
this murderer money, apparently to kill her estranged lover, Camilla. 
Indeed, at this point in the pessimistic story, Camilla seems to have just 
announced her engagement to the director, adam Kesher. moreover, 
the pessimistic narrative identifies the second telephone in the episode 
concerning the “missing” girl. It is diane’s telephone. This suggests that 
the threat to Camilla was actually diane’s payment of the hired killer. 
diane is, therefore, a person who would have an interest in hearing 
whether “the girl” had been found or not. Indeed, when she meets with 
the murderer, diane hands him a photograph of Camilla and says “This 
is the girl.”
 another sequence of events in the optimistic narrative concerns 
adam Kesher. he is making a film and is under considerable pressure 
from some goons to cast “Camilla rhodes” in the role. The goons keep 
saying “This is the girl.” moreover, when he sees this actress, he is 
forced to say, precisely, “This is the girl.” The sequence is rather pecu-
liar, with its insistence on the exact phrase. here, too, there is a connec-
tion between the two narratives, given what Camilla says to the hired 
assassin. but what is that connection? It seems the simplest interpre-
tation is to take diane’s “This is the girl” (from the pessimistic story) 
figure 5.4. Shot of rita sleeping, after the 
Winkie’s sequence.
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as real. Then the repetitions of the phrase in the optimistic story are 
derived from the pessimistic story, as dream images from life.
 but there are still problems. most obviously, the picture of Camilla in 
the optimistic story is another woman (i.e., not harring). of course, this 
too has parallels. during the director’s party, Camilla (i.e., the harring 
character) provocatively kisses another young woman right in front of 
diane (see fig. 5.5). That other young woman is the Camilla rhodes of 
the optimistic story. here, too, one can imagine a unifying interpreta-
tion in which the pessimistic story provides a face for a psychoanalytic 
“displacement” (or shift) in the dream—in this case, a displacement from 
the real Camilla to this rival.18 but the staginess of the kiss at the direc-
tor’s party and its gratuitously mean orientation toward diane (see fig. 
5.6 and fig. 5.7) are so obtrusive that it is hard to take seriously as a real 
event. It seems more like diane’s somewhat paranoid fantasy or inter-
pretation. This raises the question of whether either perceptual narrator 
directly displays the real storyworld. perhaps both are unreliable, or are 
representing something other than the real storyworld (e.g., inferences, 
fantasies, or, again, dreams).
 eventually, in the optimistic narrative, betty learns that rita has 
amnesia. They decide to look in her purse for clues. In the purse, they 
discover bundles of money and a blue key. The next scene presents the 
assassin character. The conjunction is important and suggests an asso-
ciation in the narrator’s mind. This is fitting, as the entire sequence is 
apparently explained in the pessimistic narrative when diane meets with 
the assassin. In the pessimistic version, after diane shows the assassin 
a picture of Camilla, she explains that she has the money to pay for the 
job, revealing a bundle of bills in her purse. The assassin shows diane a 
blue key and tells her “When it’s finished, you’ll find this where I told 
you.” This seems to add weight to the interpretation that locates the 
optimistic story in diane’s dream world. 
 There are, however, still difficulties. most important, there is a some-
what dreamlike quality to the signal here. We are shown the key on 
diane’s coffee table, perhaps concealed from diane’s usual line of sight 
(from her couch) by a large ashtray. We are not given any information 
as to how or when the key got there. In a later scene, after a neighbor 
has removed the ashtray, diane stares at the key almost as if she was 
not aware of it earlier, thus as if the assassin has had to enter her apart-
ment when she was not there to place it on the table. (We learn that 
she has been away prior to the scene where the key is revealed.) more-
over, she has a brief imagination of Camilla’s return before we see her 
looking at the key. This does not fit well with the idea that she is aware 
figure 5.5. Camilla kisses another woman 
before diane.
figure 5.6. but before the kiss, they check to 
make sure diane is watching.
figure 5.7. diane meets their eyes before the 
kiss.
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of the murder at that time. finally, her intense reaction of guilt after 
staring at the key seems to suggest that she has only now learned about 
the murder. on the other hand, detectives have been looking for diane 
already, which suggests that that murder took place much earlier—and 
diane knows this. In these respects, the putatively real signal and the 
surrounding events in the pessimistic narrative appear at least to some 
degree oneiric as well.
 Continuing with the optimistic narrative, the viewer finds betty 
and rita trying to figure out a scheme to uncover rita’s identity. betty 
explains, “It’s just like in the movies. We’ll pretend to be someone else.” 
like references to dreams and the representation of sleep, this seems to 
suggest that this optimistic story involves a systematic alteration from 
the real storyworld, with diane and Camilla pretending to be someone 
else—betty and rita. but, on reflection, one realizes that the idea is 
equally consistent with betty being her real name and “diane” being the 
pretense.
 Subsequently, a strange woman appears at betty’s door. recalling 
a mad prophet figure, she insists that someone is in trouble. The ever-
friendly betty introduces herself, saying, “my name’s betty.” The woman 
replies, “no, it’s not.” This is less equivocal than the previous case. but it 
still retains a degree of ambiguity, if only because the viewer is uncertain 
of the extent to which this madwoman is a reliable informant (rather 
than a means of fostering misdirection). moreover, to say that this 
woman is not betty is not necessarily to say that she is diane.
 before betty and rita can pursue their investigation of rita’s identity, 
however, betty must pursue her acting career. She practices a scene with 
rita. It begins with betty asking, “you’re still here?” and rita respond-
ing, “I came back. I thought that’s what you wanted.” The scene ends 
with betty threatening to kill rita—or, rather, betty’s character in the 
audition dialogue threatening to kill the character read by rita. Subse-
quently, betty reads the same part in an audition. The audition is note-
worthy in several respects. first, everyone is extremely nice to her. 
Second, she acts the part brilliantly, far outshining her own performance 
in the practice with rita and, indeed, greatly excelling anything viewers 
are likely to imagine possible with this vapid script (for an illuminating 
discussion of this scene, see Toles). She is virtually guaranteed the part. 
moreover, a casting agent spies her and takes her to the auditions for 
adam’s new film. adam’s and betty’s eyes meet and there is immediate 
interest and chemistry. as already noted, adam has no choice but to give 
the role to Camilla. but he is clearly drawn to betty.
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 from the perspective of the pessimistic story, the sequence is poi-
gnant for several reasons. first, in the optimistic episode, adam is 
entranced by Betty (thus Diane), rather than Camilla. Given Betty’s/
diane’s sexual preferences, it seems clear that this would never come to 
anything. however, it would help to prevent the loss of Camilla to adam. 
Second, betty’s enormous success at the audition contrasts sharply with 
diane’s admission that directors have not been terribly impressed with 
her and that she has gotten some roles due primarily to the intervention 
of Camilla. Third, one of the most pathetic moments of the pessimistic 
story involves diane looking across her kitchen at Camilla, who seems 
to have materialized out of nowhere, and saying “you’ve come back,” 
recalling the “I came back” from the play script. finally, the threat of 
murder written into the scene appears to suggest diane’s attempt to 
have Camilla murdered.
 here there seems to be a further reason for believing that the opti-
mistic episode presents a dream. The episode involves wish-fulfillment 
elements, by which the unsuccessful and cynical diane can be the suc-
cessful and cheerful betty, with her beloved and aloof Camilla trans-
formed into the dependent rita. rather than being the one who orders 
Camilla’s murder, she is the one who saves rita; rather than giving the 
money for the murder, she finds rita with the money, and so on.
 The standard interpretation is further reinforced when rita remem-
bers the name “diane Selwyn.” betty and rita first call diane’s tele-
phone number and hear the message on her answering machine. This 
too contributes to the oneiric quality of this narration, since the viewer 
later discovers that this is the answering machine message of diane in 
the pessimistic episode. of course, here too the causality could go in the 
opposite direction. even so, the likelihood of the standard interpretation 
seems further enhanced in what follows. betty and rita go to find diane 
Selwyn. When they arrive at her apartment, no one answers the door, so 
betty climbs through a window and lets rita in. They hold their noses, 
suggesting that there is a strong odor. Soon, the source of the odor is 
revealed. There is a bed with rose-colored sheets. on the bed, there is 
a woman, lying on her side with her knees bent. She is dead and her 
body is in an advanced state of decay (see fig. 5.8). In the pessimistic 
story, the viewer learns that diane’s sheets are rose. Indeed, the transi-
tion between the two narratives comes when diane wakes up on those 
rose-colored sheets, rising from almost the exact position of the corpse 
(see fig. 5.9). one obvious interpretation is that the dreaming diane has 
anticipated her own suicide.
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 That night the sexual feelings of betty and rita finally express them-
selves. It is worth noting, however, that betty repeatedly says “I’m in 
love with you,” while rita does not. In a standard, psychoanalytic dream 
interpretation, this may be seen as partially restoring the relation of 
diane and Camilla, but also as acknowledging its real asymmetry. Thus 
it combines wish fulfillment on diane’s part and the disturbing recog-
nition that the wish has not really been fulfilled. Indeed, in the middle 
of the night, the two go to a strange theater called “Silencio” and listen 
to a woman lip-sync a Spanish version of roy orbison’s “Crying.” The 
song recounts how the singer cries because her beloved no longer loves 
her. both betty and rita weep over the song. but it does not seem to 
have much to do with their story. rather, it seems to have to do with the 
story of diane and Camilla. by this point, the profile of ambiguity seems 
to strongly favor the standard “optimistic narrative as dream/pessimis-
tic narrative as reality” interpretation—though the early problems still 
remain.
 at the end of this Silencio sequence, betty finds a blue box in her 
purse. The box has a lock that clearly recalls the blue key found by rita 
in her purse with the money. here the connection with the putatively 
real story suddenly becomes opaque. There does not seem to be a realis-
tic source for the blue box in the “real world.” Indeed, the appearance of 
the blue box in the pessimistic story is far less realistic than its appear-
ance in the optimistic story.
 betty and rita rush home to find the key. but, when rita gets the 
key, betty is suddenly gone. rita opens the box on her own. The camera 
descends into the darkness of the open box as it descended into the pil-
figure 5.9. diane, just before she wakes up in 
the pessimistic story.
figure 5.8. The decaying body of diane Selwyn 
from the optimistic story.
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low at the start. now, there is a transition between the two narrations. 
The box falls to the carpet. Clearly having heard the box drop, the aunt—
once again in her own apartment—enters the bedroom and looks around. 
yet now there is nothing on the ground. This is a peculiar scene, as it 
seems to suggest some sort of reality outside the dream world, a reality 
that includes the aunt. but it is difficult to say with certainty whether it 
is reality or not. If it is part of the dream (since it occurs before diane 
wakes up), it seems unmotivated. Specifically, its relation to the opti-
mistic narrative is unclear and indeed contradictory (because the aunt is 
away). If real, it contradicts diane’s assertion that the aunt is dead, per-
haps posing a difficulty for the standard interpretation.
 following this, the viewer sees a woman lying on her side, with her 
legs bent, like the corpse of a few scenes earlier. Indeed, the viewer 
briefly sees the corpse (in a shot identical with fig. 5.8), before a change 
to a living woman (fig. 5.9). There is insistent knocking. The woman is 
diane (known up to now as “betty”). The knocking wakes her. She goes 
to the door and finds the neighbor, who has come to pick up some things. 
The beginning of the dream was signaled by the descent into the pillow. 
This waking would seem to give the end of the dream.
 yet, this too is not entirely clear. among other things, it is difficult to 
say just what the descent into the blue box might mean. If it is a dream-
like aspect of the optimistic narrative, the reappearance of the box in the 
pessimistic narrative is, if anything, far more dreamlike. of course, here 
too the standard interpretation seems to be the most viable. The point is 
simply that the work’s profile of ambiguity is much more complex than a 
focus on this standard interpretation would suggest, and that ambiguity 
is fundamentally a matter of narration (i.e., whether there are parallel, 
nonpersonified narrators or an implicitly personified, embedded, dream-
ing narrator along with one, encompassing, nonpersonified narrator).
 one of the items taken by the neighbor is her ashtray—a distinctive 
piece in the shape of a piano. near the ashtray is the blue key. a close-
up draws the viewer’s attention to the key, though the first-time viewer 
at this point knows only that it may have some relation to the key in 
rita’s purse. on a second viewing, however, viewers know that it means 
Camilla has been killed. In keeping with this—but, as already noted, sug-
gesting that the murder took place some time ago—the neighbor notes 
that two detectives came by looking for diane again.
 at this point, a series of initially confusing events occurs. betty looks 
and sees Camilla (known to the viewer as rita at this point). She says, 
“you’ve come back.” The visual narrator cuts from diane, looking left, 
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to Camilla, looking right, then back to diane, who gradually expresses 
extreme anguish. The next cut from diane should take the viewer to 
Camilla again, but it presents diane looking right, as if observing her-
self, evidently with disgust (see figs. 5.10–5.13). The sequence is disori-
enting. on first viewing, viewers are likely to infer that Camilla ended a 
relationship with diane and that diane is wishfully imagining her return 
or remembering an earlier, temporary return. after learning about the 
assassination, the viewer might find the sequence even more baffling 
(except perhaps under the assumption that diane has not yet seen the 
key, as already noted). In any case, the narration here is complex. The 
viewer is presented with what initially seems to be a simple perceptual 
narration. but on reflection it seems more likely that this is some sort 
of fantasy, memory, or even hallucination. The scene seems ambiguous 
among these possibilities—and the possibility that it is part of a dream, 
thus reversing the standard interpretation. 
 This shifting from perceptual reality to some sort of inner state 
indicates that the narrator in the pessimistic narrative has direct per-
ceptual access to the mind of diane. moreover, as becomes clear subse-
quently, this access leads to the nonchronological presentation of causal 
sequences of story events. finally, it is connected with the strict focaliza-
tion on diane that characterizes almost the entire pessimistic narrative. 
In all three respects, the narration of the pessimistic narrative differs 
from that of the optimistic narrative. The latter appears to be entirely 
chronological and not to involve shifts between perceptual reality, on 
the one hand, and fantasy, memory, or hallucination, on the other. 
moreover, it is obtrusively nonfocalized, shifting among different char-
acters and scenes without apparent constraint. Indeed, these differences 
are the main discursive reasons to posit parallel narrators here. 
 now diane crosses back to the sofa with her morning coffee. on the 
other side of the sofa, Camilla is lying down, half naked. Suddenly, diane 
is wearing not her robe and nightclothes, but shorts and no top. She is 
carrying a glass rather than a cup. most significantly, the neighbor’s ash-
tray still sits on the coffee table and there is no blue key. The interaction 
is peculiar since Camilla begins by expressing her desire for diane, but 
then quickly says that they should end their physical relationship. diane 
quickly blames “him” for this change in Camilla’s attitude. In terms of 
realistic plausibility, the scene is odd, hinting at a dream or a combina-
tion of memory with fantasy. at least some dream or fantasy element is 
suggested by the fact that diane is much prettier in this scene than in 
the immediately preceding one.
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 This is followed by another scene in which adam is introduced and 
the developing relationship between adam and Camilla is indicated. 
eventually, the film arrives at the point when diane attends adam’s 
party. This is where she has the experience in the car, asks her question 
(“What are you doing? We don’t stop here”), walks up the hill, meets 
Coco, and so on. Subsequently, she is at Winkie’s meeting the assassin, 
saying “This is the girl,” being shown the key, and so forth.
 These various events largely fit with the usual dream interpretation. 
There are, however, some possible problems. The most obvious concerns 
temporal sequence. The initial narration presumably ends when diane 
wakes up. It may at first seem that everything in the second narration 
occurs after that point. but this is incompatible with the dream interpre-
figure 5.10. diane turns with delight to the 
returned Camilla. Cut to fig. 5.11. 
figure 5.11. Camilla returns diane’s affection-
ate gaze. Cut to fig. 5.12.
figure 5.12. diane apparently continues to 
look toward Camilla. however, she becomes 
increasingly distressed. Cut to fig. 5.13.
figure 5.13. rather than Camilla, we find 
diane apparently looking back at diane.
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tation in that the exciting events for the dream (particularly, hiring the 
assassin) should precede the dream itself, not follow it.
 one can largely reconcile this with the standard interpretation once 
one recognizes the narrational complexity in the second narrative, spe-
cifically its integration of perception, memory, and fantasy. at the end of 
the entire sequence, diane is sitting alone on her sofa, in the same bath-
robe she wore when she woke up. She is staring at the blue key. While 
the viewer cannot be certain, one possible interpretation is that, after 
the opening, the entire sequence of events in the pessimistic narrative 
has been a series of memories and fantasies triggered by diane’s percep-
tion of the key. The viewer is prepared for this by the initial indication 
that the pessimistic narrative will not give any explicit signal that the 
film is entering a character’s thoughts. 
 of course, as already pointed out, this is far from definitive. The non-
chronological order of presentation and the internal access to diane’s 
mind (as well as the closely related focalization on diane) also serve to 
differentiate the nonpersonified narrator of the pessimistic narrative 
from that of the optimistic one. In other words, these features also sup-
port an analysis of the film in terms of nonpersonified, parallel narration.
 moreover, some further events are more difficult to reconcile with 
the standard interpretation. first, part of the pessimistic narration 
includes the monstrous figure behind Winkie’s. he or she19 has the blue 
box from the optimistic story. If taken as real, this would provide the 
obvious explanation for the monstrous figure and the blue box in the 
optimistic narrative/dream. But it is not clear how Diane could have 
seen this figure and the box or even that they could exist. of course, 
these could be merely imagined by diane. but why would she imagine 
them? What would give rise to this imagination? put differently, the 
existence of the blue box could serve at least as well to support a rever-
sal of the usual interpretation. betty sees a blue box in the optimistic 
story. That could serve to explain the blue box in the pessimistic story, 
if the optimistic story is real and the pessimistic story is a dream. on the 
other hand, neither betty nor diane appears to see the monstrous figure 
behind Winkie’s. That would seem to be information available only to a 
narrator. This would apparently undermine the interpretation of either 
narrative as the dream deriving from the other narrative as reality.
 Subsequent events seem even more anomalous for the “pessimistic 
story as reality” view. The monstrous figure has the blue box in a paper 
bag. once she sets it aside, two tiny figures walk out of the paper bag—
miniature versions of the elderly couple betty met on the plane and who, 
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in some storyworld, had something to do with her prize in the jitter-
bug contest. again, there is knocking at diane’s door. The tiny old cou-
ple enters through the space below the door. They assume normal size 
and pursue diane. diane screams, rushes to her bed, reaches for a gun in 
the side table and kills herself. The knocking recalls the knocking that 
(apparently) woke diane that morning. as such, it may suggest that she 
is asleep again—or that betty or rita or maybe even Camilla is asleep—
and dreaming this second narration. other options would include the 
possibility that diane is experiencing a hallucination or that the narra-
tor here is not a simple perceptual narrator, but is giving a metaphorical 
account of diane’s sense of guilt, panic, and despair.
 further difficulties arise due to the representation of the suicide. It 
is not only unrealistic. It is obtrusively theatrical. The smoke behind the 
bed recalls a theater effect (see fig. 5.14) and has no obvious realistic 
counterpart.
 The narrative points of view become—if this is possible—more ambig-
uous with what follows. first, the film returns briefly to the monstrous 
figure behind Winkie’s, a figure who remains highly obscure. If this is a 
figure of diane’s imagination, how could he or she survive diane’s death? 
If he or she is “real” in the storyworld, what does that say about the sta-
tus of that storyworld?
 When Betty/Diane was first introduced at the end of the jitterbug 
sequence, she was initially presented as an unfocused, cloudy patch of 
whiteness. This is repeated now. but, instead of being joined with the 
elderly couple, she is joined with Rita/Camilla. The image connects the 
narrator of this section with that of the jitterbug sequence. but it also 
figure 5.14. highly unrealistic, highly theatri-
cal scene of diane’s suicide.
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serves to suggest a sort of ghostly presence. It is as if the two charac-
ters are now united in spirit. or, perhaps, it suggests what aspirations 
for happiness they may have shared, or that diane (or betty) may have 
had for them. The image contributes in a complex way to the profile of 
ambiguity.
 The final shot of the film returns to the Silencio. one woman with 
strange blue hair sits in the theater and says, simply, “Silencio.” Silence 
suggests, among other things, death. In this way, this final judgment con-
tributes to the sense that there has really been a death, or perhaps two 
deaths. The silence, then, would be that of both diane and Camilla. This 
may seem to define the second narration as a real storyworld. but this 
is a figure from the first narration, not the second. her survival beyond 
the end of the second narration may be taken as suggesting that the first 
narration defines a real storyworld and that the second is a nightmare 
preserving the characters seen by betty in the first narrative (except, 
again, the monstrous figure). There is then the further complication that 
the location of the speaker in a dreamlike theater hardly makes her real-
ity status clear.20
 In sum, Mulholland Drive presents a complex profile of ambiguity. 
viewers are accustomed to ambiguity at the level of theme or norma-
tive emotion, and to some limited ambiguity in the storyworld. but this 
work presents quite extensive ambiguity at the level of the storyworld. 
That ambiguity is inseparable from (the ambiguity of) the work’s nar-
ration. Specifically, the work may be understood as having two paral-
lel, nonpersonified narrators. There are not many options that allow the 
viewer to trust both narrators. for example, one might assume that they 
represent parallel possible worlds in a science-fiction-like sense. alter-
natively, one may try to understand them in terms of a single story-
world (thus as conjunctive, rather than disjunctive, parallel narration). 
efforts at such interpretation commonly involve establishing some sort 
of hierarchy and personification of narrators. however, there is appar-
ently contradictory evidence as to what might be “real” and what might 
be either derived or unreliable. Some of the excitement and effect of 
this and other postmodern works21 derives from the ways in which they 
move viewers to the limits of their ability to resolve ambiguities of both 
storyworld and narrative voice.
 In the case of Mulholland Drive, there is a somewhat unequal profile 
of ambiguity. Specifically, one common interpretation appears more 
strongly supported than others. This is the interpretation in which a 
jealous, humiliated diane has her ex-lover murdered, but feels deeply 
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guilty for it as well. her complex emotions and associated memories give 
rise to the enigmatic dream that constitutes most of the film. The last 
part of the film brings the viewer into her waking life, where she realizes 
what she has done, remembers key moments of her relationship with 
Camilla, then is driven to suicide by her feelings of guilt and shame, as 
well as terrifying hallucinations. In the end, she seems to have some sort 
of spiritual connection with the now dead Camilla. 
 at the same time, this standard account of the film also seems to be 
undermined by information that supports other interpretations. These 
other interpretations include reversals of the dream/reality division, as 
well as pure storyworld parallelism. perhaps the best way of reconciling 
these interpretations is to say that both the optimistic and the pessimis-
tic narratives are dreams. That may seem to resolve the contradictions. 
however, in the end, most of the ambiguities remain. Specifically, in this 
case the question is not “Is the pessimistic version real, and in what ways 
does it incorporate fantasy or hallucination?” but “Is the pessimistic 
version closer to reality, and in what ways does it distort that reality?” 
note that, in both cases, we may take parts of the optimistic version as 
real and parts of the pessimistic version as unreal, though perhaps not 
precisely the same parts. moreover, in the two dreams account, we do 
not know who is dreaming the dreams and if there is one dreamer or 
there are two. Worse still, there is nothing that prevents the two dreams 
account from involving parallel nonpersonified narration. To the con-
trary, all the discourse differences continue suggest this. a final dif-
ficulty is that there is no character who is consistently present in the 
optimistic story, as we would usually expect the dreamer to be present. 
Indeed, this point counts at least prima facie against the standard inter-
pretation as well. 
 Whatever interpretation one favors here, it seems clear that even if 
the profile of ambiguity for the work contains a prominent peak, it does 
not contain only one peak. moreover, the possible interpretations and 
the encompassing pattern of discrete ambiguity are important for view-
ers’ emotional response to the film and for whatever thematic inferences 
one may wish to draw. In other words, they are a crucial part of the 
implied author’s/implied reader’s experience of the work. Finally, the 
film appears to involve parallel narration for its very different—indeed, 
contradictory—parts. In its overt presentation, that parallel narration is 
nonpersonified. In order to overcome the difficulties of parallel nonper-
sonified narration, critics tend to identify an embedded but implicit nar-
rator who is personified as a character in the story. In other words, they 
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seek to transform an apparently nonpersonified and parallel narration 
into a covertly personified and embedded narration (or its functional 
equivalent in dreaming stream of consciousness22). 
Conclusion
pre-theoretically, many readers or viewers and critics probably imagine 
that single narration is the standard case in literature—one story, one 
narrator. In fact, multiple narration is ubiquitous. multiple narration can 
take several forms. The narrators may be embedded in one another, as 
when Jones tells a story about Smith recounting an incident. alterna-
tively, narrators may be parallel, as when Jones tells a story and then 
Smith gives his version of the same events. finally, some group may be 
presented as narrating a story.
 Typically, parallel narration involves two or more personified nar-
rators who are encompassed by a single nonpersonified narrator. Com-
monly there are discrepancies between the different narrations, and one 
main interpretive task for the reader is inferring the facts of the sto-
ryworld, the thematic implications, and the normative emotions of the 
work as a whole. part of this involves determining just how the different 
narrators are or are not reliable.
 Some narratives are less concerned with exploring the storyworld per 
se than with examining and clarifying the cognitive and affective prin-
ciples by which a particular narrator transforms the storyworld into 
the narrated world. Such narratorial transformation is accessible to a 
reader primarily via contrasts with alternative representations of the 
storyworld. for this reason, mentalistic narration (which focuses on the 
mental processes of narrators or focalizers) fits particularly well with 
parallel, personified narration. The different, personified narrators may 
diverge in their representations in ways that reflect their underlying 
cognitive and affective propensities, thus their characteristic epistemic 
and motivational unreliabilities.
 faulkner’s The Sound and the Fury is an outstanding example of this. 
The three parallel narrators manifest distinctive cognitive biases, partic-
ularly in their theory of mind inclinations and propensities toward types 
of causal attribution. moreover, it is no accident that faulkner’s novel 
involves interior monologue and related techniques. mentalistic nar-
ration is readily developed in the range of narrational techniques that 
run from un-self-conscious subvocalization (strict interior monologue), 
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through modifications that incorporate verbal associations, to various 
forms of “verbal idealization” in which words of an encompassing nar-
rator express a character’s perceptual, emotional, and other nonverbal 
experiences in stream of consciousness.
 While personified, parallel narration can pose serious interpretive 
problems and manifest a high degree of ambiguity, nonpersonified par-
allel narration is typically far more ambiguous and problematic. Indeed, 
it may initially seem impossible to have a work with two distinct imper-
sonal narrators. but Mulholland Drive suggests that this is possible (as do 
other works, such as James Joyce’s Ulysses). That is not because the film 
definitively is a work of parallel nonpersonified narration. rather, that 
is one possible—indeed, highly plausible—interpretation of the work. 
This plausibility results in part from the story contradictions (a common 
feature of parallel narration) and in part from the distinct narrational 
styles of the two narratives, specifically with respect to chronological 
emplotment, access to internal states, and focalization. Indeed, the non-
focalization of the optimistic narrative—thus the frequent absence of the 
putative dreamer (betty, or perhaps rita) from the events—would seem 
to count somewhat against interpretations that make the optimistic nar-
rative a dream. 
 Critical analyses of the film do, however, point to a striking feature of 
the interpretation of such a work. despite the resulting anomalies, critics 
have often set out to reduce the film’s apparent nonpersonified narrato-
rial parallelism to a single nonpersonified narrator with an embedded, 
personified narrator (or functional equivalent). This suggests that view-
ers are strongly motivated to avoid accepting parallel nonpersonified 
narration in their interpretations of a work. In the case of Mulholland 
Drive, this avoidance is possible only if one allows a sort of covert person-
ified narration, since the narration of lynch’s film is overtly nonpersoni-
fied. The point is in itself theoretically consequential, since it suggests 
the in principle possibility of covert personification, whatever one con-
cludes about Mulholland Drive.
gain, multiple narration may be parallel, embedded, or group-
based. This chapter begins with embedded narration and some 
related issues in focalization. It first considers the topic in general, theo-
retical terms, then turns to a Kenyan novel that takes up narrational 
embedding to treat political themes. one central thematic concern of 
this novel is the unification of diverse individuals into a national or 
class-based movement. This concern has narrational consequences in 
that it poses the problem of reconciling individual voices with group 
expression. This leads to the third form of narrational multiplicity—
group narration—as well as group focalization and a namibian novel in 
part concerned with discourse, collectivity, and political solidarity.
Embedded Narration
perhaps the most important distinction in embedded narration is 
between psychological and rhetorical embedding. psychological embed-
ding preserves the epistemic and other constraints of both the embed-
ding and embedded narrators. for example, suppose Jones is explaining 
what Smith said about his (Smith’s) experiences on the day of a mur-
der. Jones clearly does not have access to Smith’s thoughts. Thus he 
cannot report those thoughts. This is a limitation of the embedding or 
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“primary” narrator. Conversely, Jones may know about events occur-
ring far away from Smith. however, Jones cannot report those as part of 
Smith’s testimony, because they were unknown to Smith. In psychologi-
cal embedding, the embedded narration would not include any informa-
tion unavailable to the embedding or embedded narrator.
 note that there are two sorts of limitation here. one sort comes 
from the embedding story narrator. The other comes from the embed-
ded story narrator. When the primary narrator is omniscient, however, 
there is only one sort of limitation. That is the limitation of the embed-
ded narrator. however much the primary narrator knows, that will not 
affect what the embedded narrator can say, if there is strict psychologi-
cal embedding. put simply, adam’s story is the same, with the same limi-
tations, whether adam is telling it himself or it is being reported by God.
 however, not all embedding is psychological, and these constraints 
are often not preserved. Thus a film may be framed as a recollection 
by one of the characters involved in the main action. however, in the 
course of the film, the viewer may be given information that should not 
have been available to that embedded narrator. Take, for example, James 
Cameron’s Titanic. The central narrative of the film is framed as a recol-
lection by rose. but the viewer is shown a number of scenes in which 
Jack is alone, doing things that rose would not have known about. Thus 
they could not be part of her recollection.
 When the embedded narrative is wholly unconstrained by the limi-
tations of the embedded narrator, one may refer to this as “rhetorical 
embedding.” but this is not the usual case. for example, it is not the case 
in Titanic. first, for many scenes where Jack is alone, rose may have had 
“factual” knowledge of the events even though she lacked perceptual 
knowledge. a film does not have to confine embedded narration to a ver-
bal statement, but may show the event to the viewer in its perceptual 
detail. That is different from showing a scene that would not be known 
at all to the narrator. In addition, a narrator may draw inferences about 
events. for example, rose can infer that Jack had to board the ship at 
some point, even if she did not see that event or hear Jack recount it. a 
narrative may present these directly as perceptions. In these and related 
cases, there is a partial deviation from the constraints of the narrator, 
but not a complete deviation.
 more importantly, perhaps, the embedded narration typically follows 
the contours of the story that would be told by the embedded narrator, 
if he or she had all the relevant information and experience. put differ-
ently, it typically follows the embedded narrator’s interests. for instance, 
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rose has an interest in how a piece of jewelry got into Jack’s possession. 
even if she does not know how that occurred, it is a topic of importance 
to her. Thus the narration might convey that information even if it was 
not available to rose. In doing so, it is violating many constraints of the 
embedded narrator, but not all of them. It is still constrained by, so to 
speak, the story that narrator would like to be able to tell. put differ-
ently, a primary narrator (e.g., the encompassing, nonpersonified narra-
tor of Titanic) may freely add information unavailable to the embedded 
narrator, while following the basic narrative orientation of that embed-
ded narrator. This may be termed idealized embedded narration.
 more technically, the defining features of a narrator may be divided 
into two groups—emotional and epistemic. psychologically embedded 
narratives are both epistemically constrained and emotionally oriented 
by the embedded narrator. purely rhetorically embedded narratives are 
unaffected by either. between these extremes, there are, first, embed-
dings that are partially epistemically constrained; specifically, there are 
embeddings that are informationally constrained, but not perceptually con-
strained. Second, there are emotionally constrained embeddings, which is to 
say, embeddings that are oriented by the emotional interests of the nar-
rator, but not epistemically constrained. emotionally constrained embed-
dings commonly appear in the form of idealized embedded narration.
 The same situation arises in cases that do not technically involve 
embedding, but where a nonpersonified narration is oriented by refer-
ence to a character, almost as if this character were the narrator. This is, 
of course, focalization. In parallel with the forms of embedded narration, 
one may distinguish psychological, informational, and emotional focal-
ization. psychological focalization is a strict limitation of narration to 
the knowledge and interests of the focalizer. Informational focalization 
honors the general informational constraints of the focalizer, but not 
the precise sources and detail of that information (e.g., inference ver-
sus perception). emotional focalization is constrained only by the emo-
tional orientation and interests of the focalizer. (focalization does not 
occur without any constraint from the focalizer. Therefore, there does 
not appear to be a parallel for rhetorical embedding.)
 as this indicates, a focalized narration may present detailed percep-
tual and other information not available to the focalizer. This may be 
termed guided omniscience, in parallel with idealized embedded narra-
tion. despite great similarity, there are some differences between guided 
omniscience and idealized embedding. perhaps most obviously, when 
reading a work that appears to involve idealized embedding, one may 
Varieties of Multiple Narration (II) | 225
always question whether the excess information—the information that 
should not be available to the narrator—is evidence of the narrator’s 
potentially unreliable inference or even misrepresentation. That is typi-
cally not the case with guided omniscience. There are presumably differ-
ences in the reader’s emotional response to voice and related matters as 
well.
 finally, idealized embedding or guided omniscience may suggest 
another narrative that more narrowly conforms to the constraints of the 
narrator or focalizer. for example, there may be an actual narrative told 
by Titanic’s rose. In most cases, this actual narrative will not be some-
thing one can reconstruct. however, there are cases where one may at 
least partially infer its content, and also infer that it in some degree par-
allels the enhanced embedded narration that is actually given in the text 
or film. This other narrative may be called an implicit subtextual template.
Embedding, Guided Omniscience, and 
Collective Narration in Petals of Blood
Petals of Blood is arguably the most important novel to emerge from 
Kenya, and one of the major works of anglophone postcolonial literature. 
Critics have not always been in agreement on this assessment. Indeed, 
many critics have greatly undervalued the novel, in part because they 
have not recognized its narrational subtleties, nor even fully understood 
its politics.1 (for a useful overview of the criticism, see mclaren.) as to 
the former, a few critics have briefly noted the narrational complexity of 
the novel. for example, aizenberg points to the work’s “multiple voices” 
(90), including “a plural, communal voice” (92).2 as to the work’s politics, 
virtually every critic recognizes the anticolonial and anti-neocolonial 
nature of the work. however, fewer writers have examined the marxist 
orientation of the novel (see, for example, Sharma; see also martini on 
links with working-class literature), not to mention the complex dialec-
tic that the work establishes between marxism and nationalism.
 Specifically, the novel explores the condition of newly independent 
Kenya. It focuses on four characters—munira, a teacher; Wanja, a prosti-
tute (among other things); abdulla, a bar owner and former revolution-
ary; and Karega, a teacher then a union leader. There are also important 
secondary characters, such as nyakinyua,3 a small farmer, repository of 
Gikuyu tradition, and grandmother of Wanja. There is a frame narrative 
involving a murder investigation. This takes place in the mid-1970s. The 
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main story of the work extends back about a decade earlier, to a period 
right after independence (in 1963). further, embedded narratives give 
stories from various individual and group histories.
 needless to say, Petals is as interpretively complex and ambiguous as 
any work. but it seems clear that the novel centrally involves national 
allegory, a point only partially explored in criticism on the novel. per-
haps most crucially, Wanja represents the nation. Though underdevel-
oped, the connection is recognized by some critics. for example, Sharma 
characterizes her as “the spirit and earth of Kenya, humiliated, exploited 
and ill-used by the Kimerias, Chuis and mzigos” (302). Though he does 
not explore the allegorical status of Wanja, eustace palmer does char-
acterize her in such a way as to illuminate that status. as he explains, 
“far from wishing to enslave men, Wanja’s ruling passion throughout is 
the need to preserve her independence” (278–79). The point applies at 
least as straightforwardly to the nation (in contrast with its enslaving 
leaders) as to an individual. one may extend these general connections 
first by noting that Wanja allegorically represents both the land and the 
people of Kenya. as the land, she is a “garden” (34), a woman with “val-
leys, rivers, streams, hills, ridges, mountains” (315). as the people, she 
is “myriad selves” (64), someone in whom Karega sees “countless other 
faces in many other places all over the republic” (294). as the last quota-
tion suggests, she often represents Kenya, though she may also represent 
the Gikuyu.4 more precisely, she is either Kenya today or the Gikuyu peo-
ple today. In keeping with this, her grandmother represents traditional 
Kenya or traditional Gikuyu society. These alternative interpretations 
are not mutually exclusive. Traditional Kenya is the collection of Gikuyu, 
masai, and other local traditions. Contemporary Kenya is itself manifest 
in its various modernized ethnicities. like Wanja, these groups have con-
nections with traditions in the countryside and with the cosmopolitan 
world of the cities.
 as a young girl, Wanja is seduced and abandoned by hawkins Kime-
ria, a member of the nascent capitalist class. Kimeria subsequently turns 
out to have been a collaborationist with the british counterinsurgency 
forces as well. The affair results in a pregnancy. Wanja gives birth to 
the child, but abandons it. In national allegories generally, the birth of 
a child points toward the birth of the nation. The suggestion here is that 
independent Kenya was the child of the nascent capitalist and collabora-
tionist class. This is in keeping with Ngũgĩ’s view of the new nation.
 after this, Wanja becomes a prostitute. The allegorical point is, of 
course, that the new Kenya has to prostitute itself to those with money in 
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order to survive. The idea is elaborated when the reader learns that she 
initially refused europeans, but eventually had to succumb. Similarly, 
“independent” Kenya realized that it had to prostitute itself to foreign 
investors. for a time, Wanja is able to take refuge in the countryside. 
There she brews a traditional drink referred to as “[t]he spirit” (210), 
which is linked with memory of the Gikuyu past and with self-realization 
(see 209–12). The suggestion is that modern Kenya could for a time retain 
its integrity by relying on the traditions of the countryside and by foster-
ing a sense of communal spirit bound up with self-realization through 
historical memory. but eventually capitalist developments—including 
industries involving hawkins Kimeria—threaten her traditional land. 
In addition, the youth of the countryside cannot afford to study. need-
ing money to preserve traditional lands and to send a talented orphan, 
Joseph, to school, Wanja is forced to prostitute herself again. here the 
point seems to be that, in order to give some minimal protection to cul-
tivators and to give at least a few poor children a chance at education, 
the prostitution of modern Kenya had to be extended to the traditional 
countryside.
 Ultimately, Wanja is almost killed when three Kenyan capitalists—
including Kimeria—are burned in an arson attack on her brothel. She is 
saved by abdulla, a former revolutionary who is now a destitute street 
vendor. at the end of the novel, Wanja is pregnant again. Thus indepen-
dent Kenya is preparing to give birth to a new nation (a point recog-
nized by several critics; see Stratton 120). but this time, it will not be the 
child of the capitalists and colonial collaborationists. It will, rather, be 
the child of the revolutionary poor.5
 The other two main characters—Karega and munira—represent a sort 
of class allegory. Karega is the child of the disenfranchised and dispos-
sessed peasantry, the generation after nyakinyua. his mother’s devotion 
allows him to earn an education. for a time, this makes him a member 
of the petite bourgeoisie, as he has a job teaching school in rural Kenya. 
however, his class origins and ties to the landless peasantry, as well as 
his experience of unemployment, petty trading, and wage labor, orient 
his class stance toward the masses and away from the elite. eventually, 
he becomes a union organizer. The novel in fact ends, not with Wanja 
and the new nation, but with Karega and the growing union movement. 
The workers are coming to recognize their own strength and their pos-
sibilities for collective action. Indeed, there is considerable tension 
between Karega and Wanja. at one point, they are lovers. but he eventu-
ally becomes disgusted with her prostitution. The allegorical point would 
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appear to be that the workers’ and the peasants’ movement is repelled 
by the prostitution of the modern nation. The novel ends with an unre-
solved tension between nationalism, on the one hand, and the class-
based struggles of the workers and peasants, on the other.
 perhaps surprisingly, the main character in the novel is the final 
character mentioned above—Godfrey munira. he is the son of ezekieli, 
“a wealthy landowner and a respected elder in the hierarchy of the pres-
byterian Church” (13). like Karega, munira is educated and becomes a 
petit bourgeois intellectual. also like Karega, and the petite bourgeoisie 
generally, munira’s “class stance” or feeling of class solidarity is mal-
leable (cf. Ngũgĩ on “the vacillating mentality and world outlook of the 
petite bourgeoisie” [in Sicherman 25]). What is curious is that his class 
origins do not influence him toward an identification with the wealthy. 
he is initially a sort of individualist, largely lacking in class solidarity. 
he does not necessarily pursue his own private gain. but, with some lim-
ited exceptions, he does pursue his goals largely in isolation from oth-
ers.6 eventually, he becomes involved in an apocalyptic Christian sect 
that works to divert the revolutionary energies of the poor away from 
material struggles (of class or nation) and toward individual spiritual 
salvation.7 In this respect, he seems to be a good example of religion 
as an opiate. The point is connected with petit bourgeois indifference 
to class, and with the moral intolerance and righteousness often asso-
ciated with the petite bourgeoisie. Such intolerance and righteousness 
are found in both Karega and munira. The result is that they both feel 
disgust for Wanja. munira, however, acts. he determines to burn her 
brothel, first setting fire to the doors and thereby preventing escape 
(333). The allegory might suggest that the religious obscurantist frac-
tion of the petite bourgeoisie also aims to rid the nation of prostitution, 
but in a moralistic and misguided way that could potentially destroy the 
nation itself.
 of course, the reader does not learn about munira’s aims and actions 
until the end. In good crime-story fashion, the novel begins with a series 
of arrests. Chapter 1 is short. It comprises five brief sections. Sections 
one through four recount the police going to munira, abdulla, Wanja, 
and Karega. Section five presents a newspaper account of an apparent 
case of arson the night before, a case in which three prominent, wealthy 
Kenyans have been killed.
 There are already interesting elements of the discourse here. The 
nonpersonified narrator is clearly omniscient. The reader has access to 
different characters’ thoughts and feelings. however, this access seems 
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particularly pronounced in the case of munira. more significantly, the 
special place of munira is signaled by the fact that abdulla, Wanja, and 
Karega are all named in the first sentence of their sections. however, 
in the opening section of the novel (treating munira), the narrator 
never tells who is being discussed. from the first sentence, then, there 
is already a presupposed framework, signaling a nonpersonified narra-
tee who is familiar with munira and with the context. The first sentence 
reads, “They came for him that Sunday.” The reader only learns that this 
“him” is someone named “munira” when one of the police officers asks if 
he is munira (2).
 other discourse elements enter in the section on Karega, as the 
reader is given access to the thoughts and feelings of a group of workers. 
The importance of this is not so much what it tells about the knowledge 
of the narrator, but what it tells about the interest of both the nonper-
sonified narrator and the implied author. To a great extent, the novel 
is thematically concerned with individualist fragmentation and different 
sorts of group solidarity. It is unsurprising that these concerns would be 
manifest at the level of the discourse from early on.
 The second chapter begins with a flashback to twelve years earlier, 
when munira began teaching school in the village of Ilmorog. munira 
is the topic of the first part of this chapter. but the focalization is not 
entirely clear. In the second paragraph, the nonpersonified narrator 
reports the views of “the elderly folk” of Ilmorog (5). after an inter-
vening paragraph, a peculiar thing happens. The narrator begins to use 
“we,” thereby becoming personified and collective, presumably manifest-
ing rather than simply reporting the group’s observations and feelings.8 
This collective “we” is contrasted most obviously with munira, who will 
(as already noted) turn out to suffer from petit bourgeois individualistic 
alienation. an obvious reading of the “we” is that it represents a com-
munal mutuality that has been lost in the modern world. Subsequently, 
nyakinyua speaks of how “Our young men and women have left us” (7, 
emphasis added), which would seem to reinforce this interpretation. but, 
in fact, the “we,” at this point, is exclusionary and closed-minded. The 
group clearly misunderstands munira when they think he is “mocking” 
their traditions (6) and they try to drive him away. Indeed, they show 
similar collective hostility toward abdulla (5).
 Three pages into the chapter, the focus shifts from munira to abdulla, 
who is introduced apparently by the nonpersonified narrator. but the 
narrative soon returns to the collective voice, with the group express-
ing its ambivalence about abdulla. again, far from being an admirable 
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expression of solidarity, the collective voice here seems to express pri-
marily suspicion and xenophobia.
 munira is eventually accepted into the village, becoming “one of us” 
(10). It is worth noting that he is accepted only when he proclaims that 
“Unity is strength” and refers to working for the new Kenya. This may 
appear to redeem the collectivity of the group. They only accept an out-
sider when the outsider demonstrates that he or she is genuinely willing 
to engage with them in solidarity. but, in fact, this too is undermined. 
munira said “Unity is strength,” while “not believing it, but noting that 
the words impressed” those around him (10).
 literary works produced in the context of nation building might be 
expected to develop group narration in order to overcome individualis-
tic fragmentation. This would be particularly unsurprising in a national 
allegory, such as Petals of Blood. But Ngũgĩ foils expectations. As the pre-
ceding points suggest, the traditional group definition of the village soci-
ety, manifest in collective narration, is highly problematic. Initially, it 
is clannish and xenophobic; subsequently, it is prone to manipulation. 
on the other hand, the scope of the collective narration at this point is 
not entirely clear.9 There are hints that it may not be village society as 
a whole but only the village elders, thus a traditional elite. moreover, 
in his petit bourgeois opposition to this collective, munira is often no 
less closed-minded, as when he characterizes Ilmorogans as “a people 
opposed to light and progress” (10).
 perhaps more significantly, the representation of the group narrator 
is by no means invariably critical. for example, though she is the grand-
daughter of nyakinyua, Wanja is a stranger to Ilmorog. Thus she needs 
to be accepted into the group, as did munira, even if the initial level of 
distrust is much lower. This acceptance is fairly quick and is signaled 
by a shift to the collective voice: “Within a week she too had become of 
us” (31). This seems to involve a reasonable balance of open-mindedness 
and caution. In this case, moreover, the group appears more encompass-
ing than the group that judged munira. It now seems to be “the people” 
generally, and not simply the elders. Consistent with this, the collective 
voice is associated at this particular point with the song and dance that 
manifest and recall the cultural traditions of the people. In this section, 
then, the representation of the “we” is positive. rather than stressing 
xenophobia, it emphasizes the shared cultural heritage that unites the 
villagers.
 returning to munira’s acceptance into the community, we find that, 
after the shift out of collective narration, the nonpersonified narrator 
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proceeds more or less straightforwardly for another eight pages until 
a discussion begins about when young people began leaving Ilmorog, 
which is to say, when the village community began to come apart. here, 
rather than an expression of group collectively, there is a series of frag-
mentary representations of individual views. In other words, the group 
is represented in a distributed fashion: “The movement away had started 
after the second big War . . . no . . . before that . . . no, it was worse after 
mau mau War” (19, ellipses in the original), and so on. Interestingly, this 
fragmented representation of the village community is explicitly about 
disintegration. In addition, it is focalized through the alienated, indi-
vidualistic, petit bourgeois character, Munira. Thus, here again, Ngũgĩ 
makes thematic use of a discourse technique.
 Though it is not a matter of discourse, it is worth pointing out that 
Ngũgĩ’s characterization of Munira stresses his individual isolation rel-
ative to the people of Ilmorog. Sitting and observing the Ilmorogans, 
munira “would vaguely feel with them” as they were united in work. but 
he always remained “an outsider to their activities” (20). The phrase “to 
their activities” is important. In Ngũgĩ’s Marxist perspective, it is the 
shared labor of the people that ultimately unites them—first, in the tra-
ditional village, then later in the trade union.
 Such story elements are, however, enhanced by discourse tech-
niques. for example, at times the omniscient narrator does very strik-
ingly limit the reader’s knowledge to that of munira. Thus when Wanja 
is introduced, readers learn as little about her as munira does. They are 
not even told that she leaves his home after he goes to the school. They 
learn this only later when munira learns it. of course, this is what one 
expects with focalization. however, the novel is not consistently focal-
ized. The strictness of constraint here tends to make munira’s isolation 
more palpable.
 much of the novel is organized around explicitly marked and 
saliently differentiated embedded narrations by the main characters. 
among other things, these narrations fill in character history and pro-
vide indirect comments on colonialism, anticolonial struggles, and neo-
colonialism. Soon after Wanja comes to Ilmorog (in chapter 2), munira 
presents the first of these. as discourse structures, these are not particu-
larly noteworthy. The process of embedding in these cases is straightfor-
ward, as they are narratives reported by an omniscient, nonpersonified 
narrator.
 Chapter 2 ends after Wanja delivers one of these embedded narra-
tives. Chapter 3 returns from the flashback of chapter 2 to the present—
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that is, twelve years later, shortly after the arrests of chapter 1. munira 
is trying to “reconstruct” the scene that the reader has just read, now 
for “a statement to the police” (41). This is revealing because it suggests 
that there is already an implicit subtextual template here. Clearly, what 
was given in chapter 2 was not the content of munira’s statement to the 
police. however, it could very well be a case of omniscience guided by 
munira’s interests, though not informationally constrained by his inabil-
ity to recall particulars. Subsequently, an inspector is introduced who 
provides munira with pen and paper and asks him to write out his state-
ment treating the events leading up to the murder. The inspector, then, 
serves as the narratee of this written account. The second section of 
chapter 3 clearly begins as that account. The opening lines of that sec-
tion are “how does one tell of murder in a new Town?” This announces 
that the embedded narrative treats the issue just posed by the inspec-
tor. It goes on to stress “God’s law” and “God’s will,” thereby indicating 
that the narration is by munira, thus not (directly) by the nonpersonified 
narrator. Subsequent paragraphs are in first person.
 but almost immediately, it is clear that the embedded narration is 
either psychological but unreliable, idealized or merely rhetorical. It 
seems most likely that the narration follows munira’s interests and the 
general structure of his own narration, but draws on the omniscience 
of the nonpersonified narrator. The first clear indication of this is when 
munira claims to remember a lengthy passage from one of Karega’s exer-
cise books (46).10
 In any case, munira’s first-person narration does not continue. Sec-
tion four shifts to Wanja, who is recovering from the fire. like munira, 
she too is trying to remember the past. Though this section returns to 
the omniscient nonpersonified narrator, the suggestion is that this 
omniscient version follows the trajectory of Wanja’s recollections. Thus 
guided omniscience follows idealized embedded narration.
 The fourth chapter begins with an unexpected reflection. The nar-
rator explains that anyone would be “overwhelmed and stilled by the 
sight” of “shimmering moonlit mist” on a particular night. This is not 
logically incompatible with nonpersonified omniscient narration. but 
it seems to involve an unusual commitment to a personal emotive 
response. The second paragraph refers to “recent archaeological finds 
in Ilmorog.” This too is logically consistent with the omniscience of the 
nonpersonified narrator. but it also seems peculiar. Up to this point, the 
nonpersonified narrator has not exhibited overt emotions or interests 
and has been unconcerned with expanses of time outside the experience 
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or attention of the characters. The following paragraph goes further still 
and personifies the narrator. It is yet a third version of the “we.” Spe-
cifically, the narrator begins by referring to “our history.” This could 
in principle suggest collective voicing (where a number of people speak 
together). In context, however, it apparently points toward an individ-
ual who, so to speak, instantiates the group. on the other hand, it is not 
an individual speaking in isolation. It is an individual recounting knowl-
edge that is available to the entire group because it has been preserved 
by a network of individuals within that group, a network with cultural 
authority—“poets and players” (67). This is, of course, a network that 
includes contemporary Kenyan novelists and thus encompasses the 
author of Petals of Blood. The group history has been preserved by poets 
and players, and is presumably manifest in this novel. however, that 
does not mean the entire society is familiar with this preserved knowl-
edge. Indeed, there would hardly be any point in having poets, play- 
ers, and novelists if everyone already did share this knowledge.
 This passage, then, extends the range of group narration isolated in 
the novel. Specifically, the novel suggests three types of group narra-
tion: 1) collective (where the group speaks together as “we”), 2) distrib-
uted (where individuals present distinct, but interrelated voices from 
the group), and 3) instantiated (where one speaker is presented as typi-
fying the group). Cross-cutting this division, the novel points toward 
three ways in which the group may be understood: 1) as the people, 2) as 
the political elite, and 3) as the cultural experts or bearers of tradition.11 
These represent different ways in which people commonly understand 
social groups and who is empowered to speak for a group. The sugges-
tions of Ngũgĩ’s text are that he celebrates the collective and distributed 
voices of the people and the instantiated voice of the cultural experts 
(such as nyakinyua), but criticizes the collective voice of the political 
elite (and the purely individual voices of self-seeking politicians).
 It is not possible to explore the entire novel in this detail. but by 
this point, the main discursive techniques used by Ngũgĩ seem clear. To 
a great extent, the rest of the novel develops these different narrative 
voices in the complex interactions of their levels of knowledge and tra-
jectories of interest. for example, chapter 5 includes an explicit return 
to munira’s testimony, again suggesting that much of the novel reca-
pitulates his testimony, but with the omniscience of the nonpersonified 
narrator adding knowledge.12 This is true even when the text is in first 
person. It thus continues to include both guided omniscience and ideal-
ized embedded narration, with the suggestion of an implicit subtextual 
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template. Indeed, the nonpersonified narrator’s omniscience leads to a 
presentation that goes beyond what munira says but could not know (in 
idealized narration) to what he knows but would not say. Specifically, it 
includes what passes through his mind in interior monologue, but would 
undoubtedly not be included in a police statement (see, for example, 
101).
 a variation of particular thematic significance occurs when omni-
science is connected implicitly with tradition. This is in keeping with 
the partial identification of the nonpersonified omniscient narrator with 
the cultural experts, the poets and players. however, here it occurs with 
character narration. Specifically, nyakinyua recites the history of the 
place. as such, she functions as “the spirit that guided and held them 
together. and she talked as if she had been everywhere” (123). The sug-
gestion is that the collective knowledge of tradition, as the product of 
countless individual points of view, is itself a sort of omniscience. This 
living, collective tradition is also emotionally unifying, or at least cre-
ates an emotional sense of unity. Thus, later, nyakinyua allows them all 
to “relive their history” and feel “a oneness” (210, 211). In keeping with 
both points (regarding knowledge and feeling), it is not surprising that 
nyakinyua’s significance expands even beyond Kenya. her representa-
tive voice is the result of her being “nyakinyua, mother of men” (123). 
despite the phrasing, this extension may not be intended to encom-
pass all humans. but it is broader than the Gikuyu or even the nation of 
Kenya. Two pages later, Karega interprets nyakinyua’s story as bearing 
on “all africa” (125).
 on the other hand, the suggestion of a still more encompassing 
humanity is not irrelevant here. The trajectory of the rest of the novel 
suggests widening circles of “we,” expansions of the group and the sense 
of group solidarity. despite Karega’s explanation of nyakinyua’s story 
as relating to africa, a larger unification is not excluded by the novel. 
Karega speaks of the humiliation of Wanja—thus, by allegorical implica-
tion, of the entire group—as “a collective humiliation.” of course, that 
collective humiliation could be ethnic (Gikuyu), national (Kenyan), or 
racial (pan-african). but he goes on to explain that it is collective because 
“it has got to do with human beings” (161). This is, of course, in keeping 
with the marxist perspective that Karega represents, since marxism has 
historically been a force favoring internationalism rather than national, 
ethnic, or other identities.
 In relation to this, it is, again, important that the novel ends, not with 
Wanja and abdulla, thus nationalism, but with Karega and the workers 
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movement, including its struggle against “national and regional chau-
vinism” (305). In keeping with its discursive embedding of voices within 
other voices, its elaboration of collective narration, and of course its 
themes of solidarity and division, the novel aptly concludes with Karega 
thinking about the struggle of the workers and the peasants to bring 
about a genuine “kingdom of man and woman” (344). In direct opposi-
tion to munira, the other petit bourgeois character, Karega realizes that 
such a kingdom must be made in this world, not imagined in another. as 
a result, he is finally able to become part of a collective—or, rather, to 
help form a new collective based not on false attempts to relive “glorious 
pasts” of a nation or ethnicity (326), but on work to create a new future. 
In the last words of the novel, the narrator explains that, finally, Karega 
“knew he was no longer alone” (345).
 In short, Ngũgĩ’s novel suggests a number of points about the nature 
of narrator embedding and group narration. These theoretical impli-
cations, in turn, react back on one’s understanding of the novel. Spe-
cifically, there is a tight interrelation between the discourse structures 
and processes of the novel, on the one hand, and its thematic points and 
emotional norms, on the other. This is particularly noteworthy because 
the novel is not at all thematically or discursively simple. for example, it 
is critical of petit bourgeois individualism, but its representation of col-
lective voicing is nuanced. Its different forms of group narration suggest 
different kinds of group formation and modes of group expression, with 
different values and different faults. This is a version of the profile of 
ambiguity and the profile of ambivalence. However, Ngũgĩ has integrated 
thematic and emotional ambiguity with narration in an unusually thor-
ough manner. moreover, he has done this in a self-consciously dialectical 
way, so that the different voices can interact with, correct, and comple-
ment one another in their real social complexity.
Narrator Knowledge, Collective Experience, and 
Access to Other Minds
One of the reasons Ngũgĩ’s dialectic is important is that group voicing 
is problematic precisely at the level of difference or diversity. The dis-
tributed mode of group narration allows for diversity of thought and 
feeling within the group. on the other hand, it may make the diversity—
even conflict—more salient than group connectedness. This problem 
is solved by the other versions of group narration. but these, in turn, 
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readily project a degree of uniformity that is often internally oppres-
sive and externally xenophobic, as Ngũgĩ recognized. Moreover, in the 
real world, groups are not at all so uniform as collective or instantiated 
voicing implies. In keeping with this, narration suggesting uniformity 
often raises issues about narrator knowledge and reliability, particu-
larly with respect to personified narrators. as margolin writes, “Claims 
about a group’s mental states or actions combine uneasily the narrator’s 
own immediate self-knowledge with inferences about the minds of other 
members” (“perspective” 423).
 Consider the case of an instantiated voice. here, the first issue is to 
what extent anyone can reasonably be spoken of as typical of a group, 
in the sense of manifesting the group’s standard properties generally, 
in the way a sample of gold may be said to manifest the properties of 
gold generally. The answer is straightforward—groups are not at all like 
the elements; their properties are not uniform across samples. of course, 
one can create a storyworld in which group thoughts are so uniform that 
this is unproblematic. for example, a science fiction work could include 
a set of identically programmed robots. but most narratives using an 
instantiated voice are probably not suggesting that the possibility of such 
a voice arises only in an unreal world. Indeed, in a case such as Petals 
of Blood, it is crucial to the work’s political purposes that there is a close 
parallel between the instantiated nature of the voice in the fiction and 
group connectedness in the real world. Similar points hold for the collec-
tive narrative voice.
 The same issues arise with indirect forms of group narration, when 
a narrator reports of a group that “they” felt x or thought y. an omni-
scient narrator may in principle know what everyone in a group is 
thinking or feeling. however, here again, it usually seems implausible 
that a group would share a particular understanding or emotion—unless 
the group is very different from groups in the real world. The prob-
lem is only worsened when the narration is rigorously focalized. This 
is because a focalizer, like a limited narrator, cannot have access to the 
inner life of group members. Thus, even if there is uniformity, he or 
she could not know. There are, then, two dilemmas for what might be 
called the indirect voicing of groups by narrators, the same two as found 
in collective and instantiated narration. first, there is the problem of 
group uniformity. Second, there is the problem of narrator/focalizer 
knowledge.
 obviously, these problems are greatest when the group is large and, 
so to speak, “abstract,” as in the cases presented by Ngũgĩ. Judgments 
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about groups become increasingly plausible as the number of people in 
the group falls, the period of time decreases, and the intensity of inter-
action among the group members (prominently including the narrator 
or focalizer) increases. Thus one is or should be highly skeptical of indi-
rect—or collective or instantiated—voicing for a race or nation. but one 
is or should be more open to the possibility of indirect—or collective or 
instantiated—voicing for, say, two close friends at a particular moment. 
This is because their shared experience in the past and present gives sig-
nificant grounds for inferring at least partially uniform internal states 
and for an enhanced degree of mutual comprehension.
 The point is related to some general issues about omniscience and 
limitation in narration. again, there are different kinds of limitation. 
Consider focalization. as noted earlier, a focalized nonpersonified nar-
rator may be rigorously epistemically restricted to a single character’s 
knowledge. alternatively, however, such a narrator may be restricted 
only in interest. In the second case, he or she may have access to a wide 
range of external facts and internal character states, but may (so to 
speak) not care to report them. This does not mean, however, that nar-
ration is necessarily a matter of either guided, though otherwise com-
plete, omniscience on the one hand or strict focalization on the other. 
rather, the narrator may have various sorts and degrees of information 
not available to the focalizer.
 Specifically, there seems to be a rough hierarchy according to which 
a focalized narrator may have “excess” knowledge. he or she may most 
readily have general social knowledge not available to the focalizer. an 
obvious case of this is language. a language may be unfamiliar to the 
focalizer. however, if the author wishes the reader to know the content 
of a particular speech, then the narrator must, at the very least, give 
an accurate transcription of the foreign language. Suppose, for example, 
that a character says something in afrikaans, but the focalizer does not 
speak afrikaans. If the author wants the content of the speech available 
to the reader, then the narrator must be able to transcribe the afrikaans 
speech, which is something the focalizer would not be able to do.
 a focalized narrator may have some knowledge of other minds as 
well, even when focalization is generally strict and therefore putatively 
involves confinement to a single perspective. Unsurprisingly, this exten-
sion of the focalized narrator’s knowledge seems to follow the same gen-
eral principles that govern one’s confidence about inferences to other 
people’s inner states in real life. observers feel quite confident in attrib-
uting a perception to someone else when they are in the same percep-
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tual environment. If Jones and Smith are both at the celebration where 
a cannon is fired, Jones feels confident that Smith heard the cannon. 
observers may also be relatively confident about emotion. doe witnesses 
the eliciting conditions of emotion and the expressive and actional out-
comes—thus he sees Jones reject Smith’s proposal of marriage; doe then 
sees Smith break into sobs and run from the room. doe or any other 
witness feels quite confident about Smith’s inner emotional state. peo-
ple seem somewhat less confident about someone else’s expectations 
and inferences. many emotional responses involve relatively automatic 
processes. but expectations and inferences are less automatic and are 
therefore more difficult to gauge. finally, observers appear to have the 
least confidence about other people’s memories and extended plans. 
memories require that the observer has shared or otherwise knows 
about the other person’s past experiences and about whether current 
circumstances are likely to trigger those memories. plans require a sense 
of the person’s enduring interests, goals, self-understanding, and other 
matters.
 If this hierarchy is roughly correct with respect to people’s real-life 
confidence, and accuracy, in evaluating other people’s mental states, 
one would expect something like it to appear in literature. In keeping 
with this, it does seem that narrators are often neither omniscient nor 
strictly focalized with respect to other characters’ mental states. rather, 
they frequently fall somewhere within an intermediate spectrum, pro-
viding some information about the mental states of other characters. 
What information can be provided by the narrator appears to be broadly 
guided by the preceding hierarchy.
 These points may be further developed by returning to theory of 
mind issues. Sometimes, one rationally infers someone’s inner state; at 
other times, one has the sense that one just knows what the person is 
feeling. Similarly, a focalized narrator may infer a state or may present 
the state as if he or she had direct access to it. In other words, he or she 
may rely on a theoretically based theory of mind or on simulation (as 
discussed in chapter 4).
 Simulation appears to be particularly prominent in the understand-
ing of other people’s emotions (see doherty 49 and citations). In keep-
ing with this, it is also particularly prominent in the feeling of actually 
experiencing other people’s inner states. In other words, perhaps the 
most frequent sense of having access to other people’s minds comes with 
the feeling of having a common emotional experience, a feeling that is 
usually inseparable from simulation. This feeling of common emotional 
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experience is enhanced by the ways in which emotions are actually 
shared interactively and the various inputs to simulation. When Jones 
and doe are laughing and tickling one another and frolicking together in 
the swaying rye field, they have a strong sense not only of being happy 
individually but of sharing happiness. many components of the experi-
ence contribute to this. These include joint attention (on a shared object) 
or mutual attention, mirroring (spontaneous imitation of one another’s 
expressions, gesture, posture, etc. [see Iacoboni]), smooth cooperative 
activity toward shared goals (including ease of mutual anticipation), 
and emotion contagion (where one person’s emotion expressions, such 
as laughter, trigger the parallel emotions in the other person; see hat-
field, Cacioppo, and rapson). The effects of these conditions are fur-
ther enhanced if there is a relation of attachment between the people 
involved, since attachment promotes a feeling of intimacy and a ten-
dency for those involved (e.g., lovers) to see themselves as in some sense 
a single “self” or, more technically, a “cognitive unit” (on the concept of 
a cognitive unit, see ortony, Clore, and Collins 77–79).
 Since these conditions enhance one’s sense of shared emotion in real 
life, one would expect them to enhance the sense of shared emotion in 
fiction. In keeping with this, one would expect these conditions to con-
tribute to group voicing in narrative. In fact, much of the group voicing 
in Ngũgĩ is emotional, whether it is a matter of shared antipathy toward 
an outsider in the village or cultural pride.
 But Ngũgĩ does not provide an ideal instance of this sort, since his 
narration is omniscient and not strictly focalized. a tighter constraint 
on the narrator should more clearly highlight the conditions in which 
group voicing occurs and how it occurs. This leads to Born of the Sun by 
Joseph diescho (with Celeste Wallin).13
Emotion Sharing, Other Minds, and Political Trust in 
Born of the Sun: A Namibian Novel
This 1988 novel concerns a young Kavango villager, muronga, in South 
West africa (namibia) during the period of South african (apartheid) 
administration. faced with the need to earn money in order to pay taxes, 
muronga goes to work in the South african mines. The novel begins with 
muronga and his wife, makena, to whom he is deeply attached. When she 
has a child, muronga develops a deep bond with the baby as well. much 
of the first part of the novel is concerned with establishing the strong 
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ties of affection that bind muronga to his family and community. The 
only dissonant notes in the opening come from colonialism, prominently 
the South african government’s taxation system.
 at the end of the first part, muronga and his good friend, Kaye, decide 
to leave home in order to secure paid work. despite his strong feelings 
for his family, muronga believes that he must do this, in part for their 
benefit. The pain of parting is initially softened by the presence of Kaye, 
with whom muronga also has strong attachment bonds. however, they 
too are separated and sent to different regions for work. Thus the first 
part of the novel establishes a clear conflict between personal attach-
ment and colonial labor.
 The very brief second part of the novel traces muronga’s transporta-
tion from namibia through newly independent botswana to South africa. 
diescho (with Wallin) depicts muronga’s new experiences of colonialism, 
technology, the diversity of african society, and other matters.
 In part three, muronga learns about work in the mines, about South 
african racism and exploitation, and about political repression. he begins 
to attend secret political meetings. When an important african activist is 
killed in prison, he participates in a strike. (The activist is modeled on 
Stephen biko, though the events in the story occur much earlier.) he is 
arrested, imprisoned, and tortured.
 In the final part of the novel, muronga has been released from prison 
and returned to the mines. after attending classes, he is now literate. he 
continues his activism and is arrested again. This time, he is deported. 
however, in botswana he and several comrades are placed under the 
custody of an official who sympathizes with the South West africa peo-
ple’s organization (SWapo, called Upo in the novel), the revolutionary 
organization struggling for an independent namibia. This official offers 
them the opportunity to escape and join SWapo. after a night of inter-
nal conflict, in which he longs for his wife, child, and friends, muronga 
decides that he must sacrifice his own personal attachments. The novel 
ends with muronga joining his comrades in escape to enter the struggle 
for his nation’s freedom.
 as should be clear even from this brief summary, the novel is nar-
ratively, thematically, and emotionally concerned with issues of trust, 
solidarity, shared action, and attachment. as such, it is a novel that 
addresses a range of concerns that bear on the understanding of other 
minds. These concerns include both the theory-based inference to other 
minds and the simulation of other minds that gives a sense of direct 
access, particularly to the feelings of other people.14
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 perhaps the most remarkable aspect of the novel is the way it recruits 
discourse techniques toward these ends. Specifically, the novel has a 
nonpersonified narrator with focalization on muronga. This narrator has 
some general knowledge and skills that muronga lacks (e.g., he or she 
has knowledge of several languages unknown to muronga). nonetheless, 
he or she generally does not have access to other minds. There are, how-
ever, exceptions to this restriction. The reader is sometimes given inner 
experiences of characters. In some cases, this is a fairly straightforward 
matter of the inner experience being easy to infer from perceptual expe-
rience that is available to muronga. These reports of inner states, then, 
need not be viewed as violating strict focalization.
 more importantly, there are cases in which the narration involves 
an indirect group voicing that is not a matter of simple inference. These 
cases are marked by precisely the sort of coordination of cooperative 
activity, commonly enhanced by shared attachment, that gives one the 
sense of shared emotion in ordinary life. These regulated violations of 
focalization serve at least three purposes. first, they enhance the emo-
tional effect of muronga’s bonds with family and friends (thus the sev-
ering of those bonds due to apartheid). Second, they extend a parallel 
relation to the solidarity and trust that occurs between muronga and his 
comrades in the struggle against South african colonialism and racism. 
Third, they highlight the alienation among different groups in apart-
heid South africa, since moments of “shared internality,” as one might 
call it, do not occur across the lines of group division—prominently the 
division between black and white.15
 The first chapter begins with muronga’s experiences (“he feels the 
day breaking” [3]) and thoughts (“It is all fine, he thinks to himself” [3]). 
These thoughts include an attempt to understand the white priest, pater 
dickmann. It is striking that he does not simulate dickmann’s mind, but 
rather infers its properties or general tendencies (e.g., it is a “suspicious 
mind” [4]). he then calculates what the best way is to persuade or pac-
ify the priest. The difference between muronga’s direct subjectivity and 
dickmann’s objectified, theoretically constructed mind is significant. It 
suggests already the distance between white and black that is central to 
the novel, and to life under apartheid. Indeed, it is in effect the psycho-
logical correlate of apartheid.
 muronga’s inner experience may not be presented with precise ver-
bal accuracy. In other words, it may not be strict interior monologue. 
however, as thought and feeling, it is aptly and convincingly simulated—
or, more properly, the apparent monologue gives the reader the cues 
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needed to engage in such simulation. for example, muronga is think-
ing about his upcoming conversion and church wedding. he suddenly 
remembers an added benefit of the church wedding—“oh, and another 
good thing is that the priest gives the marrying couples their wedding 
rings” (5). This memory surprises him, even though he latently had 
the knowledge all along. This spontaneity and seeming inconsistency 
in knowledge—both of which characterize real human thought pro-
cesses—facilitate a reader’s simulation of muronga as a full, subjectively 
self-experiencing person, in contrast with a calculated understanding of 
dickmann.
 muronga’s wife, makena, is pregnant and near to giving birth. mur-
onga has gone to call the midwife, mama rwenge. as he approaches her 
hut, the narrator seemingly shifts to the perspective of rwenge. but he 
or she only reports that rwenge “hears muronga’s quick footsteps” (6), a 
perception that is shared by muronga and readily attributed to rwenge 
in the circumstances. In other words, by the preceding hierarchy, it is 
only the most minimal violation of strict epistemic focalization.
 rwenge goes to muronga’s hut. muronga is outside, but “his 
mind . . . is in the hut with makena” (8). here, the point is not merely 
that he is thinking about her. It is that he is trying to understand what 
her experience is and he is longing to be in physical contact with this 
object of very strong attachment. muronga remembers the history of his 
and makena’s relationship, showing great tenderness. he wishes he was 
“there to hold makena’s shoulders” (10). This stresses the importance of 
attachment in the novel. It also suggests the ways in which attachment 
is bound up with a desire to share the other person’s pain and joy, thus 
with empathic engagement. When the child is born, muronga shows the 
same attachment to him as to makena.
 after the birth, there is a sort of intrusion by the narrator, present-
ing information on Kavango taboos. Clearly, this is information that 
muronga has, even if he has no occasion to think about it explicitly. 
In connection with this, some of the following sections are devoted to 
establishing the implied author’s view of Kavango tradition. muronga’s 
wise uncle ndara explains that by their tradition, a chief was supposed 
to be “like a father” and “rule according to the wishes of his people” or 
he would be “dethroned by the people” (24). The image of the chief as 
“like a father” here suggests the devoted attachment of a father to his 
children rather than the obedience of children to a paternal authority. 
This is particularly clear since, according to ndara, the chief could be 
expelled by the people. This all serves to prepare for muronga’s eventual 
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decision to join SWapo and fight for the liberation of namibia from the 
very nonfatherlike rule of the South african government.
 The second chapter takes up some of the same points. for example, 
muronga is faced with the clear irrationality of the white priest, and the 
priest’s bizarre assumption that africans will automatically believe that 
white angels are good and black angels are bad. he thinks, “The mis-
sionaries do not think beyond their long funny hair” (29). The point of 
the passage is to make readers—perhaps particularly white readers— 
recognize three things. first, Christian theology is no more rational 
than that of any other group. Second, european appearance is no more 
intrinsically beautiful than that of any other group. finally, whites have 
historically had a tendency not to think outside their own heads in the 
sense that they often have made no effort to imagine themselves into 
the place of nonwhite people, thus no effort to simulate their experi-
ence. The remainder of the chapter is replete with instances of resultant 
misunderstanding.
 more in line with the concerns of the present analysis, chapter 3 
includes some instances of collective focalization. muronga and makena 
sit “silently.” The narrator reports that “neither of them can forget the 
hectic ceremony of yesterday” and “they feel as if every villager thinks 
they are fanatics of Christendom” (60). readers know that the narrator 
has access to muronga’s thoughts. but the narrator does not generally 
have access to makena’s thoughts. here, however, the narrator’s knowl-
edge goes further than usual. at least one reason is that muronga and 
makena are bound by strong mutual attachment and have engaged in 
shared work together. That attachment and shared work—in this case, 
work actually bound up with the attachment—enable the mutual simula-
tion that can lead to collective focalization.
 Shortly after this, there are scenes of male–male attachment and 
sharing. for example, one man successfully finishes a proverbial sen-
tence begun by another (63). Two men eat from the same pots and their 
“fingers touch in the plate” (64). They contrast this sense of interper-
sonal connection with the loneliness of white people (64). This helps 
to prepare the reader for further developments of attachment-based 
mutual simulation—thus collective focalization—particularly among 
comrades in the struggle against apartheid. In keeping with the last con-
cern, this chapter also introduces SWapo, though from the perspective 
of the white South african government. 
 SWapo and taxation are addressed at a large meeting, where an 
afrikaans-speaking white man gives a talk that is translated by a self-
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serving african collaborationist. here, the narrator evidences general 
social knowledge beyond muronga, in this case knowledge of afrikaans. 
he or she presents the discrepancies between the original speech and 
the translation, discrepancies that cannot be available to muronga. here, 
then, there is another violation of strict focalization, but one that read-
ers are unlikely to notice due to its high place in the hierarchy of such 
violations.
 The fourth and fifth chapters continue to stress muronga’s attach-
ment to his wife and child. In the fifth chapter, he and his friend Kaye 
leave home to go work in South africa. Just before they leave, the nar-
rator shifts briefly to the perspective of makena. In keeping with the 
general principles set out above, however, the narrator gains access to 
a particular aspect of makena’s mind—her sharing of emotion with mur-
onga and Kaye. as they are all engaged in separating, she gains a “sense” 
of their “uncertainty” and “need” for “courage” (107).
 at this point, familial attachment bonds are again extended to men 
who share experiences and solidarity. The reader learns that mur-
onga and Kaye have “grown closer to each other” through their shared 
“undertaking.” This is not simply familiarity, but also attachment. as the 
narrator explains, “To be next to each other is one of the things they 
always wish for” and they “lie quietly side by side” at night (119). The 
discursive result of this is that they come to be collectively focalized. 
“muronga and Kaye are amazed to see. . . . They are astonished. . . . They 
are fascinated. . . . They have never seen. . . . they watch,” and so on 
(125). as soon as this mutuality develops, however, they are separated. 
The oppressive domination of the South african government first led 
to muronga’s departure from his wife and son. It now leads to his close 
friend’s departure. Thematically, then, apartheid is genuinely a system 
of separation, of breaking apart people who should be together. once 
Kaye goes off in a bus, muronga and the narrator no longer have access 
to Kaye’s thoughts or feelings. Thus the narrator must leave the reader, 
like muronga, “unsure” about whether Kaye can even see him (129). 
once more, the discourse mirrors the thematic and emotional concerns 
of the work while following the usual hierarchy of simulative access to 
other minds.
 The seventh chapter presents a positive interlude in newly indepen-
dent botswana. This points toward the importance of national liberation 
that becomes central later in the book. It also highlights the brutality of 
South africa that immediately follows.
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 after the men arrive at the mines, group-based inhibitions of sim-
ulation appear again in muronga’s relationship with his white super-
visor. When muronga works with a black man—and shares bonds of 
attachment—they frequently share emotions. This is often signaled in 
the focalization. but neither the narrator nor muronga shares the emo-
tions of the white supervisor. Thus muronga reflects that the supervisor 
“seems to think that a black man like me does not . . . feel what a white 
man does” (181). The absence of even ordinary empathy is striking. Sub-
sequently, muronga generalizes the point. Sharing emotion is a human 
tendency. but “Whites are more ‘white’ than they are human” (182). 
They allow their in-group racial definition to inhibit their “heart” (182), 
thus blocking the ordinary sorts of (simulative) access humans have to 
one another’s emotions. (This is a standard result of in-group/out-group 
division, as discussed in chapter 5.) The same point applies to black col-
laborationists. Just as the whites have “a dead heart” (182), these collab-
orationists “are dead inside” (188). muronga becomes “more aware than 
ever that he simply does not understand how these white people think” 
(189). Inference to emotion is not impossible across races. but it is not a 
true sharing, based on simulation. Thus muronga “can see . . . the white 
man’s . . . anger and hatred.” but he “does not understand” (236).
 In contrast with collaborationist blacks, “muronga and his friends” 
may be collectively focalized as they “are stunned” and “do not know 
what to say or do” (188). Sometimes they are so attuned to one another 
that they seem to communicate without speaking. muronga “muses” to 
himself, wondering why there is “broken glass atop the concrete wall.” 
as if he had uttered the question out loud, he “is surprised when [his 
fellow-worker] ndango answers his question” (189).
 as he experiences oppression and humiliation at the mines and wit-
nesses the experiences of others, muronga finds himself drawn to the 
resistance movement. at a SWapo meeting, ndango, one of the activ-
ists, explains to muronga that all the men there are “brothers” (202). 
This serves to suggest the possibility of a very broad attachment relation 
among these co-workers. muronga is initially troubled by his own more 
local affinities and identifications. however, he prays to the “God of our 
forefathers” to make “us . . . one people” (206). like Karega at the end of 
Petals, this sense of cooperative group interconnection leads muronga to 
“realize that he is not alone” (207).
 from here on, diescho (with Wallin) continues to develop the rela-
tion between personal attachment and collective solidarity, as well as 
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collective focalization. Thus, as muronga sits with a group of comrades, 
“his mind flashes back and forth between the meeting . . . and his fam-
ily” (217). When he takes part in a strike, the common aim is for every-
one to “speak with one voice” (218). When the strikers come together, 
the point is recapitulated at the level of discourse. The men, undertaking 
this joint endeavor, spontaneously share their feelings, without directly 
communicating them. moreover, all this is bound up with attachment. as 
the narrator explains, “There is fear and uncertainty, but no disagree-
ment” regarding the commitment to the strike, a strike that is connected 
with the well-being of “our own families” (218–19). due to their empris-
onment, muronga and his comrades sometimes share the same sensa-
tions and emotions, narrated collectively (“They are made to feel even 
more uncomfortable” [244]; “the prisoners are euphoric and fearless” 
[245]; “all the . . . men feel the same” [248]). This is linked with mur-
onga’s attachment to one comrade in particular, ndango; thus he “prays 
repeatedly . . . that he and ndango will not be split up” (243).
 The final chapters further develop the theme of group unity (“we 
must stand, united, against the whites” [274]). The culmination is marked 
by the same sorts of individual mental division and union that are seen 
throughout the novel. for example, muronga finds that his supervisor 
does not return his greeting, but this “doesn’t tell him much” (279). This 
is presumably because the stark group oppositions make theory of mind 
simulation impossible. In addition, muronga does not have adequate 
information to draw theoretical inferences. In consequence, he can 
understand very little from any gesture or expression of the supervisor.
 eventually, muronga is arrested again and isolated. once more, his 
greatest fear is being alone. once more, apartheid is represented as 
dividing those whose bonds of attachment should keep them together. In 
prison, he tries to remember his wife lying by his side (288). When he is 
finally released, to be deported, he finds a letter from her. She too is suf-
fering terribly from the separation and begs him to return. The last page 
of the letter has his child’s footprint (293). It seems for a moment as if 
the crimes of apartheid might, in a perverse way, cancel each other out. 
The unjust economic system drove muronga away from his family. now 
the unjust legal system will send him back.
 but in fact there is another choice. In botswana, he learns that he can 
escape to work with SWapo, which means abandoning his family. he is 
with his comrades ndango and nakare. If he joins SWapo, he will escape 
with them—perhaps only to be separated again. Unsurprisingly, they 
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share each other’s emotions; also unsurprisingly, the narrator is able to 
report this: “muronga, ndango and nakare still do not speak . . . but they 
hardly need to . . . they can communicate their feelings without words. 
each one knows what the others are going through” (300). 
 The night before the escape, muronga is tortured by a conflict 
between love and duty “for his family” and “love and duty to his peo-
ple and country” (306). Ultimately, he chooses the latter. he leaves with 
ndango and nakare for an uncertain future. of course, in doing this, 
muronga is placing himself in a cognitive unit founded on shared activity 
and attachment, thus a unit not unlike his family. That is what makes the 
choice emotionally possible in the context of the novel. 
 but there is something of a problem here. The ending of the novel 
points toward an abstract and generalized identification, an identifi-
cation with namibia. muronga’s choice is thematically presented as a 
choice in favor of the nation over more local affiliations. but the discur-
sive development of the novel actually values particularizing trust and 
practical interaction, as with ndango. In this way, the alternatives pre-
sented in the novel are always local. They are choices among different 
sorts of attachment bond and their associated forms of concrete shared 
experience, mirroring, and particularized simulation. at the end, mur-
onga does not choose abstract allegiance. he in effect chooses a set of 
local relations of trust, relations based on cooperative work, attachment, 
and associated empathic simulation—the relations with ndango and nak-
are. This may be the best choice because muronga’s relations with his 
wife and child may be practically unworkable in a colonialist and apart-
heid state. In this sense, muronga chooses what is best for both sets of 
attachment relations. but this all remains local. It is never clear that the 
novel really can support something like national identification, rather 
than more personalized loyalties with their particular attachment bonds, 
their mutual mirroring in cooperative activity, and so on. Then again, 
given the brutal behaviors that are regularly underwritten by national 
identification, perhaps that is not a bad thing.
Conclusion
There are two prominent types of limitation on embedded narrators—
epistemic and emotional. psychological embedding completely limits 
the primary narrator to the knowledge and emotional orientation of the 
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embedded narrator. merely rhetorical embedding involves no limita-
tion of either sort. In intermediate cases, the embedded narrative may 
include perceptual or other details not available to the embedded nar-
rator. nonetheless, the embedded narrative may be confined to topics 
or situations about which the embedded narrator has indirect (reported 
or inferred) knowledge. In a still more minimal case, the embedded nar-
rative is oriented by the emotional interests of the embedded narrator. 
When the narration extends beyond the experience of the embedded nar-
rator, but remains guided by (at minimum) that narrator’s interests, this 
may be called “idealized embedded narration.” That idealization may be 
informationally constrained, but not perceptually constrained, or it may 
simply be emotionally constrained. There are parallel types of focaliza-
tion. When the narration fills in information not available to an emo-
tionally focalized character, this may be called “guided omniscience.” 
Idealized embedded narration and guided omniscience may point toward 
an “implicit subtextual template,” an actual narrative produced by the 
embedded narrator or focalizer.
 Group narration, the presentation of narrative from some group, 
in a sense combines singular and multiple narration. It has three basic 
forms. Instantiated group narration involves an individual speaking as 
an instantiation of the entire group, either as somehow representative 
of the group or as allegorically personifying the group. distributed group 
narration involves a range of group members speaking as distinct parts 
of the group. These individual voices may be complementary (thus com-
pleting one another) or contradictory (thus challenging one another, 
perhaps in the service of a social dialectic). finally, collective voicing 
presents a group speaking with a single voice (thus it typically involves 
the use of the pronoun “we,” rather than “I”). These different forms of 
group narration may also express different versions of who defines the 
group. here, too, there seem to be three prominent options: 1) the peo-
ple as a whole, 2) the political elite (i.e., those with social power), and 3) 
the cultural authorities (i.e., those who have knowledge of the group).
 Ngũgĩ’s Petals of Blood is thematically focused on nationalism, colo-
nialism, and class. For the most part, Ngũgĩ pursues his political project 
in this novel through story elements, prominently allegory. however, in 
presenting these story elements, he draws on complex discourse tech-
niques. Some of these may operate primarily to enhance readers’ aes-
thetic engagement with the work. others have thematic resonances as 
well. Specifically, he often uses idealized embedded narration or guided 
omniscience, following the emotional interests and general knowledge 
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of one character. This enhanced narration often suggests a subtextual 
template. In each case, the technique arguably serves to present ade-
quate information to the reader while simultaneously foregrounding 
the particularity of those involved in experiencing, enacting, and inter-
preting the events. of course, in keeping with his marxist orientation, 
Ngũgĩ does not stress particularity only. He also takes up various types 
of group narration, largely setting them up in parallel with one another. 
This parallelism is part of Ngũgĩ’s attempt to place different groups and 
ideologies—prominently those bearing on nation and class—in dialectical 
interaction with one another. Indeed, the group narration and individual 
narrations themselves point to a further dialectic—of group and individ-
ual—that is also thematically central to his novel. 
 a key issue in the relation of groups and individuals concerns the 
possibility of genuinely sharing ideas, understandings, and emotions. 
The cultivation of such sharing—or at least an aspiration toward it—is 
important for a range of authors trying to create a sense of national or 
other social unity. The use of group narration is clearly a possible dis-
course correlate of such shared mentalities. There are, however, two sig-
nificant problems with “we” narration. first, individuals simply do not 
have access to other minds in the relevant way. Second, there is rarely 
if ever profound uniformity in a large group, the sort of uniformity pre-
supposed by most collective and instantiated narration.
 on the other hand, there are circumstances in real life where people 
feel that they are more attuned to other people’s thoughts and emotions, 
not entirely without reason. The most extreme case of this occurs when 
one has an attachment relation with someone, shares experiences with 
him or her, and has mirroring responses during a current experience. all 
this enables simulation. In contrast, one’s sense of unity with someone 
else is most thoroughly blocked by alienating, identity-group divisions 
(in effect, the opposite of attachment), with distinct or segregated expe-
riences, and no opportunities for mirroring.
 Born of the Sun takes up these conditions to explore the ways in which 
social groups are put in antagonistic relations and the ways in which 
individuals may begin to share a sense of unity and solidarity. for the 
most part, the novel is strictly focalized. nonetheless, it develops a 
growing sense of black namibians not merely deciding to join together 
for practical gains, but actually sharing feelings (and, to a lesser extent, 
thoughts), due precisely to mutual attachment, common experience, 
and mirroring. This in turn enables the localized use of collective inter-
nal focalization where the encompassing, nonpersonified narrator has 
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access to the mental states shared by two or more characters. The nar-
rational development of this mutuality may help to create a feeling of 
sharing in the reader as well. The difficulty with this approach—or, from 
another point of view, a benefit—is that such sharing applies to only 
a small number of individuals at a time and cannot be extended to a 
national group.
he first chapter concluded with the following schematic repre-
sentation of the narrational component of discourse:
real author [Implied author, guided by partially “autonomous” imag-
ined agents [Nonpersonified Narrator {Personified Narrator {Focalizer 
{Topicalizer}} Personified Narratee} Nonpersonified Narratee] Implied 
Reader/Sahṛdaya] Real Reader/Critic
Subsequent chapters have examined some of the nuances of implied 
authors, narrators, and the relations among implied authors and nar-
rators, with some treatment of focalization as well. When undertaking 
this book initially, my plan was to treat all the constituents of narra-
tion (leaving aside the real author and real reader/critic, who are not 
technically part of the discourse). as the writing progressed, I eventu-
ally realized that it would not be possible to consider the “receptive” 
half of narration (narratees and implied readers). Indeed, the current 
discussion still leaves a great deal to discuss even with respect to implied 
authors and narrators, not to mention focalizers.
 books on any complex theoretical topic are perhaps necessarily 
incomplete. Thus, extending the present discussion to other elements 
of narrational discourse can—and, indeed, should—be put off for future 
work. however, before concluding, it is worth making a few, very pre-
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liminary, comments on narratees and implied readers. When these 
receptive elements have been mentioned in the preceding pages, they 
have largely been treated as reflexes of their productive counterparts, 
narrators and implied authors. To a great extent, that makes sense. how-
ever, narratees and implied readers have their own complexities and 
nuances that merit separate examination.1 These remaining few pages 
do not constitute even an introduction to the topic of narrational recep-
tion. They are intended simply to suggest some of these complexities and 
nuances. as a basis for this discussion, I take up a poem attributed to the 
great sixteenth-century Hindi poet Mīrābāī. With great help from Lalita 
pandit hogan and philip lutgendorf, I have translated the poem some-
what freely, trying to capture some of the dhvani or suggestiveness of the 
original, as follows:2
even if you break off, beloved, I would not;
Broken off from your love, Kṛṣṇa, with whom could I be joined?
you are the tree, I am the birds.
You are the lake, I am the fish.
you are the mountain, I am the pasture.
you are the moon, I am the partridge thirsty for moonlight.
even if you break off, beloved, I would not;
Broken off from your love, Kṛṣṇa, with whom could I be joined?
you lord are a pearl, we are the ties that bind the necklace.
you are gold, we are what the jeweler adds to make a wedding band.
Lord of lady Mīrā [bāī Mīrā], who lives in Brij—
listen here cowherd!
you are my idol, I am your girl in the temple.
even if you break off, beloved, I would not;
Broken off from you, Kṛṣṇa, love, with whom could I be joined?
due to constraints of space, it is not possible to discuss the poem at any 
length. however, it is probably clear, even on first reading, that the nar-
ratee and implied reader are complex and cannot be understood as mir-
ror images of the narrator and implied author. The point is most obvious 
with the personified narrator and the personified narratee. The former 
is, roughly, Mīrābāī; the latter is Kṛṣṇa. It may seem initially that the 
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poem more or less collapses the categories of personified and nonperson-
ified narrator and narratee—and, indeed, implied author, in the former 
case. In other words, it may seem that the poem presents a personified 
narrator who is not distinguished from the nonpersonified narrator, who 
is in turn not distinguished from the implied author. moreover, it may 
seem that the personified narratee is not distinguished from the nonper-
sonified narratee. but, in fact, things are more complex.
 The opening line of the poem represents a sort of paradox. even if 
Kṛṣṇa separates himself from Mira, the two will remain joined because 
of mira’s decision. at one level, this suggests simply that mira will not 
recognize any ending of the relationship. but, in another way, it suggests 
that both lovers have control over their union. This relates to the mysti-
cal aspect of the poem, for this is not simply a love poem, but a poem of 
religious devotion as well. It speaks of mira’s romantic love. but it also 
speaks about the spiritual relation between devotee and God. The line 
suggests that the devotee and God are not so distinct as the I/you divi-
sion, the narrator/narratee separation, might initially suggest. The point 
becomes clearer as the poem develops.
 To understand the second line of the poem, one needs to look ahead 
a bit to the suggestion of later lines that the speaker is a devadāsī, a girl 
or woman who has been married to a god in a temple and is not free 
to marry anyone else (see, for example, Srinivasan 1869). at the same 
time, such women often supported themselves through prostitution (the 
point is discussed by Srinivasan; see also bhattacharji 50). In this con-
text, then, the opening stanza comes to have two broad meanings. first, 
it continues to operate at the level of the romantic and spiritual narra-
tives. At that level, Mira says to Kṛṣṇa that she will never love anyone 
else, as just noted. but the second meaning is very different. It hints at 
the speaker’s loss of support in the temple and the despairing question 
of what she could possibly do in response. here, there are two further 
implications, derived from different answers to the question and differ-
ent senses of the word “join.” The first sense is “marry,” and the answer 
to the question “with whom could I marry?” is, of course, “no one.” The 
second sense is “physically united.” There, the answer might be “anyone 
who will pay.”
 The dhvani of these lines alters one’s sense of the narrational struc-
ture. first, it at least complicates a reader’s sense of the narrator as con-
tinuous with the implied author. on the one hand, mira did leave her 
home to join a group of Kṛṣṇa devotees. However, she was literally mar-
ried to a rajput prince, not to a temple deity.3 Second, the narratee is not 
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precisely Kṛṣṇa, but the icon, the idol of the temple—for the devadāsī, 
deprived of the temple, would be separated, first of all, from the idol that 
is localized in space, not the God who is ubiquitous. or, rather, it now 
appears that there are two personified narratees. one is the icon. The 
other is the God represented by the icon. both are suggested by the cul-
minating line of the poem. I have translated it in such a way as to stress 
the former meaning—“you are my idol, I am your girl in the temple.” but 
the line equally means “you are my God, I am your devotee.”
 Indeed, one can go further still and posit yet a third narratee—almost 
nonpersonified and in effect encompassing the other two. Specifically, 
the interpretations just considered do not seem easy to reconcile. If the 
narratee is the beloved, then he is free to break off from the narrator. 
Thus he may be blamed for the breaking (or, translating differently, the 
tearing apart). But if the narratee is the idol, then he/it can hardly be 
responsible for the separation. Indeed, even the personification of God 
as a lover separating from his beloved is somewhat unclear. here, it is 
necessary to make a distinction between the “saguṇa,” or “material” 
form of the deity—either as icon or as incarnation (avatāra)—and the 
ultimate “nirguṇa,” or immaterial and formless deity (see, for example, 
mcdermott 176, 177). The latter is the ultimate source of all the causes 
or events of the world. as such, whatever happens in the world is the 
action of Kṛṣṇa. For example, when the devadāsī is separated from her 
icon, Kṛṣṇa is ultimately responsible. In this way, behind the beloved and 
the idol is the God. Whatever happens to the narrator—separation from 
her beloved or loss of her place in the temple—results from the action of 
God.
 The following lines, concerning the tree/birds and the lake/fish, take 
up the divine quality of Kṛṣṇa, for it makes him into the support for life, 
as does the final line about the partridge, who, according to legend, sur-
vived by drinking moonlight (mcGregor 297). The third line, in contrast, 
appears to make Mira and Kṛṣṇa into complementary aspects of nature. 
Specifically, Kṛṣṇa is the inanimate aspect of earth, while Mira is the food 
for animals. This is in keeping with some versions of hindu mysticism, 
according to which the ultimate spiritual realization is the unity of the 
devotee and God, a unity in which they are two sides of one reality. This 
dualistic unity is sometimes represented as a divine androgyne, in keep-
ing with the common emplotment of the devotee–God relation as driven 
by romantic love and the desire for physical union. Indeed, it is possible 
to discern a complementarity in the other lines as well. mira is given life 
by Kṛṣṇa. But, in another sense, Kṛṣṇa becomes animate only in Mira. We 
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see this in a limited way in the relation of the tree and the birds. In the 
case of water/fish and moonlight/partridge, however, the point is strik-
ing, as Kṛṣṇa is mere matter that enters into life through Mira. There is a 
similar relation between the (lifeless) idol that represents Kṛṣṇa and the 
singing and dancing devotee.
 These points complicate the narrator–narratee relation still further 
by ultimately identifying the two. It thereby makes sense out of mira’s 
insistence that she would not be separated from Kṛṣṇa even if he sepa-
rated from her. on the one hand, this means that, even if she loses her 
place in the temple, thus is separated from her icon, the devadāsī will 
not lose faith. But, at the same time, it suggests that, even if Kṛṣṇa and 
mira appear to be separated, they will not be separated in fact, any more 
than the two halves of the divine androgyne. They are complementary 
aspects of a single unity, like the mountain and the pasture. Indeed, the 
point is extended by their mutual dependency. Mira relies on Kṛṣṇa to 
stay alive, but Kṛṣṇa depends on Mira to become life. More generally, 
the relation of Kṛṣṇa and Mira reflects—indeed, is an instance of—the 
relation between the abstract, nirguṇa deity and the manifestation of 
that deity, a manifestation that occurs not only in the incarnation of 
Kṛṣṇa, but in the world generally. 
 The complications on the side of the narrator are extended further 
by the fact that the narrator identifies herself not as a single bird or fish, 
but as birds and multiple fish. This indicates that the narrator is in some 
sense a collective. Most obviously, she is a group of devadāsīs. But, more 
broadly, the suggestion is that she is everyone. The cross-textual implied 
author of Mīrābāī’s poems indicates that people all share life in Kṛṣṇa.4 
of course, not everyone realizes this—and that difference begins to bring 
in the implied audience for the poem. The implied reader is able to rec-
ognize that, in Mīrābāī’s understanding, he or she too is birds sheltered 
by Kṛṣṇa, fish sustained by him. Moreover, the implied reader is implic-
itly asked to understand himself or herself in relation to the narrator’s 
perseverance in the face of Kṛṣṇa’s apparent abandonment. Of course, 
the understanding and experience of abandonment are not the same 
for everyone. In connection with this, there are at least two distinct, if 
related implied audiences for this poem. one is general. The other is spe-
cific to devadāsīs.
 The fourth stanza intensifies these interrelations. The first and sec-
ond lines actually shift from “I” to “we.” Thus some larger group is 
again included in Mira’s account of her relation to Kṛṣṇa.5 This extends 
the plurality of the second stanza. It may or may not count as collective 
256 | Afterword
narration. (The narrator may simply be speaking about a larger group to 
which she belongs, rather than speaking for that group.) but, either way, 
the point is that both implied audiences are tacitly included in the scope 
of the pronoun “we.”
 even more significantly, the images once again reverse the usual rela-
tion between God and the devotee. here, God becomes useless without 
his devotee. a pearl gives the necklace its value. but without the string 
that binds it into a necklace, the beauty of the pearl would never be seen. 
Gold is what gives jewelry its worth. but without the chemicals used to 
form the gold into ornaments, it would never be worn.
 The poem began as an apparently pathetic appeal from a lonely and 
dejected lover, abandoned by her beloved, or by a devadāsī perhaps 
losing the support of her temple. over the course of a few lines, it has 
reversed the relationship. now the narratee is characterized as depen-
dent on the narrator. Indeed, the narratee is dependent, not only on 
the narrator, but on the implied reader as well—for the implied reader 
is part of the “we,” without whom the pearls and gold would be invis-
ible. This change in the relation is never arrogant. mira’s tone is familiar 
when she orders him to listen, but there is still a suggestion of respect.6 
The original here is “Gopāl,” a given name that means not only “cow-
herd,” but also “protector of the world” (see monier-Williams 365). The 
final line of the fourth stanza reveals the many implications of the nar-
rational discourse presupposed in the preceding analysis. a reader may 
not think of devadāsīs until this line in the poem—at which point, all the 
preceding lines alter for the implied reader (in the manner suggested in 
chapter 3). but, on a second reading, the line can almost become a sort of 
reassurance to the deity. It is almost as if she were saying—don’t worry, 
though driven away, I will still remain faithful. The final repetition of the 
refrain may be read in the same way.
 here too there are possible further resonances for the implied audi-
ence. Specifically, the early sixteenth century saw the “dawn of the 
mughal empire” (Wolpert 122), “shattering” the rajput “attempt to stem 
the tide of Mughal might” (124; Mīrābāī was Rajput). In a period marked 
by the rise of Islam, the poem appears to orient the implied readership 
in relation to the then-current politics of religion. Specifically, the poem 
may be seen as urging loyalty to Kṛṣṇa in the face of temptations to aban-
don him through conversion. In connection with this, one might even 
infer a sort of response to Islam in the poem’s combination of saguna 
and nirguna divinity—including the suggestion of idols—and in its close 
interrelating of the devotee and the deity. The narrator’s attitude toward 
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God has very little to do with submission (central to the meaning of 
the word Islam [see Waines 3]), and her view of temple worship (thus 
idolatry) does not appear at all negative (in contradiction with Islamic 
iconoclasm). 
 If these interpretive points are valid, they are, of course, a matter of 
the implied author. however, the implied audience is differentiated in 
terms of its relation to icon worship, its view of Islam, and so on. (even 
within Islam, the differentiation may operate by reference to such open 
and syncretistic developments as Sufism.) various audiences are situ-
ated somewhat differently with respect to the norms of the work. It is 
important to stress that these are implied audiences and not simply real 
audiences. a real audience may entirely miss the point of the poem. The 
implied audience recognizes the point—and relates that point to itself. 
For instance, devadāsīs would relate the point of the poem to themselves 
differently from other Kṛṣṇa devotees, who would in turn relate to the 
norms of the poem differently from recent converts to Islam. another 
way of putting this idea is to say that there is a sort of indexical ele-
ment in the implied authorial meaning of the text. The implied author 
establishes a norm and in effect asks the reader to take up that norm to 
reflect, not only on the narrator and narratee, but on himself or herself 
as well. of course, it is the real reader who takes up the particular reflec-
tion, but the norm of the reflection is defined by the implied author for 
the implied reader, or at least for the sahṛdaya.
 The model for this reflection is not religious per se. rather, marital 
relations are the means used by Mīrābāī to represent spiritual relations. 
Indeed, to a great extent, the emotional impact of the poem is bound up 
with its romantic and marital associations. The poem continually recurs 
to the loyalty of a wife to her husband, using that as a model for the loy-
alty of the devotee. Indeed, this model is developed in a much more com-
plex and subtle way than might at first be apparent—which leads to the 
sahṛdaya.
 The first chapter stressed the emotional attunement of the sahṛdaya. 
but that attunement is not simply a matter of emotional sensitivity. It is 
bound up with sensitivity to dhvani, or suggestiveness, as well. Indeed, 
the Sanskrit theorists emphasized the intertwining of dhvani and rasa.7 
(rasa is aesthetic and empathic emotion.) for the most part, the mar-
riage relation in the poem is suggested rather than made explicit. Mīrā-
bāī of course did not live in a dating culture. In her social context, the 
idea of separation from a beloved much more readily brought to mind 
marriage, making the split more serious. moreover, as already noted, 
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devadāsīs were married to their deity. These are suggestions that would 
have been widely available to readers or audience members. Two more 
subtle hints come in the opening lines of the fourth stanza. The word 
“dhāgā” means “thread,” but in the plural it may refer to “bonds . . . of 
love” (mcGregor 527). I have tried to incorporate that hint in the transla-
tion “the ties that bind the necklace.” This is the sort of suggestiveness 
to which a sahṛdaya should be both semantically and emotionally sensi-
tive. A similar point holds for the next line. The word “suhāgā” refers 
to borax (mcGregor 1033), “a superior flux” used “in the refining and 
soldering of precious metals, especially gold” (beer 164). however, the 
closely similar word “suhāga” refers to “the auspicious state of wife-
hood (as opposed to widowhood)” (McGregor 1033). The wife/widow dis-
tinction is marked in part by the presence or absence of jewelry. Thus I 
translated the word as “what the jeweler adds to make a wedding band” 
(in this case a necklace, rather than a ring). here, too, the translation is 
an attempt to capture the dhvani of the line. note that, in both cases, 
the dhvani points toward a marital relation between the narrator and 
the narratee—and thus, given the preceding analysis, a marital relation 
between the implied reader and the narratee as well. The point suggests 
the importance of the implied reader’s “wifely” loyalty to Kṛṣṇa, a loy-
alty that will manifest itself differently for different readers.
 Clearly, there is much more to say—not only about receptive dis-
course in general, but even about narratees and implied readers in this 
particular poem. however, the preceding comments should be enough 
to show that the receptive part of narrational discourse is not simply a 
mirror image of the productive part. It is, rather, a complex, vital, and 
autonomous component of discourse, a component that requires analy-
sis and appreciation beyond that given to the far more widely discussed 
productive component.
Introduction
 1. For a concise overview of some work in linguistic discourse analysis treating 
narrative, see Johnstone.
 2. The following analyses will, however, use “discourse” alone when the context 
makes clear which variety is at issue.
 3. For readers unfamiliar with the work, it is available over the Internet—just 
search using the title—and, being only one page long, it can be read in a few minutes.
 4. Here and below, I will often use “literary” as shorthand for “literary and cin-
ematic” or, in some cases, “literary, cinematic, and artistic,” when the scope of the in-
tended reference is clear.
 5. See Hogan, The Mind and Affective.
 6. Personified narrators are simply narrators that in some way are represented as 
persons (see chapter 1 for discussion).
 7. Joseph Diescho is listed as the author on the cover of the novel, and he is referred 
to as “the author” on the jacket flap. However, the title page reads “Joseph Diescho with 
Celeste Wallin,” and, on the jacket flap, Wallin is referred to as “the collaborator.” In 
the acknowledgments, Diescho explains that Wallin was his “collaborator . . . who, in 
the process of typing and editing each draft of the manuscript, contributed her valuable 
ideas and insights and, as such, co-wrote much of the story” (vii).
 8. Normative emotions are, so to speak, the emotions presupposed by the work—
more technically, the emotions of the implied reader, the emotions assumed by the im-
plied author (see chapter 1 for these concepts). A given, real reader may or may not feel 
those emotions. For example, a reader of Uncle Tom’s Cabin is clearly supposed to grieve 
for Eva. A reader has interpreted the work badly if he or she fails to recognize this. But 
a given reader may find Eva’s idealization excessive and thus unsympathetic, even while 
recognizing that the work establishes grief over her death as a norm.
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 9. Kenneth Newell has argued that meaning and interpretation should be under-
stood probabilistically. Though I cannot make clear sense of the idea of probability in 
this context, there is a sort of kinship between his idea and the notion of a profile of 
ambiguity.
Chapter 1
 1. “Plot” may seem to suggest only the temporal sequence of events and not, for 
example, the descriptive elements, whose importance has been stressed by David Her-
man (see chapter 7 of his Story).
 2. The “[embedded discourse [embedded story]]” has been added to the usual 
schema in anticipation of later discussions.
 3. The inferred author seems to be what is of central concern to empirical narra-
tologists such as Bortolussi and Dixon. They separate the implied author from the real 
author because “intentions that seem to be implied by the text need not actually be true 
of the historical author” (66). But their primary concern is not norms. It is, rather, what 
readers actually do—hence their reference to “intentions that seem to be implied” (thus 
intentions inferred by readers, whatever the facts may be). They subsequently shift to 
“the reader’s representation of the author” (76, italics in the original). When they return 
to the topic later, they suggest that “most of the time, readers do not clearly distinguish 
the characteristics and intention of the narrator from that of the implied or historical 
author” (239). They go on to indicate that, in order to follow through on a narrator/
implied author distinction—thus engaging in a relatively professionalized form of in-
terpretation—readers require training (see 250–51).
  In a sense, the research of Bortolussi and Dixon is directly complementary to 
that of the present book. Bortolussi and Dixon examine the real readers with their pro-
pensities and inclinations, the readers who infer meanings. The present book examines 
the norms that may serve to evaluate those inferences.
 4. As Peter J. Rabinowitz explains, authors “design their books rhetorically for 
some more or less hypothetical audience” (Before 21, emphasis in the original; see also 
Ong).
 5. As is common in narratology, this and the following chapters will refer repeat-
edly to “storyworlds.” As Herman explains, “storyworlds are mental models of who 
did what to and with whom, when, where, why, and in what fashion” (Story 5). Here 
and below, “storyworld” is used normatively to refer to the storyworld of the implied 
author, a storyworld to which the storyworlds of other readers may be more or less 
similar. It is worth noting here that this account of the storyworld allows one to dis-
tinguish story from discourse without thereby committing oneself to the idea that the 
same story can be manifest in different discourses (on the problems with this idea, 
see, for example, Toolan, and also Herman Story 214). Presumably the precise manner 
in which a narrative is presented—thus the precise discourse—will make a difference 
to the story worlds of readers and to the (normative) storyworld of the implied author. 
It is also important to note that the implied author’s storyworld has normative value 
only for particular interpretive purposes. Readers and critics are free to stipulate dif-
ferent purposes, thereby giving other storyworlds normative value (for discussion, see 
chapter 1 of Hogan On Interpretation). For example, a historical study of a work’s impact 
may aim at isolating the common understanding of the work, even if that contradicts 
implied authorial intent. In that case, the interpretive norm would be the common 
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understanding. Similarly, a study of the influence of a work on some author—say, the 
influence of Moll Flanders on James Joyce—may be concerned with Joyce’s understand-
ing of Moll Flanders, however that is related to the implied authorial norms for that 
work.
 6. I am leaving aside second-person narratives here. Clearly, a full treatment of the 
narratee would require a discussion of this important, if limited, genre of writing. For 
a discussion of some key points in second-person narration, see Richardson “Poetics.” 
For my differences from standard views on second-person narration, see the afterword 
of How.
 7. This story has received some attention from narratologists, prominently Robert 
Scholes (Semiotics 110–26). For an illuminating discussion of the complex organization of 
plot in the work—an aspect of discourse not considered here—see Bundgaard and Øster-
gaard. For an application of more recent narrative theories to the story, see Semino. For 
a broader discussion of the implied reader in Hemingway’s fiction, see Zapf.
 8. A very nice instance of this duality is discussed by Semino in her treatment of 
the sentence “Luz would not come home until he had a good job and could come to New 
York to meet her.” As Semino points out, the first “come” has the soldier as the refer-
ence point, whereas the second “come” has Luz as the reference point (95–96). On “en-
coding . . . directionality of movement” through “motion verbs” generally, see Herman 
(Story 282–84). I should note that my use of “dual focalization” here is different from 
that of Phelan, for whom “dual focalization” refers to the particular case in which “a 
homodiegetic narrator perceives the perceptions of his or her former self” (Phelan and 
Booth “Narrative” 372).
 9. Obviously, some readers do not draw the distinction at all. I am speaking here 
only of readers who do distinguish narrators, implied authors, and real authors. Put dif-
ferently, here as elsewhere I am referring primarily to professional readers or critics.
 10. One reader expressed concern about my treatment of sincerity; he claimed that 
“Authors of fiction are generally presumed not to be speaking sincerely, since every-
thing they say in the text is just pretend.” I hope that the preceding comments clarify 
that I am not, first of all, speaking of sincerity with respect to the fictional world. On 
some issues of implied authorship in relation to fiction versus nonfiction, the reader 
may wish to consult Phelan’s “The Implied Author.”
 11. Rabinowitz compellingly isolates a series of heuristics that guide interpretation. 
On the topic of rules and heuristics, it is worth noting that David Herman has sensibly 
argued for a particular theoretical understanding of such rules, drawing on Jackendoff’s 
idea of “preference rules” (Story 28; see also Jackendoff).
 12. Several theorists have stressed continuities between the real and fictional 
worlds. They have pointed out that readers or viewers tend to assume the storyworld 
is like the real world in, for example, having the same referents for the names of cities 
(“New York”) and historical figures (“Abraham Lincoln”). Perhaps the best articulation 
of this is Marie-Laure Ryan’s treatment of the “Principle of Minimal Departure.” These 
formulations, however, concern the ideas people have about the real world before they 
read a narrative and whether they extend those ideas to the storyworld or not. The issue 
under consideration here moves in the opposite direction. It concerns the ideas readers 
derive from fictional narratives and then potentially extend to the real world.
 13. Indeed, the phrase itself is ambiguous enough that its usage may vary consider-
ably even in a single book by a single critic (see Darby 842–43 for a prominent example). 
It is important to note that such diversity of understandings applies to those who reject 
the notion of an implied author as well as to those who accept it. For a range of recent 
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views, see the special, Spring 2011 issue of Style (45.1) on the topic, particularly Richard-
son’s valuable “Introduction.”
 14. The idea is in keeping with other analyses of the creative processes of artists. 
Thus Locher, drawing on work by Mace and Ward, writes that “As a result of evaluative 
processes, the artist decides at some point that the work is considered either ‘complete’ 
or as non-viable” (132). The point applies even to orature. As Innes explains, regard-
ing Mandinka griots, “a griot in his younger days . . . listens to other griots and bor-
rows . . . repeatedly modifying his own version until eventually he arrives at a version 
which seems to him the most satisfying” (118).
 15. Here, I am connecting the implied author with what I have elsewhere referred 
to as “aesthetical intent.” For the implications of this idea in resolving some problems 
in aesthetic theory, see chapter 5 of Hogan On Interpretation.
 16. Consider the famous experiment with young men put on a suspension bridge. 
They experienced autonomic system arousal due to the swaying of the bridge. However, 
they (partially) attributed the arousal to their conversation with a young woman and 
that person’s alluring qualities (see Oatley, Keltner, and Jenkins 23, 24).
 17. A range of relevant cases may be found in emotion research—for example, in 
studies where test subjects are not aware of having seen an emotion-provoking image 
(i.e., information about the image does not enter working memory). However, it has 
clearly been processed because it has effects on the subjects’ subsequent responses 
within the experiment, effects they cannot explain (see, for example, Öhman and Soares, 
and Armony and colleagues).
 18. This partial opacity of one’s own reasons and principles fits well with Booth’s 
view on intention and implied authorship. Specifically, Booth wishes to preserve the in-
sight that “the author’s expressed intentions, outside the text, could be in total contrast 
to the intentions finally realized in the finished text” (“Resurrection” 75).
 19. This receptive intentional account has some relation to both “actual intention-
alism” accounts and “hypothetical intentionalism” accounts (for a lucid discussion of 
this distinction, see Kindt and Müller). It is a form of actual intentionalism; however, it 
avoids the intentional fallacy and limits the relevance of biography by specifying the 
nature of the intention involved. That specification ties the implied author to a form 
of hypothetical audience understanding. However, it grounds that hypothetical un-
derstanding in the author, thereby avoiding the ontological vagueness of hypothetical 
intentionalism.
 20. See chapter 1 of Hogan How and “On the Origin.”
 21. On the operation of memories in the anticipation of future events, see Schacter, 
Addis, and Buckner.
 22. As early as Abhinavagupta, similar points have been made about the role of 
memories in the response of readers to characters and actions; for a recent treatment 
of memories and reader response, see Oatley “Emotions” and “Why.”
 23. On authors’ feeling that this is what they are doing, see Keen 125–27 and cita-
tions. For a literary representation of this idea, including the possibility of authorial 
error, see Pirandello.
 24. I have drawn the term from Bordwell Narration. Some authors use personalized 
(e.g., Margolin “Character” 56).
 25. Jacques Lacan famously formulated this distinction as that between the subject 
(who constitutes) and the ego (that is constituted). (For discussion of Lacan’s distinction, 
see Hogan “Structure.”) In Lacanian terms, the distinction between a personified and a 
nonpersonified narrator is roughly the distinction between a subject and an ego. Cog-
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nitive science draws much the same distinction, for instance in developmental studies 
concerning “self-concept” (Eysenck 284).
 26. Theory of mind is generally understood as involving two practices—simulation 
and theory-based inference. For an outline of the distinction, see Doherty.
 27. On literary imagination as simulation, see Oatley “Why” and chapter 1 of Hogan 
How.
 28. In exploring the embedding of theory of mind in characters, I am indebted to 
Lisa Zunshine. Similarly, in stressing the rhetorical purposes, I am indebted to James 
Phelan.
 29. The idea of a nonpersonified narrator that encompasses personified narrators 
reflects a point made by David Bordwell, though he drew an almost diametrically op-
posed conclusion. Discussing film and drawing on work by Edward Branigan, Bordwell 
notes that “personified narrators are invariably swallowed up in the overall narrational 
process of the film, which they do not produce. So the interesting theoretical problem 
involves an implicit, nonpersonified narrator” (61). The idea of embedding personified 
narrators within a nonpersonified narrator also reflects Hayman’s idea of a nonper-
sonified “Arranger” who selects and organizes the details of the various narrations 
and interior monologues in Joyce’s Ulysses. In certain respects, the present argument 
generalizes Hayman’s concept, which he characterizes as falling “somewhere between 
the narrator and the implied author” (122). Dancygier is, to some extent, getting at a 
similar idea when she treats narration in relation to an encompassing “story-viewpoint 
space” (chapter 3), though her development of this and related ideas is different from 
the approach presented here. For a characteristically precise and rigorous treatment of 
the issue of whether a narrator is ubiquitous, see Margolin “Necessarily.” 
 30. One reader objected to this point on the grounds that we are told he went to 
Chicago. In fact, we are told only that Luz wrote a letter to Chicago. A number of my 
students regularly assume that she is writing to the major in Chicago. The point is not 
that readers cannot figure out it is the soldier. They can figure this out. The point is that 
standard orientational devices would have introduced the information about his going 
to Chicago explicitly and early on. Contrast what the narrator tells us: “they agreed that 
he should go home to get a job,” with the more fully orienting alternative, “they agreed 
that he should go home to Chicago to get a job.” The narrator is treating the location of 
“home” as if it is familiar information, not new information. The same point holds for 
the reference to Luz’s letter to Chicago.
 31. The general point is common enough. For example, Chatman writes that “every 
tale implies a listener or reader, just as it implies a teller” (Story 151). The difference 
here is the extension of a nonpersonified narrator to encompass even works with per-
sonified narrators. As Chatman suggests, the generalization of the (in this case, non-
personified) narrator undermines the traditional distinction between putatively “mi-
metic” drama and “narrated” stories. Related points have been made by other authors 
in recent years. For example, Manfred Jahn argues that every drama has a narrator, 
an “agent who manages the exposition, who decides what is to be told, how it is to be 
told, . . . and what is to be left out” (“Narrative” 670; see also Richardson “Drama” 151–
52). The idea is also consistent with van Peer’s isolation of “the perspective through 
which we are given the story” in Euripides’ Medea. McIntyre too touches on the topic, 
though his concern is more with shifting points of view than an encompassing narra-
tive voice.
 32. The final point partially agrees with “no-narrator” theory (see Banfield and ci-
tations) in that it recognizes the possible collapsing of narrator and (implied) author. 
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However, the crucial difference from no-narrator theory is that, by the present account, 
it is always possible for the narrator and the author to be distinguished. In this way, 
generalizing the narrator is the opposite of “making authors indistinguishable from 
narrators” (Banfield 396), which Banfield sees as the result of such generalization. In 
fact, generalizing the narrator means preserving a consistent distinction between nar-
rators and authors—both real and implied.
 33. I should note that Jahn allows that a narrator might have an “emotional stance” 
(“Focalization” 101). But, for Jahn, that is only one of many possibilities. The suggestion 
of the preceding analysis is that, if one takes seriously the notion of a narrator as a tac-
itly simulated speaker, one must always attribute emotion to the narrator—not some-
times as one possibility among many.
 34. Peter Rabinowitz pointed out to me that it seems unlikely Luz wrote that she had 
never known Italians before. It is, I believe, possible to construe the line as the soldier’s 
inference from some statement in Luz’s letter (e.g., “Before, I never got to know the local 
population very well”). Nonetheless, the point is well taken. This particular sentence is 
readily interpretable as focalizing Luz. As such, it contributes to the narrational ambigu-
ity of the work. In that ambiguity, there are points such as this that allow an interpreta-
tion of the story as having dual affective focalization, though the bulk of the story seems 
to favor a single affective focalization on the soldier.
 35. Such an affective preference is arguably in keeping with some feminist respons-
es to Hemingway, which see his work as not merely patriarchal, but in some cases even 
misogynistic (see Ferrero and citations)—though I personally do not view this story as 
either.
 36. See, for example, chapter 2 of Hogan The Mind and Oatley “Emotions” and “Sug-
gestion.”
 37. In neurological terms, this sort of processing is commonly triggered when one 
part of the brain (anterior cingulate cortex) detects some contradiction or conflict in 
processing elsewhere. This, in turn, activates working memory (including dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex), which allows the self-conscious consideration and adjudication of 
such conflicts. On these processes, see Carter and colleagues, MacDonald and colleagues, 
Lieberman and Eisenberger, and Kondo and colleagues.
 38. One referee worried that I was “underestimat[ing] the resourcefulness of hu-
man engagement,” since men can imagine what it is like to have a child. My point is not 
at all that our empathy is confined to nearly identical emotional memories. The point 
is simply that empathic response involves emotional memories. As such, the presence 
or absence of intense, approximately parallel emotional memories is likely to enhance 
empathic response. Of course, I may be wrong about this particular case, and something 
else may account for the difference in my response to Lahiri’s novel.
 39. Note that “readers” here include the (implied) author. Indeed, the normative 
task of critics is commonly one of isolating and explaining features of the text that are 
experienced, but not self-consciously recognized and understood by the author.
Chapter 2
 1. For simplicity, this chapter will use the word “painting” to refer to a range of 
two-dimensional works of visual art, including, for example, ink drawings.
 2. Some writers have treated connections between narratology and painting, pri-
marily by reference to narrative painting. An interesting study that extends beyond 
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obviously narrative works may be found in Labruda. Peggy Phelan’s treatment of action 
painting and its relation to performance art provides another significant extension.
 3. Indeed, film theorists sometimes treat the concepts of implied author and auteur 
as equivalent (see Murphet 83).
 4. On emotional memories, see LeDoux; on mirroring, see Iacoboni.
 5. There are also emotional and thematic consequences of style in both verbal and 
visual art. However, style requires separate treatment.
 6. Instances of narrative paintings range from, for example, representations of 
Jesus’s Passion (see Derbes) to the “patua” scroll painting of Bengal (see Guha-Thakurta 
12–13n.3 and 19).
 7. See chapter 5 of Hogan The Mind.
 8. The point was famously emphasized by Lessing, in a different theoretical con-
text. It has recently been addressed by Kafalenos (“Implications”). The practice is not 
by any means confined to Western art. For example, a great deal of early modern Indian 
art focused on illustrating key moments from important narratives, such as the great 
Sanskrit epics (a point attested even by a brief look at the figures in Guha-Thakurta). 
In fact, the tendency to embed paintings in implicit narratives is so ubiquitous and 
fundamental that an unclear narrative context can lead to viewer disorientation. Thus 
Schwabsky explains that, initially, critics responded badly to Manet’s paintings. “What 
was missing, in the eyes of Manet’s contemporaries,” he explains, “was a coherent story 
holding together the people and things depicted in the paintings” (32). The point even 
extends to relatively abstract work. Thus, in a recent newspaper article, Vicenzo Trione 
characterizes Italian Transavanguardia painters as trying to produce “dream narra-
tions” (26).
 9. It is also worth noting that there are many storytelling traditions in which pic-
tures serve a role (see, for example, Mair 5). Of course, after publication technology 
made possible the mass reproduction of pictures, genres arose that integrate pictures 
more fully with verbal narrative, as in children’s picture books and graphic fiction. In-
deed, illustrations extend well beyond these genres. For example, illustrations of narra-
tives were common in British India, as Guha-Thakurta’s work shows.
 10. On the function of context in interpreting emotion expressions, see Carroll and 
Russell. See Kafalenos on photographs as “lend[ing] themselves to being interpreted as 
an event in a number of different stories” (“Photographs” 429).
 11. Quoted in Robinson (49).
 12. Readers of Rabinowitz will not be surprised at this. See Reading 58–65 on the 
orientational and interpretive function of titles. The disambiguating value of allusions 
is stressed by Wolf (432).
 13. This and subsequent references to plates refer to Robinson.
 14. See, for example, the description of the women’s quarters in “The Wife’s Letter” 
(208).
 15. This is a common approach to Tagore’s paintings, particularly in relation to his 
sister-in-law; see Sen.
 16. The value of locating a work in an authorial canon has, of course, been recog-
nized by narratologists. For example, Rabinowitz notes that “The appropriate back-
ground group for a given text usually includes the previous works by the same author” 
(Reading 71). Nonetheless, the general idea of a cross-textual implied author is contrary 
to the usual usage of “implied author” in literary study. For example, Susan Lanser 
points out that “Narratologists have long maintained that an ‘implied’ author is the 
property of a single text, and cannot be extrapolated to a writer’s entire oeuvre” (see 
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also Shen 178). Indeed, in his initial discussion of the implied author, Wayne Booth 
maintained that “regardless of how sincere an author may try to be, his different works 
will imply different versions” of himself (Rhetoric 71). This is part of the ambiguity of the 
concept in Booth’s work and elsewhere in narratology. In this section of The Rhetoric of 
Fiction, Booth is exploring implied authorship as a sort of authorial self-presentation, an 
author’s creation of an impression on readers. This is an important idea, but one very 
different from the implied author as an interpretive standard, particularly when this is 
understood in terms of consistency in receptive intent (as I advocated in chapter 1). In 
later work, Booth took up this idea of the author’s self-presentation, extending it across 
works, in his notion of a “career-author.” The idea may initially seem to have some 
similarity to the cross-textual implied author. However, Booth’s career-author is not 
the enduring set of cognitive principles that recur in receptive intents across a range of 
works. Rather, it is a “sustained character” who is “the sum of the invented creators” 
(Critical Understanding 270).
 17. In keeping with this idea of pathos, Sen notes that critics such as W. G. Archer 
and K. G. Subramanyan link the “ovoid face” with “the desolate woman.”
 18. On Tagore and attachment, see chapter 7 in Hogan What Literature and “Reading 
Tagore.”
 19. Indeed, there are multiple interrelations between attachment and empathy. For 
example, Royzman and Rozin point out that sympathetic sorrow tends to foster attach-
ment, while attachment is almost a necessary condition for empathic joy.
 20. At a presentation based on this chapter, one audience member objected that this 
does not mean that the painting constitutes a “pregnant moment” in the way that, for 
example, the Goya painting does. That is true. A scene constitutes a pregnant moment 
if it has highly specific and proximate precedents and consequents. In other words, 
the immediately preceding and following events are well defined. For instance, in the 
Goya painting, the central figure will be shot and die in the next moment. However, 
the preceding argument indicates that narrative quality in visual art is not confined to 
pregnant moments. Rather, narrative quality extends across a range of degrees in prec-
edent/consequent specificity and proximity. Tagore’s painting suggests precedents and 
consequents, but they have relatively low specificity and proximity.
 21. The point applies to television narratives as well (see Huisman “Aspects” 156–
60).
 22. I am grateful to Ben Singer for suggesting this term.
 23. Dutt’s first film, Baazi (1951), already shows some tendency toward interposition, 
and Murthy was not director of photography for that film. However, he was involved 
with camera operation, so the assignment of responsibility even in that film remains 
unclear.
 24. See Hogan “On the Meaning.”
 25. On the necessity of stipulating a guiding intention, see chapter 1 of Hogan On 
Interpretation.
 26. After formulating these ideas initially, I came upon Berys Gaut’s valuable essay, 
which happens to use the phrase “minimal auteurism.” However, Gaut defines standard 
auteurism very differently. Thus his notion of minimal auteurism is very different as 
well.
 27. A recurring pattern in an author’s canon need not recur in every work. It need 
only recur sufficiently to distinguish the author from others.
 28. Clearly, there are other contexts in which one can locate the film beyond that of 
the auteur. Wendy Doniger presents an analysis of the film in relation to recurring motifs 
Notes to Chapter 3 | 267
of doubling and identity. Vijay Mishra locates the play within generic considerations of 
the “gothic.”
 29. On some of the many instances of this recurring pattern in national allegory, see 
Hogan Understanding Nationalism 134–36.
 30. Guha-Thakurta gives an example of this sort from the visual arts. “The great 
‘discovery’ of the Kalighat pats [scroll paintings] as a vibrant and original folk art form” 
occurred when “the living tradition had become defunct” (23).
 31. On this recurring allegorical feature, see Hogan Understanding Nationalism 144–
47.
 32. Actually, there are different accounts of karma in Hindu tradition. Popular ac-
counts tend to stress reward and punishment. However, Vedāntic philosophy stresses 
the consequences of desire.
 33. As one referee pointed out, it is also possible that expectations from across an 
author’s works will mislead an interpreter. Indeed, it is quite possible that there will be 
contradictions between the textual implied author and the cross-textual implied author. 
(Presumably, in such cases, we defer to the former.) Moreover, one may isolate cross-
textual implied authors for subsets of an author’s canon—for instance, certain periods 
or genres. I have not stressed discontinuities in implied authorship here since that is the 
topic of the following chapter.
 34. One reader worried that I am claiming all pictures tell stories. I hope it is clear 
that I am not claiming any such thing. The argument here is, rather, that aspects of nar-
rative discourse analysis may help us discuss painting more clearly and that a discus-
sion of painting may enrich narrative discourse analysis. The mutual benefits arise most 
obviously from the notion of a cross-textual implied author. It is the case that such an 
implied author will often lead us to locate the moment of a painting in a more or less im-
precise sequence of events, thus a sort of minimal story (e.g., longing for a child followed 
by the birth and death of a child or a failure to conceive). However, not all elements of 
the cross-textual implied author need be story-related. In any case, it should be clear 
that a painting is not typically presenting a story itself. Indeed, that is the whole point 
of requiring that events be filled in from elsewhere.
 35. This distinctiveness criterion eliminates the problem of standard techniques 
or “craft context” as well. Clearly, much of what a director, cinematographer, or other 
auteur does will be standard in the profession. As such, it will recur across his or her 
canon, but nondistinctively. This craft context is explicated with particular care in vari-
ous works by Bordwell (see, for example, Bordwell, Staiger, and Thompson).
Chapter 3
 1. The distinction is drawn from Elizabeth Anscombe, though the following discus-
sion will develop it somewhat differently.
 2. Unsurprisingly, other authors have noted something along these lines. See, for 
example, Lanser “The ‘I,’” Rader, and Phelan’s discussion of “mask narration” in Living.
 3. As the following discussion will make clear, this unity need not be ideal, which 
is to say, found at all levels. Indeed, one main point of the present analysis is that the 
unity will rarely if ever be ideal. Rather, the final receptive intent provides the possibil-
ity for isolating patterns across otherwise diverse, local attitudes, themes, and so forth, 
even when those are contradictory. To anticipate the present argument slightly, a work 
may shift back and forth in pro- and antiwar attitudes. However, this does not mean 
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that the only unity is at the level of local, implied—more technically, “implicated”—
authors (with one part unified in being prowar and another unified in being antiwar). 
The encompassing implied author may implicitly unify these different views through a 
pattern of tacit assimilation to World War II and the Vietnam War respectively. This is 
far from an ideal unity. But it is a pattern that brings the work together with specifi-
able consistency. Put differently, there may be profound contradictions in a work. The 
unity treated here is the consistent pattern that explains the contradictions. Thus the 
work may be prowar when the model of World War II is activated, but antiwar when the 
model of the Vietnam War is activated. The alternation of these contexts and models 
may be perfectly consistent across the work, giving the work unity at that level.
 4. For instance, it is well established that people engage in very different cognitive 
processing strategies depending on mood state (see, for example, Forgas “Introduction” 
15–17 and citations).
 5. See Holland, Holyoak, Nisbett, and Thagard 313–14.
 6. In using “implicated” here, I do not have in mind Grice’s idea of implicature. 
Rather, I am using the term in its more ordinary sense. When people say that someone is 
implicated in a crime, they usually suggest that he or she had some ancillary role, rather 
than a main role. Similarly, one may think of the local, implicated authors as ancillary 
to the larger, encompassing, implied author.
 7. This sort of discrepancy in terminology is not unusual. Apparently identical as-
sertions of implied authorial multiplicity may in fact mean something very different 
from one another. For example, Nelles discusses some “unusual situations,” including 
that in which a reader sees “multiple implied authors” (“Historical” 28). In fact, Nelles 
means that the work has several inferred real authors, despite one name being given 
on the cover of the book. This meaning becomes clear when he gives an example of 
a critic who concluded that “Jane Eyre was the product of multiple authors” (29). The 
point is entirely valid, but completely different from the notion of multiple implicated 
authors presented above. Similarly, Klaiber talks about “multiple implied authors,” but 
she is concerned with texts by multiple real authors. Somewhat differently, Richardson 
addresses multiplicity in implied authorship in relation to an author’s creation of “dif-
ferent authorial persona[s]” (“Introduction” 6). On the other hand, Richardson’s brief 
example of an apparent contradiction in Chaucer (Unnatural Voices 121) does seem to 
move in the direction of the account presented here.
 8. As discussed in chapter 1, people are very bad at explaining their own judg-
ments, even about such simple matters as plural formation in their native language. 
Again, there is no reason to believe that authors are any more successful characterizing 
the enormously complex principles that bear on literary narratives.
 9. One could also differentiate implicated audiences in terms of themes. For ex-
ample, the “theme of northern moral complicity in slavery” (Walters 180) obviously has 
a primarily northern implicated audience. 
 10. See, for example, Gregg Crane on the legislative impact of the novel.
 11. Much of the discussion about the novel concerns the actual, biographical au-
thor, rather than one or more implied or implicated authors. This discussion is valuable, 
but largely irrelevant to the present analysis. For example, there has been much inter-
est in just what Stowe really knew about the South and about slavery (see, for example 
Otter 17 and Pryse 134; but see also the research of Albion Tourgee cited in Cantave 
98–99). Other writers have been concerned about her treatment of real black women, 
prominently Harriet Jacobs (see Logan 54–55). These are interesting and significant is-
sues. But their relation to the novel is somewhat indirect at best. If they enter at all, 
they do so in productive rather than receptive intent.
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  The work of Yuexin Liu seems particularly relevant to cases such as Stowe’s in 
suggesting why such biographical considerations are likely to be irrelevant to the un-
derstanding of the implied author. As Shen summarizes Liu’s argument, “the real author 
may be restricted by . . . various social relations, practical interests and pragmatic con-
siderations, which make him or her vulgar and hypocritical. By contrast, in constructing 
a fictional narrative, the author can transcend . . . the confinement of social relations 
and pragmatic considerations” (“Booth’s” 171). Insofar as one is concerned with the 
biographical author, it may be that Leslie Fiedler has come closest to identifying those 
aspects of Stowe’s feelings and fantasies that motivated the book. Fiedler writes that 
Stowe “dreamed only of being able to die well under the extremest persecution, forgiv-
ing her persecutors,” even “converting them to a redeemed life.” “All of this,” he con-
tinues, “she projects onto Tom, who as her surrogate . . . does not reflect invidiously on 
Afro-American masculinity” (What 173).
 12. See Nandy on the general use of childhood as a model for Africans; see chapter 
4 of Hogan Culture on how particular models are associated with particular political ten-
dencies.
 13. See, for example, 402, 405, 409, 423, and 476; for critical discussion, see Dono-
van’s chapter, “Inferno: The Legree Plantation.”
 14. George’s emigration to Liberia has been a point of controversy. A number of 
critics see this as evidence of Stowe’s racist desire to rid the United States of Africans. 
Ammons characterizes this as “Deportation” (74) to solve “the problem of dealing 
with demands for racial equality” (74). But this is a curious reading. The novel never 
advocates rounding up African Americans and shipping them to Liberia against their 
will (“deportation”). Moreover, Stowe has George indicate that blacks need a nation to 
defend themselves against the racism of a majority white population. Stowe’s attitude 
here seems more biased against whites than against blacks, since whites seem largely 
incorrigible (despite a few positive examples, such as Tom Loker [see Gillian Brown 84]).
 15. Warhol illuminates some of the ways in which the misunderstanding of Uncle 
Tom came about (see “‘Ain’t I’”).
 16. On the nature and operation of positive and negative stereotypes, and empirical 
research on these topics, see Hogan Culture 129–30 and citations.
 17. This is not to say that she is the only person to have asserted African spiritual 
superiority. As critics have noted, she was drawing in part on lectures by Alexander 
Kinmont (see Nuernberg 40 and citations).
 18. As, for example, Railton stresses, “Stowe had, of course, to write for her readers,” 
who were almost entirely white (104).
 19. This sort of appeal has been explored with rigor and insight by Warhol. See her 
influential essays “Toward a Theory” and “Poetics” and chapter 5 of Gendered.
 20. An emphasis on the importance of attachment in the novel is broadly consistent 
with some previous interpretations, particularly Jane Tompkins’s important analysis, 
which stresses the novel’s utopian “vision” of “daily living” in “Christian love” as “re-
vealed . . . in motherhood” (141). Understanding the multiplicity of Stowe’s implied 
authorship and locating her emotional orientations in the context of current affective 
science—particularly work on attachment—do not contradict this observation. Rather, 
these points extend and deepen Tompkins’s insights, particularly in relation to the “en-
abling contradictions” of the novel, as David Leverenz rightly called them (120).
 21. Readers interested in this topic should consult Richardson’s essay, which pres-
ents a rigorous and wide-ranging treatment.
 22. It is important to note that misdirection is not necessarily perfidious, as the 
preceding example may suggest. It does involve some degree of intentional deception. 
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However, that intentional deception may be in the service of protecting the real author 
from persecution (e.g., if he or she holds “heretical” religious views).
 23. As the phrasing suggests, the present distinction cuts across that between on-
screen and voice-over narration. For a clear summary of some uses of voice-over, see 
Kozloff.
 24. In keeping with the analysis in chapter 1, “narrator” here refers to a poten-
tially unreliable communicator of storyworld information, oriented by epistemic and 
emotional particularities. This does not mean that the narrator is necessarily a bodily 
presence at a particular point in space (e.g., a person who takes up the position of the 
camera). This is the primary sense in which Bordwell, quite rightly, objects to the idea 
of an invisible observer putatively guiding film narration (see Narration 3–15). The fol-
lowing discussion cannot cover all the varieties of film narrator. For an overview of film 
narration in relation to other standard narratological categories (e.g., homodiegetic or 
extradiegetic), see Murphet (see also Fulton 115). (For a diagram of some main narrato-
logical divisions, see Huisman “Narrative” 26.)
 25. Here the internal access is perceptual (e.g., through point-of-view shots). Note 
that this access is clearly not something that can be communicated in the verbal narra-
tion of the frame story. Thus it is available to the viewer, but not to the narratee (i.e., 
Roshan).
 26. The scenario is far from entirely fictional. As Chomsky points out, “There 
is . . . mounting evidence that Cheney-Rumsfeld torture created terrorists . . . directly,” 
citing the case of Abdallah al-Ajmi (Hopes 266). Within the film, the pattern is repeated 
when Zilgai experiences further humiliation and ends up killing a police officer, then 
committing suicide. Note that the point here is directly opposed to the view that former 
detainees “reengage” in terrorism (a widely cited argument against releasing Guantána-
mo prisoners; see Worthington). The point of the film is precisely that this is not “recidi-
vism.” It is, rather, the creation of criminality. The proper response is not continuing to 
imprison the innocent—or simply abandoning them to the further humiliation faced by 
Samir—but helping them return to a normal life.
 27. For example, his “stunning reversal” on Guantanamo, including a March 7 “ex-
ecutive order formalizing a system of indefinite detention for dozens of the 172 remain-
ing detainees at Guantanamo, all Muslims and . . . the resumption of military trials” 
(“Abu Ghraib in America” 3).
Chapter 4
 1. Along the same lines, Currie points out that “A newspaper article can be unreli-
able, meaning that it misleads us about what actually happened” (19).
 2. A similar general point is made by Dancygier (chapter 3).
 3. Readers familiar with Phelan’s account in Living to Tell About It will recognize that 
I am confining unreliability here to what Phelan calls “reporting.” Phelan has two fur-
ther categories, “interpreting” and “evaluating.” However, interpretive and evaluative 
views can be reported as true or expressed as opinion (contrast “Smith was deceitful” 
and “I always felt that Smith was deceitful”). I would reserve the term “unreliability” 
(or, more precisely, “representational unreliability,” as discussed below) for cases where 
the narrator’s information is presented as true (within the storyworld), not as opinion—
thus cases where the (mis)information is reported.
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 4. “Trust” here refers to the full spectrum of emotional confidence in the narrator. 
In other words, here and below, the word “trust” is not confined to “normative unreli-
ability,” as found in some writers (see Nünning “Reconceptualizing” 93).
 5. As noted in chapter 1, there is neurological research, specifically work on the 
monitoring of contradiction, that suggests a scenario of this sort.
 6. One referee worried that resolving ambiguity here is a matter of understanding 
rather than motivation. The point is not that understanding is irrelevant to contradic- 
tion. It usually is relevant. Indeed, it is usually the means by which we resolve contra-
dictions. The point is that readers experience a contradiction through their engage-
ment with some process. The process in question may be, first of all, a matter of under-
standing. But it may also be a matter of, for instance, sustaining one’s positive view of 
a hero whom one likes or with whom one identifies. The process in question is always 
motivated. Without the motivation, we would not engage in the process and we would 
sense no contradiction—at least no contradiction that would itself motivate our effortful 
engagement in seeking a resolution.
 7. This may seem to refer to a “source” rather than a “type.” In fact, one could re-
fer to this entire hierarchy as one of “epistemic source” or “source of justification.” The 
important point is that this is different from the first category, the speaker’s location in 
narrative discourse.
 8. Unsurprisingly, critics have noted this basic point about the novel. See, for ex-
ample, Rigney 39. On the other hand, many critics have arguably underestimated the 
depth and extent of that unreliability. For example, can one really call the narrator “vi-
sionary” (Gray 132) when her “visions” appear to be hallucinations? The hallucinations 
are related to a spiritual quest, but the situation is at best complicated. More strikingly, 
can one trust her view that her dead mother left behind a jacket or seeds for her to find? 
(see Gray 132). It seems, rather, that the implied author views these as saliently unreli-
able claims.
 9. Much of the criticism has been concerned with the narrator’s relations with her 
parents. On the figure of the mother, see, for example, Grace.
 10. On the spiritual and shamanic resonances of the work, see, for example, Guédon 
and Josie Campbell.
 11. For a summary of alternative views, see Bouson 59–60. As Bouson points out, 
“Some readers are optimistic about the fate of Atwood’s character,” including some crit-
ics who focus on her “visions.” In contrast, “Other critics . . . are troubled” (59)—some-
times faulting Atwood on this score (60).
 12. On some resonances of this image, see Wilson 105–6. Wilson is treating the pres-
ence of folklore motifs in the novel. On this topic, see also Baer.
 13. Many critics have noted the nationalist themes in the novel. Stein summarizes 
critical tendencies, noting that “Canadian critics looked at [Atwood’s] nationalism; 
American critics focused on her feminism” (50). As Kapuscinski points out, “a significant 
proportion” of the criticism on the novel “views the narrative as contributing to the de-
velopment of a distinctive national identity” (105). Such approaches sometimes simplify 
the novel’s politics. However, as Kapuscinski stresses, the book manifests a “recognition 
of Canada’s ongoing history of violence” (114). Other writers have pointed to complexi-
ties in Atwood’s relation to nationalism (see, for example, Laura Wright).
  There is a similar complexity in Atwood’s relation to feminism. It is therefore 
difficult to accept Bouson’s view that Surfacing is “A novel premised on the ideology of 
cultural feminism,” that it “rejects the masculinist culture,” including its “rationalist” 
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elements, and “idealizes a nature-identified femininity” (40; Bouson also claims that the 
work “undercuts its own romantic feminism,” which makes it difficult to see how it can 
be viewed as asserting romantic feminism).
Chapter 5
 1. As this indicates, conjunctive parallel narrators may treat precisely the same 
events. In consequence, this use of the term “parallel” should be distinguished from that 
of writers such as O’Neill (see 368).
 2. As Alan Palmer points out, “the formal or theoretical definitions” of interior 
monologue and stream of consciousness “vary widely” (“Stream” 570). The intent of the 
present discussion is to develop theoretically precise descriptive and explanatory ideas. 
This does not involve any claim that these are somehow the “right” definitions of these 
particular words. It would make no difference if other labels were attached to the con-
cepts presented here.
 3. In this sense, it is not “the ‘prespeech’ level of consciousness,” as Dorrit Cohn 
puts it (108). Rather, it encompasses the nonverbalized levels of consciousness. There 
are other important distinctions here as well, most obviously direct versus indirect dis-
course. (For a rigorous recent discussion of the latter, see Sharvit; for a clear overview 
of some influential distinctions, see Palmer “Thought.”) The set of distinctions in the 
present discussion of mentalistic narration, like those developed elsewhere in the book, 
is not meant to be exhaustive.
 4. My account of interior monologue and stream of consciousness has obvious con-
nections with that of Lawrence Bowling. However, Bowling does not seem to fully ap-
preciate the operation of verbal encoding by the narrator, as Chatman points out, using 
different terminology (see Story 187–88).
 5. András Kovács argues that the cinematic “equivalent” to “stream of conscious-
ness” is “travel [that] takes place . . . in a person’s mind” (103). Kovács presents a con-
vincing case that the “mental journey” has a narrative function similar to stream of 
consciousness. But it does not commonly seem to be an instance of stream of conscious-
ness.
 6. As Ross puts it, “Faulkner distorts each brother’s narrative in order to explore 
the depths of the speaker’s mind not revealed through his straightforward storytelling.” 
This is possible because “the distortions each brother’s narration undergoes are appro-
priate to his psychological makeup” (169).
 7. As this indicates, I see no reason to accept Ross’s view that Benjy is not only 
“physically” but also “mentally incapable of speech” (171). It seems clear that the ideal-
ized stream of consciousness incorporates a good deal of Benjy’s own subvocalizations. 
Indeed, it is clear that he is often “trying to say” (see 40) something and is prevented 
for purely physical reasons. Of course, his comprehension of speech is severely limited 
by his other cognitive deficits.
 8. Some critics have recognized the general point, though they have developed 
it somewhat differently. For example, Matthews stresses the insularity of distinct mo-
ments for Benjy (36). Ross recognizes the limitation most directly by stressing the 
absence of “because” and “so” in Benjy’s speech (172). Some authors have traced pecu-
liarities of the verbal style in this section to Benjy’s problems with cause and effect (see 
Jeffries and McIntyre 6 and citations).
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 9. Benjy’s relation with Caddy has been a focus of much analysis; see, for example, 
Baum, Page, and Wagner.
 10. Critics have, of course, recognized Jason’s unreliability. However, they have 
formulated its reasons differently. For example, Kuminova claims that Jason’s bias is 
“towards oversimplifying and flattening out the complexities of the inner life” of other 
characters (50).
 11. For example, at one point, Quentin thinks, “I can be dead in Harvard Caddy said 
in the caverns and grottoes of the sea” (136). But this expresses a mere possibility, evi-
dently a metaphorical one, and one articulated by someone else.
 12. The reasons for Quentin’s suicide have, of course, been of concern to critics. 
Labatt notes, for example, that the reader is given “several intermittently connected 
causes” (20), so various as to make the suicide “believable and yet inexplicable” (21). 
Labatt makes a good point. In terms of the present analysis, acts have, in effect, a profile 
of causal ambiguity.
 13. This desire for unity presumably involves sexual desire. The crucial feature, 
however, is attachment dependency. Readers interested in the issue of Quentin’s sexual 
desire may consult Irwin or Matthews (48–49).
 14. One referee worried that Mulholland Drive is “merely nonsensical if its narrations 
are parallel.” I hope the discussion makes clear that parallel narration does not make the 
work nonsensical in the sense of making the work gibberish. However, it does inhibit the 
possibilities for developing an encompassing resolution of the ambiguity of the work. 
At the same time, that lack of resolution may, in turn, serve emotional or thematic pur-
poses that reestablish coherence and “sense” in a different way.
 15. See Thomas 83. Critics have noted many of the basic interpretive points consid-
ered here. Thomas’s essay is particularly well developed and insightful regarding these 
points.
 16. In an interesting interpretation, Bruckner examines the following narrative in 
terms of Rita’s head injury. For reasons of space, the following discussion will leave aside 
this possibility.
 17. A point noted by critics (see Thomas 86).
 18. Unsurprisingly, the bulk of interpretations of the film involve at least some psy-
choanalytic component. Beyond Thomas, McDowell, and Shostak, already mentioned, 
representative cases would include Schaffner, Restuccia, and Hageman.
 19. The character is referred to as a man, but is played by an actress and is not 
clearly gendered in visual appearance.
 20. Moreover, there is a link not only with theater, but with filmmaking, since, as 
Jean-Marc Lalanne points out, ending with the word silencio alludes to the ending of 
Jean-Luc Godard’s Le Mépris, which treats filmmaking. Readers interested in the cin-
ematic background to Lynch’s film may wish to view Lalanne’s lecture, “Mulholland Drive, 
film matrice (2000–2010),” available on the internet at http://www.canal-u.tv/video/
cinematheque_francaise/mulholland_drive_film_matrice_2000_2010_conference_de_
jean_marc_lalanne.6432 (accessed 15 August 2012). 
 21. Needless to say, critics have remarked on the postmodernist affiliations of 
Lynch’s film. See, for example, d’Ocarmo.
 22.  Dreaming stream of consciousness is the equivalent of personified and embed-
ded narration in this context because, in addition to being personified and embedded, 
the dreaming character’s mind becomes the possible source for epistemic or motiva-
tional unreliability in the narration. Indeed, to say that something is a dream is, in effect, 
274 | Notes to Chapter 6
to say that it manifests particular sorts of epistemic and motivational unreliability tied 
to a particular person. 
Chapter 6
 1. This is not to say that the novel is beyond criticism. For example, there is some 
truth to the view that “Wanja embodies the features of a number of female stereotypes 
identified in African literature” (Lovesey 59; see citations 144n.14). Of course, observa-
tions such as this must be seriously qualified by a recognition of Wanja’s allegorical role. 
On the other hand, some critics have taken this into account and still found the novel 
problematic. Stratton offers a particularly compelling argument. However, Stratton 
seems to overstate her case. It seems clear that Ngũgĩ recognizes and rejects Wanja’s 
sexual exploitation even as he recognizes and rejects that of the nation. Moreover, 
Wanja’s main source of strength and knowledge is her grandmother, Nyakinyua, which 
hardly suggests that “The trope . . . excludes women from the creative production of the 
national polity” (122).
 2. Some critics have also treated some aspects of narration in other of Ngũgĩ’s nov-
els (see, for example, Mwangi on unreliable narration in Devil on the Cross).
 3. On the significance of this and other names in the novel, see the linguistic glos-
sary in Sicherman.
 4. See Treister 268 on Wanja’s relation to Gikuyu ethnicity, as manifest in the rela-
tion of her name to three daughters of the great Gikuyu ancestor, Muumbi.
 5. This seems to be the point where another resonance of Wanja’s name enters—its 
echoing of “Wanjiru,” the wife of Mau Mau leader Dedan Kimathi (see Sicherman 187–88 
on Wanjiru).
 6. The main exception is his participation in a group delegation from the country-
side to the capital. But he seems to enter into this more or less by accident (see 114).
 7. The role of Christianity in the novel is deep and complex, as critics have noted. 
See, for example, Sharma and Pagnoulle.
 8. There has been relatively little discussion of collective narration by narratolo-
gists. An important exception is Margolin’s “Collective.”
 9. Margolin notes that the reference of a narratorial “we” will often “shift in iden-
tity, scope, size, and temporal location in the course of the narration” (“Collective” 245).
 10. This is one of the most common forms of idealization.
 11. After drafting this chapter and deriving these options empirically, I came upon 
Margolin’s “Collective Perspective” essay and found that he reached distinct, but com-
plementary conclusions through logical analysis (see 243). I would urge anyone inter-
ested in this topic to read Margolin’s insightful and thought-provoking essay.
 12. The text also recurs to Munira’s testimony on 190, 224, 243, 269, 295, and else-
where.
 13. Though Diescho is a highly respected Namibian public intellectual and political 
commentator, his novel has generated almost no critical discussion. The MLA Interna-
tional Bibliography lists only two works treating Diescho. Both concern his other novel, 
Troubled Waters. Part of the purpose of the present analysis is to foster such discussion 
and, more generally, attention to Born of the Sun.
 14. Some readers have seen this as related to Alan Palmer’s recent revival of Hege-
lian idealism, specifically his claim that there is “intermental thought” (“Social Minds”). 
However, to say that people have a sense of direct access to other people’s thought is 
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quite different from saying that people do have such direct access. For a few of the prob-
lems with Palmer’s views in this area, see Hogan “Palmer’s.”
 15. In the course of the novel, there is one very clear violation of the general pat-
tern just outlined. That is when readers are given the internal thoughts of an Afrikaner 
minister (170). The passage highlights the inaccessibility of the white man’s thoughts 
to the Africans, and vice versa. This inaccessibility results from the fact that they never 
share common projects, easy cooperation, mirroring, and so on. However, the fact that 
the white man’s thoughts can be represented in the novel tends to discourage the sort 
of dehumanization that might have resulted from a complete confinement of interiority 
to blacks.
Afterword
 1. This brief afterword is clearly not the place for an overview of the literature on 
these topics. There has certainly been valuable research in this area, as illustrated by 
the pathbreaking work of Prince (“Introduction”) and Iser. The standout recent treat-
ment of the implied reader is Brian Richardson’s (“Singular Text”), already mentioned 
in chapter 3. More recent examinations of the narratee would include Phelan’s careful 
treatment of Prince’s ideas on the narratee and Rabinowitz’s conception of the narrative 
audience (“Self-Help”). Nonetheless, the relative neglect of the topics is illustrated by 
the differences between the entries for “Implied Reader” and “Implied Author” (a ratio 
of roughly one to six) as well as “Narratee” and “Narrator” (a ratio of roughly one to 
fourteen) in Herman, Jahn, and Ryan.
 2. The basis of this translation is the text in Bahadur (44), supplemented by the 
version in Shantaram.
 3. Or, rather, as Hawley and Juergensmeyer explain, this is how legend has it (124–
27). Little is known about “the original” Mīrābāī, “if ever indeed she existed at all” (123). 
The biographical point holds whether the poem was written by Mīrābāī or in her name. 
The author of a pseudo-Mīrābāī poem would adopt the implied authorial position of a 
reader reading the poem as authored by Mīrābāī, a point suggested by the reference to 
“lady Mira.”
 4. Here, again, the point holds whether the poem was authored by Mīrābāī or writ-
ten in her name.
 5. It is possible to use “we” for “I” in Hindi. However, this does not seem to be the 
case here, since Mira elsewhere uses “I,” and the plurality of “we” is prepared for in the 
plural images of the second stanza. I should note that Bahadur has “we” already in the 
moon and partridge line. I have chosen Shantaram’s version because it is more inter-
nally consistent, confining “we” to a single stanza. (I have also followed Shantaram in 
repeating the opening lines as a refrain and in a couple of small variants in wording.)
 6. This line is not in Bahadur, but is included in Shantaram.
 7. See, for example, the references to rasadhvani in Ingalls.
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Kṛṣṇa: divine responsibility of, 254; as 
personified narratee, 252–54
Labov, William, 4, 5–6, 9
Lacan, Jacques, 262–63
Lahiri, Jhumpa, 58
Lalanne, Jean-Marc, 273
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complexity in work of, 255, 256; 
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plied authors, multiple
multiple narration: contradiction or 
gaps in, 186; divergence creating in-
terest in, 184, 186, 188–89; group or 
collective, 184; narrator psychology 
in, 188–89; summary of, 220; types 
of, 15, 183, 222. See also embedded 
narration; parallel narration
Murthy, V. K., 92, 266
The Namesake (Lahiri), 58
Nandy, Ashis, 129
296 | Index
narratee: ambiguity, 43; in communica-
tive discourse, 24–25, 37–46; com-
plexity of, 252, 255, 275; embedded, 
42, 43, 44, 46; heterodiegetic, 28; 
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cross-cultural aspect of, 2–3; polite-
ness in, 2
nomological discourse analysis: example 
of, 6–7; structural component isola-
tion in, 6
nonliterary narrative, 11
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implicated authors in film, 132–33, 
148; profile of ambiguity juxtaposed 
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cific topics
thematic reflection: cross-textual con-
sideration impact on, 87; in repre-
sentational painting, 66
theme: defined, 18; as reader purpose, 
18. See also specific topics
theory of mind: example of, 194–95; fo-
calized narrator and, 238; forms of, 
194; nature of, 193–94, 263
Third of May (Goya): emotional response 
from, 66; as narrative art, 67
Titanic (Cameron), 223–24, 225
titles: irony in, 75; for paintings, 75
Tolstoy, Leo, 158
topicalization: affective, 52–53; example 
of, 50, 52–53
topicalizer: focalizer compared to, 49–50; 
for narrator, 49
trust: emotional response, narrator reli-
ability, and, 154, 167, 271; hierarchy 
summarized, 167–68, 271; as narra-
tor reliability default, 158, 181, 186; 
parallel narration, narrator reliabil-
ity, and, 188; perceptual narration 
and, 135–36, 144
Ulysses (Joyce), 189, 221, 263
Uncle Tom’s Cabin (Stowe), 15; African 
generational model promoted in, 
129; analysis of, 121–30; “child” 
model for Africans in, 126–30, 269; 
implicated authors and contradic-
tion in, 119, 121–30, 147; implied 
authorial coherence in attachment 
relations, 130–31, 269; implied 
reader emotion from, 55, 129–30; 
“industry” and “enterprising” treat-
ment in, 123–26; morality in, 123–24, 
128–29; racial ideology in, 121–30
Der Untergang (Hirschbiegel), 62; emo-
tional contradictions elicited in, 61; 
gaps in, 61
verbal art: ambiguity in, 70; discourse 
for comparing visual and, 67; nar-
rative, 21; visual art compared to, 
65–66, 67–68, 265
Vermeer, Johannes, 14
“A Very Short Story” (Hemingway), 6–9, 
10, 13, 261; character imagination in, 
42–43; focalization in, 28–29, 50–52, 
264; gaps in, 60; implied author com-
pared to narrator in, 26–28; implied 
compared to real author in, 31–32; 
narratee and narrator in, 28, 37, 
42–43, 46, 50, 263; narrator/narratee 
personification in, 43–44; topicaliza-
tion in, 50, 52–53
visual art: ambiguity in, 67–68, 70; cross-
textual authorship and, 109–10; 
discourse and narration in, 66; dis-
course for comparing verbal and, 67; 
memory inspired by, 66; text in, 75; 
verbal compared to, 65–66, 67–68, 
265. See also painting; representa-
tional art; representational painting
voice, 45–46
War and Peace (Tolstoy), 157, 166–67
The Waves (Woolf), 192
Weinstein, Cindy, 122
women, 73–74, 80, 82–83, 87
Woolf, Virginia, 191, 192
world. See real world; storyworld
Wright Wexman, Virginia, 90
Yacobi, Tamar, 150, 159
Zeki, Semir, 14
Zunshine, Lisa, 263
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